J.P. Gupta, J.:— This civil revision petition under Section 115 of CPC has been preferred against the order dated 31.10.2020 passed by IV Civil Judge, Class-2 Waidhan, District Singrauli in Civil Suit No. 114-A/2020 whereby the application filed by the applicants under Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC has been rejected.
2. In brief, the facts of the case are that the respondent/plaintiff was appointed as Joint General Manager in Essar Power MP Limited Company (in brief EPMPL) on 1 September, 2016. The applicants/defendants having ill-will without any authority and malicious intention after hatching conspiracy by letter dated 30.9.2020, terminated the services of the respondent/plaintiff. The aforesaid act of the applicants/defendants is illegal, ineffective and bereft on any authority as the applicants/defendants have no right to terminate the services of the respondent/plaintiff and during Covid-19 Pandemic the Central and State Government have issued direction that no employee/officer shall be transferred or terminated. The aforesaid act of the applicants/defendants is against the aforesaid direction of the Government, apart from it, the EPMPL Company is a corporate debtor and on 29.9.2020, the National Company Law Tribunal, New Delhi has admitted the application under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 filed by the ICICI bank for initiating the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process and ended the management and control of the company by giving the same to the interim regulation professional, therefore, without the permission of the same, the employee cannot be terminated or suspended by the another employee of the company. Apart from it, in the termination letter, no reason for termination has been given, therefore, the respondent/plaintiff filed the civil suit on 5.10.2020 before the trial Court seeking declaration under Section 34 of Specific Relief Act that the termination letter dated 30.9.2020 is illegal, ineffective and bereft of any authority and the respondent/plaintiff is entitled to work in EPMPL Company and further relief also claimed for permanent injunction under Section 38 of the Specific Relief Act that the applicants/defendants should not interfere or obstruct in the residence of the plaintiff at Essar Township Quarter No. 103, A-Block Executive Building, Biloungi Tahsil and District Singrauli and mandatory injunction under section 39 of Specific Relief Act that the applicants/defendants shall allow respondent/plaintiff to continue his work as Joint Manager at EPMPL Company and not interfere or obstruct in his work.
3. On behalf of the applicants/defendants, an application under Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC was filed before the trial Court stating that the suit is barred by law, therefore, it is liable to be rejected. In this regard, it is stated that considering the averment in the plaint itself, as per the provision of Sections 231 and 238 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, the civil suit is barred against the company. Apart from it, the plaintiff has prayed for specific performance of the contract, relating to do personal service which is barred under Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act. This suit has been filed without implicating the EPMPL Company as defendant against whom, allegedly, the cause of action has arisen and in view of the Clause 29(1) of the appointment letter dated 1.9.2016, which is also part of the pleading relied by the plaintiff, only the court situated at Mumbai would have jurisdiction about all disputes with regard to the aforesaid agreement. The court situated in District Singrauli, has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the case, therefore, the plaint is liable to be rejected.
4. The learned trial Court having given an opportunity to both the parties, arrived at the conclusion that there is no bar in the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 to file civil suit in connection with the subject matter involved in this case and the objection with regard to non-joinder of necessary parties concerned, does not come in purview of Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC, if the court finds such error can direct the parties concerned to rectify the error but cannot reject the suit by exercising power under Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC.
5. So far, the objection with regard to territorial jurisdiction is concerned, despite of the term of contract of the appointment about the execlusion of the jurisdiction of other court, except the court situated at Mumbai, does not debar the respondent/plaintiff to file the suit before the court situated in District Singrauli where the cause of action had arised, after placing reliance on the judgment of Patel Roadways Ltd. Bombay v. Tropical Agro Systems Pvt. Ltd., (1991) 4 SCC 270 : AIR 1992 SC 1514, the prayer with regard to objection under Section 14 of Specific Relief Act has been rejected on the ground that the declaration/injunction has not been claimed against the EPMPL Company. It is claimed against the applicants/defendants who terminated the services of respondent/plaintiff illegally which is ineffective and bereft of any authority. Apart from it, there is a mix question of law and fact that whether on 30.9.2020, applicant no. 1/defendant no. 1 had the legitimate authority to issue the termination letter or not and the relief clause may be amended during the trial. Accordingly, the application has been rejected, hence, this revision.
6. Applicants/defendants have filed this revision on the ground that aforesaid finding with regard to rejection of the applications are erroneous and contrary to law. This suit has been filed by the respondent/plaintiff for the relief to continue his status in the company as Joint Manager along with all benefits and cleverly has not joined the company as a defendant and under the Specific Relief Act, no decree for declaration or injunction having effect of specific performance of the contract of personal service can be passed.
7. Similarly, the appointment letter which has been relied by the respondent/plaintiff ousted the jurisdiction of the court situated other than place of Mumbai, therefore, any dispute with regard to term of appointment cannot be filed at another place except Mumbai and the learned trial Court has wrongly placed reliance on the case of Patel Roadways Ltd., Bombay (Supra) in which no cause of action had arisen at the place, which was admitted by the party to be place of adjudication, while in the present case the appointment letter was issued from Mumbai, therefore, partly cause of action had arisen at Mumbai. In the circumstances, the parties are bound to oblige the agreement ousting the other places for adjudication, therefore, the plaint deserves to be rejected. It is also argued that in the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 the suit is barred and the learned trial Court has not considered the provision of the aforesaid Act in right perspective, therefore, impugned order be set-aside and the plaint be rejected.
8. Learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff has supported the finding of the learned trial Court and prayed for rejection of this revision.
9. Having considered the contention of learned counsel for both the parties and perusal of the record, in view of this court, learned trial Court has rightly rejected the objection with regard to bar of this suit. Under Section 231 and 238 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, as the subject matter of this suit is not related to the provision of aforesaid sections, similarly, on account of the objection with regard to error of non-joinder of necessary parties, the plaint cannot be dismissed under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC and the learned counsel of the applicants has also not seriously objected the aforesaid finding, hence, this court is not going to disturb the aforesaid finding.
10. So far the other objections are concerned, they have a substance and learned trial Court has erroneously rejected in as much as the relief clause of plaint categorically disclosed that the plaint has been filed for getting the relief in term of declaration and injunction for specific performance of contract of personal service which cannot be directed by the Civil Court in view of the provision of Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act.
11. Hon'ble the Apex Court in case of Indian Airlines Corporation v. Sukhdeo Rai . ((1971) 2 SCC 192 : AIR 1971 SC 1828) this court also observed as follows:
“It is a well settled principle that when there is a purported termination of a contract of service, a declaration, that the contract of service still subsisted, would not be made in the absence of special circumstances because of the principle that courts do not ordinarily grant specific performance of service. This is so, even in cases where the authority appointing an employee was acting in exercise of statutory authority. The relationship between the person appointed and the employer would in such cases be contractual, i.e. as between a master and servant, and the termination of that relationship would not entitle the servant to a declaration that his employment had not been validly determined.”
12. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in Bank of Baroda v. Jewan Lal Mehrotra, (1970) 2 Lab LJ 54, 55 where this court observed as follows:
“The law as settled by this Court is that no declaration to enforce a contract of personal service will be normally granted. The well recognised exceptions to this rule are (1) where a public servant has been dismissed from service in contravention of Art. 311; (2) where reinstatement is sought of a dismissed worker under the industrial law by labour or industrial tribunals; (3) where a statutory body has acted in breach of a mandatory obligation imposed by statute;”
13. In the Sirsi Municipality's case ((1973) 1 SCC 409 : AIR 1973 SC 855) the matter was exhaustively reviewed and Ray, J., (as he then was) observed as follows:
“The cases of dismissal of a servant fall under three broad heads, purely by contract of employment. Any breach of contract in such a case is enforced by a suit for wrongful dismissal and damages. Just as a contract of employment is not capable of specific performance similarly breach of contract of employment is not capable of founding a declaratory judgment of subsistence of employment. A declaration of unlawful termination and restoration to service in such a case of contract of employment would be indirectly an instance of specific performance of contract for personal service. Such a declaration is not permissible under the Law of Specific Relief Act.
The second type of cases of master and servant arises under Industrial Law. Under that branch of law a servant who is wrongfully dismissed may be reinstated. This is a special provision under Industrial Law. This relief is a departure from the reliefs available under the Indian Contract Act and the Specific Relief Act which do not provide for reinstatement of a servant.
The third category of cases of master and servant arises in regard to the servant in the employment of the State or of other public or local authorities or bodies created under statute.”
14. Considering the aforesaid law the Apex Court in case of Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College, Shamli v. Lakshmi Narain, (1976) 2 SCC 58 : AIR 1976 SC 888 has observed as follows:
“On a consideration of the authorities mentioned above, it is, therefore, clear that a contract of personal service cannot ordinarily be specifically enforced and a Court normally would not give a declaration that the contract subsists and the employee, even after having been removed from service can be deemed to be in service against the will and consent of the employer. This rule, however, is subject to three well recognised exceptions - (i) where a public servant is sought to be removed from service in contravention of the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution of India; (ii) where a worker is sought to be reinstated on being dismissed under the Industrial Law, and (iii) where a statutory body acts in breach or violation of the mandatory provisions of the statute.”
15. The aforesaid interpretation of law made it clear that in the present case, where the employer is not the statutory body and only a private company, the civil court cannot direct to perform the contract of personal service and on the breach of contract remedy is damages or compensation, therefore, prima facie, the plaint is barred by law.
16. The learned trial Court having considered the ground that this suit is not against the company and only the persons, who are claiming to be acted on behalf of the company, despite of having no authority and with ill-will issued the order of termination, has been sued. This is the cleverness of pleading while the real intention or object is to get relief with regard to specific performance of the contract of personal service, therefore, merely, on the ground, it cannot be said that this suit is not barred under Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act, therefore, the aforesaid objection has a substance.
17. Similarly, the objection with regard to territorial jurisdiction of the trial Court, Waidhan, District Singrauli is concerned, the term of Clause 29 of the appointment order dated 1.9.2016 in which it is mentioned that all dispute with regard to the appointment would be subjected to the court situated in Mumbai excluding the other places, In this regard, law is very clear, if the place which has been chosen for adjudication is one of the place where the cause of action also arised then only the place which has been chosen, the litigation can take place, if the chosen place is the place where no cause of action arise, the other place where the cause of action has arisen cannot be excluded as held by the Apex Court in the judgment of Shriram City Union Finance Corporation Ltd. v. Rama Mishra ., (2002) 9 SCC 613 which reads as follows:
“9. In the present case the impugned order of the High Court and the order passed by the appellate court arises out of the order passed by the Civil Judge, Bhubaneshwar. We have to keep in mind that there is difference between inherent lack of jurisdiction of any court on account of some statute and the other where parties through agreement bind themselves to have their dispute decided by any one of the courts having jurisdiction. Thus the question is not whether the Orissa courts have the jurisdiction to decide the respondent's suit but whether the respondent could have invoked the jurisdiction of that court in view of the aforesaid clause 34. A party is bound either by provision of the Constitution, statutory provisions or any rule or under terms of any contract which is not against the public policy. It is open for a party for his convenience to fix the jurisdiction of any competent court to have their dispute adjudicated by that court alone. In other words, if one or more courts have the jurisdiction to try any suit, it is open for the parties to choose any one of the two competent courts to decide their disputes. In case parties under their own agreement expressly agree that their dispute shall be tried by only one of them then the parties can only file the suit in that court alone to which they have so agreed. In the present case, as we have said, through clause 34 of the agreement, the parties have bound themselves that in any matter arising between them under the said contract, it is the courts in Calcutta alone which will have jurisdiction. Once parties bound themselves as such it is not open for them to choose a different jurisdiction as in the present case by filing the suit at Bhubaneshwar. Such a suit would be in violation of the said agreement.
10. For the said reasons we have no hesitation to hold that the suit filed by the respondent in the civil court at Bhubaneshwar would not be valid, in view of the said agreement.
11. In Hakam Singh v. Gammon (India) Ltd. ., (1971) 1 SCC 286 : (1971) 3 SCR 314 this court held: (SCC pp. 288 & 289, paras 4 & 7)
“But where two courts or more have under the Code of Civil Procedure jurisdiction to try a suit or proceeding an agreement between the parties that the dispute between them shall be tried in one of such courts is not contrary to public policy. Such an agreement does not contravene Section 28 of the Contract Act.
Since an application for filing an award in respect of a dispute arising out of the terms of the agreement could be filed in the courts in the City of Bombay, both because of the terms of clause 13 of the agreement and because the respondents had their Head Office where they carry on business at Bombay, the agreement between the parties that the courts in Bombay alone shall have jurisdiction to try the proceeding relating to arbitration was binding between them.”
18. But the learned trial Court has placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in case of Patel Roadways Ltd. Bombay (Supra) while the fact of the aforesaid case are different. The place which was chosen did not oust the other places of the cause of action as there was no cause of action at the chosen place, whereas in the present case, the appointment order has been issued at Mumbai, therefore, in case of violation of the terms of the appointment contract, Mumbai would also be a place of the cause of action, resultantly, the adjudicating body of Mumbai has exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute. On that account also the suit is barred due to lake of territorial jurisdiction of the court situated at Waidhan, District Singrauli where the termination order was issued.
19. In view of the aforesaid discussions, the impugned order of the trial Court is not sustainable, therefore, it is set aside and the application filed by the applicants/defendants deserves to be allowed, hence, the same is allowed and the plaint is rejected.
20. A copy of this order be sent to the learned trial Court for information and compliance.