ORDER
The Writ Petition stands dismissed."
(Emphasis supplied)
This order becomes final. A week after rejection of the petition, the petitioner files the subject petition. It now becomes germane to notice the prayer sought in the subject petition. It reads as follows:
"a Quash the entire criminal proceedings in Crime No.118/2024 pending on the file of the XXIII Additional City Civil & Sessions Judge and
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Special Judge (P.C.Act), Bengaluru (Annexure-C) arising out of FIR in Crime No.118 of 2024 dated 28-05-2024 (Annexure-A) and the charge sheet dated 5-08-2024 (Annexure-E) filed by the respondent No.1 Police for the alleged offence punishable Under Sections 120B, 409, 420, 467, 468, 471 of the IPC and Section 13(1) r/w 13(2) of the PC Act, 1988 as against the petitioner is concerned, and
b. Declare that the arrest of the petitioner on 11.06.2024 and the remand order dated 13-06- 2024 was illegal, arbitrary and violative of Article 19, 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India as illegal and void ab initio in view of the rejection of transit warrant by the Magistrate at Hyderabad on 12-06-2024 and accordingly quash the remand order dated 13.06.2024 passed in Crime No.118 of 2024 by the learned III ACMM, Bengaluru as per (Annexure C & D) insofar as the petitioner is concerned.
c. Declare that the arrest of the petitioner dated 11.06.2024 in Crime No.118 of 2024 pending before the XXIII Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge and Special Judge (P.C.Act) at Bengaluru (Annexure-C) is illegal and consequently release the petitioner from judicial custody, forthwith with a direction to the respondent No.3 to release the petitioner herein."
(Emphasis added)
Prayer (b) is to declare arrest of the petitioner being violative of Article 22 of the Constitution of India in view of rejection of transit warrant. Prayer (c) is to hold the arrest of the petitioner as illegal and consequently release him. Prayer (a) for the first time, springs
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seeking quashment of entire proceedings in Crime No.118 of 2024 and the charge sheet so filed thereon.
15. The issue now would be, whether the petitioner is entitled to repeatedly challenge the alleged illegal arrest on new grounds that were available at the time when he had filed the earlier petition. It is an admitted fact that the present petition, second in line, is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India read with Section 482 of the CrPC which was the same provision that was invoked when filing the earlier petition. Jurisprudence is replete by the Apex Court considering the issue, as to whether the second petition seeking the very same prayer, would become maintainable or otherwise, particularly on pleas manifestly available at the first instance.
16. The learned senior counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of the Apex Court in the case of ANIL
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KHADKIWALA v. STATE (GOVERNMENT OF NCT OF DELHI)1 wherein the Apex Court considering the issue has held as follows:
"…. ….. ….
8. In Mohan Singh [Supt. and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs v. Mohan Singh, (1975) 3 SCC 706: 1975 SCC (Cri) 156: AIR 1975 SC 1002], it was held that a successive application under Section 482 CrPC under changed circumstances was maintainable and the dismissal of the earlier application was no bar to the same,
observing: (SCC pp. 709-10, para 2)
"2. … Here, the situation is wholly different. The earlier application which was rejected by the High Court was an application under Section 561-A of the Criminal Procedure Code to quash the proceeding and the High Court rejected it on the ground that the evidence was yet to be led and it was not desirable to interfere with the proceeding at that stage. But, thereafter, the criminal case dragged on for a period of about one-and-a-half years without any progress at all and it was in these circumstances that Respondents 1 and 2 were constrained to make a fresh application to the High Court under Section 561-A to quash the proceeding. It is difficult to see how in these circumstances, it could ever be contended that what the High Court was being asked to do by making the subsequent application was to review or revise the order made by it on the earlier application. Section 561-A preserves the inherent power of the High Court to make such orders as it deems fit to prevent abuse of the process of the court or to secure the ends of justice and the High Court must, therefore, exercise its inherent powers having regard to the situation prevailing at the particular point of time when its inherent jurisdiction is sought to be invoked. The High Court was in the circumstances entitled to entertain the subsequent application of Respondents 1 and 2 and consider whether on the
46
facts and circumstances then obtaining the continuance of the proceeding against the respondents constituted an abuse of the process of the Court or its quashing was necessary to secure the ends of justice. The facts and circumstances obtaining at the time of the subsequent application of Respondents 1 and 2 were clearly different from what they were at the time of the earlier application of the first respondent because, despite the rejection of the earlier application of the first respondent, the prosecution had failed to make any progress in the criminal case even though it was filed as far back as 1965 and the criminal case rested where it was for a period of over one-and-a-half years."
9. In Harshendra Kumar D. v. RebatilataKoley [Harshendra Kumar D. v. RebatilataKoley, (2011) 3 SCC 351: (2011) 1 SCC (Civ) 717: (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 1139:
2011 Cri LJ 1626], this Court held: (SCC p. 362, paras 26-
27)
"26. Criminal prosecution is a serious matter; it affects the liberty of a person. No greater damage can be done to the reputation of a person than dragging him in a criminal case. In our opinion, the High Court fell into grave error in not taking into consideration the uncontroverted documents relating to the appellant's resignation from the post of Director of the Company. Had these documents been considered by the High Court, it would have been apparent that the appellant has resigned much before the cheques were issued by the Company.
27. As noticed above, the appellant resigned from the post of Director on 2-3-2004. The dishonoured cheques were issued by the Company on 30-4-2004 i.e. much after the appellant had resigned from the post of Director of the Company. The acceptance of the appellant's resignation is duly reflected in the Resolution dated 2-3-2004. Then in the prescribed form (Form 32), the Company informed to the Registrar of Companies on 4-3-2004 about the appellant's resignation. It is not even the case of the complainants that the dishonoured cheques were issued by the appellant. These facts leave no manner of doubt that on the date the offence was
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committed by the Company, the appellant was not the Director; he had nothing to do with the affairs of the Company. In this view of the matter, if the criminal complaints are allowed to proceed against the appellant, it would result in gross injustice to the appellant and tantamount to an abuse of process of the court."
10. Atul Shukla [Atul Shukla v. State of M.P., (2019)
17 SCC 299] is clearly distinguishable on its facts as the relief sought was for review/recall/modify the earlier order [Surendra Singh v. State Of Madhya Pradesh, 2018 SCC OnLine MP 1425] of dismissal in the interest of justice. Consequently, the earlier order of dismissal was recalled. It was in that circumstance, it was held that in view of Section
362 CrPC the earlier order passed dismissing the quashing application could not have been recalled. The case is completely distinguishable on its own facts.
11. The Company, of which the appellant was a Director, is a party-respondent in the complaint. The interests of the complainant are therefore adequately protected. In the entirety of the facts and circumstances of the case, we are unable to hold that the second application for quashing of the complaint was not maintainable merely because of the dismissal of the earlier application."
(Emphasis supplied)
A second petition was held to be maintainable on different grounds. The said judgment is distinguishable without much ado, as the petition preferred by the petitioner which comes to be rejected by the coordinate Bench has no difference with the subject petition. There is no iota of change of circumstance for the petitioner to be permitted to file second petition. The second petition is admittedly preferred adding a ground with regard to his arrest being illegal
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from 11-06-2024 till he was remanded to police custody under the jurisdiction of Bengaluru, all on the score that the transit warrant was returned. This is a ground that was available to the petitioner at the time when he had filed the earlier petition. What was projected in the earlier petition, though filed under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. was on grounds of arrest. That fails.
17. The second petition is preferred on an altogether new ground that his arrest was illegal, as transit warrant had been returned. As observed earlier, the petition was preferred on 12-05- 2025. The arrest of the petitioner was on 11-06-2024. By the time the earlier petition was filed, charge sheet also had been filed.
Therefore, this was a ground that was available to be taken and contended in the earlier petition. Since the said ground was not taken though available, it had been abandoned and the abandoned ground is exhumed in the subject petition. The petitioner now, by the present petition, is in effect wanting to resurrect substantially the same grounds interlaced with a plea for quashment of proceedings. This is clearly impermissible in law. Even in the criminal proceedings,
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i.e., in the petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India read with Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., the principle that a ground that was available to be taken at the outset not being taken cannot be permitted to be taken in a second petition, becomes applicable, as fragmented petitions would emerge on given up grounds. It can lead to several petitions being filed on each of the grounds that the petitioner would think of, after the dismissal of the petition, till he succeeds in one of the petitions. This is sans countenance.
18. It becomes apposite to refer to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of BHISHAM LAL VERMA v. STATE OF U.P. id="sup_6">2 wherein the Apex Court has held as follows:
"…. …. ….
11. We are in complete agreement with these observations of the Madras High Court. Though it is clear that there can be no blanket rule that a second petition under Section 482 Cr. P.C. would not lie in any situation and it would depend upon the facts and circumstances of the individual case, it is not open to a person aggrieved to raise one plea after the other, by invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 Cr. P.C., though all such pleas were very much available even at the first instance. Permitting 2 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1399
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the filing of successive petitions under Section 482 Cr. P.C. ignoring this principle would enable an ingenious accused to effectively stall the proceedings against him to suit his own interest and convenience, by filing one petition after another under Section 482 Cr. P.C., irrespective of when the cause therefor arose. Such abuse of process cannot be permitted."
(Emphasis supplied) The said judgment is again followed in M.C. RAVIKUMAR v. D.S. VELMURUGAN3wherein the Apex Court has held as follows:
"… …. ….
Discussion and Analysis:—
10. We have heard the submissions advanced at the bar and have gone through the impugned order and material placed on record.
11. The short question that arises for our consideration is "Whether a second quashing petition under Section 482 CrPC would be maintainable on the grounds/pleas that were available to be raised even at the time of filing/decision of the first quashing petition?"
12. At the outset, we may like to note that the submission advanced by the learned counsel for the accused- respondents that the second quashing petition came to be filed based on new grounds/pleas, is not tenable on the face of it. From the bare perusal of the record, it is evident that the second quashing petition raised no such grounds/pleas which were unavailable to the accused-respondents at the time of adjudication of the first quashing petition. The failure of the accused-respondents to raise a pertinent ground/plea which was tangibly available to them at the time of adjudication of the first quashing petition can in no circumstance grant a right to the said accused persons to file
3 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1498
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a subsequent quashing petition as it would amount to seeking review on pre-existing material.
13. This Court in catena of judgments has held that it is not open to an accused person to raise one plea after the other, by repeatedly invoking the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC, though all such pleas were very much available to him even at the first instance. We may hasten to add that there is no sweeping rule to the effect that a second quashing petition under Section 482 CrPC is not maintainable and its maintainability will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. However, the onus to show that there arose a change in circumstances warranting entertainment of a subsequent quashing petition would be on the person filing the said petition. In this regard, we may gainfully refer to the observations made by this Court in the case of Bhisham Lal Verma v. State of UP, which are extracted below for ready reference:—
"11. …… Though it is clear that there can be no blanket rule that a second petition under Section 482 Cr. P.C. would not lie in any situation and it would depend upon the facts and circumstances of the individual case, it is not open to a person aggrieved to raise one plea after the other, by invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 Cr. P.C., though all such pleas were very much available even at the first instance. Permitting the filing of successive petitions under Section 482 Cr. P.C. ignoring this principle would enable an ingenious accused to effectively stall the proceedings against him to suit his own interest and convenience, by filing one petition after another under Section 482 Cr. P.C., irrespective of when the cause therefor arose. Such abuse of process cannot be permitted."
(Emphasis Supplied)
14. Furthermore, we are of the opinion that the order passed by the High Court in the second quashing
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petition amounted to review (plain and simple) of the earlier order passed by the co-ordinate bench of the High Court in the first quashing petition, since there was admittedly no change in circumstances and no new grounds/pleas became available to the accused- respondents, after passing of the order of dismissal in the first quashing petition. The order passed by the High Court is in gross disregard to all tenets of law as Section 362 CrPC expressly bars review of a judgment or final order disposing of a case except to correct some clerical or arithmetical error.
15. This Court has time and again held that the High Courts while exercising their inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC cannot override a specific bar laid down by other provisions of CrPC, i.e., to say that the High Court is not empowered to review its own decision under the purported exercise of its inherent powers. To fortify the aforesaid conclusion, we may gainfully refer to the observations made by this Court in the case of Simrikhia v. Dolley Mukherjee and Chhabi Mukherjee19, the relevant portions whereof are quoted below for ease of reference:
"6. In Superintendent & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs v. Mohan Singh, (1975) 3 SCC 706, this Court held that Section 561A preserves the inherent power of the High Court to make such orders as it deems fit to prevent abuse of the process of the Court or to secure the ends of justice and the High Court must therefore exercise its inherent powers having regard to the situation prevailing at the particular point of time when its inherent jurisdiction is sought to be invoked. In that case the facts and circumstances obtaining at the time of the subsequent application were clearly different from what they were at the time of the earlier application. The question as to the scope and ambit of the inherent power of the High Court vis-a-vis an earlier order made by it was, therefore, not concluded by this decision.
7. The inherent jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be invoked to override bar of review u/s
362. It is clearly stated in Sooraj Devi v. Pyare Lal, (1981) 1 SCC 500 that the inherent power of
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the Court cannot be exercised for doing that which is specifically prohibited by the Code. The law is therefore clear that the inherent power cannot be exercised for doing that which cannot be done on account of the bar under other provisions of the Code. The court is not empowered to review its own decision under the purported exercise of inherent power. We find that the impugned order in this case is in effect one reviewing the earlier order on a reconsideration of the same materials. The High Court has grievously erred in doing so. Even on merits, we do not find any compelling reasons to quash the proceedings at that stage."
(Emphasis supplied)
16. In the instant case, the quashing by the High Court of a similar complaint, i.e., Criminal Complaint No. 41 of 2015 filed by the complainant against the accused-respondents in respect of properties situated at Thanjavur vide order dated 9th March, 2020 was an event that happened well before the dismissal of the first quashing petition under Section 482 CrPC and the said ground/plea was manifestly available to the accused-respondents while seeking adjudication of the first quashing petition. That being the situation, the accused-respondents were not at liberty to invoke the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court raising the aforesaid ground/plea at a later point of time by filing the second quashing petition.
17. As an upshot of the above discussion, we have no hesitation in holding that the impugned order passed by the High Court is unjustified on the face of the record and cannot be affirmed. Hence, the impugned order dated 13th September, 2022 passed by the High Court in Criminal Original Petition No. 16241 of 2022 is quashed and set aside. As a result, thereof, the Criminal Complaint No. 1828 of 2019 filed by the appellant-complainant against the accused- respondents is restored to the file of the learned IX Metropolitan Judicial Magistrate, Saidapet, Chennai."
(Emphasis supplied)
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The Apex Court, in the afore-quoted elucidation of law, both in
BHISAM LAL VERMA and RAVIKUMAR makes it abundantly clear that successive petitions under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., grounded upon pleas manifestly available at the first instance, are impermissible. To permit otherwise, would be putting a premium on fragmented litigation, and reducing the judicial process into a stratagem for delay. That being the situation, the accused was not at liberty to invoke the inherent jurisdiction, raising the ground/plea at a later point in time, by filing second petition.
19. The learned senior counsel for the petitioner seeks to contend that prayer for quashing the proceedings was not sought earlier; what was preferred was only to declare the arrest of the petitioner as illegal and his consequent release. Therefore, in effect, this is the first quashing petition that is preferred. This submission borders on hyper technicality. Two of the grounds now urged were manifestly available earlier - one ground is raised, the petition is lost. The second ground is raised in the second petition. Therefore, I decline to accept the submission of the learned senior counsel that
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the second ground can be urged in the second petition, taking shelter under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Therefore, the ground, on grounds of arrest and release on illegal arrest cannot be permitted to be agitated in the subject petition. In the light of the preceding analysis, I decline to entertain the subject petition, second in line, albeit, laced with a challenge to the entire proceedings under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C./528 of the BNSS. Issue No.1 is answered accordingly.
Issue No.2:
(ii) If maintainable, whether the arrest of the petitioner could be held to be illegal, resulting in his release from custody?
20. The second issue that has fallen for consideration with regard to the arrest being illegal or otherwise, would be dependent upon the first issue. If the first issue was in favour of the petitioner, further examination would ensue. In the light of the issue No.1 being held against the petitioner, consideration of the issue No.2 is unwarranted, as, if the petition is not even
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entertainable on the said issue, consideration of the issue would not arise. Therefore, issue No.2 is answered accordingly.
CHALLENGE TO THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS IN CRIME NO.118
OF 2024 AND ITS AFTERMATH:
Issue No.3:
(iii) Whether interference in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS (482 of the Cr.P.C.) is warranted?
21. What remains is, consideration of quashment of proceedings under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. The complaint is quoted hereinabove. The petitioner is said to be key conspirator of huge scam running to ₹188/- crores. Cash of ₹8/- crores and gold of 15 Kgs. is found in the house of the petitioner who is said to be a civil contractor. The explanation of cash and gold found, has not come forward at all. Even if it has come forward, it has to be tested in evidence. The modus operandi of the petitioner is narrated in the summary of the charge sheet, as quoted hereinabove, insofar it
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concerns the petitioner. The charge sheet paints the petitioner not as a passive bystander, but as the very kingpin of the fraudulent design. The wealth of detail in the investigation, recovery of cash and gold and the labyrinth of transactions alleged are all matters demanding the crucible of full blown trial. The case is shrouded with maze of facts. The money that had to be spent for upliftment of Scheduled Tribes, the avowed objective with which the Corporation was created, is allegedly swindled by the officers of the Bank, or the accused named in the charge sheet.
22. The learned Additional Special Public Prosecutor has brought to the notice of this Court that the CBI is also conducting investigation on the alleged scam, as officers of the Bank, a Government of India undertaking are accused. It, therefore,
revolves round maze of facts which would amaze this Court for interference under Section 528 of the BNSS. If interfered, it would run foul of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of
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KAPTAN SINGH v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH4 wherein it is held as follows:
"9.1. At the outset, it is required to be noted that in the present case the High Court in exercise of powers under Section 482 CrPC has quashed the criminal proceedings for the offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 406, 329 and 386 IPC. It is required to be noted that when the High Court in exercise of powers under Section 482 CrPC quashed the criminal proceedings, by the time the investigating officer after recording the statement of the witnesses, statement of the complainant and collecting the evidence from the incident place and after taking statement of the independent witnesses and even statement of the accused persons, has filed the charge-sheet before the learned Magistrate for the offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 406, 329 and 386 IPC and even the learned Magistrate also took the cognizance. From the impugned judgment and order [Radhey Shyam Gupta v. State Of U.P. 914] passed by the High Court, it does not appear that the High Court took into consideration the material collected during the investigation/inquiry and even the statements recorded. If the petition under Section 482 CrPC was at the stage of FIR in that case the allegations in the FIR/complaint only are required to be considered and whether a cognizable offence is disclosed or not is required to be considered. However, thereafter when the statements are recorded, evidence is collected and the charge-sheet is filed after conclusion of the investigation/inquiry the matter stands on different footing and the Court is required to consider the material/evidence collected during the investigation.
Even at this stage also, as observed and held by this Court in a catena of decisions, the High Court is not required to go into the merits of the allegations and/or enter into the merits of the case as if the High Court is exercising the appellate jurisdiction and/or conducting the trial. As held by this Court in Dineshbhai Chandubhai Patel [Dineshbhai Chandubhai
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Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2018) 3 SCC 104 : (2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 683] in order to examine as to whether factual contents of FIR disclose any cognizable offence or not, the High Court cannot act like the investigating agency nor can exercise the powers like an appellate court. It is further observed and held that that question is required to be examined keeping in view, the contents of FIR and prima facie material, if any, requiring no proof. At such stage, the High Court cannot appreciate evidence nor can it draw its own inferences from contents of FIR and material relied on. It is further observed it is more so, when the material relied on is disputed. It is further observed that in such a situation, it becomes the job of the investigating authority at such stage to probe and then of the court to examine questions once the charge-sheet is filed along with such material as to how far and to what extent reliance can be placed on such material.
9.2. In Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar [Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 18 SCC 191 :
(2020) 3 SCC (Cri) 672] after considering the decisions of this Court in Bhajan Lal [State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426] , it is held by this Court that exercise of powers under Section 482 CrPC to quash the proceedings is an exception and not a rule. It is further observed that inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC though wide is to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution, only when such exercise is justified by tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is further observed that appreciation of evidence is not permissible at the stage of quashing of proceedings in exercise of powers under Section 482 CrPC. Similar view has been expressed by this Court in Arvind Khanna [CBI v. Arvind Khanna, (2019) 10 SCC 686 : (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 94] , Managipet [State of Telangana v. Managipet, (2019) 19 SCC 87 : (2020) 3 SCC (Cri) 702] and in XYZ [XYZ v. State of Gujarat, (2019) 10 SCC 337 : (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 173] , referred to hereinabove.
9.3. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions to the facts of the case on hand, we are of the opinion that the High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction in
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quashing the criminal proceedings in exercise of powers under Section 482 CrPC.
10. The High Court has failed to appreciate and consider the fact that there are very serious triable issues/allegations which are required to be gone into and considered at the time of trial. The High Court has lost sight of crucial aspects which have emerged during the course of the investigation. The High Court has failed to appreciate and consider the fact that the document i.e. a joint notarised affidavit of Mamta Gupta Accused 2 and Munni Devi under which according to Accused 2 Ms Mamta Gupta, Rs 25 lakhs was paid and the possession was transferred to her itself is seriously disputed. It is required to be noted that in the registered agreement to sell dated 27- 10-2010, the sale consideration is stated to be Rs 25 lakhs and with no reference to payment of Rs 25 lakhs to Ms Munni Devi and no reference to handing over the possession. However, in the joint notarised affidavit of the same date i.e. 27-10-2010 sale consideration is stated to be Rs 35 lakhs out of which Rs 25 lakhs is alleged to have been paid and there is a reference to transfer of possession to Accused 2. Whether Rs 25 lakhs has been paid or not the accused have to establish during the trial, because the accused are relying upon the said document and payment of Rs 25 lakhs as mentioned in the joint notarised affidavit dated 27-10-2010. It is also required to be considered that the first agreement to sell in which Rs 25 lakhs is stated to be sale consideration and there is reference to the payment of Rs 10 lakhs by cheques. It is a registered document. The aforesaid are all triable issues/allegations which are required to be considered at the time of trial. The High Court has failed to notice and/or consider the material collected during the investigation.
11. Now so far as the finding recorded by the High Court that no case is made out for the offence under Section 406 IPC is concerned, it is to be noted that the High Court itself has noted that the joint notarised affidavit dated 27-10-2010 is seriously disputed, however as per the High Court the same is required to be considered in the civil proceedings. There the High Court has committed an error. Even the High Court has failed to notice that another FIR has been lodged against the accused for the offences under Sections 467, 468, 471 IPC
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with respect to the said alleged joint notarised affidavit. Even according to the accused the possession was handed over to them. However, when the payment of Rs 25 lakhs as mentioned in the joint notarised affidavit is seriously disputed and even one of the cheques out of 5 cheques each of Rs 2 lakhs was dishonoured and according to the accused they were handed over the possession (which is seriously disputed) it can be said to be entrustment of property. Therefore, at this stage to opine that no case is made out for the offence under Section 406 IPC is premature and the aforesaid aspect is to be considered during trial. It is also required to be noted that the first suit was filed by Munni Devi and thereafter subsequent suit came to be filed by the accused and that too for permanent injunction only. Nothing is on record that any suit for specific performance has been filed. Be that as it may, all the aforesaid aspects are required to be considered at the time of trial only.
12. Therefore, the High Court has grossly erred in quashing the criminal proceedings by entering into the merits of the allegations as if the High Court was exercising the appellate jurisdiction and/or conducting the trial. The High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction in quashing the criminal proceedings in exercise of powers under Section 482 CrPC.
13. Even the High Court has erred in observing that original complaint has no locus. The aforesaid observation is made on the premise that the complainant has not placed on record the power of attorney along with the counter filed before the High Court. However, when it is specifically stated in the FIR that Munni Devi has executed the power of attorney and thereafter the investigating officer has conducted the investigation and has recorded the statement of the complainant, accused and the independent witnesses, thereafter whether the complainant is having the power of attorney or not is to be considered during trial.
14. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the impugned judgment and order [Radhey Shyam Gupta v. State Of U.P. 914] passed by the High Court quashing the criminal proceedings in exercise
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of powers under Section 482 CrPC is unsustainable and the same deserves to be quashed and set aside and is accordingly quashed and set aside. Now, the trial is to be conducted and proceeded further in accordance with law and on its own merits. It is made clear that the observations made by this Court in the present proceedings are to be treated to be confined to the proceedings under Section 482 CrPC only and the trial court to decide the case in accordance with law and on its own merits and on the basis of the evidence to be laid and without being influenced by any of the observations made by us hereinabove. The present appeal is accordingly allowed."
(Emphasis supplied)"
The principle enunciated in KAPTAN SINGH as observed is apposite:
quashing of proceedings post charge sheet is an exception not a rule and can be invoked only where the allegations taken, on their face value, disclose no offence whatsoever. This is far from the case here. For the aforesaid reasons, the prayer with regard to quashment of proceedings under Section 482 of the CrPC is to be rejected. Issue No.3 is answered accordingly.
CONCLUSION:
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entertainable, unless founded upon demonstrable change in circumstance.
(ii) Grounds that were manifestly available at the time of first petition, cannot be exhumed later, to prop up a second petition.
(iii) In the light of the grave allegations, voluminous material and triable questions of fact, this Court cannot wield its extraordinary jurisdiction to stifle proceedings at their threshold.
In the result and for the reasons elaborated hereinabove, this Court finds no scintilla of merit in the present petition. Law cannot bend to repeated challenges, devoid of new substance nor it can ignore the gravity of allegations that undoubtedly wants an adjudication in a full blown trial.
23. Accordingly, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Sd/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA)
JUDGE
Bkp
CT:SS
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