Thorsby & Ors v The Queen

Factual and Procedural Background

The Court heard an appeal against sentence by Appellant and three applications for extensions of time to apply for leave to appeal against sentence by Appellees. The central issue was the sentencing court's failure to give credit under section 240A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, as amended, for half the time spent by the offender on qualifying curfew before sentence. The applications raised the question of whether significant extensions of time should be granted when delays were caused by the court and legal representatives rather than the applicants personally. The Court considered statutory provisions, previous case law, and practical difficulties in applying the qualifying curfew credit regime. The Court also addressed the particulars of each appellant's case, the failures in the Crown Court and legal representatives, and the appropriate exercise of the Court of Appeal's discretion in granting extensions of time and correcting sentences.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the sentencing court erred in failing to give credit under section 240A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 for time spent on qualifying curfew before sentence.
2. In what circumstances the Court of Appeal should grant significant extensions of time for applications for leave to appeal when delay is attributable to the court or legal representatives rather than the applicant.
3. The proper procedure and responsibilities of courts and legal representatives in calculating and applying qualifying curfew credit.
4. The criteria and principles guiding the Court of Appeal’s discretion to extend time and correct sentencing errors under section 240A.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by outlining the statutory framework established by section 240A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and its amendments, detailing the mandatory nature of the sentencing court’s duty to credit qualifying curfew time. It emphasized the procedural safeguards and responsibilities imposed on courts, advocates, and prosecutors to ensure accurate credit calculations at sentencing or promptly thereafter.

The Court observed that failures in the present cases resulted from neglect by both the Crown Court and legal representatives, leading to the applicants being denied their statutory entitlement. The Court distinguished between errors of law and errors of judicial discretion, holding that failure to apply section 240A credit is an error of law requiring correction.

The Court analyzed the principles governing extensions of time for late applications, balancing the interests of justice, finality of judgments, and efficient administration against the liberty interests of defendants. It concluded that when the fault lies with the court or legal representatives and the applicant is not personally responsible for delay, the Court of Appeal is inclined to grant extensions of time to correct errors of law, even if a significant delay has occurred.

Conversely, where the applicant knew of the error but delayed unreasonably, the Court is less likely to grant relief. The Court also recognized practical difficulties in ascertaining qualifying curfew days after delay and indicated that in such cases the Court may refuse extensions or leave to appeal if the interests of justice do not favor intervention.

Applying these principles to the individual appellants, the Court found that all had been denied their statutory credit due to court and advocate failings, with no personal fault causing delay. It granted extensions of time and allowed the appeals, directing the correct credit to be given. The Court also addressed ancillary errors, such as failure to impose a victim surcharge where required.

The Court concluded with practical recommendations for improving administrative procedures in the Crown Court, including the use of sentencing checklists to ensure qualifying curfew time is considered and recorded, and emphasized the need for diligence by all parties to prevent future errors and delays.

Holding and Implications

The Court granted extensions of time, allowed the appeals, and ordered that the appropriate number of qualifying curfew days be credited towards each appellant’s sentence under section 240A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.

The direct effect is the correction of sentencing errors denying statutory credit, ensuring appellants receive proper credit for time spent on qualifying curfew. The Court underscored the mandatory nature of the sentencing court’s duty and the responsibility of legal representatives to raise and verify qualifying curfew credit at sentencing.

No new legal precedent was established beyond reinforcing existing principles and procedural requirements. The Court emphasized administrative improvements to reduce future errors and delays, promoting efficient justice and protecting the liberty of offenders.