Enforcement) Act, 1933 enacted by the British Parliament under Section (1) in pursuance of which the Government of United Kingdom issued Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments (India) Order, 1958. Apart from it there are other enactments such as Indian and Colonial Divorce Jurisdiction Act, 1940 which safeguard the interests so far as United Kingdom is concerned. But the rule of domicile replacing the nationality rule in most of the countries for assumption of jurisdiction and granting relief in matrimonial matters has resulted in conflict of laws. What is this domicile rule is not necessary to be gone into. But feasibility of a legislation safeguarding interests of women may be examined by incorporating such provisions as- (1) No marriage between a NRI and an Indian woman which has taken place in India may be annulled by a foreign court; (2) Provision may be made for adequate alimony to the wife in the property of the husband both in India and abroad. (3)The decree granted by Indian courts may be made executable in foreign courts both on principle of comity and by entering into reciprocal agreements like Section MAT.APP.(F.C.).101/2020 Page 14 of 24 44-A of the Civil Procedure Code which makes a foreign decree executable as it would have been a decree passed by that court.
24. The reasons that had weighed with the legislature for amending Section 19 of the Act and inserting sub-clause (iiia) have been succinctly stated in the following words by a Division Bench of the High Court of Madras in R.Sridharan v. The Presiding Officer, Principal Family Court, Chennai & Ors., reported as 2010 SCC Online Mad 3807 :
12. The Hindu Marriage Act, as it originally stood besides its coverage to the whole of India, also applied to all Hindus domiciled in India. The Act was subsequently amended and it was given an extended application. Accordingly domicile in India was substituted by a new clause domiciled in the territories to which this Act extends. This amendment was made with a specific purpose to extent the provisions of the Act to all Hindus with such domicile, even though for the time being, they are outside the said territories. Because of this amendment, it was not open to a person governed by Hindu Law to contest the matter on the sole ground that he is residing outside India and as such the Act has no application to him.
13. Section 19 of the Hindu Marriage Act deals with jurisdiction and procedures. Before the amendment made to Section 19 as per Act 50 of 2003, the provision was as under:
19. Court to which Petition shall be presented. Every Petition under this Act shall be presented to the District Court within the local limits of whose ordinary original Civil jurisdiction
(i) the marriage was solemnized, or
(ii) the Respondent, at the time of presentation of the Petition, resides, or
(iii) the parties to the marriage last resided together, or MAT.APP.(F.C.).101/2020 Page 15 of 24 [(iii-a) in case the wife is the Petitioner, where she is residing on the date of presentation of the Petition, or]
(iv) the Petitioner is residing at the time of the presentation of the Petition, in a case where the Respondent is, at that time, residing outside the territories to which this Act extends, or has not been heard of as being alive for a period of seven years or more by those persons who would naturally have heard of him if he were alive.
14. It was found that the provision regarding jurisdiction caused serious prejudice to the cause of women. It was not possible for a women to initiate proceedings before the Court in whose jurisdiction she was residing. Because of this rigid provision, women were compelled to approach the Courts in whose jurisdiction the marriage was solemnized or the husband resides or the parties to the marriage last resided together. They have to approach Courts in distant places to resolve their matrimonial disputes. Courts were flooded with transfer petitions to transfer those proceedings on various grounds so as to enable the wife to contest the proceedings before the nearest Court without any kind of difficulties. The jurisdiction clause as it stood originally, was really unfair to the women. Accordingly it was decided to amend Section 19 for the purpose of incorporating a provision to enable the wife to file a Petition before the District Court in whose jurisdiction she is actually residing. This provision was inserted by Act 50 of 2003 with effect from
23 December, 2003. Therefore the wife is now entitled to file a Matrimonial Petition before the District Court in whose territorial jurisdiction she is residing.
15. The provision regarding jurisdiction as per sub- clause( iv) of Section 19 permits initiation of Matrimonial proceedings before the Court in whose local jurisdiction the Petitioner is residing at the time of presentation of the petition, in a case where the Respondent is, at that time, residing outside the territories to which the Hindu Marriage Act extends. Therefore the fact that the other party to the proceeding is residing outside the territory to which the Hindu Marriage Act extents does not disentitle the Petitioner wife from applying before the local MAT.APP.(F.C.).101/2020 Page 16 of 24 designated Court to redress her grievances.(emphasis supplied)
25. In Mandeep Kaur v. Dharam Lingam, reported as 2016 SCC Online P&H 10594, while dealing with a case where the husband was a citizen of Canada who had raised the issue of jurisdiction in a petition for divorce filed by the wife in Ludhiana, Punjab, a Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana had observed as under:
12. In the case in hand, the respondent was stated to be citizen of Canada. On notice of the petition, he had appeared before learned trial Court but without filing written reply to the petition and raising any objection/pleading relating to his status as domicile of India or jurisdiction of the Court, had walked out of the proceedings. In the absence of pleading on his part, it cannot be assumed that he was not a Hindu domiciled in India by origin and residing outside the territory of India. Issue No. (i) is answered accordingly.
14. Section 19 of the Act deals with jurisdiction and procedure, which reads as under:
19. Court to which petition shall be presented. -Every petition under this Act shall be presented to the district court within the local limits of whose ordinary original civil jurisdiction-
(i) the marriage was solemnised, or
(ii) the respondent, at the time of the presentation of the petition, resides, or
(iii) the parties to the marriage last resided together, (iiia) in case the wife is the petitioner, where she is residing on the date of presentation of the petition, or
(iv) the petitioner is residing at the time of the presentation of the petition, in a case where the respondent is, at that time, residing outside the territories to which this Act extends, or has not been heard of as being alive for a period of MAT.APP.(F.C.).101/2020 Page 17 of 24 seven years or more by those persons who would naturally have heard of him if he were alive.
15. Sub-clause (iii-a) was inserted by Act 50 of 2003. As it was found that the provision regarding jurisdiction caused serious prejudice to the cause of women and the jurisdiction clause as it stood originally, was unfair to the women, necessary amendment was made in Section
19 of the Act for the purpose of incorporating a provision to enable the wife to file a petition before the District Court in whose jurisdiction she is actually residing. Accordingly, the wife is now entitled to file a matrimonial petition before the District Court in whose territorial jurisdiction she is residing. (emphasis supplied)
26. A reading of the judgment in Sondur Gopal (supra), would show that the argument advanced by the appellant/husband therein that the domicile of the respondent/wife would automatically follow the domicile of the husband, had not been decided in his favour by the Supreme Court. Nor can the observations made in para 27 of the said judgment and relied upon by the appellant/husband herein come to his aid. Para 34 of the said judgment makes it clear that for proving domicile, it has to be established that there is a manifest intention of the party of abandoning the domicile of origin. For ready reference, the observations made by the Supreme Court in para 34 of Sondur Gopal (supra), is extracted as under:-
34. Domiciles are of three kinds viz. domicile of origin, the domicile by operation of law and the domicile of choice. In the present case, we are concerned only with the domicile of origin and domicile of choice. Domicile of origin is not necessarily the place of birth. The birth of a child at a place during temporary absence of the parents from their domicile will not make the place of birth as the domicile of the child. In domicile of choice one is abandoned and another domicile is acquired but for that, MAT.APP.(F.C.).101/2020 Page 18 of 24 the acquisition of another domicile is not sufficient. Domicile of origin prevails until not only another domicile is acquired but it must manifest intention of abandoning the domicile of origin.
35. The right to change the domicile of birth is available to any person not legally dependent and such a person can acquire domicile of choice. It is done by residing in the country of choice with intention of continuing to reside there indefinitely. Unless proved, there is presumption against the change of domicile. Therefore, the person who alleges it has to prove that. Intention is always lodged in the mind, which can be inferred from any act, event or circumstance in the life of such person. Residence, for a long period, is an evidence of such an intention so also the change of nationality. (emphasis supplied)
27. The captioned judgment refers to Section 1(2) of the Act and states that the said provision applies to Hindus by religion in any form and takes in its fold, sub-sects like Buddhists, Jains, Sikhs and covers all such persons who are domiciled in India, not being Muslims, Christians, Parsis or Jews unless it is proven that they are not governed by the Act. The conclusion drawn was that Section 2 would apply to Hindus domiciled in territories contemplated in Section 1(2) of the Act including those Hindus who are living outside the territories of India.
28. In Kedar Pandey v. Narain Bikram Sah, reported as AIR 1966 SC 160, on the aspect of domicile, the Supreme Court held as under:
10. The law on the topic is well established but the difficulty is found in its application to varying combination of circumstances in each case. The law attributes to every person at birth a domicil which is called a domicil of origin. This domicil may be changed, and a new domicil, which is called a domicil of choice, acquired; but the two kinds of domicil differ in one respect. The domicil of MAT.APP.(F.C.).101/2020 Page 19 of 24 origin is received by operation of law at birth; the domicil of choice is acquired later by the actual removal of an individual to another country accompanied by his animus manendi. The domicile of origin is determined by the domicile, at the time of the child's birth, of that person upon whom he is legally dependent. A legitimate child born in a wedlock to a living father receives the domicil of the father at the time of the birth; a posthumous legitimate child receives that of the mother at that time. As regards change of domicile, any person not under disability may at any time change his existing domicile and acquire for himself a domicile of choice by the fact of residing in a country other than that of his domicile of origin with the intention of continuing to reside there indefinitely. For this purpose residence is a mere physical fact, and means no more than personal presence in a locality, regarded apart from any of the circumstances attending it. If this physical fact is accompanied by the required state of mind, neither its character nor its duration is in any way material. The state of mind, or animus manendi, which is required demands that the person whose domicile is the object of the inquiry should have formed a fixed and settled purpose of making his principal or sole permanent home.. (emphasis added)
29. Similarly, in Abdus Samad v. State Of West Bengal ., reported as (1973) 1 SCC 451, the Supreme Court observed as under:
6. .. By domicile is meant a permanent home. Domicile means the place which a person has fixed as a habitation of himself and his family not for a mere special and temporary purpose, but with present intention of making it his permanent home. Domicile of choice is thus the result of a voluntary choice.
7. Every person must have a domicile. A person cannot have two simultaneous domiciles. Domicile denotes connection with the territorial system of law. The burden of proving a change in domicile is on those MAT.APP.(F.C.).101/2020 Page 20 of 24 who allege that a change has occurred. (emphasis added)
30. Yet again, on the concept of resident and domicile, following are the pertinent observations made by the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Dudh Nath Prasad reported as (2000) 2 SCC 20:- "27. ...........The classical division of domicile is well known. There are the domicile of origin, the domicile of choice and the domicile of dependence. There has been little change in the essential concept of these three domiciles........
28. In view of the above, the concept of "domicile" as canvassed by learned counsel for the appellants with reference to change of nationality or change of domicile from one country to another, cannot be imported in the present case. Moreover, "Domicile" and "Residence" are relative concepts and have to be understood in the context in which they are used, having regard to the nature and purpose of the statute in which these words are used. (emphasis supplied)
31. To crystallize the law, the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court amply demonstrate that the question of domicile of the parties depends on their intention. It is well-settled that strong proof would be required to establish that a person has abandoned the domicile of origin and has acquired a new domicile. Domicile being primarily a mixed question of law and fact, this intention can be determined by the court after the parties get an opportunity to lead evidence. Under Order VII Rule 11, CPC, the court can only scrutinize the contents of the plaint taken as a whole but it cannot consider the evidence, if any, or the pleas taken in the written statement. In Abdus Samad Vs. State of West Bengal reported as (1973) 1 SCC 451, it has been categorically held that the burden of proving a MAT.APP.(F.C.).101/2020 Page 21 of 24 change in domicile is on those who allege that a change has occurred. Since the appellant/husband has asserted that the respondent/wife has changed her domicile, it shall be for him to discharge the said onus by leading evidence. His oral assertion would certainly not suffice.
32. In the present case, the stage of leading evidence has yet to arrive. The question as to whether the respondent/wife is a domicile of India or not, has not been proved. The matter was still at the stage of completion of pleadings, when the application was moved by the appellant/husband for seeking rejection of the divorce petition. The respondent/wife has categorically stated in her petition that she wants to reside in India. To establish as to whether she has abandoned the domicile of origin which is India, evidence will necessarily have to be led. We are therefore of the opinion that after amendment to the Act in the year 2003 and on insertion of sub-clause (iiia) in Section 19, it cannot be said that Family Courts in Delhi are not vested with the jurisdiction to try and entertain the divorce petition filed by the respondent/wife.
33. The contention of the appellant/husband that courts in the State of Illinois have acquired prior jurisdiction premised on the divorce petition filed by him and entertained by the said courts, is also found to be meritless. The facts as they stand today, show that the parties were married in Delhi and the marriage was conducted in accordance with Sikh ceremonies. Once the marriage was solemnized under the Hindu law, the divorce proceedings must also be initiated under the Hindu Marriage Act. The appellant/husband cannot raise an objection to the respondent/wife initiating proceedings of divorce in India under the provisions of the Act only because he is a US citizen and domiciled in USA. [Refer : Y. Narasimah Rao & Ors. Vs. Y. Venkta Lakshmi & Anr. reported as (1991) 3 SCC 451]. MAT.APP.(F.C.).101/2020 Page 22 of 24
34. Even assuming for the sake of arguments, that the appellant/husband has abandoned his domicile as asserted by him, the facts as they emerge from a reading of the divorce petition shows that India remains the domicile of choice for the respondent/wife. Unless, it is proven otherwise by leading appropriate evidence, it cannot be stated at this stage that courts in India are divested of the territorial jurisdiction to entertain a petition filed under the Act simply on the say so of the appellant/husband. Once the respondent/wife has averred in clear and unequivocal terms that she has not abandoned the domicile of India, it has to be held that the divorce petition discloses a valid cause of action and cannot be held to be barred under any law.
35. If we accept the contention of the appellant/husband that both the parties must be domiciled in India for a petition to be maintainable in India, it would lead to an absurd and untenable inference that after the marriage, if a wife is abandoned in a foreign land on being deserted by the husband, she will be left with no remedy other than to institute/contest the case in a foreign land where she may have no financial means, wherewithal or support for the same.
36. The marriage between the parties herein having been solemnized under the Hindu Law, can only be dissolved on the grounds set out in Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act. Irretrievable break down of marriage is not a ground available under the said provision. It therefore, does not lie in the mouth of the appellant/husband to claim that courts in Illinois, California had acquired prior jurisdiction in the matter merely because he had approached the said courts for seeking divorce against the respondent/wife on grounds that are not even available under the Act. In fact, it will be for the appellant/husband to establish the validity of the decree of divorce granted by the foreign court in his favour on the ground MAT.APP.(F.C.).101/2020 Page 23 of 24 of irretrievable break down of marriage. [Refer (1991) 1 SCC 451, Y. Narasimah Rao & Ors. Vs. Y. Venkta Lakshmi & Anr.].
37. In the instant case, the respondent/wife remains a citizen of India and therefore, is a domicile of India for all intents and purposes. She has chosen to approach the courts in India for obtaining a decree for divorce. Section 19(iiia) read with Section 1 and Section 2 of the Act must be interpreted meaningfully and in such a manner as to confer jurisdiction on courts in India for entertaining a petition under the Act filed by the wife in circumstances where her husband has deserted her to go abroad or invoked the jurisdiction of foreign courts to obtain ex-parte orders/decree, leaving her with no efficacious remedy outside the country.
38. It was therefore, too premature a stage for the Family Court to have determined with certainty, the intention of the respondent/wife as to her domicile of choice. That would be a matter of trial and based on the evidence brought on record, the learned Family Court will have to draw an appropriate conclusion. In our opinion, the application filed by the appellant/husband under Order VII Rule 11 CPC for rejection of the divorce petition without taking the matter to trial, has been rightly turned down.
39. To conclude, none of the two grounds invoked for rejection of the divorce petition under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, have been made out by the appellant/husband. The issue as to whether the respondent/wife has abandoned her domicile in India, is a mixed question of law and facts that can be established only in a trial, after evidence is led by the parties. The divorce petition filed by the respondent/wife read as a whole, does disclose a valid cause of action that can be entertained by the learned Family Court in India. Section 19(i), (iiia) and (iv) read with Sections 1 and 2 of the Act confer jurisdiction on courts in India to entertain such a dispute. MAT.APP.(F.C.).101/2020 Page 24 of 24
40. We, therefore, do not find any infirmity in the impugned judgment. The appeal, therefore, fails and is accordingly, dismissed along with the pending application. HIMA KOHLI, J. SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD, J. OCTOBER 12, 2020 pst/ap/sk/NA/tr