J U D G M E N T
The above original petition has been filed challenging Ext.P9 judgment, whereby Ext.P8 order has been interfered with.
2. Petitioners are respondent Nos.1, 3 and 4 in Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No.44/2022 on the file of the Additional District Court-III, Palakkad, and in Pauper Original Petition No.1/2014 on the file of Principal Subordinate Judge's Court, Palakkad. The 1strespondent herein is the appellant in the above CMA and the petitioner in the above POP. The above POP was filed for filing a suit as an indigent person. The ultimate prayer in the purported suit is to declare that Document Nos.700/2011 and 701/2011 of S.R.O., Palakkad as null and void, which were executed by one late Shanmughan, who is the father of the parties herein.
3. The Court fee to be paid in the proceedings is ₹83,950/-. Since the 1strespondent has no means to pay the said Court fee, Ext.P1 POP No.1/2014 was filed before the Principal Subordinate Judge's Court, Palakkad. Ext.P2 objection was filed by the petitioners. The specific contention taken in Ext.P2 is that the mandate of Order 33 Rule 2 of CPC has not been complied with and
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therefore, the original petition is liable to be dismissed under Order
33 Rule 5(a) of the CPC. However, the original petition was allowed by the trial court which was challenged in O.P.(C) No.2695/2016, and by Ext.P3 judgment dated 19.06.2018, the said original petition was allowed and the case was remitted back for fresh consideration. After remand, Ext.P4 application in I.A.No.403/2019 was filed to incorporate certain movables allegedly kept for sale in the shop as belonging to the petitioner, to which Ext.P5 objection was preferred, and the said petition was allowed as per Ext.P6. In Ext.P1 proceedings, a report was called for from the District Collector, and Ext.P7 report was submitted, wherein it is stated that the total income of the family is ₹72,000/-, consisting of the rental income of ₹48,000/-, and the salary of the son of the petitioner is ₹24,000/-. The petitioner would contend that since he is running a shop in the building, the income from the said shop would be over and above the total annual income. After considering the rival contentions, the trial court dismissed Ext.P1 POP as per Ext.P8 order. Aggrieved by the same, an appeal was preferred as CMA No.44/2022 and the Additional District Court-III, Palakkad allowed the CMA as per Ext.P9 judgment, which is impugned in this original petition.
4. The petitioner would contend that the original petitioner in Ext.P1 was examined as PW1 twice and the evidence given on
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these two occasions would stand contradictory. It is further contended that the husband of the petitioner is a lottery seller and her son has also got his own engagements with corresponding income, and the pauper original petitioner is running a shop at their residential house, and this would clearly prove that the pauper original petitioner has sufficient means to pay the Court fee. Though there is an allegation that the residential building is in the name of her husband, no document has been produced to substantiate the same. No bank passbook or any proof was produced to show the bank balance as well as the turnover from her shop. The learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that all these things would constitute the fact that the mandate contained in Order 33 Rule 2 of CPC is not complied with. Consequently the original petition is liable to be dismissed under Rule 5(a) of Order 33 of the CPC. The learned counsel for the petitioner relies on the judgment in Jagadamma v. Sheela [2021
(3) KLT 347] and also the judgment in Mathew v. State of Kerala [1996 (2) KLT 363]. The learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that it is without considering any of these aspects Ext.P9 judgment was passed allowing the POP.
5. For a proper consideration of the issues involved in this case, it is profitable to extract Order 33 Rule 2 as well as Order 33 Rule 5(a) of the CPC which is extracted as below:-
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"Order 33 Rule 2 - Contents of application.—Every application for permission to sue as an [indigent person] shall contain the particulars required in regard to plaints in suits: a schedule of any movable or immovable property belonging to the applicant, with the estimated value thereof, shall be annexed thereto; and it shall be signed and verified in the manner prescribed for the signing and verification of pleadings."
"Order 33 Rule 5. Rejection of application.—The Court shall reject an application for permission to sue as [an indigent person]—
(a) where it is not framed and presented in the manner prescribed by rule 2 and 3, or"
Order 33 Rule 2 deals with the contents of an application and mandates that every application for permission to sue as an indigent person shall contain the particulars required in this regard to plaints in suits and a schedule of any movable or immovable property belonging to the applicant, with the estimated value thereof, shall be annexed thereto. Whereas, Order 33 Rule 5 (a) mandates that the Court shall reject an application for permission to sue as indigent person where it is not framed and presented in the manner prescribed in Rules 2 and 3. On the basis of the same, it is the contention of the petitioner that the pauper original petitioner who was examined twice as PW1 has taken a contrary stand and since she has suppressed material facts in the application submitted, the application is liable to be rejected as mandated in Order 33 Rule 5(a) of CPC.
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6. Though the application submitted by the petitioner was allowed earlier, this Court has interfered with the same in Ext.P3 judgment. Though this Court has interfered with the order, the petitioner in POP was granted opportunity to adduce evidence to disprove the source of income and assets as pointed out by the defendants and also permitted the plaintiff to amend the petition and adduce further evidence regarding the assets and details thereof. The pauper original petitioner was examined as PW1. She has deposed that she is not having sufficient means to pay the required Court fee, and further deposed that she has no immovable property in her name and that her husband is an itinerary lottery vendor, and she has in her possession only B schedule wearing apparels. She has also denied the averments in the objection of Respondents No.1 and 4 that her husband is working as a supervisor in a textile shop and that her son is a company employee and that she has business in the name 'Sudha Stores'. In cross-examination, PW1 has stated that 2.5 cents of property and the house therein and the room rented out to Neethi Stores belonging to her and she is running a business by name 'Sudha Stores' in another room.
7. After the remand of the case, she has categorically deposed therein that the above property, and house and shop are in the name of her husband. The appellate Court has noted that
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PW1 is a rustic village women and it is quite normal for a village women to refer her husband's assets as her own and that when the deposition of PW1 is considered in the entirety it would reveal that the land and the house belongs to her husband and the room in that house is rented out to Neethi Stores. It is also pertinent to note that the District Collector, Palakkad, after due enquiry has submitted a report regarding the assets of the petitioner. A perusal of the Appellate Court judgment would reveal that, in the report dated 15.12.2021 of the District Collector, Palakkad, it is stated that the petitioner has no property in her name, and that the 3 cents of property wherein the house situates is in the name of her husband, and the room attached to that house is let out, and the annual rental income from that room is ₹48,000/-. It is also further reported by the District Collector that the petitioner's son is engaged in PSC coaching and is earning only an annual income of ₹24,000/-, and therefore, it is reported by the District Collector that total annual family income of the petitioner is only ₹72,000/- and her husband is an itinerant lottery vendor. So the report of the District Collector clearly reveals that the 3 cents of land and the house is in the name of her husband and that the total annual family income is only ₹72,000/-. The total Court fee required to be paid is ₹83,950/-.
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8. It is settled law by the judgment of this Court in
Pathumma Vs. KSEB [1997 (2) KLT 227], that mere possession of property is not sufficient, but the capacity to raise money to pay the Court fee is what is relevant for considering an application under Order 33 Rule 1. Petitioner has no assets of her own and the house belong to her husband. This Court in Resleth v. Indian Bank [1992 KHC 139] has held that, petitioner's wife can file an appeal as an indigent person even though her husband is a business man having sufficient income. The expression 'sufficient means' to pay Court fee has to be considered with a capacity or ability to raise sufficient funds in order to meet requisite Court fee and therefore, the sufficient income would always be appreciated in relation to income of petitioners or capacity to raise income and cannot be considered as a reference to income of his or her close relatives as held by this Court in Thankamani and Others v. Vijayadharan [2021 (5) KHC 395]. This Court has again considered in Thachireth Matathil Abdul Sathar v. Manoj Kumar and Others [2021 (6) KHC 694] that earning capacity of spouse of petitioner and financial capacity of parents of the petitioner are not grounds to dismiss a petition to sue as an indigent person. The learned counsel for the petitioner relying on the judgment in Jagadamma's case cited supra as well as the judgment in Mathew's case cited supra contended that the
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petitioner has suppressed material facts and therefore, the application is liable to be dismissed under Order 33 of Rule 5(a). There may be some discrepancies in the deposition of the petitioner as PW1 before the remand as well as after the remand. I am of the view that the said minor mistakes of an ordinary village women cannot be taken into consideration in isolation. When the evidence of PW1 is read in full as found by the Appellate Court, she has categorically stated that she has no property of her own. Further, the report of the District Collector also would clearly show that the petitioner has no property of her own and the house which is in 3 cents of land is in the ownership of her husband and that the total annual income is only ₹72,000/-. Even going by the report submitted by the District Collector, the total annual income of the petitioner's family is only ₹72,000/-. The issues considered in the
Jagadamma's case and Mathew's case are totally on different set of facts which cannot be applied in the facts and circumstances of the present case. This court in Pathumma v. KSEB [1997(2) KLT 227] has held in paragraph 3 as follows:
"3.If the requirement of law is that, a person has to sell whatever little he possess in this world or beg, borrow or steal to raise money for payment of court fee, that will be too harsh an approach to the problem resulting in manifest injustice cutting at the very root of the basic values and ideals of administration of justice in a welfare-State. While stating so we are only reminding ourselves of the constitutional
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obligations of the State to administer justice within its realm and the Directive Principles of the State Policy in Art. 39A which enjoins the State to ensure that opportunities of securing justice are not denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities. The laws' delays and expenses of litigation are the notorious twin spokes on the wheels of legal system and administration of justice. If the social and economic change is to be achieved through peaceful means, then their realization and effectuation which are directly linked to the availability and efficacy of expeditious and cheap legal remedies must receive top priority on the constitutional agenda."
In view of the above facts and circumstances, I am of the view that the impugned order Ext.P9 is not liable to be interfered with, and accordingly the above original petition is dismissed. Sd/-
VIJU ABRAHAM
JUDGE
sbk/-
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