Vinishma Technologies Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Chhattisgarh & Anr.
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant, Vinishma Technologies Pvt. Ltd., is a company registered under the Companies Act, 2013, claiming experience in supplying sports kits to various departments in the States of Bihar, Karnataka, Gujarat and the Government of NCT of Delhi. Respondent No. 1 is the State of Chhattisgarh and respondent No. 2 is the State Project Director, Samagra Shiksha Chhattisgarh State Project Office, Department of School Education, Government of Chhattisgarh.
The judgment notes the Integrated Child Development Service (ICDS) Scheme as a centrally sponsored flagship programme of the Central Government, launched in 1975, aimed at providing supplementary nutrition, immunization and pre-school education through an integrated package of services for holistic child development, implemented by State Governments and Union Territories and largely funded by the Government of India.
On 21.07.2025, the Samagra Shiksha Chhattisgarh State Project Office, Department of School Education, issued three tender notices through the Government-e-Marketplace (GeM) Portal for the supply of sports kits to students of Government Primary Schools, Government Upper Primary Schools and Government High and Higher Secondary Schools in Chhattisgarh. The sports kits were to be supplied to 5,540 cluster resource centres across all 33 districts in the State. The tender values were Rs. 15.24 crores, Rs. 13.08 crores and Rs. 11.49 crores.
Section III(A) of the tender documents (the “impugned tender notices”) contained qualification criteria with additional terms and conditions. The appellant was aggrieved by additional conditions numbered 1, 4, 11 and 13, which rendered it ineligible to participate. It submitted a representation dated 29.07.2025 to the State Project Director, Samagra Shiksha, but received no response. The appellant then filed three writ petitions before the High Court of Chhattisgarh: Writ Petition (C) No. 4266 of 2025, Writ Petition (C) No. 4263 of 2025 and Writ Petition (C) No. 4274 of 2025, challenging the validity of these impugned conditions.
During the pendency of the writ petitions, by corrigendum dated 07.08.2025, conditions 1, 11 and 13 were deleted. However, condition No. 4 (the “past performance restriction”) remained. This condition required that bidders must have supplied sports goods worth at least Rs. 6.00 crores (cumulative) to State Government agencies of Chhattisgarh in the last three financial years.
The Division Bench of the High Court, by a common order dated 11.08.2025 in Writ Petition (C) Nos. 4266 and 4263 of 2025, and by order dated 12.08.2025 in Writ Petition (C) No. 4274 of 2025, upheld condition No. 4. It held that the impugned eligibility condition relating to past performance was of similar nature and purpose as the condition considered in Association of Registration Plates v. Union of India and Ors. It further noted that such a condition was prevalent in other States (Gujarat, Assam, Delhi, Orissa and Jharkhand) and that a contract containing a similar condition had been awarded to the appellant in the State of Jharkhand. The High Court rejected the challenge on grounds of discrimination and unreasonableness, held that the State was entitled to prescribe such a condition to ensure selection of the most capable and reliable bidder for a project of significant public importance, and found that the condition did not violate Articles 14 or 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India.
Aggrieved, the appellant approached the Supreme Court by way of Special Leave Petitions (SLP (C) Nos. 24075, 26192 and 23611 of 2025). Leave was granted, and the matters were heard as civil appeals challenging the High Court’s orders and the continued operation of condition No. 4 of the tender notices.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the impugned tender condition (condition No. 4), requiring bidders to have supplied sports goods worth at least Rs. 6.00 crores (cumulative) to State Government agencies of Chhattisgarh in the specified past three financial years, meets the test of reasonableness and fairness.
- Whether this condition constitutes an arbitrary and discriminatory criterion that excludes other eligible bidders from participation and thereby violates Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The appellant contended that the High Court erred in relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Association of Registration Plates, as that decision was not applicable to the factual matrix of the present case.
- It was argued that the impugned condition requiring bidders to have supplied sports kits worth at least Rs. 6.00 crores (cumulative) to State Government agencies of Chhattisgarh in the last three financial years is violative of Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India.
- According to the appellant, this condition:
- Excludes competent suppliers from outside the State of Chhattisgarh,
- Discourages wider participation in the tender process, and
- Fosters cartelisation.
- The appellant emphasized that the impugned condition directly excluded it from participating in the tenders in question.
- On this basis, it was urged that the High Court’s common orders be quashed and set aside, and that the impugned tender condition itself be struck down.
Respondents' Arguments
- Respondent No. 2 submitted that the tendering authority was well within its powers to frame the impugned tender condition.
- In view of the geographical and social conditions of the State of Chhattisgarh, it was contended that the condition was incorporated:
- To safeguard timely delivery of sports kits,
- To ensure quality compliance, and
- To prevent supply chain disruptions.
- It was stated that similar conditions are prevalent in other States as well.
- The respondents pointed out that on 21.08.2025, the financial bids had already been opened and successful bidders identified. Interference with the tender process at that stage, it was argued, would necessitate re-tendering, which would consume considerable time and result in forfeiture of a substantial portion of the academic year.
- Learned Senior Counsel for respondent No. 1 adopted the submissions of respondent No. 2 and further submitted that the impugned condition was designed to ensure that the successful bidder had knowledge of the topography of the State of Chhattisgarh, which is described as a Naxal-affected State, so that the sports kits could be delivered timely to children in Government schools.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| Association of Registration Plates v. Union of India and Ors., (2005) 1 SCC 679 |
The High Court treated the tender eligibility condition in this case as being of similar nature and purpose to the impugned condition relating to past performance. |
The Supreme Court recorded that the High Court relied on this decision to uphold the impugned condition, and that the appellant argued the precedent was inapplicable. The Supreme Court ultimately did not uphold the impugned condition, thereby departing from the High Court’s approach. |
| Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India & Ors., (1979) 3 SCC 489; AIR 1979 SC 1628 |
Government discretion in granting largesse is not unlimited; the Government cannot give or withhold largesse arbitrarily or at its sweet will, cannot exclude any person from dealing with it without adequate reason, and its activities have a public element requiring fairness and equality. |
Invoked to underline that even in tender matters, State action is subject to constitutional constraints of non-arbitrariness and fairness, forming part of the framework for judicial review of tender conditions. |
| Directorate of Education & Ors. v. EDUCOMP Datamatics Ltd. & Ors., (2004) 4 SCC 19 |
Government must have a free hand in setting the terms of a tender; courts cannot strike down tender terms merely because they consider some other terms to be fairer, wiser, or more logical. |
Cited to acknowledge the general principle of judicial deference to tender conditions, subject to the caveat that such conditions must not be arbitrary, discriminatory or mala fide. |
| Global Energy Ltd. & Anr. v. Adani Exports Ltd. & Ors., (2005) 4 SCC 4 35 |
In formulating conditions of tender documents, courts will not interfere unless the action of the tendering authority is found to be arbitrary or malicious. |
Relied upon to reiterate the limited scope of interference with tender conditions, which the Court then applied to test whether the impugned condition crossed the threshold of arbitrariness. |
| Shimni Utsch India Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. West Bengal Transport Infrastructure Development Corporation Ltd. & Ors., (2010) 6 SCC 303 |
Cited along with Global Energy Ltd. for the proposition that, in tender matters, courts should not interfere with conditions unless the authority’s action is arbitrary or malicious. |
Used as part of the body of case law defining the narrow limits within which tender conditions can be judicially reviewed. |
| Icomm Tele Ltd vs. Punjab State Water Supply and Sewerage Board & Anr., (2019) 4 SCC 401 |
Court cannot sit in judgment on what should be the eligibility criteria in a tender notice unless such criteria are arbitrary, discriminatory, or actuated by mala fides. |
Applied to emphasize that while eligibility criteria are generally in the domain of the tendering authority, they remain open to challenge if they are arbitrary, discriminatory, or mala fide — the lens through which the impugned condition was examined. |
| Uflex Ltd. v. Government of Tamil Nadu & Ors., (2022) 1 SCC 165 |
Cited with Icomm Tele Ltd for the proposition that courts ordinarily do not interfere with eligibility criteria in tenders unless those criteria are arbitrary, discriminatory or mala fide. |
Served to reinforce the standard for intervention, against which the impugned local-experience condition was tested and ultimately found wanting. |
| UOI & Ors. Bharat Forge Ltd. & ANR., (2022) 17 SCC 188 |
This case enunciated the doctrine of a “level playing field”, stating that the doctrine finds expression in Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution; all equally placed competitors must be given equal opportunity to participate in trade and commerce, and the State should not skew the market in favour of a few by erecting artificial barriers. |
The Supreme Court relied on this doctrine to hold that the impugned condition, by linking eligibility to past supplies exclusively in Chhattisgarh, created an artificial barrier, denied equally placed competitors from outside the State a fair opportunity, and thereby violated the level playing field principle. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court first delineated the contours of judicial review over tender conditions. Referring to established precedent, it reiterated that while the Government must act fairly and cannot distribute largesse arbitrarily, it generally has a free hand in setting tender terms. Courts will not strike down tender conditions merely because different terms might be considered fairer or wiser, and will ordinarily refrain from interfering unless the tendering authority’s action is arbitrary, discriminatory, malicious, or actuated by mala fides.
The Court then examined the constitutional principles involved. It noted that the principle of non-discrimination is embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution, and that Article 14 must be read together with rights conferred by other provisions such as Article 21, which refers to the right to life and includes “opportunity”. The Court highlighted that the doctrine of a level playing field is an important concept in construing Article 19(1)(g), which confers the fundamental right to carry on business. A company, therefore, may invoke this doctrine, which is nonetheless subject to public interest. The doctrine of level playing field provides the space within which equally placed competitors can bid in furtherance of larger public interest.
Turning to the facts, the Court emphasized that the tenders were for the supply of sports kits to students in Government schools in Chhattisgarh. It held that the eligibility criteria in the impugned tender notices must have a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved: ensuring supply of good quality sports kits to students at the best price, thereby safeguarding the public exchequer. Accordingly, the eligibility criteria ought to be framed in a manner that encourages wider participation and secures the most advantageous price for the State.
Applying the doctrine of level playing field as articulated in the Bharat Forge decision, the Court observed that the doctrine requires that all equally placed competitors be given an equal opportunity to participate in trade and commerce, and that it is intended to prevent the State from skewing the market in favour of a few by erecting artificial barriers. In the present case, the impugned “past performance restriction” required bidders to have supplied sports goods worth at least Rs. 6.00 crores (cumulative) to State Government agencies of Chhattisgarh in the specified three-year period.
The Court found that this condition had the effect of excluding bidders who were otherwise financially sound and technically competent but lacked experience in supplying sports goods to State Government agencies of Chhattisgarh in the preceding three years. By linking eligibility to past local supplies within a single State, the State had created an artificial barrier against suppliers who had no prior dealings with Chhattisgarh, thereby curtailing the fundamental rights of such bidders to participate in the tenders.
The Court stated that the object of public procurement is to secure quality goods and services for the benefit of the public exchequer. This objective, it noted, can be achieved by requiring bidders to demonstrate financial capacity, technical experience, and past performance in contracts of a similar nature, regardless of the place of performance of such contracts. To confine eligibility to past performance within one State was held to be irrational and disproportionate to the goal of ensuring effective delivery of sports kits.
Consequently, the Court concluded that such a restriction could not be justified as a reasonable restriction under Article 19(6) of the Constitution. While acknowledging that the State enjoys freedom to prescribe conditions in tender notices, the Court held that this power cannot be exercised in a manner that infringes constitutional guarantees by effectively closing the market to outsiders without just cause.
The Court held that the impugned condition excluded competent and experienced suppliers who may have executed contracts of far greater magnitude in other States or for Central Government departments, and that it had the impact of promoting cartelisation. By operating as a closed door to outsiders and restricting wider participation and competition, the condition was found to violate Article 14 and to offend the freedom of trade guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g).
Addressing the State’s justification—that Chhattisgarh is a Maoist-affected area and only those with past experience of supply within the State could be relied upon—the Court rejected this reasoning as untenable. It gave three specific reasons:
- The tender was for the supply of sports kits, not for security-sensitive equipment, and thus did not involve any special risk or security repercussions.
- Only some districts in Chhattisgarh are affected by Maoist activities; it was incorrect to treat the entire State as uniformly Naxal-affected for the purpose of excluding other eligible bidders.
- A successful bidder unfamiliar with the State’s topography could engage a local supply chain to effect timely delivery of sports kits.
In light of this analysis, the Court held that the impugned tender condition was arbitrary, unreasonable and discriminatory, lacking any rational nexus with the object of ensuring effective supply of sports kits to children in the State, and in violation of Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.
Holding and Implications
The Supreme Court held that the impugned “past performance” tender condition, which restricted eligibility to bidders having supplied a specified value of sports goods to State Government agencies of Chhattisgarh in the preceding three years, was unconstitutional. It was found to be arbitrary, unreasonable, discriminatory, and in violation of Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India.
Holding: The Court allowed the appeals. It quashed and set aside the orders dated 11.08.2025 and 12.08.2025 passed by the High Court in Writ Petition (C) Nos. 4266, 4263 and 4274 of 2025, as well as the impugned tender notices dated 21.07.2025 issued by the Department of School Education, Government of Chhattisgarh, for supply of sports kits to students of Government Primary, Upper Primary, High and Higher Secondary Schools.
The Court clarified that the respondents are at liberty to issue fresh notices inviting tenders.
Implications: The immediate consequence is that the existing tender process based on the impugned condition stands invalidated, and the State of Chhattisgarh must re-tender if it wishes to procure sports kits for Government school students. The Court’s reasoning underscores that tender eligibility criteria which confine participation based on past performance restricted to a single State, without a rational nexus to the procurement objective and without adequate justification, are vulnerable to challenge as violating the principles of equality, non-discrimination and the doctrine of level playing field under Articles 14 and 19(1)(g). The judgment operates directly on the parties and does not expressly articulate any broader policy directions beyond the constitutional analysis applied to the impugned condition.
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