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Advocates
- Mr A Davies & Ms S Hastie (instructed by Messrs Osmond & Osmond) appeared on behalf of the Appellant.
- Mr A Caldecott QC & Ms Alexandra Marzec (instructed by Messrs Farrer & Co) appeared on behalf of the Respondent.
Judges
- LORD JUSTICE JACOB
- LORD JUSTICE TUCKEY
- SIR ANTHONY CLARKE MR
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Jeynes v. News Magazines Ltd & Anor
Smart Summary
Factual and Procedural Background
This is an appeal from an order dated 25 April 2007 made by Judge Eady in a libel action. The judge struck out paragraphs 5 and 6 of the particulars of claim on the basis that they did not disclose defamatory meanings capable of being attributed to the words complained of. Consequently, the appellant's claim was dismissed. Permission to appeal was initially refused by both the judge and Pill LJ on paper, but later granted by Sedley LJ after an oral hearing.
The alleged libel concerned words appearing on the front cover of a magazine called "Love It" in an issue dated 9-15 May 2006. The words stated: "BB'S LISA 'THE GEEZER' My fake boobs fell out on a date with James Hewitt!" These words appeared alongside a photograph of the appellant with the word "REALITY!" across her chest. The first respondent was the publisher of the magazine, and the second respondent published an advertisement reproducing the cover in another newspaper. The words acted as a trailer for an article inside the magazine, which was not itself complained of.
The appellant, who had been a housemate on the television programme Big Brother about three years prior, alleged that the words bore defamatory meanings: (1) that she was a man posing as a woman, or (2) that she was a transgendered or transsexual person born a man but now a woman. Paragraph 6 of the particulars alleged the same meaning by innuendo, relying on rumours circulating at the time of her Big Brother appearance about a transgendered housemate being introduced to the show.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the words complained of were capable of bearing the pleaded natural and ordinary meaning that the appellant was a man posing as a woman or a transgendered/transsexual person.
- Whether the words were capable of bearing the pleaded innuendo meaning based on circulating rumours at the time of the appellant's Big Brother appearance.
- Whether the judge erred in striking out the relevant paragraphs of the particulars of claim and dismissing the appellant's claim.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- "BB" is a clear reference to the television programme Big Brother, and "BB's LISA" refers to the appellant as a former housemate.
- The phrase "THE GEEZER" should be understood in its dictionary sense, implying the appellant is or is posing as a man.
- The reasonable reader could understand the words as meaning the appellant was a man posing as a woman or a transgendered/transsexual person, and this question should be left to the jury.
- It was perverse for the judge to reject the dictionary meaning and the appellant’s interpretation of the phrase.
Respondents' Arguments
- No reasonable person could interpret the words and photograph as conveying that the appellant was male or deceiving anyone about her gender.
- Such an interpretation would be strained, forced, or utterly unreasonable.
- The words and photograph should not be read in isolation but together with the article inside the magazine, which clearly identifies the appellant as a woman.
- The magazine was targeted primarily at women and featured real-life stories, with the words serving as a trailer for a personal story by the appellant, not an expose.
- The appellant was known as "The Geezer" as a nickname unrelated to any suggestion of gender deception.
- The photograph showed an attractive woman with no indication that she was or had been a man.
- The innuendo claim added nothing substantive because it was not alleged that the appellant was the transgendered person rumoured to enter the Big Brother house.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| Gillick v Brook Advisory Centres [2001] EWCA Civ 1263 |
Approach to whether words are capable of bearing defamatory meaning; reluctance to interfere with first instance interlocutory findings. |
Adopted as the correct approach for appellate review of whether words are capable of defamatory meaning. |
| Hinduja v Asia TV Limited [1998] EMLR 516 |
Reluctance to reverse interlocutory findings on defamatory meaning. |
Referenced as supporting the principle of deference to first instance findings. |
| Cruise v Express Newspapers [1999] QB 931 |
Self-denial in libel cases and appellate review of meaning. |
Referenced for the principle of judicial restraint in libel meaning determinations. |
| Geenty v Channel Four Television [1998] EMLR 524 |
Reduced reluctance to interfere where words are held not capable of defamatory meaning. |
Supported the court’s willingness to review such findings more readily. |
| Patterson v ICN Phototonics [2003] EWCA Civ 343 |
Application of the Gillick approach on appellate review of defamatory meaning. |
Followed to affirm the appellate approach to meaning. |
| Jameel v Wall Street Journal Europe SPRL [2003] EWCA Civ 1694 |
Appellate approach to defamatory meaning and jury role. |
Adopted the Gillick approach and emphasized jury’s role in meaning. |
| Berezovsky v Forbes Inc [2001] EMLR 1030 |
Approach to ascertaining range of legitimate meanings in libel. |
Quoted to emphasize the exercise as one of generosity to possible meanings. |
| Skuse v Granada Television Limited [1996] EMLR 278 |
Summary of legal principles on defamatory meaning and reasonable reader. |
Principles drawn from this case were summarized and applied to the facts. |
| Neville v Fine Arts Company [1897] AC 68 |
Defamatory meaning must not be based on strained or unreasonable interpretation. |
Applied to exclude meanings that are fanciful or absurd. |
| Charleston v News Group Newspapers Limited [1995] 2 AC 65 |
Consideration of relationship between headline and article in libel. |
The court noted it was unnecessary to consider this relationship given the dismissal of the appeal. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court focused on whether the words complained of were capable of bearing the defamatory meanings alleged by the appellant. The judge had applied the correct legal test, determining that no reasonable reader could construe the words and accompanying photograph as meaning the appellant was a man posing as a woman or a transgendered/transsexual person. Such a meaning would require a strained or forced interpretation and would be perverse.
The court considered the context of the publication, including the magazine’s target audience, the nature of the article for which the words served as a trailer, and the appellant’s public persona as a former Big Brother housemate. The phrase "The Geezer" was understood as a nickname unrelated to gender deception. The photograph depicted the appellant as an attractive woman without any suggestion of male identity or deception.
The appellant’s argument that the dictionary meaning of "geezer" should be accepted was rejected as it would require an unreasonable interpretation. The innuendo claim was also dismissed as it failed to allege that the appellant was the transgendered person rumoured to be introduced into the Big Brother house, thus adding nothing to the case.
The court reiterated that while meaning is generally a question for the jury, a judge must decide at an appropriate stage whether the words are capable of the defamatory meaning alleged. If no reasonable reader could arrive at such a meaning, the claim should be struck out. The court concluded that the appellant’s suggested meanings were fanciful, absurd, or factitious.
Holding and Implications
DISMISSED
The court upheld the judge’s decision to strike out the relevant paragraphs of the particulars of claim and dismiss the appellant’s libel claim. The words complained of were not capable of bearing the defamatory meanings alleged. The appeal was dismissed without setting any new precedent. The direct effect is that the appellant’s claim cannot proceed on the basis of the meanings pleaded.
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