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2022 INSC 365
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
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  • Section 30 of Employees Compensation Act, 1933
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2022 INSC 365
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 30 of Employees Compensation Act, 1933
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The deceased workman was employed as a driver of autorickshaw No. KA-17-A-6365 owned by the first respondent and insured with the second respondent (New India Assurance Co. Ltd.). On 7-4-2010 he suffered a cardiac arrest while on duty and died. His wife and mother filed a claim before the Labour Officer and Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation, Davanagere.

On 19-6-2012 the Commissioner found that the death arose out of and in the course of employment, fixed the workman’s age at 30 years, his wages at Rs 4000 per month with Rs 50 daily allowance, and awarded Rs 4,15,960 with 12% interest against the insurer. The insurer appealed. On 15-11-2018 the High Court of Karnataka reversed the award, holding that no nexus was proved between the death and employment and that the Commissioner lacked jurisdiction to grant compensation. The claimants appealed to the Supreme Court, resulting in the present judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the findings of fact recorded by the Commissioner—that the workman’s death by cardiac arrest was attributable to employment as a driver—were perverse or unsupported by evidence.
  2. Whether, in the absence of a substantial question of law under Section 30 of the Employees Compensation Act, 1923, the High Court was justified in reversing the Commissioner’s award.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants’ Arguments (Claimants)

  • The deceased was 30 years old, employed as a driver, and died on duty from cardiac arrest caused by job-related stress; these foundational facts were proved by documentary evidence (FIR, inquest, spot mahazar, post-mortem, charge-sheet, FSL report).
  • The Commissioner’s factual findings were cogent and free from perversity; hence the High Court could not re-appreciate evidence under Section 30.
  • The precedent in Shakuntala Chandrakant Shreshti is distinguishable because there the deceased was a cleaner with minimal strain, whereas here the deceased was a driver exposed to job stress.
  • No substantial question of law arose to justify High Court interference.

Respondent Insurer’s Arguments

  • The claimants failed to establish that the death was caused by employment; there was no evidence of hospital admission or medical nexus.
  • Relying on Shakuntala Chandrakant Shreshti, the insurer contended that basic jurisdictional facts were unproved, therefore the Commissioner lacked authority to award compensation.
  • The High Court correctly identified the absence of evidence and set aside the award.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Shakuntala Chandrakant Shreshti v. Prabhakar Maruti Garvali, (2007) 11 SCC 668 Defines when a substantial question of law arises and discusses causal connection between death and employment. The High Court relied on it to deny compensation; the Supreme Court distinguished it, noting that findings of fact here were evidence-based, and therefore no substantial question of law arose.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court scrutinised the evidentiary record considered by the Commissioner—FIR, mahazars, charge-sheet, post-mortem and FSL reports—and held that these documents adequately established:

  • Employment: The deceased was driving the insured autorickshaw.
  • Age and wages: 30 years old, earning Rs 4000 per month plus daily allowance.
  • Causation: Cardiac arrest occurred while on duty, attributable to driving strain.

Because the Commissioner’s findings were grounded in legal evidence and were neither perverse nor illegal, they could not be reopened in an appeal limited to substantial questions of law under Section 30 of the Employees Compensation Act.

The Court observed that para 42 of Shakuntala Chandrakant Shreshti itself clarifies that a question of law emerges only when findings are unsupported by evidence. The High Court’s reasoning—that absence of hospital records negated causal nexus—was characterised as assumptive and insufficient to label the Commissioner’s conclusion perverse.

Consequently, the Supreme Court concluded that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in re-appreciating evidence and substituting its view for the Commissioner’s.

Holding and Implications

Held: The appeal is allowed; the High Court’s judgment dated 15-11-2018 is set aside and the Commissioner’s award dated 19-6-2012 is restored. No order as to costs.

Implications: The insurer must pay Rs 4,15,960 with 12% interest to the claimants. The decision reinforces the principle that High Courts, when exercising jurisdiction under Section 30 of the Employees Compensation Act, cannot disturb factual findings unless a genuine substantial question of law arises; mere re-appreciation of evidence is impermissible.

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    C. Manjamma And Another (S) v. Divisional Manager The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. (S).

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    Dinesh Maheshwari, J.— Leave granted. The challenge herein is to the judgment and order dated 15-11-2018 2018 SCC OnLine Kar 3925 passed by the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru in Miscellaneous First Appeal No. 10293 of 2012 (WC), whereby the High Court has reversed the judgment and award dated 19-6-2012 passed in WC-DVGWCA No. 76 of 2010 on the file of the Labour Officer and Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, Davanagere (“the Commissioner”).

    2. By the judgment and award dated 19-6-2012, the Commissioner had awarded compensation in the sum of Rs 4,15,960 (Rupees four lakh fifteen thousand nine hundred sixty) together with interest @ 12% p.a. to the wife and mother of the deceased workman, said to be employed as a driver on the autorickshaw belonging to Respondent 2. The workman allegedly died while on duty due to cardiac arrest.

    3. Shorn of unnecessary details, the relevant aspects of the present case are that the Commissioner, while dealing with the claim made by the present appellants, framed the following issues for consideration:

    “1. Whether the petitioners have proved that, the deceased died due to driving strain on 7-4-2010 while working as driver in the autorickshaw bearing No. KA-17-A-6365 owned by the first respondent?
    2. Whether the petitioners prove that, they are the dependants of the deceased?
    3. Whether the petitioners have proved the monthly salary received by the deceased while working as driver in the autorickshaw bearing No. KA-17-A-6365 owned by the first respondent and the age of the deceased?
    4. What compensation are the petitioners entitled for and from whom?
    5. What order?”

    4. The Commissioner returned the finding on Issue 1, after examination of the material placed on record in the following manner:

    “… On examining the documents viz. Ext. P-1 FIR, Ext. P-2 inquest mahazar, Ext. P-3 spot mahazar, Ext. P-4 statement of the 1st respondent, Ext. P-5 post-mortem report, Ext. P-8 charge-sheet, Ext. P-9 FSL report, post-mortem reports produced and got marked during examination of his sworn evidence, the second petitioner, it is considered that, the said documents are corroborative to the factors in the petition and sworn affidavit of the petitioners, it is confirmed that, the deceased died due to the driving strain on 7-4-2010 while working as driver in the autorickshaw bearing No. KA-17-A-6365 owned by the first respondent and decide accordingly.”

    5. In Issue 2, the Commissioner held that the claimants were dependents of the deceased; and in Issue 3, held that the deceased was 30 years of age and was receiving monthly wages of Rs 4000 and daily allowance of Rs 50 from the employer. While quantifying compensation and deciding liability in Issue 4, the Commissioner assessed the amount of compensation at Rs 4,15,960 (Rupees four lakh fifteen thousand nine hundred sixty) with reference to the monthly wages of the deceased at Rs 4000 (Rupees four thousand).

    6. The Commissioner also examined in detail the submissions made on behalf of the respondent insurer and the affidavit filed on its behalf and ultimately recorded his conclusion on the liability of the insurer and the entitlement of the claimants in the following words:

    “… Autorickshaw baring No. KA-17-A-6365 owned by the first respondent is insured with the second respondent and the said insurance policy is marked as Ext. R2-1 and the insurance policy was valid as on the date of accident and the driver of the vehicle is covered under the said insurance policy and on examining thoroughly and considering the factors addressed during arguments of the learned counsel for both the parties with regard to payment of compensation due to the first and second petitioner under law towards the death of the deceased, it is decided that, the second respondent is liable to pay compensation of Rs 4,15,960-00 to the first and second petitioners under statute with regard to the death of the deceased.”

    7. In the insurer's appeal against the judgment and award aforesaid, the High Court took note of the facts and circumstances of the case and the findings of the Commissioner and then, with reference to the decision of this Court in Shakuntala Chandrakant Shreshti v. Prabhakar Maruti Garvali (2007) 11 SCC 668, particularly paras 38 to 42 thereof, found the judgment and award made by the Commissioner unsustainable for the following reasons : (New India Assurance case 2018 SCC OnLine Kar 3925, SCC OnLine Kar para 21)

    “21. As noticed hereinabove, there is no oral evidence with regard to admission of the workman into the hospital. Further, the cause of death is not forthcoming in the records. Therefore, in my considered view, the conclusion arrived at by the W.C. Commissioner that there exists a nexus between the cause of death and the occupation of workman is not supported by any evidence and therefore, the W.C. Commissioner does not get jurisdiction to award compensation.”

    8. Assailing the judgment and order so passed by the High Court, the learned counsel for the appellant has strenuously argued that in this case, the fundamental facts stand duly established by evidence produced on record that the deceased was 30 years of age; he was engaged as a driver on the autorickshaw; and he expired while on duty because of cardiac arrest, which he suffered due to the strain and stress of his job. The learned counsel would submit that on the basis of relevant material, the Commissioner had recorded cogent findings of fact and there had not been any perversity in such findings so as to call for interference by the High Court.

    9. The learned counsel would further submit that the decision in Shakuntala Chandrakant Shreshti (2007) 11 SCC 668 is clearly distinguishable because the deceased therein was engaged on the job of a cleaner on the vehicle and this Court consciously took note of the fact that nature of his duty, being of helper, was not such that it would cause stress or strain. The learned counsel has further drawn our attention to the observations made in para 38 of the said decision and has submitted that in the present case, the basic and foundational facts have been established by the claimants that it had been a case of death during the course of employment and having been caused due to the reasons attributable to the employment. The learned counsel has also submitted that there was no such substantial question of law involved in the matter so as to call for interference by the High Court.

    10. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent insurer has duly supported the judgment and order passed by the High Court and has emphasised on the contentions that the appellants have failed to establish that the death occurred due to employment or due to reasons attributable to the employment. The learned counsel would rely upon the decision in Shakuntala Chandrakant Shreshti (2007) 11 SCC 668. According to the learned counsel, since the claimants failed to prove the basic jurisdictional facts, the High Court has rightly interfered in the matter.

    11. Having given anxious consideration to the rival submissions and having examined the material placed on record with reference to the law applicable, we are clearly of the view that the impugned judgment and order 2018 SCC OnLine Kar 3925 cannot be sustained as there was no substantial question of law involved in the matter for which, the High Court could have interfered with the judgment and award made by the Commissioner.

    12. As noticed above, the Commissioner had returned the basic findings of fact with reference to the material placed on record. It is noticed that the claimants i.e. the wife and mother of the deceased, had indeed placed on record the FIR, inquest mahazar, spot mahazar, charge-sheet and post-mortem report along with FSL report. The Commissioner, with reference to the said evidence as also after analysing the rebuttal evidence adduced by the respondent insurer, recorded the findings which cannot be said to be perverse or suffering from any such manifest illegality so as to give rise to a “substantial question of law” for consideration of the High Court.

    13. Even in para 42 of the decision in Shakuntala Chandrakant Shreshti (2007) 11 SCC 668, this Court has made it clear that a question of law would arise when the same is not dependent on examination of evidence and which may not require any fresh investigation of fact. A question of law would arise, of course, when the finding is perverse or when no legal evidence is adduced to establish the jurisdictional facts. The observations made by the High Court in the present case in para 21 appear to be rather of assumptive nature than of specific conclusion on perversity.

    14. In other words, the view as taken by the Commissioner was the one based on the material placed on record, which basically established that the deceased was indeed employed as a driver on the vehicle; he was 30 years of age; and he died while on duty and his demise due to cardiac arrest was attributable to his job of driver. There had not been shown any other background aspect or any other clinching feature because of which death of the workman, a 30 year old person, could be attributed to any other cause.

    15. That being the position, the view taken by the Commissioner had been a possible view of the matter in the given set of facts and circumstances; and there was no reason for the High Court to interfere with the same, particularly when the case did not involve any substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 30 of Employees Compensation Act, 1933.

    16. For what have been discussed and observed hereinabove, this appeal succeeds and is allowed. The impugned judgment and order dated 15-11-2018 passed by the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. C. Manjamma 2018 SCC OnLine Kar 3925 is set aside and the judgment and award of the Labour Officer and Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, Davanagere dated 19-6-2012 stands restored. No costs.

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    Comments

    C. Manjamma And Another (S) v. Divisional Manager The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. (S).
    (Mar 29, 2022)