"1.1. SERVICES, WORK ORDERS, 1.1 Services. LSP will provide services to Amazon non- exclusive basis, in accordance with the terms and conditions of this Agreement ("Services") as the Parties may from time to time agree and specify in work orders ("Work Orders") issued or signed by Amazon. The agreed form of Work Order is attached as Exhibit A to this Agreement. Any Affiliate of Amazon will have the right to enter into Work Orders with LSP under this Agreement, and with respect to such Work Orders, such Affiliate becomes a Party to this Agreement and references to Amazon in this Agreement are deemed to be references to such Affiliate. With respect to Amazon, each Work Order is a separate obligation of the Amazon entities or entity that execute(s) such Work Order and no other Amazon entity has any obligation under such Work Order. Amazon makes no promises or representations whatsoever as to the amount of business LSP can expect at any time under this Agreement. It is further clarified that nothing in this Agreement prevents Amazon or any of its Affiliates from procuring same or similar Services from any other third party.
1.2 Work Orders. This Agreement governs each Work Order, except that any conflict between the terms of ac Agreement and a Work Order will be resolved in favor of the Work Order, if the Work Order explicitly states that the wended to modify the conflicting terms of this Agreement. This Agreement does not obligate Amazon to engage LSP to perform any Services, or LSP to perform any Services, until both Parties have signed a Work Order. Both Parties must sign a Work Order for it to be effective. Notwithstanding the aforesaid, a Work
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Order will be binding on both Parties If LSP: (a) signs and returns it to Amazon; (b) begins performance; or (c) acknowledges it by email, facsimile or any other commercially reasonable means. If LSP commences Services for Amazon in the absence of a Work Order and Amazon accepts such Services, this Agreement will nevertheless apply, unless the Parties otherwise mutually agree in writing. LSP will, at no cost to Amazon, promptly and satisfactorily correct any Services or Work Product found to be defective or not in conformity with the requirements of this Agreement and the applicable Work Order."
The Master Services Agreement relied by the defendant does not have any work order or any Exhibit-A as mentioned in the agreement. Considering the entire evidence of the parties and the documents, this Court finds that only to avoid the service of the plaintiff, the defendants have executed the said agreement after thought and the agreement cannot be relied upon as the agreement contained some date, the parties to the agreement have sign the agreement on different dates and the agreement does not contained Exhibit-A i.e. work orders.
In the written statement, the defendant no. 2 has further made out a case that by an email dated 3rdFebruary, 2015 requested the CBRE to visit the Sreerampore Warehouse for inspection on 4th February, 2015 in the morning and subsequently the defendant no. 2 inspected the site of Sreerampore Warehouse property on 4th February, 2015 through CBRE and further fixed an inspection of the said Warehouse with the defendant no. 1 on 6thFebruary, 2015. In
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paragraphs 22 and 23 of the plaint, the plaintiff has specifically made out a case that one Mr. Satapathy, representative of the defendant no. 2 has requested for site visit on 5thFebruary, 2015, accordingly, the plaintiff had fixed the site visit on 5thFebruary, 2015 at 09.30 A.M. but Mr. Satapathy, the representative of the defendant no. 2 had not reached due to flat tire of car of Mr. Satapathy. The said contention has also admitted by the defendant no. 2 in its written statement at paragraph 7 (k) of the written statement. The said stand of the defendants are contradictory as in one hand they have visited the site on 4thFebruary 2015 and on the other hand they have requested the plaintiff for site visit on 5thFebruary 2015. The defendant no. 1 continued corresponding with the plaintiff through email till the month of February, 2015 but the defendant no. 1 has not disclosed to the plaintiff with regard to the Master Services Agreement entered by the defendant no. 1 and the defendant no. 2 on 22ndDecember, 2014. If, this Court beliefs the Master Services Agreement than the question arise why the defendant no. 1 continued with correspondence with the plaintiff with regard to the property which the defendant no. 1 intends to take on long term lease. In view of the above, this Court decided the Issue No. 2 affirmative in favour of the plaintiff.
c. Issue No. 3 : Does the instant suit suffer from lack of or non- disclosure of cause of action as alleged by the defendants in the written statement?
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In the plaint, at paragraph 37, the plaintiff has stated as follows :
"37. As part of cause of action as pleaded in paragraphs 4, 7, 8, 9, 17, 28 and paragraphs 38 hereinabove have arisen within the jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court and inasmuch as a part of the cause of action as pleaded in paragraphs 9, 17, 28, 30 and 38 hereinabove have arisen outside the jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court, the Plaintiff prays for leave under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent to institute the instant suit in this Hon'ble Court."
The plaintiff has filed the suit against the defendants on the basis of the emails exchange between the parties with regard to the properties as required by the defendant no. 1. Initially, the defendant no. 1 had sent the email along with Mutual Non-disclosure Agreement and subsequently the said correspondences were continued till the month of February, 2015. In between the defendant no. 1 has introduced the defendant no. 2 and the defendant no. 2 had supported corresponding with the plaintiff on behalf of the defendant no. 1. The plaintiff has filed the suit on the ground that on 28thMay, 2015 when Mr. Kejriwal had visited the Sreerampore Warehouse property came to know that the defendant no. 2 had directly entered into the tenancy agreement with Keola Associates Private Limited for taking Sreerampore Warehouse by passing the plaintiff though the plaintiff has provided all the documents in respect of several properties including Sreerampore Property (Keola Associates Private Limited). The defendant no. 2 in its written statement with respect to the paragraph 37 of the plaint has only denied that no cause of action as alleged as
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arisen in favour of the plaintiff and in the written statement, the defendant no. 2 has not denied that no cause of action for filing the suit arose and as such the issue no. 3 is decided affirmative in favour of the plaintiff.
d. Issue Nos. 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 are taken up together as all the issues are connected with each other.
h. Issue No.4 Was the defendant no.1 after orally accepting the terms and conditions of brokerage services of the plaintiff and thereafter having acted in furtherance to such acceptance by forwarding the 'Mutual Non disclosure agreement', not bound and obliged to honour the terms thereof as stated in paragraph 5 of the plaint?
i. Issue No.5 Was not acceptance of the terms of the Mutual Non Disclosure agreement by the defendant No.1 final and binding after exchange of the emails dated 4thDecember, 2014 as stated in paragraph 7 of the plaint?
j. Issue No.6 Did the defendants in consent and connivance with each others violating the terms of the mutual non-disclosure agreement on one hand and taking full advantage of the plaintiff's services on the other acted to the prejudice and detrimental of the plaintiff?
k. Issue No.7 Is the defendant no.2 bound by any contractual obligation or otherwise with the plaintiff?
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l. Issue No.8 Whether any concluded contract was entered into in between the plaintiff and the defendant No.1 which can entitle the plaintiff to obtain a decree of Rs.1,15,92,877/- as against the defendant no.1?
Paragraph 5 of the plaint, the plaintiff has made out a case that
"Pursuant to such oral agreement as aforesaid on or about 14thOctober, 2014, the said Mr. K. Prasad, being the representative of the Defendant no.1 by an e-mail forwarded to the said Mr. Ramesh Kejriwal a draft of an agreement described as "Mutual Non-Disclosure Agreement"
The e-mail dated 14thOctober, 2014 sent by the representative of the defendant no.1 is marked as Exhibit-A wherein the defendant no.1 had sent Mutual Non-Disclosure Agreement to the plaintiff and the said document is admitted by the parties. On receipt of the e-mail dated 14thOctober, 2014, the plaintiff has sent a reply to the representative of the defendant no.1 by an e-mail dated 18thOctober, 2014 at 4:37 PM in which the plaintiff has made some minor corrections and requested the defendant no.1 to go through the same and to inform the plaintiff to enable the plaintiff to get the same printed and to be sent to the defendant no.1. The email dated 18th October, 2014 is marked as Exhibit-B and the corrected Mutual-Non- Disclosure Agreement is marked as Exhibit-B/1. By an email dated 4th December, 2014, at 2:18 p.m. the plaintiff had again sent an email to the defendant no.1 again forwarding the email dated 18thOctober, 2014 and requested the defendant no.1 to go through the attachment
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and to inform the plaintiff at which address the signed copy of the agreement should be sent. The email dated 4thDecember, 2014, is marked as Exhibit-C. In reply to the said email, the representative of the defendant no. 1 by an email dated 4thDecember 2014 at 3:39 p.m. requested the plaintiff to send the same to him and had also shared the address through the said email. The email dated 4thDecember, 2014, is marked as Exhibit-D. By an email dated 19thOctober, 2014 at 2:15 p.m. the representative of the plaintiff had sent an email to the representative of the defendant no.1 by forwarding the details of about five (5) properties and also informed to the defendant no.1 that in the event of finalization of any offered properties, the plaintiff shall charge the consultation fees "equivalent to 1(one) month's rental plus service tax as applicable immediately after signing the Agreement/Possession, whichever is earlier." The email dated 19thOctober, 2014 along with the details of the property is marked as Exhibit -F (Collectively). On 19thOctober, 2014 at 2.52 p.m, the plaintiff has again sent an e-mail to the defendant no.1 along with the details of the warehouse complex at NH2, Dankuni and the said email is marked as Exhibit-G Collectively. On 21stOctober, 2014 at 07.29 p.m. the defendant no. 1 had sent an email to the plaintiff confirming the receipt of the earlier e-mail sent by the plaintiff and in the said e-mail, it is also stated that the defendant no. 1 is looking after BTS option (Build-to-Suit) which means if any property suits the defendant no. 1 according to the capability of the landlord, the property may be prepared and handed over to the defendant by March, 2015. The said e-mail is marked as
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Exhibit-H. On 25thOctober, 2015, at 11.59 a.m. the plaintiff had again sent an e-mail to the defendant no. 1 by sending a proposal for warehouse along with photographs of the proposed property for perusal of the defendant no. 1 and in the said e-mail, it was also informed to the defendant no. 1, the inspection of the properties can be arranged at any time, any date as per the convenience of the defendant no. 1 on prior intimation. The said e-mail is marked as Exhibit-I Collectively. On 27thOctober, 2014, the defendant no. 1 had sent an e-mail to the plaintiff at 06.28 p.m. wherein the defendant had sent a checklist and requested the plaintiff to fill up the properties in the check list. The said e-mail is marked as Exhibit-J. On 28th October, 2014 at 06.37 p.m. the plaintiff had sent an e-mail by enclosing the site plan, duly filled up checklist and some photographs of the property to the defendant which is marked as Exhibit-K. On 28th October, 2014 at 06.38 p.m. the plaintiff had sent an e-mail to the defendant by enclosing construction related drawings, checklist, deeds and several documents. The said e-mail along with documents have been marked as Exhibit-L Collectively. On 4thDecember, 2014 at
02.18 p.m. the plaintiff had sent an e-mail along with a copy of mutual non-disclosure agreement in which some modifications were made by the plaintiff and requested the defendant to confirm the same to the plaintiff if it is correct. The said Mutual Non-Disclosure Agreement is marked as Exhibit C/1. The plaintiff had sent two numbers of Mutual Non-Disclosure Agreement on Non Judicial Stamp Papers containing six pages each duly signed by the plaintiff to the defendant on 16th
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December, 2014 by post requesting the defendant to return one set of Mutual Non-Disclosure Agreement to the plaintiff after signing by the defendant company. The said letter is marked as Exhibit-S. By an e- mail dated 26thDecember, 2014 at 03.22 p.m., the plaintiff had again informed the defendant that the plaintiff had already sent two copies Mutual Non-Disclosure Agreements duly stamped and signed by the plaintiff and requested the defendant to put the company's stamp and signature and send one copy of the said agreement to the plaintiff for the record of the plaintiff company. The said e-mail is marked as Exhibit-T. On 31stDecember, 2014, the plaintiff had again sent an e- mail at 01.42 p.m. along with the documents for proposal of Warehouse at Sreerampore, Delhi Road, Hooghly along with all photographs and checklist. The said e-mail is marked as Exhibit-U Collectively. On 12thJanuary, 2015 at 12.57 p.m., the defendant had sent an e-mail to the plaintiff requesting to send the postal address of Keola Warehouse - Khadim Warehouse. In reply to the said e-mail, the plaintiff by an e-mail dated 13thJanuary, 2015 at 10.00 a.m. had sent the postal address of Sreerampore Warehouse i.e. Keola Associates Private Limited. The said e-mail is marked as Exhibit "W". On 3rd February, 2015, at 1:11 p.m. one Pankaj Dubey, the representative of the defendant no. 2 had sent an e-mail to the plaintiff, copy to the representative of the defendant no. 2 wherein it is requested to share the documents along with pictures of Sreerampore property. The said document is marked as Exhibit "X". On 3rdFebruary, 2015 at 03.51 p.m., the plaintiff had sent Google Earth Picture and the Link showing
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the warehouse with reference to the e-mail sent by Mr. Pankaj Dubey. The said e-mail is marked as Exhibit-Y Collectively. On 4thFebruary, 2015 at 7.14 p.m. the plaintiff had sent e-mail to Mr. Pankaj Dubey as well as Mr. Satapathy by enclosing more documents like conversion and No Objection Certificate from the concerned authorities related to Sreerampore Warehouse for the purpose of record of the defendant no. 1, the said e-mail along with document is marked as Exhibit-Z Collectively. On 5thFebruary, 2015, an e-mail which was sent by the plaintiff to Mr. R. K. Satpathy and Mr. Pankaj Dubey both are the representatives of the defendant no. 2, stating a request from the plaintiff's side that to reschedule the inspection of the Sreerampore property which Mr. Satapathy of defendant no. 2 and the plaintiff had decided on the previous occasion over a telephonic call due to some complications related to time of the plaintiff, which is marked and exhibited as Exhibit - AA. Exhibit - BB is an e-mail which was sent by the plaintiff to Mr. R. K. Satapathy and Mr. Pankaj Dubey both representatives of defendant no. 2, dated- 20thFebruary, 2015 the mail had an attachment of an offer letter of four properties as it was previously asked by Mr. Satapathy. Exhibit - CC is an e-mail which was sent by the plaintiff to Mr. Satapathy and Mr. Dubey both are the representatives of the defendant no. 2 on 3rdFebruary, 2015 attaching some documents relating to the Sreerampore property, some Auto CAD drawings and some photographs of the Sreerampore property. Exhibit-DD is copy of some documents which are e-mails that were sending by the plaintiff to Mr. Prasad the representative of defendant
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no. 1 on the occasion's first mail dated 22ndApril, 2015, the plaintiff had requested to return him one copy on judicial stamp paper with the seal and signature of the officials. On the second mail dated 2ndJuly, 2015, the plaintiff had reiterated the same facts that he had sent in his first mail. On the third mail dated 10thAugust, 2015, the plaintiff had requested to send him a copy of the mail of Mutual Non- Disclosure Agreement duly signed by the Council of the defendant no. 1 with their official seal. Exhibit - EE is a Copy of the first Advocates notice which was sent to defendant no. 1 and 2 and original receipt of the speed post which the plaintiff had caused to send to the four persons officials of the defendant nos. 1 and 2 through his advocate. And the second document is also a notice which per as the plaintiff's instruction, the Advocate had sent to the officials of the defendant no. 1 and 2 by speed post and the receipt of the same original is enclosed with the document and Exhibit - EE/1 is AD Card of the notice sent by the plaintiff's advocate to the defendant no. 2 and the second is the track record of the notice that was sent by the plaintiff's Advocate. In the case reported in (2008) 13 SCC 597 (BSNL & Anr. vs. BPL Mobile Cellular Ltd. & Ors.), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that:
"47. Section 8 of the Contract Act reads as under:
"8. Acceptance by performing conditions, or receiving consideration.—Performance of the conditions of a proposal, or the acceptance of any consideration for a reciprocal promise which may be offered with a proposal, is an acceptance of the proposal."
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It provides the acceptance of the proposal by conduct as against other modes of acceptance. It can be divided in two parts : (1) performance of the conditions of a proposal; and (2) acceptance of any consideration for a reciprocal promise which may be offered with a proposal. The latter corresponds to general divisions of proposals into those which offer a promise in exchange for an act or acts and those which offer a promise for exchange for a promise. The bills were raised on the basis of the said premise. They were accepted. The promise on the part of the appellant was acted upon by the respondent. The appellants, thus, now should not ordinarily be permitted to take a different stand. This aspect of the matter was considered in Amrit Amrit Banspati Co. Ltd. v. Union Of India wherein it was stated:
"Section 8 of the Contract Act provides that performance of the conditions of a proposal, or the acceptance of any consideration for a reciprocal promise which may be offered with a proposal is an acceptance of the proposal. The language of the section is rather vague but its meaning is clear. It is based on the principle that if an offer is made subject to a condition, the offeree cannot accept the benefit under the offer without accepting the condition. He cannot take the attitude, 'I shall accept the benefit but reject the condition'."
48. In Union of India v. Rameshwarlall Bhagchand it was stated :
"6. Section 8 provides that performance of the conditions of a proposal, or the acceptance of any consideration for a reciprocal promise which may be offered with a proposal, is an acceptance of the proposal. According to Section 2(a) of the Contract Act when one person signifies to another his willingness to do or to abstain from doing anything, with a view to obtaining the assent of that other to such act or abstinence, he is said to make a proposal; and clause (b) of Section 2 states that when the person to whom the proposal is made signifies his
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assent thereto, the proposal is said to be accepted. A proposal when accepted becomes a promise. Section 2(f) enacts that promises which form the consideration or part of the consideration for each other are called reciprocal promises."
It was furthermore observed :
"8. Some English decisions were referred to with approval in Patna case [Union of India v. Jethabhai Jesinbhai Patel and Co., AIR 1960 Pat 30] relied upon by Shri Dam, I think that those cases have no bearing on and relevancy to Section 8 of the Act. It is mentioned on p. 59 of the Pollock and Mulla's Commentary on the Indian Contract Act, 8th Edn., that 'nothing like the terms of Section 8 occurs in the original draft of the Indian Law Commissioners, nor so far as known to us, in any authoritative statement of English law' and that the terms of the section 'appear to have been taken from the draft Civil Code of New York with slight verbal alteration'. It follows from these excerpts that the English law has no provision parallel to Section 8 of the Act and as such recourse to English decisions for determining the scope of Section 8 may not be very apposite.
Sections 7 to 9 of the Contract Act describe the various modes in which proposal may be accepted, and, if I may say so, Section 8 provides the acceptance of a proposal by conduct as against other modes of acceptance, such as verbal or written communication contemplated by Sections 7 and 9. Therefore, in a way Section 8 provides undoubtedly a unique provision in the Contract Act. It embraces a case to cite an instance, of a reward offered for the finder of a lost article. If a person restores the found article to the one who offered the reward, without accepting the latter's proposal in any other manner, the act or conduct or restoration itself is considered sufficient acceptance of the proposal to merit the
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reward. True that it is an ordinary rule of law that an acceptance of an offer made ought to be notified to the person who makes the offer. But since such notification is required for the benefit of the person making the offer the latter may dispense with notice to himself if he deems that course to be desirable. If the person making the offer to another intimates him expressly or impliedly a particular mode of acceptance the offeree can adopt that mode to conclude a binding bargain. If a man writes to another to send him certain goods, then the dispatch of goods would surely amount to acceptance of the offer."
49. In LIC v. Raja Vasireddy Komalavalli Kamba this Court on acceptance of provisions as envisaged under Sections 7 and 8 of the Contract Act, 1872 opined :
"14. … Acceptance must be signified by some act or acts agreed on by the parties or from which the law raises a presumption of acceptance."
In the case reported in (2006) 5 SCC 311 (Bhagwati Prasad Pawan Kumar vs. Union of India and Others), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that:
"14. In Amar Nath Chand Prakash v. Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. the facts were that the respondent gave a contract to the appellant for doing certain construction work which was completed by the first week of March, 1965. The appellant Company prepared a final bill of the work done on 29-3-1965. The appellant signed a no-claim declaration and also gave a receipt in token of accepting the amount found due to the appellant. The appellant thereafter raised a dispute alleging short payment, etc. It invoked the arbitration clause and called upon the respondent to appoint an arbitrator. When the respondent did not respond to the notice issued by the appellant, an application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act was filed by the appellant. The respondent
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contested the application contending that the appellant having given a no-claim certificate in final settlement of its claim and having accepted the payment by means of a cheque in full and final settlement of its dues, it amounted to discharge of the contract along with which the arbitration agreement also stood extinguished and, therefore, there was no dispute capable of being referred to arbitration. The High Court considered the material on record and found that though the declaration was signed by the appellant, as also the memorandum of payment, in the final bill there was an endorsement to the effect that the appellant had accepted the payment under protest. This was done on 29-3- 1965 whereas the cheque was actually prepared and delivered much later on 14-12-1965. In the absence of any oral evidence, the High Court was required to construe the document in order to ascertain the intention of the contractor in making such an endorsement and of the Company in permitting such an endorsement to be made. In the facts of the case the High Court observed that the endorsement dispelled any intention to remit the performance in regard to the balance of the claim. On the contrary, it clearly evinced that the receipt of the amount was not unconditional so as to effect the discharge of the contract. On the contrary, it safeguarded the position of the contractor and indicated that he was not accepting the payment without any reservation. The appellant specifically stated that he was receiving the money "under protest" which clearly amounted to making a reservation. The reservation could only be that the acceptance of payment was not in discharge of the contract. Consequently, it could not be said that the appellant dispensed with, or remitted the performance of the contract, for the rest of his dues. Reliance was placed on the principle enunciated in Day v. McLea [(1889) 22 QBD 610 : 58 LJQB 293 : 60 LT 947 (CA)] in which it was observed:
"If a person sends a sum of money on the terms that it is to be taken, if at all, in satisfaction of a larger claim: and if the money is kept it is a question of fact as to the terms upon which it is so kept. Accord and
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satisfaction imply an agreement to take the money in satisfaction of the claim in respect of which it is sent. If the accord is a question of agreement, there must be either two minds agreeing or one of the two persons acting in such a way as to induce the other to think that the money is taken in satisfaction of the claim, and to cause him to act upon that view. In either case it is a question of fact."
19. It is well settled that an offer may be accepted by conduct. But conduct would only amount to acceptance if it is clear that the offeree did the act with the intention (actual or apparent) of accepting the offer. The decisions which we have noticed above also proceed on this principle. Each case must rest on its own facts. The courts must examine the evidence to find out whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the conduct of the "offeree" was such as amounted to an unequivocal acceptance of the offer made. If the facts of the case disclose that there was no reservation in signifying acceptance by conduct, it must follow that the offer has been accepted by conduct. On the other hand, if the evidence discloses that the "offeree" had reservation in accepting the offer, his conduct may not amount to acceptance of the offer in terms of Section 8 of the Contract Act."
In the present case also on 14thOctober, 2014, Mr. K. Prasad, the representative of the defendant no.1 had forwarded a copy of Mutual Non-Disclosure Agreement to the plaintiff by an email (Exhibit-A). The said fact was pleaded by the plaintiff at paragraph 5 of the plaint, the defendant no.1 has not denied the same in the written statement. The plaintiff with the minor modifications in the said agreement sent the same to the defendant no.1 for perusal and if the agreement is correct, the same is to be printed and will be sent to the defendant. On 4th December, 2014, the defendant no.1 through the email accepted the
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modifications in the Mutual Non-Disclosure Agreement and instructed to forward signed copy of the agreement to the defendant (Exhibit-D). The plaintiff after preparing the Mutual Non-Disclosure Agreement in the non-judicial bond paper in two sets and after executing the same sent to the defendant at its registered office by a letter dated 16th December, 2014 with the request to return one set of the agreement to the plaintiff for their record (Exhibit-S). Though the defendant no.1 has not sent one signed copy of the agreement to the plaintiff but the plaintiff and the defendant no. 1 continued with the exchange of mails with regard to several properties and on 31stDecember, 2014, the plaintiff by an email forwarded the proposal for the warehouse of Sreerampore property along with particulars for identification (Exhibit- U Collectively). On receipt of the details of the Sreerampore property, the defendant no.1 by an email dated 12thJanuary, 2015, requested the plaintiff to send postal address of the property and by an email dated 13thJanuary, 2015, the plaintiff has provided complete postal address of the Sreerampore property to the defendant no.1 (Exhibit-V and W). On 3rdFebruary, 2015, the representative of the defendant no.2 namely Pankaj Dubey sent an email to the plaintiff copy to Satapathy requesting to share documents and pictures of the Sreerampore property and on the same day the plaintiff had forwarded Google Earth Pictures and link showing the warehouse for the reference of the defendants (Exhibit-X and Y Collectively). On 4th February, 2015, the plaintiff has sent an email to the Mr. Dubey and Mr. Satapathy by enclosing more documents like conversion and No
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Objection certificates obtained from the concern authorities relating to Sreerampore Property (Exhibit-Z). On 3rdFebruary, 2015, the plaintiff had again sent several documents, photographs and Auto CAD DWG to the defendants with respect Sreerampore property (Exhibit-CC Collectively).
On the request of the representative of the defendant no.2 namely Satapathy, the plaintiff fixed the site visit on 5thFebruary, 2015 at 9.30 am but Mr. Satapathy did not reach the office of the plaintiff at the date and time fixed by the plaintiff though the representative of the plaintiff waited till 12.30 PM. The said fact is admitted by the defendant no.2 in the written statement at paragraphs 7(i), (j) and (k). On 20thFebruary, 2015, the plaintiff had again sent details of other four properties by way of email and the same was also received by the defendants (Exhibit-BB Collectively). On 22ndApril, 2015, the plaintiff by an email again requested the defendant no.1 to send back one copy of the agreement for record of the plaintiff and in the said email, the plaintiff has enclosed other emails wherein, the plaintiff had requested the defendant no.1 for sending back one signed copy of the agreement (Exhibit-DD Collectively).
Considering the above facts and circumstances this Court finds that even after receipt of Mutual Non-Discloser Agreement by the defendant no.1, the defendant no.1 had never informed the plaintiff that the defendant no. 1 will not execute the agreement or does not agree with the terms and conditions of the agreement. There is no evidence to prove that the defendant no. 1 has informed that the
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defendant no. 1 is not intending to continue with any deal with the plaintiff, thus this Court safely held that there is concluded contract between the plaintiff and the defendant no.1.
The defendant no.1 relied upon the judgment reported in (1990)
4 SCC 147 (Brij Mohan & Others vs. Sugra Begum and Others) wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that:
"16. The High Court further held that it must be remembered that this agreement is in respect of a valuable property and the main intention was to reduce the terms of agreement into writing and when the parties are very much relying on the alleged oral agreement dated May 3, 1979, there would definitely have been a reference in Exs. A-1 and A-2 to the oral agreement said to have taken place on May 3, 1979. The absence of the same in Exs. A-1 and A-2 again throws a serious doubt about the alleged agreement, dated May 3, 1979. In any event the mere fact that there was a meeting between plaintiffs 1 and 2 and DW 2 on May 3, 1979 does not establish that there was a concluded contract between the parties on that day because admittedly defendant 1 was not present at that time. What all had happened according to PWs 1 and 3 is that they offered to pay Rs 10,00,000 for the suit building and DW 2 having contacted defendant 1 over the phone conveyed to them her acceptance of the price fixed. In the absence of evidence that the other terms also were discussed over the phone and settled at that time and defendant 1 agreed for the terms, it cannot be said that there is a concluded contract on May 3, 1979. The fixation of price is only one of the terms of the contract and by mere acceptance of the price it cannot be said that there is a concluded contract between the parties in the absence of proof of fixation of other conditions mentioned in Exs. A-1 and A-2, viz., undertaking by defendant 1 to obtain permission from Urban Land Ceiling Authority and the amount of advance to be paid. It is not the case of the plaintiffs 1 and 2 that prior to May 5, 1979 there was an agreement between the parties as to the amount of advance to be paid. The High Court
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thus held that in the absence of any consensus being arrived at between the two contracting parties about these important aspects of the agreement it cannot be said that there is a concluded oral contract between the parties on May 3, 1979.
20. We have given our careful consideration to the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the parties and have thoroughly perused the record. We agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants to the extent that there is no requirement of law that an agreement or contract of sale of immovable property should only be in writing. However, in a case where the plaintiffs come forward to seek a decree for specific performance of contract of sale of immovable property on the basis of an oral agreement alone, heavy burden lies on the plaintiffs to prove that there was consensus ad idem between the parties for a concluded oral agreement for sale of immovable property. Whether there was such a concluded oral contract or not would be a question of fact to be determined in the facts and circumstances of each individual case. It has to be established by the plaintiffs that vital and fundamental terms for sale of immovable property were concluded between the parties orally and a written agreement if any to be executed subsequently would only be a formal agreement incorporating such terms which had already been settled and concluded in the oral agreement.
21. Now we shall examine the facts and circumstances of the present case in order to find whether the plaintiffs have been able to prove that there was a concluded oral agreement between the parties on May 3, 1979 in order to seek decree for specific performance of contract in their favour. Admitted facts of the case are that the transaction in question related to a sale of an immovable property for no less than a sum of Rs 10,00,000 in May 1979. May 3, 1979 is the crucial date on which the oral agreement is alleged to have been concluded. Admittedly on that date even earnest/advance money had not been settled. It was also not settled as to when the
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earnest/advance amount and the balance amount of sale consideration would be paid. It was also not settled as to when the final sale deed would be executed and registered. No talk with regard to any terms of the oral agreement took place in the presence of the vendor defendant 1 on May 3, 1979. It was also not decided whether actual possession or only symbolical possession of the premises in question would be given by the vendor. No consideration actually passed even on May 6, 1979 and negotiations failed. Apart from the above admitted facts of the case we would consider as to what happened on May 3, 1979. The plaintiffs have alleged in the plaint that in the third week of April 1979 plaintiffs 1 and 2 along with Shri Ibrahim Moosa and Shri Arif Ali went to the residence of the defendant who was insisting on the payment of Rs 10,00,000 as the sale price. At the said meeting the husband of the defendant was also present. Plaintiffs 1 and 2 increased their price from Rs 7,00,000 to Rs 8,00,000. Defendant 1 said that she would think over and inform the plaintiffs 1 and 2 through Shri Arif Ali. On May 3, 1979 plaintiffs 1 and 2 along with Shri Ibrahim Moosa met Shri Arif Ali. He stated that the defendant was agreeable to sell the plan schedule property to plaintiffs only for Rs 10,00,000 and not a pie less. Thereupon the plaintiffs agreed to pay Rs 10,00,000 as the sale price. Shri Arif Ali after getting the confirmation of acceptance of the said offer of plaintiffs 1 and 2 from defendant 1 said that plaintiffs 1 and 2 should meet the defendants on May 6, 1979 and that she would in the meanwhile purchase the stamp papers for making the formal agreement for sale
incorporating the oral agreement arrived at. Then there is an averment with regard to the meeting of May 6, 1979 between plaintiffs 1 and 2 along with Shri Ibrahim Moosa and defendant 1 and her husband in the presence of Shri Arif Ali. It has been alleged that in the said meeting of May 6, 1979 the amount of earnest money to be paid, time for registration of the sale deed etc. were decided. Now it is an admitted case of the plaintiffs themselves that negotiations failed on May 6, 1979 and defendant 1 resiled to sign any of the receipts nor accepted any earnest/advance money nor any agreement was even typed on the stamp papers nor signed by defendant 1."
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The judgment relied by the defendant is distinguishable from the facts and circumstances of the present case. In the present case, the defendant no.1 had sent the draft copy of the Mutual Non-Disclosure Agreement and in reply, the plaintiff after some modifications returned to the defendant no.1 and the defendant no.1 has accepted the modifications. The defendant had never disclosed that the defendant has not agreed with the terms and conditions of the agreement or have not accepted the same.
The defendants have relied upon the Master Services Agreement entered between the defendant no.1 and the defendant no.2 (Exhibit-
2). The said Master Service Agreement was entered between the defendant no.1 and defendant no. 2 on 22ndDecember, 2014 but during the examination in chief of the defendant no.1 witness at Question No. 31, a specific question was put to the witness "How and when the defendant no. 2 entered into the picture with regard to the property forming subject matter of the suit?/The defendant no.1 rejected the proposal .After that they appointed a logistic service provider which is defendant no.2 and on from February 2015, the defendant no.2 entered into the picture."
The defendant no.1 has admitted during his cross-examination with regard to the correspondences between the plaintiff and the defendant no.1 but during his examination, the defendant no. 1 has taken the stand that the plaintiff has committed inordinate delay in finalising the warehouse but the defendant no. 1 has not taken the
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said defence in the written statement. The defendant has also not brought any evidence on record to show that the defendant has informed the plaintiff that they have rejected the proposal of the plaintiff.
In the case reported in (2018) 11 SCC 652 (Shivaji Balaram Haibatti -vs- Avinash Maruthi Pawar), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that:
"24. First, the respondent (defendant) had not raised such plea in his written statement. In other words, the respondent did not set up such defence in the written statement. Second, the trial court, therefore, had no occasion to frame any issue on such plea for want of any factual foundation in the written statement. Third, the trial court and the first appellate court, in these circumstances, had no occasion to record any finding on this plea either way. Fourth, in the light of these three reasonings, the High Court ought to have seen that such plea really did not arise for consideration because in order that any question is involved in the case, the party concerned should lay its factual foundation in the pleading and invite finding on such plea. Fifth, the High Court failed to see the case set up by the respondent in his written statement. As mentioned above, the defence of the respondent was that he had denied the appellant's title over the suit shop and then set up a plea of adverse possession contending that he has become the owner of the suit shop by virtue of adverse possession, which according to him, was from time immemorial.
25. It was clear that the respondent never claimed that he was in possession of the suit shop as tenant of the appellant's predecessor-in-title. On the other hand, the respondent had asserted his ownership right over the suit shop on the strength of his long adverse possession.
26. It is these issues, which were gone into by the two courts and were concurrently decided
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by them against the respondent. These issues, in our opinion, should have been examined by the High Court with a view to find out as to whether these findings contain any legal error so as to call for any interference in second appeal. The High Court, however, did not undertake this exercise and rather affirmed these findings when it did not consider it proper to frame any substantial question of law. It is a settled principle of law that the parties to the suit cannot travel beyond the pleadings so also the court cannot record any finding on the issues which are not part of pleadings. In other words, the court has to record the findings only on the issues which are part of the pleadings on which parties are contesting the case. Any finding recorded on an
issue dehors the pleadings is without
jurisdiction. Such is the case here."
In view of the settled position of law, the defense taken by the defendant that the defendant no.1 has rejected the proposal of the plaintiff cannot be accepted.
At the time of evidence of the defendant no. 2 witness (DW-2) documents being page Nos. 83 to 96 of the Judges brief of documents were exhibited as Exhibit-4 (with Objection) and the sais documents are the emails and property related documents with respect of Sreerampore property with CBRE and other local representative. The emails are dated 3rdFebruary, 2015 to 5thFebruary, 2015 and the documents appearing at page nos. 93 to 96 (Exhibit-4 Collectively) are the similar documents sent by plaintiff to the defendants i.e. Mr. Satapathy and Mr. Pankaj Dubey on 3rdFebruary, 2015 at 1:14 PM (Exhibit-CC Collectively) but the email which the defendants are relying upon are of 5thFebruary, 2015 at 7:19 PM. On 4thFebruary,
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2015 at 7:14 PM, the plaintiff had again sent documents to the defendants by mail (Exhibit-Z).
In one hand, the defendant no. 2 has made out a case in the written statement that the plaintiff the defendant could not considered the said site from the plaintiff as the plaintiff fail to complete the site visit on the other had from the statement of the defendant no. 2 and from the documents it is established that the defendants have already visited the site of 4thFebruary, 2015. The said fact is also admitted by the defendant during his cross examination at Question No. 177. From the act of the defendants it proves that the defendants in connivance with each other after obtaining all the details of the properties including the property of Sreerampore from plaintiff have neglected the plaintiff only to avoid to perform the contract entered between the plaintiff and the defendant no.1.
In the case reported in (2004) 6 SCC 516 (Link International & Anr. -vs- Mandya National Paper Mills Ltd.), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that :
"8. In this case, admittedly, the appellants had acted as agents. We will presume that they had not entered into the contract on behalf of the principal. The fact still remains that two courts have, on the basis of evidence, concluded that the appellants had facilitated playing of a fraud upon the respondent. If that be so, the appellants as agents would be personally liable to the respondent for whatever loss is caused to the respondent. Section 233 of the Contract Act permits the respondents to recover either from the agent or from the principal or from both. Nothing could be shown to us that the findings given by the trial court and the High Court that the appellants had facilitated
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fraud are not correct. In this view of the matter, even if the reasoning given by the two courts below is not correct, the appellants would still be liable to the respondent for the loss caused to them. We clarify that we have not concluded that the reasoning of the trial court and the High Court is not correct."
In the case reported in AIR 1967 All 382 (Firm Rupram Kailash Nath -vs- Co-operative Union, Mallawah & Anr.), the Hon'ble Allahabad High Court held that :
"13. In the present case the scope of the authority of the second defendant has to be inferred from the circumstances of the case. He was acting as the sales agent of the first defendant and was in its employment and apart from his salary received some commission as well. There is nothing to show that the plaintiff believed that when he sought the purchase of cloth on credit his act was not within the scope of his authority. If the second defendant had committed any fraud while acting in the course of business of the first defendant, it would make the first defendant liable for the act of its agent. The rule of law on the subject was quoted from Story on Agency in Mc. Gowan and Co. Ltd. v. Dyer(1873) 8 QB 141 as follows:
"……the general rule that the principal is liable to third persons in a civil suit for the frauds, deceits, concealment,
misrepresentations, torts, negligences, and other malfeasances or misfeasances and omissions or duty of his agent in the course of his employment, although the principal did not authorise, or justify, or participate in, or indeed know of such misconduct, or even if he forebade the acts, or disapproved of them."
"But although the principal is thus liable for the torts and negligences of his agent yet we are to understand the doctrine with its just limitations, that the tort or negligence occurs in the course of the agency. For the principal is
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not liable for the torts or negligences of his agent in any matters beyond the scope of the agency, unless he has expressly authorised them to be done, or he has subsequently adopted them for his own use and benefit."
17. In the present case, as mentioned above, the second defendant was acting within the scope of his authority in making the purchase of cloth from the plaintiff for the first defendant. If he made the purchase on credit and committed fraud, the first defendant was liable for the act of his agent. So far as the plaintiff was concerned, he had no reason to believe that the second defendant was not acting within the scope of his authority in making the purchase on credit for the first defendant. The court below was therefore in error in modifying the decree of the trial court and in decreeing the suit as against the second defendant only. The trial court has rightly decreed the suit against both the defendants. The appeal is allowed with costs, the decree of the lower appellate court is modified and the suit is decreed against both the defendants in terms of the decree passed by the trial court."
As per the claim of the plaintiff the total area of the Sreerampore property is measuring about 85000 Sq.Ft which is to be let out @ Rs. 20/- per sq.ft. per month and thus the plaintiff has suffered financial loss of Rs. 34,00,000/-. This Court held that there is a concluded contract between the plaintiff and the defendant no.1, the defendants are in connivance with each other have avoided to perform the contract. It is also admitted that the defendant no.2 had entered an agreement with the Sreerampore property and not the defendant no.1. Though the defendants have taken the stand that the defendant have obtained documents from the CBRE but the said documents were also forwarded by the plaintiff to the defendant no.2 on the
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request of the defendant no.2. The defendants have not brought any evidence on record to prove that the defendant no.2 has paid the brokerage charges to the CBRE and the defendant no.2 had entered into an agreement with the landlord with the help of CBRE. Considering the above facts and circumstances this Court finds that the defendants have obtained details of several properties from the plaintiff including the property of Sreerampore but only to avoid the obligation of paying the brokerage charges as well as service tax, the defendant no.2 directly entered into an agreement with the landlord. In view of the above, Issue nos. 4 to 8 are decided in favour of the plaintiff.
e. ISSUE NOS. 9, 10 and 11 are taken up together for consideration:
Issue No.9 Are not the defendants liable to
compensate the plaintiff as per the particulars as stated in paragraph 35 of the plaint?
Issue No.10 Is the plaintiff entitled to any
interest @ 18% on the sum of Rs.1,00,00,000/- on
and from 31stDecember, 2014 till 18thNovember,
2015 from the defendants?
Issue No.11 Whether the plaintiff is entitled to
a decree as prayed for?
This Court already held that there is a concluded contract between the plaintiff and the defendant no.1, the defendants are in connivance with each other have avoided to perform the contract. As per the agreement between the parties, the plaintiff is entitled to brokerage charges plus service tax. The total area of the property is 85000 sq.ft and the monthly rent is Rs. 20/- per sq.ft. per month thus
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the defendants are jointly and severally liable to pay a sum of Rs. 34,00,000/- plus service tax to the plaintiff. As there is no evidence that the plaintiff has suffered any damages by way of loss of reputation and thus this Court is not inclined to grant any damages to the plaintiff. The plaintiff is entitled to get an amount of Rs.34,00,000/- along with interest at the rate of 12% per annum with effect from 7thJanuary 2016 i.e. from the date of presentation of plaint till the realization of the total decretal amount along with Service Tax as applicable.
In view of the above, Issue Nos. 9, 10 and 11 are decided accordingly.
The defendants are directed to pay jointly and severally a sum of Rs.34,00,000/- along with interest @12% per annum from 7th January, 2016 till the realization of the said amount along with service tax to the plaintiff.
C.S-COM 69 of 2024 (Old Nos: CS 2 of 2016 & CS 45 of 2024) is thus disposed of. Decree be drawn accordingly. (Krishna Rao, J.)