O R D E R:
This civil revision petition is filed by the petitioners/Decree holders under Article 227 of the Constitution of India against the Orders passed by the learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Gajuwaka in EA.No.431 of 2015 in EP.No.273 of 2015 in OS.No.163 of 2004, dated 28.04.2016, wherein and whereby the executing Court allowed the petition filed by R1/claim petitioner under Order XXI Rule 97 read with Section 151 of Civil Procedure Code (in short CPC), and declared that the decree passed in OS.No.163 of 2004, dated 08.08.2011 cannot be enforced against R1, as R1 is able to establish a better title than the petitioners/Decree holders.
2. When this civil revision petition is coming up for hearing, the learned counsel for the revision petitioners filed a memo, requesting the Court to direct R1 to furnish details of legal representatives of R2/Judgment debtor.
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For which, the learned counsel for R1 objected. Then this Court also posted the matter today for hearing with regard to maintainability of revision petition against the Orders passed by the Court below under Order XXI Rule 97 of CPC.
3. Both learned counsel representing the revision petitioner as well as R1 consented to submit the arguments with regard to maintainability of revision petition. With the consent of both sides, this Court also taken up hearing of the civil revision petition and its maintainability against the Orders passed by the Court below under Order XXI Rule 97 of CPC. The learned counsel for R1 represented that he filed a memo before the Registry on 22.11.2022 showing events and dismissal of CMA.No.8 of 2016 preferred by the revision petitioners and prays to consider the same.
4. The present civil revision petition is filed by the petitioners/Decree holders stating that the Orders passed by the executing Court in EA No.431 of 2015, which filed by R1 under Order XXI Rule 97 read with Section 151 of
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CPC, which is erroneous and the executing Court ought not to have entertained the petition. The petitioners have also raised other grounds and the learned counsel for the revision petitioners filed written arguments with precedent law with regard to law of lis pendency.
5. The learned counsel for the revision petitioners would submit that the executing Court has exceeded its jurisdiction by entertaining the petition filed by R1, who is subsequent purchaser during pendency of the suit and the High Court exercising its revisional jurisdiction can entertain revision. He would further submit that entertaining the petition filed by R1,by the executing Court itself is erroneous, due to that reason the revision petitioners have got right to file revision petition invoking Article 227 of the Constitution of India questioning the Orders passed by the executing Court in a petition filed by R1/claimant. He relied on ratio laid down in
K.Rameshwar Dass Gupta. Petitioner vs.State of U.P. and another. Respondents. AIR 1997 (SC), 410, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court while considering
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the service matter held that the executing Court cannot travel beyond the order or decree under execution and when executing Court has exceeded its jurisdiction, it is the duty of the High Court to correct the same by exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of
CPC.
He prays to entertain the civil revision petition and allow the same after considering the written arguments with precedent law submitted by him.
6. The learned Senior counsel Mr.P.Rajasekhar would submit that the revision under Article 227 of Constitution of India is not maintainable against the Orders passed by the executing Court under Order XXI Rule 97 of CPC, as Order passed under Order XXI Rule 97 of CPC is a decree, against which appeal shall only lie. He would further submit that the revision petitioners have filed CMA No.8 of 2016 on the file of XIII Additional District Judge, Gajuwaka against the Orders passed by the executing Court and withdrawn the said civil miscellaneous application without any leave to file any
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further proceedings and accordingly the civil miscellaneous application is dismissed on 01.11.2016, which fact they suppressed in the present civil revision petition. He argued that when no leave is obtained to file fresh petition on same cause of action, the revision petitioners cannot be permitted to prosecute the same before this Court by filing the revision petition as dismissal of civil miscellaneous application is withdrawn without leave to file any further proceedings, thereby the civil miscellaneous application became infructuous and the impugned order is no longer in existence on the principle of doctrine of merger. He relied on ratio laid down in Sarguja Transport Service, Petitioner vs.State Transport Tribunal, Gwalior and others, Respondents,1 wherein at paras 5 to 7 held as follows:
"5.In this case we are called upon to consider the effect of the withdrawal of the writ petition filed under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India without the permission of the High Court to file a fresh petition. The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. 1908 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code') are not in terms applicable to the writ proceedings although the procedure prescribed therein as far as it can be made applicable is followed by the High Court in disposing of the writ petitions. Rule 1 of Order XXIII of the Code provides
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for the withdrawal of a suit and the consequences of such withdrawal. Prior to its amendment by Act 104 of 1976, rule 1 of Order XXIII of the Code provided for two kinds of withdrawal of a suit. namely, (i) absolute withdrawal, and (ii) withdrawal with the permission of the Court to institute a fresh suit on the same cause of action. The first category of withdrawal was governed by sub-rule (1) thereof as it stood then, which provided that at any time after the institution of a suit the plaintiff might, as against all or any of the defendants 'withdraw' his suit or abandon a part of his claim. The second category was governed by sub-rule (2) thereof which provided that where the Court was satisfied (a) that a suit must fail by reason of some formal defect, or (b) that there were sufficient grounds for allowing the plaintiff to institute a fresh suit for the subject-matter of a suit or part of a claim. it might, on such terms as it thought fit, grant the plaintiff permission to withdraw from such suit or abandon a part of a claim with liberty to institute a fresh suit in respect of the subject-matter of such suit or such part of the claim. Sub-rule (3) of the former rule 1 of order XXIII of the Code provided that where the plaintiff withdrew from a suit or abandoned a part of a claim without the permission referred to in sub-rule (2) he would be liable to. such costs as the Court might award and would be precluded from instituting any fresh suit in respect of such subject-matter or such part of the claim. Since it was considered that the use of the word 'withdrawal' in relation to both the categories of withdraw- als led to confusion, the rule was amended to avoid such confusion. The relevant part of rule 1 of Order XXIII of the Code now reads thus:--
"Rule 1. Withdrawal of suit or abandonment of part of claim--
(1) At any time after the institution of a suit, the plaintiff may as against all or any of the defendants abandon his suit or abandon a part of his claim:
…………….
(3) Where the Court is satisfied—
(a) that a suit must fail by reason of some formal defect, or
(b) that there are sufficient grounds for allowing the plaintiff to institute a fresh suit for the subject-matter of a suit or part of a claim,
it may, on such terms as it thinks fit, grant the plaintiff permission to withdraw from such suit or such part of the claim with liberty to institute a fresh suit in respect of the subject-matter of such suit or such part of the claim.
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(4) Where the plaintiff—
(a) abandons any suit or part of claim under sub-rule (1), or
(b) withdraws from a suit or part of a daim without the permission referred to in sub-rule (3), he shall be liable for such costs as the Court may award and shall be precluded from instituting any fresh suit in respect of such subject-matter or such part of the claim."
6.It may be noted that while in sub-rule (1) of the former rule 1 of Order XXIII of the Code the words 'withdraw his suit' had been used, in sub-rule (1) of the new rule 1 of Order XXIII of the Code, the words 'abandon his suit' are used. The new sub-rule (1) is applicable to a casewhere the Court does not accord permission to withdraw from a suit or such part of the claim with liberty to institute a fresh suit in respect of the subject-matter of such suit or such part of the claim. In the new sub-rule (3) which corresponds to the former sub-rule (2) practically no change is made and under that sub-rule the Court is empowered to grant subject to the conditions mentioned therein permission to withdraw from a suit with liberty to institute a fresh suit in respect of the subject-matter of such suit. Sub-rule (4) of the new R. 1 of O.XXIII of the Code provides that where the plaintiff abandons any suit or part of claim under sub-rule (1) or withdraws from a suit or part of a claim without the permission referred to in sub-rule (3), he would be liable for such costs as the Court might award and would also be precluded from instituting any fresh suit in respect of such subject matter or such part of the claim.
7.The Code as it now stands thus makes a distinction between 'abandonment' of a suit and 'withdrawal' from a suit with permission to file a fresh suit. It provides that where the plaintiff abandons a suit or withdraws from a suit without the permission, referred to in sub-rule (3) of R.1 of O.XXIII of the Code, he shall be precluded from instituting any fresh suit in respect of such subject-matter or such part of the claim. The principle underlying rule 1 of Order XXIII of the Code is that when a plaintiff once institutes a suit in a Court and thereby avails of a remedy given to him under law, he cannot be permitted to institute a fresh suit in respect of the same subject-matter again after abandoning the earlier suit or by withdrawing it without the permission of the Court to file fresh suit. Invito benificium non datur. The law confers upon a man no rights or benefits which he does not desire.
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Whoever waives, abandons or disclaims a right will loose it. In order to prevent a litigant from abusing the process of the Court by instituting suits again and again on the same cause of action without any good reason the Code insists that he should obtain the permission of the Court to file a fresh suit after establishing either of the two grounds mentioned in sub-rule (3) of rule 1 of Order XXIII. The principle underlying the above rule is rounded on public policy, but it is not the same as the rule of res judicata contained in section 11 of the Code which provides that no court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly or substantially in issue has been directly or substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such Court. The rule of res judicata applies to a case where the suit or an issue has already been heard and finally decided by a Court. In the case of abandonment or withdrawal of a suit without the permission of the Court to file a fresh suit, there is no prior adjudication of a suit. or an issue is involved, yet the Code provides, as stated earlier, that a second suit will not lie in sub-rule (4) of rule 1 of Order XXIII of the Code when the first suit is withdrawn without the permission referred to in sub-rule (3) in order to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court".
7. In view of contentions raised by both sides, the issue that emerges for consideration by this Court is:
"Whether the Civil Revision Petition is maintainable against the Orders passed by the Executing Court under Order XXI, Rule 97 read with Section 151 of CPC?"
8. POINT: Before going to the merits of the case, it would be beneficial to quote Order XXI Rule 97 of CPC, which reads as under:
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"97. RESISTANCE OR OBSTRUCTION TO POSSESSION OF
IMMOVABLE PROPERTY.
(1) Where the holder of a decree for the possession of immovable property or the purchaser of any such property sold in execution of a decree is resisted or obstructed by any person obtaining possession of the property, he may make an application to the Court complaining of such resistance or obstruction.
(2) Where any application is made under sub-rule (1), the Court shall proceed to adjudicate upon the application in accordance with the provisions herein contained".
9. On perusal of the above referred provision, which makes it clear that any objection raised with regard to execution of the decree and delivery of property, such objection shall be decided by the executing Court and not by a separate suit. It is not in dispute that the Orders passed under Order XXI Rule 97 of CPC, is a decree. This Court had an occasion to deal with similar question in
Gurram Seetharam Reddy, Petitioner. vs.Smt Gunti Yashoda and another, Respondents,2 wherein this Court after considering the relevant provisions of Order XXI, Rule 58, 98, 100, 96, 104 and also Order 43, Rule 1 of CPC held that:
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"42.For the foregoing reasons, we hold that:
(a) Against the orders passed under Rule 58 (3) and Rules 98 and 100 of Order 21, CPC regular appeals under Section 96 and not miscellaneous appeals under Section 104 read with Order 43, Rule 1, CPC are maintainable and that the judgment of this Court in Nookaraju's case (supra) does not represent the correct position of law.
(b) the court fee payable on such appeals shall be the one calculated in accordance with Articles 11 (i) or 3 (i) of Schedule II of Court-fees Act, as the case may be read with Section 49 of the A.P.Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act.
(c) A second appeal under Section 100, CPC is maintainable against an order passed in appeal, arising out of order passed under Rule 58 (3) or Rules 98 and 100 of Order 21,
CPC.
43. Consequently, the order under revision is upheld and the CRP is dismissed. The petitioner shall be entitled to avail the remedy of appeal under Section 96, CPC against the order of the Executing Court, only availing the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act".
10. After perusal of ratio laid down by the Full Bench of this Court, which is binding precedent on this Court, makes it clear that against the Orders passed under Order XXI, Rule 96 and 100 of CPC, regular appeal shall only lie, not civil revision petition and not even civil miscellaneous appeal. The ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court (Full Bench) in K.Rameshwar Dass Gupta
case referred supra, relied on by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner is with regard to executing Court passed an Order in addition to the relief granted in the
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execution petition, due to that the Hon'ble Apex Court held that once the executing Court has exceeded its jurisdiction, it is the duty of the High Court to correct the same while exercising the jurisdiction under Section 115 of CPC. The same ratio cannot be applied to the facts of the present case and it is also not applicable to the facts of the present case, as 1strespondent filed petition under Order XXI, Rule 97 of CPC, wherein the enquiry is conducted as prescribed under Order XXI, Rule 101 of CPC, as objection with regard to delivery has to be decided in the said application, not by way of separate suit. Therefore, this Court is of considered opinion that against the Orders passed by the executing Court under Order XXI, Rule 97 read with Section 151 of CPC, the revision will not lie and appeal alone shall lie as per ratio laid down by this Court Full Bench in Gurram Seetharam Reddy case referred supra.
11. The learned counsel for the 1strespondent also submitted that in view of withdrawing the CMA No.8 of 2016, without leave of the Court to file further
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proceedings, the present revision petition became infructuous on principle of doctrine of merger. It is not in dispute that CMA No.8 of 2016 has been filed by the revision petitioners herein, but the reasons best known to them, they have withdrawn the same by filing a memo 'not pressing' the civil miscellaneous appeal, which also dismissed without costs. When this Court came to the conclusion that the civil revision petition itself is not maintainable in view of ratio laid down by the Full Bench of this Court in Gurram Seetharam Reddy case referred supra, not inclined to go into the merits of the case and effect of withdrawal of CMA No.8 of 2016, without leave of the Court to institute further proceedings. There is no dispute with regard to the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Sarguja Transport Service case referred supra, relied on by the learned Senior counsel for the 1strespondent, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court also considered the doctrine of
"Invito beneficium non datur", which means the law confers upon a man no rights or benefits which he does
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not desire. The said aspect can only be considered, if this Court has taken up the revision petition on merits, when this Court is of an opinion that revision itself is not maintainable, not inclined to go into the merits of the case to apply the ratio laid down in Sarguja Transport Service case referred supra.
12. In the result, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed as not maintainable. No order as to costs. Consequently, miscellaneous petitions if any, shall stand closed. Interim stay if any, granted shall stand vacated.
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JUSTICE BANDARU SYAMSUNDER
Date :15.12.2022
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THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE BANDARU SYAMSUNDER CRP No.3545 of 2016
Date : 15.12.2022
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