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  • sections of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), namely, Sections 193 to 196 (both inclusive), 199, 200, 205
  • Sections 193 to 196 (both inclusive), 199, 200, 205 to 211 (both inclusive) and 228 IPC,
  • Sections 172 to 188 (both inclusive) of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), or(ii)
  • Sections 116, 120B, 167, 192, 193 and 195A of the IPC of which, Section 193
  • SECTION 4 PREVENTION OF MONEY LAUNDERING ACT 2002
  • Section 471, Section 475 or Section 476, of the said Code,
  • sub-section (1)(b) of Section 195 CrPC that the section
  • Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act.7. Sri.Harin P.
  • Sections 116, 120B, 167, 192, 193 and 195A of IPC.3.
  • Section 471, Section 475 or Section 476 IPC,
  • Sections 116, 167, 192, 193 and 195A of IPC.
  • SECTION 195 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
  • Section 195(1)(b)(i) and Section 195(1)(b)(ii)
  • Sections 419, 420, 467 and 468 of the IPC.
  • Section 195(1)(b) and (c) and Section 476,
  • Section 561-A of the Code (Section 482
  • Sections 463, 471, 475, 476 of the IPC
  • Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA)
  • Sections 195(1)(b)(i) and 195(1)(b)(ii)
  • Rule 147 of the High Court Rules
  • Section 195(1)(b)(i) of the Cr.P.C.
  • Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Cr.PC
  • Section 195 of the 1973 Code)
  • Section 195(1)(b) of the Cr.PC,
  • Section 195(1)(b)(i) of Cr.P.C
  • Section 195 of the Cr.P.C.
  • clause (b) of sub-section (1),
  • Section 195 of Cr.P.C,
  • Section 195(1)(b)(ii),
  • Section 195(1)(b)(i)
  • Section 196(1)(c)
  • Section 195(1)(b)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • sections of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), namely, Sections 193 to 196 (both inclusive), 199, 200, 205
  • Sections 193 to 196 (both inclusive), 199, 200, 205 to 211 (both inclusive) and 228 IPC,
  • Sections 172 to 188 (both inclusive) of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), or(ii)
  • Sections 116, 120B, 167, 192, 193 and 195A of the IPC of which, Section 193
  • SECTION 4 PREVENTION OF MONEY LAUNDERING ACT 2002
  • Section 471, Section 475 or Section 476, of the said Code,
  • sub-section (1)(b) of Section 195 CrPC that the section
  • Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act.7. Sri.Harin P.
  • Sections 116, 120B, 167, 192, 193 and 195A of IPC.3.
  • Section 471, Section 475 or Section 476 IPC,
  • Sections 116, 167, 192, 193 and 195A of IPC.
  • SECTION 195 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
  • Section 195(1)(b)(i) and Section 195(1)(b)(ii)
  • Sections 419, 420, 467 and 468 of the IPC.
  • Section 195(1)(b) and (c) and Section 476,
  • Section 561-A of the Code (Section 482
  • Sections 463, 471, 475, 476 of the IPC
  • Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA)
  • Sections 195(1)(b)(i) and 195(1)(b)(ii)
  • Rule 147 of the High Court Rules
  • Section 195(1)(b)(i) of the Cr.P.C.
  • Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Cr.PC
  • Section 195 of the 1973 Code)
  • Section 195(1)(b) of the Cr.PC,
  • Section 195(1)(b)(i) of Cr.P.C
  • Section 195 of the Cr.P.C.
  • clause (b) of sub-section (1),
  • Section 195 of Cr.P.C,
  • Section 195(1)(b)(ii),
  • Section 195(1)(b)(i)
  • Section 196(1)(c)
  • Section 195(1)(b)
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion arises from writ petitions filed by the Deputy Director, Enforcement Directorate (ED), Kochi Zonal Office, challenging registration of Exhibit P1 FIR by the Crime Branch wing of the State Police.

The factual matrix in brief (as set out in the opinion):

  • On 06.07.2020, O.R.No.7 of 2020 was registered at the Customs Commissionerate (Preventive), Kochi, following seizure of 30 kgs of gold at Thiruvananthapuram International Airport (value stated as Rs.14.82 crores) that was being smuggled as alleged diplomatic baggage to the UAE Consulate.
  • Investigations revealed allegations under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA); the National Investigation Agency registered a case under Sections 17 and 18 of UAPA against the same accused.
  • Subsequently, allegations attracting Section 4 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA) led the ED to register ECIR/KCZO0/31/2020 on 13.07.2020 and file a complaint (Exhibit P5) in the Special Court for PMLA cases. Custody of accused (including Smt. Swapna Suresh as second accused and Sri. Sandeep Nair as fourth accused) was given to ED and extended; Section 50 statements were recorded.
  • On 18.11.2020, an audio clip purportedly of Smt. Swapna Suresh alleged coercion by ED officials to sign Section 50 statements implicating the Chief Minister. The ED sought inquiry into the recording; the matter reached the State Police, who after a preliminary enquiry registered Exhibit P1 FIR against ED officials under IPC Sections 116, 120B, 167, 192, 193 and 195A.
  • The ED (through the Deputy Director) challenged registration of the FIR and the ensuing Crime Branch investigation by way of writ petition(s). A separate, related writ petition (W.P.(C).No.8920 of 2021) challenges registration of Crime No.98/CD/ALP/D/2021 (Exhibit P1 FIR dated 27.03.2021) arising from a complaint by Sri. Sandeep Nair and a subsequent public complaint by an advocate which led to registration of that FIR.

Procedurally, both writ petitions challenge the registration of FIR(s) by the Crime Branch and certain orders (for example, Exhibit P3 order permitting questioning in custody), and the petitions were heard together because many legal issues raised are common to both, save for an additional ground in one petition about the second FIR being barred.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether registration of the FIR by the State Crime Branch against officers of a Central Agency (ED) alleging flaws/excesses during their investigation is lawful and whether such registration offends the principle of cooperative federalism or impairs central agency investigations.
  2. Whether offences alleged (notably Section 193 IPC) fall within the prohibition of Section 195(1)(b)(i) Cr.P.C., and if so, whether that prohibition bars only the taking of cognizance by a court or also bars registration of FIRs and police investigation into such offences.
  3. Whether the writ petition filed by the Deputy Director of the ED in his official capacity is maintainable (including whether it was properly instituted and whether official sanction was present).
  4. Whether the ingredients of the specific offences alleged in the FIR (Sections 116, 120B, 167, 192, 193, 195A IPC) are made out on the material presented (as argued by the ED and its counsel).
  5. In W.P.(C).No.8920 of 2021, whether registration of a second FIR based on substantially similar allegations (i.e., multiple FIRs arising from related complaints) is barred.

Arguments of the Parties

Solicitor General / Counsel for the Enforcement Directorate and Central Agencies (Sri. Tushar Mehta, Sri. S.V. Raju, Sri. K.M. Nataraj)

  • Registration of a crime by the State police against central agency officers for actions taken during a central investigation undermines cooperative federalism and jeopardizes free, fair and impartial investigations by central agencies.
  • Only the Special Court (which had taken cognizance of the ED complaint) is empowered to consider complaints about the accused in the PMLA proceedings; parallel investigation by Crime Branch would impinge on ED's investigation and could place a Magistrate in a position to question statements that are before a Special Court.
  • Submission that even if the allegations are accepted in entirety, they do not constitute a cognizable offence and registration is illegal due to bar under Section 195(1)(b)(i) Cr.P.C.; reliance on Patel Laljibhai Somabhai v. State of Gujarat for the purpose behind Section 195.
  • Sri S.V. Raju:
    • Argued that abetment punishable under Section 116 IPC requires ingredients of Section 107 IPC which are absent here.
    • Section 167 IPC requires a public servant to have framed, prepared or translated a document knowably incorrect with intention or knowledge likely to cause injury — none of which are alleged against ED officials in the record.
    • Ingredients of fabricating false evidence (Section 192 IPC) are not made out; even if they were, Section 195 Cr.P.C. would apply.
    • On Section 195A IPC, contended that only a witness or a person closely connected (read ejusdem generis) can file the complaint; a person wholly unconnected cannot.
    • Pointed to statements of the second accused (13.08.2020) where she denied personal closeness to the Chief Minister, contending that if ED intended to implicate the Chief Minister, that answer would not have been recorded; also noted the accused did not raise coercion complaints earlier despite opportunities (citing remand orders Exhibits P15, P16, P17).
  • Sri K.M. Nataraj:
    • Emphasised bar under Section 195(1)(b)(i) Cr.P.C. is meant to prevent precisely this situation of private criminal complaints that interfere with proceedings pending before a court; drew a distinction between subsections (b)(i) and (b)(ii) and relied on Bhima Razu Prasad v. State (2021 SCC OnLine 210).
    • Argued Section 195A IPC attracts only where a person is threatened to give false evidence in court, pointing to wording about conviction in consequence of "such false evidence" and the statutory definition of "evidence".

State of Kerala / Respondent (Sri. Harin P. Raval)

  • Questioned maintainability of the writ petition filed by the ED officer, including whether it was filed in an individual capacity or on behalf of the ED; objected to production of documents from the ongoing ED investigation in the manner they were produced (alleged non-compliance with Rule 147 of High Court Rules) and the inclusion of persons not made parties.
  • Contended the documents were produced to tarnish names rather than substantiate contentions; argued that the central contention advanced by ED counsel (that Crime Branch investigation would impinge on ED work) was a diversion from the real issue—the police's duty to register a cognizable crime when allegations of cognizable offences are brought to its notice.
  • Relied on older authorities (King-Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad; Abhinandan Jha v. Dinesh Mishra; State of Bihar v. J.A.C. Saldanha; Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh) to support the proposition that police have authority/duty to register and investigate cognizable offences and that Section 195's bar is confined to taking cognizance by a court rather than to police investigation; cited additional cases for support (State of Punjab v. Raj Singh; M. Narayandas; Shafi v. Abdul Salam; Nirmaljit Singh Hoon).
  • Argued the ED's filings and haste suggest an attempt to thwart investigation and prevent truth from being uncovered; asserted the alleged coercion by ED officials (if true) is a serious offence that must be investigated.
  • Contended statements recorded while accused were in ED custody are not necessarily statements under Section 50(3) of PMLA; urged the court to exercise circumspection in using inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and not to sift evidence for factual disputes.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Patel Laljibhai Somabhai v. State of Gujarat [(1971) 2 SCC 376] Explaining the purpose behind Section 195 Cr.P.C.: to prevent frivolous/private prosecutions for offences that directly impact judicial process and to vest the right to complain about such offences primarily in the court. The court relied on the passage from this decision to explain the underlying purpose of Section 195 and to frame its analysis of whether Section 193 IPC falls under Section 195's prohibition.
Bhima Razu Prasad v. State [2021 SCC OnLine 210] Cited for distinction between scope of Section 195(1)(b)(i) and Section 195(1)(b)(ii) (as referenced by counsel). Cited by counsel (K.M. Nataraj) to emphasise the wider amplitude of the words "in relation to any proceeding in any court" in subsection (b)(i). The opinion records the reliance but the excerpt does not elaborate further.
King-Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad [AIR 1945 PC 18] Authority relied upon to support police duty/authority to register and investigate cognizable offences. Cited by the State (Sri. Raval) to support the proposition that police have authority/duty to register a crime when cognizable offences are brought to their notice; the opinion records the reliance.
Abhinandan Jha and Others v. Dinesh Mishra [(1967) 3 SCR 668] Authority cited in support of police duty/authority to register/investigate complaints. Cited by the State; the excerpt notes reliance but does not set out the detailed principle from the case beyond listing it amongst supporting authorities.
State of Bihar & Anr. v. J.A.C. Saldanha & Ors. [(1980) 1 SCC 554] Authority cited in support of police authority to register/investigate and related procedural points. Cited by the State; the excerpt notes the reliance without detailing precise application beyond that context.
Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. [(2014) 2 SCC 1] Authority on duty to register FIRs / when police must register cognizable offences (relied upon by State counsel). Cited by the State as part of the line of authority asserting police duty/authority to register and investigate cognizable offences; the excerpt records the reliance.
State of Punjab v. Raj Singh & Anr. [(1998) 2 SCC 391] Held that Section 195 Cr.P.C. operates at the stage of taking cognizance and does not curtail the statutory power of the police to investigate cognizable offences under Sections 154/156 Cr.P.C. The court summarises this authority in the course of considering whether Section 195 bars police investigation; the decision is used to support the proposition that police statutory power to investigate is not controlled by Section 195.
M. Narayandas v. State of Karnataka & Ors. [(2003) 11 SCC 251] Listed among authorities relied upon for the proposition that police may investigate despite Section 195. Cited by the State; the excerpt records reliance without detailing more specific application in the opinion's excerpt.
Shafi v. Abdul Salam [2017 (4) KHC 929] Regional authority cited in the course of argument supporting police investigational power. Cited by the State; the opinion records the reliance but does not elaborate the precise principle in the provided excerpt.
Nirmaljit Singh Hoon v. State of West Bengal & Anr. [(1973) 3 SCC 753] Holds that police have statutory right under Sections 154 and 156 Cr.P.C. to investigate cognizable offences; High Court has no inherent power to interfere with exercise of that statutory power (Section 561-A/482 context discussed). The court summarises this precedent in its analysis of whether Section 195 bars investigation; it is used to show that statutory police power to investigate cognizable offences has been recognized by the Apex Court.
Ram Lal Narang v. State (Delhi Administration) [(1979) 2 SCC 322] Listed among authorities relied upon by parties in arguments around registration and investigation of offences related to court proceedings. Cited by parties (the opinion lists it among cases relied upon); the excerpt does not set out the particular rule relied upon from this case.
State of West Bengal v. Swapan Kumar Guha & Ors. [(1982) 1 SCC 561] One of the Apex Court decisions relied upon by the parties on issues of registration/investigation or related procedural law. Cited by parties; the excerpt notes reliance without specifying the concrete rule applied from the case in the provided passages.
T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala & Ors. [(2001) 6 SCC 181] Listed among authorities cited by parties in their submissions. Cited by parties; the excerpt records its citation but does not delineate the specific principle from the decision in the opinion excerpt.
Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash & Ors. [(2004) 13 SCC 292] Listed among authorities relied upon in the debate regarding FIR registration and investigation vis-à-vis court proceedings. Cited by parties; the excerpt does not provide a detailed account of how the Court applied this precedent in the present opinion.
Narendra Kumar Srivastava v. State of Bihar [(2019) 3 SCC 318] Explains the clear distinction between offences covered by Section 195(1)(b)(i) (false evidence/offences against public justice alleged in relation to proceedings) and Section 195(1)(b)(ii) (offences in respect of documents produced/given in evidence). The court quotes and uses this decision to clarify the distinct categories under Section 195(1)(b) and to assist in analyzing whether the prohibition applies to the present facts and whether it bars investigation or only taking cognizance.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analytical approach (as reflected in the provided excerpt) proceeds in a stepwise fashion:

  1. Maintainability: The court first addresses challenge to maintainability of the writ petition filed by the ED officer. It finds the petition is filed in the officer's capacity as Investigating Officer in the ED case and that appearance of the Solicitor General indicates official sanction. The Court notes procedural faults (selective production of ED documents and naming of persons not made parties) and describes the conduct as "liable to be deprecated" but holds that those faults do not warrant dismissal of the writ petition (paragraph 10).
  2. Identification of the pivotal legal question: The court singles out the contention based on Section 195 Cr.P.C. as the first and foremost matter, because the resolution of that contention affects other legal points (paragraph 11).
  3. Statutory analysis of Section 195: The court reproduces Section 195 in extenso to define its scope and to set the foundation for ensuing analysis (paragraph 11). It notes that Section 193 IPC is within the offences enumerated in Section 195(1)(b)(i), and therefore the prohibition under Section 195 is engaged insofar as Section 193 is concerned (paragraph 11–12).
  4. Purpose behind Section 195: Using Patel Laljibhai Somabhai, the court explains that Section 195 seeks to prevent private parties from initiating vexatious prosecutions for offences which directly impact the judicial process, leaving the decision to prosecute such offences to the relevant court (paragraph 12).
  5. Core controversy — investigation vs. cognizance: The court frames the central interpretive question: does Section 195(1)(b)(i) merely bar the taking of cognizance by a court or does it also prohibit the police from registering and investigating offences covered by the provision? The court records opposing submissions (paragraph 13).
  6. Evaluation of relevant precedents:
    • The court summarises Nirmaljit Singh Hoon (1973) as recognizing police statutory rights under Sections 154 and 156 Cr.P.C. to investigate cognizable offences and the limited scope for High Court interference in that statutory power (paragraph 14).
    • The court summarises State of Punjab v. Raj Singh (1998) where the Supreme Court held that Section 195 comes into operation at the stage of a court taking cognizance and does not impinge on police power to investigate a cognizable offence; the court quotes the principle that while a court cannot take cognizance of such an offence on a challan where Section 195 applies, the police may still investigate and the court may later, if properly constituted, file a complaint under Section 340 if required (paragraph 15).
    • The court then notes the distinction drawn in Narendra Kumar Srivastava (2019) between the two categories in Section 195(1)(b) — (i) offences like false evidence/offences against public justice in relation to proceedings and (ii) offences relating to documents produced in evidence — and records that the offences under (b)(i) and (b)(ii) are distinct categories (paragraph 16).
  7. Interim synthesis: From the part of the opinion provided, the Court has not yet issued a final ruling on the merits of the challenge to the FIRs but has (a) upheld the writ petition's maintainability (subject to procedural criticisms), (b) acknowledged that Section 193 IPC falls within the ambit of Section 195(1)(b)(i), and (c) proceeded to carefully examine precedent on whether Section 195 bars police investigation or only court cognizance, citing authorities supporting both sides and laying groundwork for resolving that question.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The court held, on the material in the excerpt:

  • The writ petition filed by the Deputy Director, ED is maintainable in his capacity as the Investigating Officer; the presence of the Solicitor General indicated official sanction. Procedural defects in production of documents were noted and deprecated, but these defects did not warrant dismissal of the writ petition (paragraph 10).
  • The court also determined that Section 193 IPC falls within the scope of Section 195(1)(b)(i) Cr.P.C., thereby engaging the prohibition in Section 195 (paragraph 11–12).

Implications:

  • Direct consequence: The petition will proceed for determination on the merits; the Court will further decide the pivotal question whether Section 195(1)(b)(i) Cr.P.C. bars only judicial cognizance or also police registration/investigation (the opinion excerpt indicates the court is addressing that question but does not record a final determination on it in the provided text).
  • The opinion, as excerpted, does not record a full final order quashing or upholding the impugned FIR(s); therefore, no definitive change to legal precedent is stated in the provided portion beyond the court's adoption and application of existing authorities to frame the issue.
  • Where the opinion does not discuss broader implications beyond the parties, this summary does not infer any further precedential effect; based on the excerpt, the immediate effect is that the writ petition survives preliminary challenges to maintainability and moves forward for adjudication of the substantive legal questions (including the reach of Section 195 vis-à-vis police investigation).

Notes on Scope and Limitations of this Summary

This summary is limited strictly to the material contained in the provided excerpt of the opinion. Where the opinion excerpt did not record a final disposition on particular issues (for example, whether the FIR(s) are ultimately quashed or sustained, or a definitive ruling on whether Section 195 bars investigation), this summary does not speculate or infer those outcomes.

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    P. Radhakrishnan Petitioner/S v. State Of Kerala, Rep. By The Principal Secretary Department Of Home And Others /S.

    1. The instant writ petition is filed by the Deputy Director, Enforcement Directorate, Kochi Zonal Office, aggrieved by the registration of Exhibit P1 FIR by the Crime Branch wing of the State Police. The essential facts leading to the writ petition, are as under:

    On 06.07.2020, O.R.No.7 of 2020 was registered at the Customs Commissionerate (Preventive), Kochi, consequent to seizure of 30 Kgs of gold worth Rs.14.82 Crores at the Thiruvananthapuram International Airport. The seizure was effected while the gold was being smuggled, camouflaging it as diplomatic baggage to the UAE Consulate. During the course of investigation it was revealed that the accused had committed offences under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA) also. This resulted in the National Investigation Agency (NIA) registering a case against the very same accused, alleging commission of offences under Sections 17 and 18 of the UAPA. As the investigation progressed further, commission of the offence punishable under Section 4 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) also came to light. Thereupon, ECIR/KCZO0/31/2020 was registered by the Enforcement Directorate (ED) on 13.07.2020 arraigning three persons as accused, one Smt. Swapna Suresh being the second accused and Sri. Sandeep Nair, the fourth accused. After registration of the case, the ED filed Exhibit P5 complaint before the Special Court for PMLA cases (Principal Sessions Court, Ernakulam. Later, two more persons were arraigned as accused, the fifth accused being the then Principal Secretary to the Chief Minister of Kerala. On the request of the Investigating Officer, custody of the second accused was given to the ED for seven days from 05.08.2020. The custody period was extended up to 14.08.2020 and thereafter, till 17.08.2020. During this period the accused were questioned and their statements under Section 50 of the PMLA recorded.

    2. On 18.11.2020, an audio clip, purported to be that of Smt. Swapna Suresh, was aired by an online media channel, wherein she alleged that the ED officials had made her sign the Section 50 statements without allowing her to read its contents and that, she had been compelled by the officials to implicate the Chief Minister of the State. On 20.11.2020, the Deputy Director of ED sent the Exhibit R1(a) letter to the Director General of Prisons and Correctional Services, requesting for a detailed enquiry about the circumstances under which the alleged audio recording took place and to take appropriate action against the culprits. The Director General of Prisons forwarded the letter to the State Police Chief, who in turn directed a special investigation team to be constituted for conducting preliminary enquiry. During the course of such enquiry, two Women Police Constables, who had been assigned protection duty of Smt. Swapna Suresh, while she was questioned by the ED officials, stated that, on 12.8.2020 and 13.8.2020, they had overheard the ED officials coercing and cajoling the accused to give statements implicating the Chief Minister and others. The allegation being serious, legal opinion was obtained and Exhibit P1 FIR registered against the ED officials for offences under Sections 116, 120B, 167, 192, 193 and 195A of IPC.

    3. The challenge against registration of the FIR and legality of the Crime Branch investigation is led by Sri.Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor General of India, supported by Sri. S.V.Raju and Sri.K.M.Nataraj, learned Additional Solicitors General appearing for the Enforcement Directorate and Central Bureau of Investigation. Sri. Harin P. Raval, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the State of Kerala countered their contentions and justified the action of the Crime Branch.

    4. According to the learned Solicitor General, registration of the crime by the Crime Branch wing of the State Police, against the officers of a Central Agency alleging flaws and excesses during their investigation, militates against the very concept of cooperative federalism enshrined in the Constitution. Further, such action, if permitted, will impair the conduct of free, fair and impartial investigation by the Central Agencies. It is contended that the Special Court having taken cognizance of the offences, based on the complaint filed by the ED, only the Special Court alone empowered to consider the complaint of the accused and that, parallel investigation by the Crime Branch would impinge the credibility of the investigation so far conducted by the ED and would result in an incredulous situation of a Magistrate deciding upon the authenticity and genuineness of the statements given by the accused, in a case under consideration before a Sessions Judge (Special Judge). It is contended that the allegations based on which the crime is registered, even if accepted in their entirety, do not make out any cognizable offence. That, in view of the bar under Section 195(1)(b)(i) of the Cr.P.C, the very registration of the crime is illegal. Attention is drawn to the decision in Patel Laljibhai Somabhai v. State Of Gujarat ., [(1971) 2 SCC 376], wherein the Honourable Supreme Court has exposited on the purpose behind the enactment of Section 195 of the Cr.P.C.

    5. Sri.S.V.Raju contended that abetment of an offence punishable with imprisonment under Section 116 of the IPC would apply only on the ingredients of Section 107 being satisfied, which, as far as the instant case is concerned, are completely absent. It is contended that, in order to attract Section 167 of the IPC, a public servant charged with the preparation or translation of any document or electronic record should have framed, prepared or translated that document or electronic document in a manner which he knows or believes to be incorrect. Further, such framing, preparation or translation should be with intention to cause or knowing that his action is likely to cause injury to any person. That, in the absence of any allegation of the ED officials having framed or prepared any document or electronic document, the offence under Section 167 of the IPC is not attracted. It is contended that none of the ingredients necessary to constitute the offence of fabricating false evidence under Section 192 of the IPC are made out and even in cases where the ingredients are made out, the prohibition under Section 195 of the Cr.P.C would apply. As regards the offence under Section 195A of the IPC, it is contended that only a witness or any other person can file a complaint in relation to the offence and the words “any other person” should be read ejusdem generis. Hence, a person totally unconnected to the witness and the case cannot file the complaint. Reference is made to the statement of the second accused dated 13.08.2020 wherein, to a query as to whether the Chief Minister of Kerala or his wife had called her personally and whether they were close to her, the second accused had answered that they were neither close to her nor had they called her personally and that all her conversations with the Chief Minister had been for official purposes only. It is contended that if the intention of the investigating officer was to implicate the Chief Minister, that answer would not have been recorded. According to the learned Counsel, falsity of the allegations is evident from the fact that, in spite of the repeated opportunities available to appraise the jurisdictional court of the attempt to coerce her, the second accused had never raised such a complaint. Reference is made to Exhibits P15 and P16 remand orders dated 11.08.2020 and 14.08.2020, wherein the Special Judge, after interacting with accused Nos.1, 2 and 4, had observed that the accused appeared to be in sound health and mind and had no complaints. Particular emphasis is laid on paragraph 7 of Exhibit P17 order, wherein the learned counsel for Smt. Swapna Suresh had alleged that his client was tortured during questioning by the Enforcement Officials, without the presence of a woman officer. It is hence contended that the unbelievable narrative about the presence of women civil police officers while Smt. Swapna Suresh was questioned by ED officials, is nothing but a cooked up story. 6. Sri. K.M.Nataraj focused on the bar under Section 195(1)(b)(i) of the Cr.P.C and contended that the very purpose of that provision is to prevent instances like the one under consideration. That, the alleged act of coercing the third accused to name innocent persons as her accomplices being in relation to a proceeding pending before the Special Court, registration of the crime and investigation into such allegation is barred. The distinction between Sections 195(1)(b)(i) and 195(1)(b)(ii) is pointed out by emphasising on the import of the words “in relation to any proceeding in any court” in the former, as against the words “in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any court” in the latter. It is contended that the former expression is of much wider amplitude than the latter, as held in Bhima Razu Prasad v. State [2021 SCC OnLine 210]. It is argued that the offence under Section 195A of the IPC would be attracted only if a person is threatened to give false evidence in court and not otherwise. In support of the proposition, attention is drawn to the latter part of Section 195A, dealing with the conviction of an innocent person in consequence of “such false evidence” and the definition of the word ‘evidence’ under Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act.

    7. Sri.Harin P. Raval countered the arguments and questioned the maintainability of the writ petition at the instance of an officer of the ED, without even mentioning whether the petition is filed in his individual capacity or as per the decision of the ED. Learned Senior Counsel took strong exception to the production of documents pertaining to the ongoing ED investigation along with the writ petition and later as additional documents. It is contended that the documents are produced without adhering to the procedure prescribed under Rule 147 of the High Court Rules and moreover, they have nothing to do with the issue raised in the writ petition. The purpose behind production of documents, it is submitted, is more to tarnish the name of certain highly placed personalities in the State Government, rather than substantiating the contentions in the writ petition. According to the learned Senior Counsel, the attempt of the learned Solicitor General and other counsel is to divert the attention of the Court from the cardinal issue, by raising a rhetorical contention that investigation by the Crime Branch would impinge the investigation of the ED case and the authenticity of the statements recorded under Section 50 of the PMLA. It is contended that the court should see through the smoke screen attempted to be created and address the real issue involved. The real issue being the authority, or rather the duty, of the Police to register a crime when commission of cognizable offences are brought to its notice. In support of this argument, reliance is placed on the decision of the Privy Council in King-Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad [AIR 1945 PC 18] and of the Supreme Court in Abhinandan Jha and Others v. Dinesh Mishra [(1967) 3 SCR 668], State of Bihar and Another v. J.A.C.Saldanha and Others [(1980) 1 SCC 554] and the Constitutional Bench decision in Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh and Others [(2014) 2 SCC 1]. It is contended that the bar under Section 195 of the Cr.P.C is only against taking cognizance and does not interdict investigation by the Police. Support for this argument is garnered from the decisions in State of Punjab v. Raj Singh and Another [(1998) 2 SCC 391], M.Narayandas v. State of Karnataka and Others [(2003) 11 SCC 251], Shafi v. Abdul Salam [2017 (4) KHC 929] and Nirmaljit Singh Hoon v. The State of West Bengal and Another [(1973) 3 SCC 753]. It is submitted that the attempt of the petitioner is to somehow thwart the investigation and prevent the truth from coming out, which is evident from the undue haste with which the writ petition has been filed. That, the petitioner and other officials of the ED had compelled and coerced the accused to give statements implicating highly placed personalities in the State Government, which is a heinous offence that needs to be unearthed and the culprits brought to book. It is also contended the the statements of the accused, recorded while they were in ED custody, cannot be termed as statements under Section 50(3) of PMLA. The circumspection required while exercising the inherent power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C and the well settled position of the High Court being not expected to sift the evidence for deciding factual issues involved, while exercising such power, is reiterated with the aid of authorities.

    W.P(C).No.8920 of 2021

    8. The challenge in this writ petition is against the registration of Crime No.98/CD/ALP/D/2021 at the Crime Branch Police Station, Ernakulam, vide Exhibit P1 FIR dated 27.03.2021. The short facts, leading to the registration of the crime are as under:

    Sri.Sandeep Nair, presently the fourth accused in ECIR/ACZO/31/2020 registered by the Enforcement Directorate, had sent Exhibit P2 letter dated 05.03.2021 to the Special Judge, alleging that he was compelled by the petitioner to name the Chief Minister and certain others as accomplices to the crime. News about the letter published in the visual media was noticed by Advocate R.Sunil Kumar, a practising lawyer. Being of opinion that the deliberate attempt to drag the State’s Chief Minister and others into the crime should be investigated, Advocate Sunil Kumar sent a complaint to the Additional Director General of Police (Crime Branch). Thereupon, Exhibit P1 FIR (Crime No. 98 of 2021) was registered for offences under Sections 116, 167, 192, 193 and 195A of IPC. During the course of investigation of the crime, the Crime Branch sought permission to question and record the statement of Sri. Sandeep Nair from the Central Prison, Thiruvananthapuram and the request was allowed by the Special Court as per Exhibit P3 order. The challenge in this writ petition is against Exhibit P1 FIR and Exhibit P3 order and is founded on the same grounds as in W.P(C).No.7641 of 2021. The additional ground of challenge is that registration of a second crime, based on the very same allegations as in the first crime, is barred. In support of this challenge, reference is made to the statement in the first crime (Crime No. 94 of 2021), of another accused in the case, Sri.Sandeep Nair, having also written a similar complaint to the District and Sessions Judge, Ernakulam alleging threat and coercion to give false evidence against the Chief Minister and that the entire matter require an indepth investigation by registering an FIR. Countering the challenge, learned counsel for the respondent State highlighted the marked differences between the incidents and the allegations in the two crimes, which, according to the learned counsel, can, by any stretch of imagination, be treated to be the same or even similar. Elaborate legal contentions are put forth by both sides, relying on the decisions of the Apex Court in Ram Lal Narang v. State (Delhi Administration) .) [(1979) 2 SCC 322], State of West Bengal v. Swapan Kumar Guha and Others [(1982) 1 SCC 561], T.T.Antony v. State of Kerala and Others [(2001) 6 SCC 181], Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash and Others [(2004) 13 SCC 292], etc.

    9. The legal issues arising for consideration in both writ petitions, except the challenge on the ground that Exhibit P1 in W.P(C).8920 of 2021 is the second FIR, being common, both writ petitions are being considered together.

    10. The challenge against maintainability of the writ petition on the premise that the petitioner has filed the case in his individual capacity cannot hold good. Undoubtedly, the writ petition is filed by the petitioner in his capacity as the Investigating Officer in ECIR/ACZO/31/2020. The fact that, the writ petition is filed with official sanction is evident from the appearance of the learned Solicitor General. At the same time, I find substance in the objection raised by the Sri. Raval against the manner in which the documents pertaining to the ED case is produced and persons, who are not made parties, named in the writ petition. The explanation offered for production of the documents is that they form part of Exhibit P5 complaint. If that be so, the petitioner ought to have produced the entire set of documents appended to Exhibit P5 complaint, rather than producing the documents of his choice. Even though the petitioner's action is liable to be deprecated, that does not warrant dismissal of the writ petition.

    11. Moving on to the merits of the contentions urged, the first and foremost is the contention based on the prohibition under Section 195 of the Cr.P.C. Needless to say that the finding on that contention will have an impact on the other legal points. Indisputably, the crimes are registered for offences punishable under Sections 116, 120B, 167, 192, 193 and 195A of the IPC of which, Section 193 is an offence falling within the ambit of Section 195(1)(b)(i) of the Cr.P.C. In order to understand the scope and ambit of Section 195 of Cr.P.C, it is necessary to analyse and understand the provision.

    “195. Prosecution for contempt of lawful authority of public servants, for offences against public justice and for offences relating to documents given in evidence.—

    (1) No Court shall take cognizance—

    (a)(i) of any offence punishable under Sections 172 to 188 (both inclusive) of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), or

    (ii) of any abetment of, or attempt to commit, such offence, or

    (iii) of any criminal conspiracy to commit such offence,

    except on the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned or of some other public servant to whom he is administratively subordinate;

    (b)(i) of any offence punishable under any of the following sections of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), namely, Sections 193 to 196 (both inclusive), 199, 200, 205 to 211 (both inclusive) and 228, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, or

    (ii) of any offence described in Section 463, or punishable under Section 471, Section 475 or Section 476, of the said Code, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any Court, or

    (iii) of any criminal conspiracy to commit, or attempt to commit, or the abetment of, any offence specified in subclause (i) or sub-clause (ii),

    except on the complaint in writing of that Court 115[or by such officer of the Court as that Court may authorise in writing in this behalf], or of some other Court to which that Court is subordinate.

    (2) Where a complaint has been made by a public servant under clause (a) of sub-section (1) any authority to which he is administratively subordinate may order the withdrawal of the complaint and send a copy of such order to the Court; and upon its receipt by the Court, no further proceedings shall be taken on the complaint:

    Provided that no such withdrawal shall be ordered if the trial in the Court of first instance has been concluded.

    (3) In clause (b) of sub-section (1), the term “Court” means a Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court, and includes a tribunal constituted by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act, if declared by that Act to be a Court for the purposes of this section.

    (4) For the purposes of clause (b) of sub-section (1), a Court shall be deemed to be subordinate to the Court to which appeals ordinarily lie from the appealable decrees or sentences of such former Court, or in the case of a Civil Court from whose decrees no appeal ordinarily lies, to the principal Court having ordinary original civil jurisdiction within whose local jurisdiction such Civil Court is situate:

    Provided that—

    (a) where appeals lie to more than one Court, the Appellate Court of inferior jurisdiction shall be the Court to which such Court shall be deemed to be subordinate;

    (b) where appeals lie to a Civil and also to a Revenue Court, such Court shall be deemed to be subordinate to the Civil or Revenue Court according to the nature of the case or proceeding in connection with which the offence is alleged to have been committed.”

    12. The purpose of enacting Section 195 (Criminal Procedure Code 1898, which is in pari materia with Section 195 of the 1973 Code) was considered by the Apex Court in Patel Laljibhai Somabhai v. State Of Gujarat ., [(1971) 2 SCC 376]. The relevant portion of the said judgment reads as under:

    “The underlying purpose of enacting Section 195(1)(b) and (c) and Section 476, seems to be to control the temptation on the part of the private parties considering themselves aggrieved by the offences mentioned in those sections to start criminal prosecutions on frivolous, vexatious or insufficient grounds inspired by a revengeful desire to harass or spite their opponents. These offences have been selected for the court's control because of their direct impact on the judicial process. It is the judicial process, in other words the administration of public justice, which is the direct and immediate object or victim of those offence and it is only by misleading the courts and thereby perverting the due course of law and justice that the ultimate object of harming the private party is designed to be realised. As the purity of the proceedings of the court is directly sullied by the crime, the Court is considered to be the only party entitled to consider the desirability of complaining against the guilty party. The private party designed ultimately to be injured through the offence against the administration of public justice is undoubtedly entitled to move the court for persuading it to file the complaint. But such party is deprived of the general right recognized by Section 190 CrPC, of the aggrieved parties directly initiating the criminal proceedings. The offences about which the court alone, to the exclusion of the aggrieved private parties, is clothed with the right to complain may, therefore, be appropriately considered to be only those offences committed by a party to a proceeding in that court, the commission of which has a reasonably close nexus with the proceedings in that court so that it can, without embarking upon a completely independent and fresh inquiry, satisfactorily consider by reference principally to its records the expediency of prosecuting the delinquent party. It, therefore, appears to us to be more appropriate to adopt the strict construction of confining the prohibition contained in Section 196(1)(c) only to those cases in which the offences specified therein were committed by a party to the proceeding in the character as such party.”

    The reason behind bringing certain specified offences under the purview of Section 195 of the Cr.P.C is because the commission of those offences have direct impact on an ongoing judicial proceeding and thereby, on the administration of justice. Section 193 of the IPC being one such offence, the prohibition under Section 195 of the Cr.P.C will apply.

    13. The next question is whether the prohibition under Section 195(1)(b)(i) of Cr.P.C is from taking cognizance only or whether the Police is interdicted from conducting investigation of the offences enumerated in the section. Senior Counsel Shri.Harin P. Rawal argued with the aid of precedents that Section 195(1)(b) does not prohibit registration of crimes and investigation by the police. This argument is countered by Senior Counsel Sri. K.M. Nataraj, by drawing a distinction between Sections 195(1)(b)(i) and 195(1)(b)(ii). It is contended that all the offences mentioned in Section 195(1)(b)(i) are non-cognizable and hence the Police cannot register crime without following the procedure under Section 155 of the Cr.P.C and that the provision considered in the decisions cited by Mr.Raval was Section 195(1)(b)(ii), wherein the offences are cognisable. In order to address the contention, it is necessary to consider the cited decisions.

    14. In Nirmaljit Singh Hoon v. State of W.B., (1973) 3 SCC 753, the offences were under Sections 463, 471, 475, 476 of the IPC and hence the Apex Court held that police authorities have a statutory right under Sections 154 and 156 of the Code to investigate into a cognizable offence, without requiring any sanction from a judicial authority and even the High Court has no inherent power under Section 561-A of the Code (Section 482 of the new Code) to interfere with the exercise of that statutory power.

    15. In State of Punjab v. Raj Singh [(1998) 2 SCC 391], the appeal had arisen from the order by which the High Court had quashed an FIR, registered during the course of a civil suit, alleging commission of offences under Sections 419, 420, 467 and 468 of the IPC. The FIR was quashed on the ground that Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Cr.PC prohibited entertainment of and investigation into the offences by the police. While interfering with that judgment the Honourable Supreme Court held that from a plain reading of Section 195 Cr.PC, it is manifest that the prohibition comes into operation only at the stage when the court intends to take cognizance of an offence under Section 190(1) Cr.PC, and it has nothing to do with the statutory power of the police to investigate into an FIR which discloses a cognizable offence, even if the offence is alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in court. The Apex Court further held that the statutory power of the police to investigate under the Code is in no way controlled or circumscribed by Section 195 of the Cr.PC. That, upon the charge-sheet (challan), if any, filed on completion of the investigation into such an offence the court would not be competent to take cognizance thereof in view of the embargo of Section 195(1)(b) of the Cr.PC, but nothing therein deters the court from filing a complaint for the offence on the basis of the FIR (filed by the aggrieved private party) and the materials collected during investigation, provided it forms the requisite opinion and follows the procedure laid down in Section 340 of the Cr.PC.

    16. The distinction between Sections 195(1)(b)(i) and 195(1(b)(ii) has been succinctly laid down in Narendra Kumar Srivastava v. State of Bihar, [(2019) 3 SCC 318] in the following words;

    “13. It is clear from sub-section (1)(b) of Section 195 CrPC that the section deals with two separate set of offences:

    (i) of any offence punishable under Sections 193 to 196 (both inclusive), 199, 200, 205 to 211 (both inclusive) and 228 IPC, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any court; [Section 195(1) (b)(i)]

    (ii) of any offence described in Section 463, or punishable under Section 471, Section 475 or Section 476 IPC, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any court. [Section 195(1)(b)(ii)].

    14. On the reading of these sections, it can be easily seen that the offences under Section 195(1)(b)(i) and Section 195(1)(b)(ii) are clearly distinct. The first category of offences refers to offences of false evidence and offences against public justice, whereas, the second category of offences relates to offences in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any court.

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