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(Cr.A.No.282/2016)
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR
Criminal Appeal No.282 of 2016 {Arising out of judgment dated 22-2-2016 in Sessions Trial No.27/2015 of the learned Sessions Judge, Baikunthpur, District Korea} Basant Rajwade, S/o Jagarnath Rajwade, Aged about 36 years, R/o Village Odgi, Kenapara, P.S. Baikunthpur, District Korea (C.G.) (In Jail)
---- Appellant
Versus
State of Chhattisgarh, through District Magistrate, District Korea (C.G.) ---- Respondent
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For Appellant: Mr. Pushkar Sinha, Advocate. For Respondent/State: Mr. Afroz Khan, Panel Lawyer. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hon'ble Shri Sanjay K. Agrawal and Hon'ble S hri Sanjay Agrawal, JJ.
Judgment On Board (20/12/2023)
Sanjay K. Agrawal, J.
1. This criminal appeal preferred by the appellant herein under Section 374(2) of the CrPC is directed against the impugned judgment of conviction recorded and sentence awarded by the learned Sessions Judge, by which the appellant has been convicted for offence under Section 302 of the IPC and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and further sentenced to pay a fine of ₹ 500/-, in default, to further undergo additional rigorous imprisonment for three months.
2. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 16-11-2014 at 5:00-5:30 a.m., at Village Odgi, Kenapara, Police Station Baikunthpur, District
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Korea, the appellant strangulated his wife Sumitra to death and thereby committed the offence. Further case of the prosecution is that Jagarnath Rajwade (PW-9) - father-in-law of deceased Sumitra along with Shivprasad Rajwade (PW-4), Hem Kumar & Umashankar lodged report on 16-11-2014 at Police Station Baikunthpur that on 15-11-2014, Sumitra had gone for harvesting of paddy and in the night, after taking dinner, she was sleeping and in the morning, younger daughter-in-law of Jagarnath namely, Hemwati noticed that Sumitra was hanging on the sealing of her house and she died, then all other persons including the accused/ appellant herein reached to the spot and saw that Sumitra was lying on the floor. Morgue intimation Ex.P-12 was lodged by Jagarnath Rajwade (PW-9), inquest Ex.P-6 was conducted, crime details form Ex.P-13 was prepared, FIR Ex.P-23 was registered against the accused/appellant and postmortem Ex.P-16 was conducted by Dr. Surendra Paikra (PW-11) and cause of death was stated to be asphyxia resulting in respiratory arrest due to strangulation and nature of death was homicidal. The accused was arrested vide Ex.P-25 and his memorandum statement was recorded vide Ex.P-4 pursuant to which one iron parsool, a sharp-edged weapon, used in the commission of offence, has been seized from his possession (kitchen) vide Ex.P-5.
3. Statements of the witnesses were recorded under Section 161 of the CrPC. After usual investigation, the accused / appellant was charge-sheeted for offence under Section 302 of the IPC and charge-sheet was filed before the jurisdictional criminal court and
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the case was committed to the Court of Sessions, Baikunthpur, District Korea where the trial was conducted.
4. The accused / appellant abjured the guilt and entered into defence. In order to bring home the offence, the prosecution examined as many as sixteen witnesses and exhibited 26 documents as also Articles A-1 to A-4 - photographs of the deceased. The defence has examined none and no document has been exhibited.
5. The trial Court upon appreciation of oral and documentary evidence on record and considering the homicidal nature of death of the deceased and also considering that it is the appellant who has caused the murder of his wife, proceeded to convict and sentence him under Section 302 of the IPC in the manner mentioned in the opening paragraph of this judgment against which the instant appeal under Section 374(2) of the CrPC has been preferred.
6. Mr. Pushkar Sinha, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, would submit that Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 has wrongly been invoked as according to the evidence of witnesses Subans Rajwade (PW-1) & Jagarnath (PW-9), apart from the appellant & the deceased, other persons were also residing in the house and relationship of the appellant & the deceased were not strained, therefore, in that view of the matter and in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Nagendra Sah v. State of Bihar1, the appellant is entitled for acquittal on the ground of benefit of doubt.
7. Mr. Afroz Khan, learned Panel Lawyer appearing for the State /
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respondent, would support the impugned judgment and would submit that death of the deceased was homicidal in nature and it is the appellant who has caused the death of his wife Sumitra. He would further submit that the prosecution has been able to bring home the offence against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. As such, with the aid of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, the appellant has rightly been convicted under Section 302 of the IPC.
8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the original records of the trial Court with utmost circumspection and carefully as well.
9. The question whether the death of the deceased was homicidal in nature has rightly been answered by the trial Court in affirmative relying upon the statement of the medical officer Dr. Surendra Paikra (PW-11), who has proved the postmortem report Ex.P-16, which is a pure and simple finding of fact based on the evidence available on record, it is neither perverse nor contrary to the record and we hereby affirm the said finding.
10. Now, the question is, whether the appellant is the author of the crime in question for which the trial Court has invoked Section 106 of the Evidence Act holding that the appellant & the deceased were in the house and dead body of the deceased was found inside the house and therefore in absence of explanation of the appellant in his examination under Section 313 of the CrPC, the appellant is guilty of the offence under Section 302 of the IPC.
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11. Now, the question would be, whether the trial Court has rightly invoked Section 106 of the Evidence Act.
12. Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, states as under: -
"106. Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge.—When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him."
13. This provision states that when any fact is specially within the knowledge of any person the burden of proving that fact is upon him. This is an exception to the general rule contained in Section 101, namely, that the burden is on the person who asserts a fact. The principle underlying Section 106 which is an exception to the general rule governing burden of proof applies only to such matters of defence which are supposed to be especially within the knowledge of the other side. To invoke Section 106 of the Evidence Act, the main point to be established by prosecution is that the accused persons were in such a position that they could have special knowledge of the fact concerned.
14. In the matter of Shambhu Nath Mehra v. The State of Ajmer2, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that the general rule that in a criminal case the burden of proof is on the prosecution and Section 106 of the Evidence Act is certainly not intended to relieve it of that duty. On the contrary, it is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible, or at any rate disproportionately difficult, for the prosecution, to establish facts which are "especially" within the knowledge of the accused and
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which he could prove without difficulty or inconvenience. The Supreme Court while considering the word "especially" employed in Section 106 of the Evidence Act, speaking through Vivian Bose, J., observed as under: -
"11. … The word "especially" stresses that it means facts that are preeminently or exceptionally within his knowledge. If the section were to be interpreted otherwise, it would lead to the very startling conclusion that in a murder case the burden lies on the accused to prove that he did not commit the murder because who could know better than he whether he did or did not. It is evident that that cannot be the intention and the Privy Council has twice refused to construe this section, as reproduced in certain other Acts outside India, to mean that the burden lies on an accused person to show that he did not commit the crime for which he is tried. These cases are Attygalle v. The King, 1936 PC 169 (AIR V
23) (A) and Seneviratne v. R. 1936-3 ER 36 AT P. 49 (B)."
Their Lordships further held that Section 106 of the Evidence Act cannot be used to undermine the well established rule of law that save in a very exceptional class of case, the burden is on the prosecution and never shifts.
15. Similarly, the Supreme Court in the matter of Gurcharan Singh v. State of Punjab3, while considering the provisions contained in Sections 103 & 106 of the Evidence Act, held that the burden of proving a plea specially set up by an accused which may absolve him from criminal liability, certainly lies upon him, but neither the application of Section 103 nor that of 106 could, however, absolve the prosecution from the duty of discharging its general or primary burden of proving the prosecution case beyond reasonable doubt.
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It was further held by their Lordships that it is only when the prosecution has led evidence which, if believed, will sustain a conviction, or which makes out a prima facie case, that the question arises of considering facts of which the burden of proof may lie upon the accused. Their Lordships also held that the burden of proving a plea specifically set up by an accused, which may absolve him from criminal liability, certain lies upon him.
16. The principle of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Gurcharan Singh (supra) has been followed with approval by their Lordships in the matter of Sawal Das v. State Of Bihar . of Bihar4 and it has been held that burden of proving the case against the accused was on the prosecution irrespective of whether or not the accused has made out a specific defence.
17. The decision of the Supreme Court in Shambhu Nath Mehra
(supra) was followed with approval in Nagendra Sah (supra) in which it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that where there is no evidence on record to show that relationship between the appellant and the deceased was strained in any manner and that other members of the family of the appellant were present in the house when the incident took place, the chain is not complete and in that view of the matter, their Lordships set aside the judgment invoking Section 106 of the Evidence Act and observed as under: -
"16. As can be seen from the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, the in-laws of the deceased were very much staying in the same premises where the
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appellant and deceased were staying. PW 1 stated that he saw the father-in-law of the deceased extinguishing the fire. The learned trial Judge has specifically discarded the testimony of PWs 1 to 5. But PW 6 Shri Vijay Kumar Gupta stated that he noticed that family members of the accused were extinguishing the fire. The evidence adduced by the prosecution shows that at the time of the alleged incident, there were other members of the family of the accused with the accused in his house. However, it is not even the case of the prosecution that the relationship between the appellant and his deceased wife was strained or that the relationship between the deceased wife and the appellant's parents was strained. On the contrary, some of the prosecution witnesses have stated that their relationship was cordial.
19. In this case, as mentioned above, neither the prosecution witnesses have deposed to that effect nor any other material has been placed on record to show that the relationship between the appellant and the deceased was strained in any manner. Moreover, the appellant was not the only person residing in the house where the incident took place and it is brought on record that the parents of the appellant were also present on the date of the incident in the house. The fact that other members of the family of the appellant were present shows that there could be another hypothesis which cannot be altogether excluded. Therefore, it can be said that the facts established do not rule out the existence of any other hypothesis. The facts established cannot be said to be consistent only with one hypothesis of the guilt of the appellant.
22. Thus, Section 106 of the Evidence Act will apply to those cases where the prosecution has succeeded in establishing the facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding the existence of certain other facts which are within the special knowledge of the accused. When the accused fails to offer proper explanation about the existence of said other facts, the court can always draw an appropriate inference.
23. When a case is resting on circumstantial evidence, if the accused fails to offer a reasonable explanation in discharge of burden placed on him by virtue of Section
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106 of the Evidence Act, such a failure may provide an additional link to the chain of circumstances. In a case governed by circumstantial evidence, if the chain of circumstances which is required to be established by the prosecution is not established, the failure of the accused to discharge the burden under Section 106 of the Evidence Act is not relevant at all. When the chain is not complete, falsity of the defence is no ground to convict the accused."
18. Reverting to the facts of the case, it is quite vivid that though the incident took place in the house of the appellant and in room of the appellant, but as per the evidence of Subans Rajwade (PW-1) - brother of the appellant and brother-in-law (dewar) of the deceased, and Smt. Devmati (PW-2) - wife of Subans Rajwade (PW-1), on the date of offence, along with the appellant & the deceased, both these witnesses (PW-1 & PW-2), Jagarnath (PW-9) and other members of the family were also residing in the house. Similarly, Jagarnath (PW-9) - father-in-law of the deceased and father of the appellant, has also made similar statement in paragraph 8 of his evidence that on the fateful day, all family members were present in the house and they have taken dinner together also. Furthermore, father & mother of the deceased namely, Mohar Sai (PW-13) & Rambai (PW-14), respectively, have sought to say that the appellant and his family members used to harass the deceased citing otherwise illicit relationship of the deceased with other person, but except their self-serving statement, there is no evidence against the appellant and they are interested witnesses, therefore, it would be unsafe to rely upon their testimony that it is the motive for offence. Moreover, no specific question has been
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put to the accused in his examination under Section 313 of the CrPC to the effect that whether, on the date of offence, the appellant & the deceased were all alone, no other person was present in the house and the dead body was found in the house of the appellant. In that view of the matter, in light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Nagendra Sah (supra), the appellant is entitled for acquittal on the ground of benefit of doubt.
19. Accordingly, the impugned judgment dated 22-2-2016 passed in Sessions Trial No.27/2015 by the Sessions Judge, Baikunthpur, District Korea, is hereby set aside. The appellant stands acquitted of the charge framed against him for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC. He is in jail. He shall be forthwith set at liberty, unless he is required in connection with any other case.
20. The appeal is allowed.
21. Let a certified copy of this judgment along with the original record be transmitted to the trial Court concerned for necessary information and action, if any. A certified copy of the judgment may also be sent to the concerned Jail Superintendent forthwith wherein the appellant is suffering the jail sentence.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Sanjay K. Agrawal) (Sanjay Agrawal)
Judge Judge
Soma