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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant, Union of India represented by the Chief Engineer, Project Dantak, entered into an agreement with the respondent, M/s Build Worth Pvt. Ltd., for the design and erection of six bridges on Indo-Bangladesh border roads under Project Dantak in Meghalaya. The original stipulated construction period for five of these bridges was 270 days. However, the respondent failed to complete the work within this period, leading to an initial extension of 159 days, followed by further extensions. Ultimately, the respondent took 1258 days in total against the original 270 days.

Due to the delay, the appellant levied a compensation of Rs. 7.5 lakhs on the respondent, which was recovered from the respondent's bill. The respondent challenged this compensation through arbitration, where the Arbitrator directed the appellant to refund the Rs. 7.5 lakhs. The appellant then filed an appeal under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 before the Additional District Judge, Kamrup, which was dismissed. Consequently, the appellant filed the present application under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 before the Gauhati High Court to challenge the dismissal of the appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the arbitral award directing the appellant to refund Rs. 7.5 lakhs to the respondent can be set aside under the grounds specified in Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
  2. What is the scope and limitation of judicial intervention under Section 34 and Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 in challenging or appealing arbitral awards.
  3. How the concept of "public policy of India" is to be interpreted in the context of setting aside arbitral awards.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
P.R. Shah, Shares & Stock Broker (P) Ltd. v. B.H.H. Securities (P) Ltd., (2012) 1 SCC 594 Clarification that courts do not sit in appeal over arbitral awards by reassessing evidence; awards can only be challenged on grounds under Section 34(2). The court reiterated that judicial review under Section 34 is limited and does not permit reappraisal of evidence or substitution of its own decision for that of the arbitral tribunal.
Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co., [1994 Supp. (1) SCC 644] Interpretation of "public policy" in the context of enforcement of foreign arbitral awards; it must relate to the fundamental policy of Indian law, interests of India, or justice and morality. The court adopted the narrower meaning of public policy requiring more than mere violation of Indian law; enforcement can be refused only if contrary to fundamental policy, interests of India, or justice/morality.
Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd., AIR 2003 SC 2629 Expanded the meaning of "public policy" to include awards that are patently illegal or shock the conscience of the court. The court applied this wider interpretation and held that an award can be set aside if it is patently illegal or unfair to the extent that it shocks the conscience, thus violating public policy.
ONGC Ltd. v. Western Geco International Ltd., (2014) 9 SCC 263 Further expansion of "public policy" to include reasonableness, fundamental principles for administration of justice, and enforcement of law. The court recognized additional aspects of public policy including judicial approach, application of mind, and reasonableness under the Wednesbury principle.
Associate Builders v. Delhi Development Authority, AIR 2015 SC 620 Clarified the fundamental policy of Indian law and the scope of challenge to arbitral awards for miscarriage of justice due to untenable inferences. The court emphasized that arbitral awards are open to challenge if there is a miscarriage of justice or untenable inference, but courts should not reappraise evidence beyond the grounds in Section 34(2).
Haryana Tourism Ltd. v. Kandhari Beverages Ltd., (2022) 3 SCC 237 Reaffirmed that awards can only be set aside if against public policy and cautioned against courts exercising appellate jurisdiction under Section 37 beyond the statute. The court held that the High Court erred by deciding the appeal on merits as if it were a trial court, exceeding its jurisdiction under Section 37, thereby invalidating the impugned judgment.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the limited scope of judicial intervention under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, emphasizing the legislative intent to curtail judicial interference in arbitral awards. It noted that Section 34 allows setting aside an award only on specific grounds such as incapacity, invalid arbitration agreement, lack of proper notice, matters beyond arbitration scope, procedural irregularities, disputes not arbitrable, or conflict with public policy.

The court relied on authoritative Supreme Court precedents to interpret "public policy" narrowly, restricting it to violations of fundamental policy of Indian law, interests of India, justice or morality, or patent illegality that shocks the conscience. It rejected any broader or merit-based scrutiny of the arbitral award.

Applying these principles, the court found no grounds under Section 34 to set aside the arbitral award directing the appellant to refund Rs. 7.5 lakhs. It held that the appellant's appeal was devoid of merit, and the lower courts acted within their jurisdiction in dismissing the appeal.

Holding and Implications

The court dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant (Union of India) under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, thereby upholding the arbitral award directing the refund of Rs. 7.5 lakhs to the respondent.

This decision confirms the limited scope of judicial review of arbitral awards under the Arbitration Act, reinforcing the principle that courts should not reappraise evidence or substitute their own judgment for that of the arbitral tribunal. The judgment does not establish new precedent but reiterates established legal principles, ensuring finality and efficacy of arbitration awards within the statutory framework.

To access the original judgment, please Sign In or Subscribe.

    UNION OF INDIA v. M/S BUILD WORTH PVT. LTD.

    Page No.# 1/9

    GAHC010206442016

    THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT

    (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)

    Case No. : Arb.A./13/2016

    UNION OF INDIA

    REPRESENTED BY THE CHIEF ENGINEER, PROJECT DANTAK, C/O 99 APO

    VERSUS

    M/S BUILD WORTH PVT. LTD.

    G.S. ROAD, DISPUR, GUWAHATI 781006

    Advocate for the Petitioner : C.G.C.

    Advocate for the Respondent :

    :: PRESENT ::

    HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PARTHIVJYOTI SAIKIA

    For the Appellant : Mr. S. Gupta, Advocate.

    For the Respondent : Mr. S. Sarma, Advocate.

    Date of Hearing : 13.09.2022.

    Date of Judgment : 05.01.2023.

    1

    JUDGMENT AND ORDER (CAV)

    Heard Mr. S. Gupta, learned counsel appearing for the appellant. Also heard Mr. S. Sarma, the learned counsel representing the respondent.

    2. This is an application under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 challenging the judgment and order dated 24.06.2014 passed by the learned Addl. District Judge No.2, Kamrup(M) in Misc. Arb. Case No.9 of 2006 dismissing the appeal filed by the appellant.

    3. The appellant Union of India is represented by the Chief Engineer, Project Dantak, C/O. 99 APO and the respondent is a private limited company.

    4. On the basis of an agreement between both sides, the respondent was given the task of designing and erection of six bridges on Indo- Bangladesh border roads under project Dantak in the State of Meghalaya. Out of the six bridges, for five of them, there was a stipulated construction time of 270 days. It was not done accordingly and therefore, an extension of time of 159 days was given. Even within that time period, the construction of the bridges could not be completed. There was further extension of time given to the respondent. In fact, the respondent had taken a total of 1258 days against original stipulated time period of 270 days.

    5. For the aforesaid reasons, according to the terms of the agreement, the appellant levied a compensation of Rs.7.5 lakhs upon the respondent

    2

    as compensation and it was recovered from the respondent's bill.

    6. Thereafter, the respondent took the matter for arbitration. The Arbitrator directed the appellant to refund the sum of Rs.7.5 Lakh to the respondent.

    7. The appellant approached the court of the Addl. District Judge, Kamrup under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 and the learned appellate court agreed with the respondent and dismissed the appeal. Hence, the present application has been filed before this Court.

    8. I have given my anxious considerations to the submissions made by the learned counsel of both sides.

    9. Section 34 of the Act of 1996 is based on Article 34 of the UNCITRAL Model Law and the scope of the provisions for setting aside the award is far less than it was under the Sections 30 or 33 of the 1940 Act. The new Act was brought into being with the express Parliamentary objective of curtailing judicial intervention. Section 34 significantly reduces the extent of possible challenge to an award.

    10. Section 34 provides that an arbitral award may be set aside by a court on certain grounds specified therein. These grounds are:

    1. Incapacity of a party

    2. Arbitration agreement not being valid

    3. Party not given proper notice of arbitral proceedings

    4. Nature of dispute not falling within the terms of submission to arbitration

    3

    5. Arbitral procedure not being in accordance with the agreement

    11. Section 34(2)(b) mentions two more grounds which are left with the Court itself to decide whether to set aside the arbitral award:

    1. Dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitral process

    2. The award is in conflict with the public policy of India.

    12. Thus the powers of the court U/S. 34 is limited and courts should not expand their own powers granted by the statute. Any such attempts by the courts while exercising their powers under S.34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 shall frustrate the purpose of the above said Act itself.

    13. In P.R. Shah, Shares & Stock Broker (P) Ltd. V. B.H.H. Securities (P) Ltd. (2012) 1 SCC 594 it was held that a Court does not sit in appeal over the award of an Arbitral Tribunal by reassessing or reappreciating evidence and an award can be challenged only under the grounds mentioned in Section 34(2) and in the absence of any such ground it is not possible to re examine the facts to find out whether a different decision can be arrived at.

    14. Deliberating upon the phrase "public policy" as referred to in section 34 of the Act, in Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co. . [1994 Supp. (1) SCC 644], considered Section 7(1) of the Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act, 1937 which inter alia provided that a foreign award may not be enforced under the said Act, if the Court dealing with the case is satisfied that the enforcement of the award will be contrary to the Public Policy. After elaborate discussion, the Court arrived at the

    4

    conclusion that Public Policy comprehended in Section 7(1)(b)(ii) of the Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act, 1961 is the 'Public Policy of India' and does not cover the public policy of any other country.

    15. For giving meaning to the term 'Public Policy', in Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. (supra) the Court observed thus:-

    "66. Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention of 1958 and Section 7(1)(b)(ii) of the Foreign Awards Act do not postulate refusal of recognition and enforcement of a foreign award on the ground that it is contrary to the law of the country of enforcement and the ground of challenge is confined to the recognition and enforcement being contrary to the public policy of the country in which the award is set to be enforced. There is nothing to indicate that the expression "public policy" in Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention and Section 7(1)(b)(ii) of the Foreign Awards Act is not used in the same sense in which it was used in Article I(c) of the Geneva Convention of 1927 and Section 7(1) of the Protocol and Convention Act of 1937. This would mean that "public policy" in Section 7(1)(b)(ii) has been used in a narrower sense and in order to attract to bar of public policy the enforcement of the award must invoke something more than the violation of the law of India. Since the Foreign Awards Act is concerned with recognition and enforcement of foreign awards which are governed by the principles of private international law, the expression "public policy" in Section 7(1)(b)(ii) of the Foreign Awards Act must necessarily be construed in the sense the doctrine of public policy is applied in the field of private international law. Applying the said criteria it must be held that the enforcement of a foreign award would be refused on the ground that it is contrary to public policy if such enforcement would be contrary to (i) fundamental policy of Indian law; or (ii) the interests of India; or (iii) justice or morality."

    5

    16. Referring to Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. (supra) the Apex Court in Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd.( AIR 2003 SC 2629) has held ---

    " The phrase 'Public Policy of India' used in Section 34 in context is required to be given a wider meaning. It can be stated that the concept of public policy connotes some matter which concerns public good and the public interest. What is for public good or in public interest or what would be injurious or harmful to the public good or public interest has varied from time to time. However, the award which is, on the face of it, patently in violation of statutory provisions cannot be said to be in public interest. Such

    award/judgment/decision is likely to adversely affect the administration of justice. Hence, in our view in addition to narrower meaning given to the term 'public policy' in Renusagar's case (supra), it is required to be held that the award could be set aside if it is patently illegal. Result would be - award could be set aside if it is contrary to: -

    (a) fundamental policy of Indian law; or

    (b) the interest of India; or

    (c) justice or morality, or

    (d) in addition, if it is patently illegal. Illegality must go to the root of the matter and if the illegality is of trivial nature it cannot be held that award is against the public policy. Award could also be set aside if it is so unfair and unreasonable that it shocks the conscience of the Court. Such award is opposed to public policy and is required to be adjudged void."

    17. The Supreme Court in ONGC Vs Western Geo International Ltd (2014) 9 SCC 263 further has expanded the scope of "Public policy"

    including reasonableness, fundamental principles providing a basis for administration of Justice and enforcement of law in addition to the

    6

    principles laid down by the above said SAW pipes judgment (supra). Hence the term public policy as per the Western Geo Judgment includes all the following aspects:

    (i) Judicial Approach (Judicial approach ensures the authority to act in a fair, reasonable and objective manner and not based on some extraneous considerations

    (ii) Application of mind and recording reasons

    (iii) Decision should not fall out of reasonableness if tested on the touch stone of Wednesbury principle of reasonableness

    18. In Associate Builders v. Delhi Development Authority . AIR 2015 SC 620, the Hon,ble Supreme Court has explained what constituted the fundamental policy of Indian law. In that process, it extracted certain passages from its earlier decision in ONGC Ltd. v. Western Geco International Ltd (supra).In para 40 of that judgment, it was observed as under:

    "40. It is neither necessary nor proper for us to attempt an exhaustive enumeration of what would constitute the fundamental policy of Indian law nor is it possible to place the expression in the straitjacket of a definition. What is important in the context of the case at hand is that if on facts proved before them the arbitrators fail to draw an inference which ought to have been drawn or if they have drawn an inference which is on the face of it, untenable resulting in miscarriage of justice, the adjudication even when made by an Arbitral Tribunal that enjoys considerable latitude and play at the joints in making awards will be open to challenge and may be cast away or modified depending upon whether the offending part is or is not severable from the rest."

    19. In Associate Builders (supra) the Apex Court also referred to the

    7

    decisions in P.R. Shah, Shares & Stock Brokers (P) Ltd. (supra) where it was reiterated that the Court does not sit in appeal over the Award of an Arbitral Tribunal by reassessing or re-appreciating the evidence. It was reiterated that the Award could be challenged only on the grounds mentioned under Section 34(2) of the Act.

    20. In Haryana Tourism Ltd. v. Kandhari Beverages Ltd., (2022) 3 SCC 237 , in paragraph 9, it is held as under---

    "9. As per settled position of law laid down by this Court in a catena of decisions, an award can be set aside only if the award is against the public policy of India. The award can be set aside under Sections 34/37 of the Arbitration Act, if the award is found to be contrary to: (a) fundamental policy of Indian law; or (b) the interest of India; or (c) justice or morality; or (d) if it is patently illegal. None of the aforesaid exceptions shall be applicable to the facts of the case on hand. The High Court has entered into the merits of the claim and has decided the appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act as if the High Court was deciding the appeal against the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial court. Thus, the High Court has exercised the jurisdiction not vested in it under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act. The impugned judgment and order [Kandhari Beverages Ltd. v. Haryana Tourism Ltd., 2018 SCC OnLine P&H 3233] passed by the High Court is hence not sustainable."

    21. When two parties sign the arbitration agreement under Section 7 of the Act, the agreement is binding upon both the parties. Subsequently when a dispute arises between them and when they opt for arbitration, the award passed by the appointed arbitrator will be binding on both the parties.

    22. But when both the parties or either of the party is not satisfied with the award, in that case a recourse is also provided in the Act. For this,

    8

    Section 34 of the Act provides certain grounds in which application for setting aside of an award can be made and further Section 37 provides for the provision of appeal regarding certain orders.

    23. Section 34(2) of the Act provides following grounds for setting aside of an arbitral award by the Court-

    1. If there was some incapacity, or

    2. The law which the parties are subjected to makes the agreement void, or

    3. The party making the application was not provides with proper notification about the appointment of arbitrator or about arbitral proceedings or was not give a chance to present his case, or

    4. The award deals with the matters beyond the scope the arbitration agreement, or

    5. The composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not according with the agreement of the parties, or

    6. Where the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration or the award is in conflict with any public policy of India.

    24. Thus, the law is very clear. I find that under the given circumstances of the case, the present appeal is devoid of merit and stands dismissed accordingly.

    Send back the LCR.

    JUDGE

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    UNION OF INDIA v. M/S BUILD WORTH PVT. LTD.
    (Jan 5, 2023)