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Smart Summary

Judicial Opinion Summary — Bail Application (Crime No. 10 of 2020)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner seeks bail in Crime No. 10 of 2020 registered by the Vallam Police Station (Thanjavur District). The police allege that on 19.01.2020 one Arokiyamary was robbed of a gold chain at about 06:30 A.M. on Alakudi Road; a person on a two-wheeler (Regn. No. TN 47 AQ 5726) came from behind, threatened her with a knife and took away one sovereign of gold. The complaint was lodged at around 8:00 A.M. and the matter was registered as offences under Sections 392 and 397 IPC. The petitioner was arrested during the day on the allegation that he committed the robbery and was remanded to judicial custody.

The petitioner had earlier applied for bail before the same court and those petitions were dismissed because the petitioner was said to be involved in three previous cases of the same nature. The present petition is asserted solely on the ground that the prosecution has not filed the final report within the statutory period and therefore the petitioner claims default (compulsory) bail.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the order passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 23.03.2020 in Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No. 3 of 2020 (and related orders) extending periods of limitation w.e.f. 15.03.2020 "till further orders" applies to the time-limits in Section 167(2) Cr.P.C., and thereby postpones the accrual of the accused's entitlement to default bail.
  2. Whether, on the facts of this case (arrest and remand on 19.01.2020 and non-filing of the final report within the period specified in Section 167(2)), the petitioner is entitled to default bail.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petition was filed solely on the ground that the prosecution has failed to file the final report within the mandatory time limit under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C., and therefore the petitioner is entitled to default bail.
  • Earlier bail petitions were dismissed by this court on the basis that the petitioner was involved in three prior similar cases (this is a factual background relevant to the petitioner's procedural history).

Prosecution's Arguments

  • The petitioner is accused of offences under Sections 392 read with 397 IPC; Section 397 carries a minimum sentence of seven years and is triable by the Sessions Court. Section 392 includes two categories of robbery with different punishments.
  • If the present case is categorized as robbery simpliciter, default bail would be claimable after 60 days from remand; if categorized as aggravated robbery, the relevant outer period is 90 days. The petitioner's remand dated 19.01.2020 would therefore result in expiry of relevant periods on 19.03.2020 (60 days) or 18.04.2020 (90 days) respectively.
  • The prosecution conceded that the final report had not been filed but relied on the Hon'ble Supreme Court's order dated 23.03.2020 in Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No. 3/2020 extending periods of limitation with effect from 15.03.2020 until further orders, to contend that the accrual of any right to default bail is postponed by that order; consequently, the petitioner could not claim default bail during the extended period.
  • The prosecution accepted that, notwithstanding the limitation extension, the court retains the discretion to grant bail on merits, but submitted that the petitioner is not entitled to default bail as of right while the Supreme Court order remains in force.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Achpal v. State of Rajasthan (2019) 14 SCC 599 Holds that the Code does not empower anyone to extend the period within which investigation must be completed; upon expiry, if the accused applies for bail and is ready to furnish sureties, an indefeasible right accrues to him. The court relied on this proposition to support the principle that statutory time-limits in the Code (relating to detention pending investigation) cannot be extended by other authorities and that expiry leads to accrual of a right to default bail.
Rakesh Kumar Paul vs. State of Assam (2017) 15 SCC 67 Holds that an order releasing an accused on default bail does not prohibit arrest or rearrest on cogent grounds; if rearrested the accused must move a regular bail application. The court applied this authority to clarify that the order granting default bail does not bar lawful re-arrest; if re-arrested, the petitioner must seek bail afresh and such application will be considered on merits.
P.K. Shaji Alias Thammanam Shaji v. State of Kerala [(2005) AIR SCW 5560] Addresses the effect and enforcement of conditions imposed when an accused is released on bail by a Magistrate/Trial Court. The court invoked this precedent to justify that breach of bail conditions would allow the Magistrate/Trial Court to take appropriate action as if the bail had been granted by that court itself.
Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No. 3 of 2020 — Order dated 23.03.2020 (Supreme Court) Extended the period of limitation in all proceedings (general and special laws) w.e.f. 15.03.2020 until further orders, by exercising powers under Articles 142 and 141 of the Constitution; declared binding on all Courts/Tribunals. The court considered the prosecution's reliance on this order but analysed whether an extension of "period of limitation" under that order was intended to include the statutory timelines in Section 167(2) Cr.P.C.; ultimately the court held that the Supreme Court order did not apply to Section 167(2) so as to postpone accrual of default bail rights.
Order dated 06.05.2020 in Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No. 3/2020 (I.A. No. 48411/2020) Extended periods of limitation under Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 and section 138 Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, with guidance on computing extension where limitation had expired after 15.03.2020. The court noted this order and observed it similarly did not address Section 167 Cr.P.C.; it was used to illustrate that the Supreme Court's orders dealt with statutory limitation regimes specific to certain statutes, not the detention periods under Section 167(2).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court identified the central legal question as whether the Supreme Court's extension of periods of limitation (order of 23.03.2020) applies to the time-limit in Section 167(2) Cr.P.C., thereby delaying the accused's entitlement to default bail.

Step 1 — Binding nature of the Supreme Court order: The court acknowledged that the Supreme Court's order was issued under Articles 142 and 141 of the Constitution, is binding on all Courts and Tribunals, and cannot be re-interpreted by subordinate courts. Despite this, the court considered the precise scope of that order as applied to Section 167(2).

Step 2 — Distinction between "period of limitation" and the statutory detention period under Section 167(2): The court analysed the legal meaning of "period of limitation" (citations from the Limitation Act and legal lexica are reproduced in the opinion) and concluded that what the Supreme Court extended was limitation periods for filing suits/appeals/applications under limitation statutes. The court emphasised that Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. does not operate as a limitation on filing a final report in the same sense; rather, it prescribes a period beyond which the magistrate cannot authorize detention and an indefeasible right to default bail accrues to the accused if he is willing to furnish bail.

Step 3 — Statutory construction and prior interpretations: The court observed that Section 167(2) does not bar the filing of a final report after the statutory period; it only limits magistratal authority to authorize continued detention beyond that period. The court also noted that Chapter XXXVI of the Cr.P.C. deals with limitation for taking cognizance of certain offences, and Section 167 should not be conflated with those limitation provisions. The court referred to the interpretation of Section 167(5) indicating magistrates may still take cognizance upon a final report filed later; thus Section 167 cannot be treated as an ordinary "limitation" for the purposes of the Supreme Court's order.

Step 4 — Effect of the Supreme Court orders and executive measures: The court reviewed the subsequent Supreme Court order dated 06.05.2020 (which extended limitation under specific statutes) and noted that these Supreme Court orders did not expressly include the detention period under Section 167(2). The court further observed that the executive had issued the Taxation and Other Laws (Relaxation of Certain Provisions) Ordinance, 2020 extending certain compliance periods, but no executive or legislative step had been taken to amend or extend the time specified in Section 167(2). The court stressed that if the executive intended to extend the period specified in Section 167, it should have enacted an appropriate formal measure.

Step 5 — Practical considerations and compliance: The court noted that arrests and remands continued to occur during the pandemic; nothing prevented the prosecution from presenting the final report before the stipulated date and obtaining the initial of the jurisdictional magistrate, which would have been construed as compliance. The court found the prosecution's reliance on court closures and general limitation extension to be unjustified in the circumstances.

Step 6 — Constitutional right to personal liberty: The court emphasised that personal liberty under Article 21 is precious and that denying compulsive/default bail where the statutory entitlement has accrued would violate Article 21. The court concluded that the Supreme Court's benevolent extension of limitation periods was not intended to strip away accrued rights of accused persons under Section 167(2).

Step 7 — Exceptions acknowledged: The court recognised that certain special statutes (e.g., provisions under the NDPS Act such as Section 36-A(4), and provisions under UAPA) contain specific extension mechanisms for investigative periods and that in such cases the benefit of the Supreme Court's direction or statutory extension may apply. The court confined its holding to offences governed by Section 167 Cr.P.C. where no specific statutory extension exists.

Step 8 — Relief fashioned: Applying the above reasoning to the facts (arrest/remand on 19.01.2020 and non-filing of the final report within the statutory period), the court held that the petitioner was entitled to default bail. The court then imposed specific conditions for release and reminded that re-arrest on cogent grounds remains possible as per extant authority.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The petitioner is entitled to default (compulsory) bail under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C.

Direct implications and consequences:

  • The petitioner was ordered to be released on default bail subject to conditions: (i) execution of a bond for Rs. 10,000 with two sureties each for like sum to the satisfaction of the learned Judicial Magistrate No. II, Thanjavur District; (ii) the petitioner must appear before the respondent police as and when required for interrogation; and (iii) on breach of conditions, the Magistrate/Trial Court is entitled to take appropriate action as laid down in P.K. Shaji (2005).
  • The court made clear that this order does not prohibit arrest or re-arrest of the petitioner on cogent grounds; in such an event the petitioner must move a regular bail application which will be considered on merits (as explained in Rakesh Kumar Paul (2017)).
  • The court clarified that the Supreme Court's order of 23.03.2020 extending limitation periods did not apply to postpone the accrual of the statutory right to default bail under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. for offences to which Section 167 applies and where no special statutory extension mechanism exists.
  • The court acknowledged that in respect of certain special statutes (for example, under NDPS Act where statutory provisions permit extension of investigative periods), different rules may apply and the benefit of the Supreme Court directions or statutory provisions permitting extension would be available in those contexts.

Note: The court's order also records the administrative directives and the names of authorities to whom copies were directed, and it contains the standard caveat that the soft copy of the order on the website may be acted upon without obtaining a certified copy.

Order date and authority: G.R.S., J., 08.05.2020.

    Settu Petitioner/Accused v. State, Rep. By Inspector Of Police /Complainant.

    Prayer: For Bail in Crime No. 10 of 2020 on the file of the respondent Police.

    1. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and the learned Government Advocate (Crl. Side) appearing for the respondent police.

    Facts of the case:

    2. According to the respondent police, one Arokiyamary was on her morning walk on 19.01.2020 in Alakudi Road when she was robbed of her gold chain. A person coming from behind in a two wheeler bearing Registration No. TN 47 AQ 5726 intercepted her and threatened her with a knife and took away her one sovereign gold chain. The occurrence is said to have taken place at about 06.30 A.M and the complaint was lodged at around 8.00 A.M. It was registered as Crime No. 10 of 2020 by the respondent for the offences under Sections 392 and 397 of I.P.C. The petitioner was arrested during the course of the day on the allegation that it was he who committed the aforesaid robbery. He was remanded to judicial custody.

    3. The petitioner had earlier filed bail petitions before me. I dismissed them because the petitioner was said to be involved in three previous cases of the same nature. This petition has been filed solely on the ground that since final report has not been filed within the mandatory time limit, the petitioner is entitled to default bail.

    Objection raised by the prosecution:

    4. Shri. A. Robinson, the learned Government Counsel (crl.side) submitted that the petitioner is accused of having committed the offences under Sections 392 r/w 397 of IPC. The offence under Section 397 of IPC is punishable with imprisonment which shall be not less than seven years. It is an offence triable by the Sessions Court. Section 392 of IPC deals with robbery of two kinds ; robbery committed on the highway between sunset and sunrise and other kinds of robbery. The former is punishable with imprisonment that may extend to 14 years. Robbery simpliciter is punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years. If the case on hand is brought under the robbery simpliciter category, the petitioner can seek default bail on the expiry of the 60 day from the date of remand. If the petitioner's case is catergorized under the aggravated type, then it will be on the expiry of 90 3/19 days. The petitioner's arrest and remand was on 19 January, 2020. The 60 day will fall on 19 March, 2020. The 90 day will fall on April 18 2020. Shri. A. Robinson with his customary fairness submitted that the final report has not been made ready till date. But, he wanted to take advantage of the special direction passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 23.03.2020 in Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No. 3 of 2020 by which the period of limitation prescribed under various laws stood extended until further orders. The sweep and reach of the order passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court is with effect from 15 March, 2020. Even if the petitioner's case comes under the lesser category, his right to default bail will accrue only on 20 March. In view of the intervention by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the failure of the prosecution to file final report will not confer any right on the petitioner. His pointed contention is that while it is open to this Court to grant bail on merits, the petitioner is not entitled to claim the benefit of default bail.

    Order passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 23.03.2020 in Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No. 3 of 2020:

    “This Court has taken Suo Motu cognizance of the situation arising out of the challenge faced by the country on account of Covid-19 Virus and resultant difficulties that may be faced by litigants across the country in filing their petitions/applications/suits/appeals/all other proceedings within the period of limitation prescribed under the general law of limitation or under Special Laws (both Central and/or State).

    To obviate such difficulties and to ensure that lawyers/litigants do not have to come physically to file such proceedings in respective Courts/Tribunals across the country including this Court, it is hereby ordered that a period of limitation in all such proceedings, irrespective of the limitation prescribed under the general law or Special Laws whether condonable or not shall stand extended w.e.f. 15th March 2020 till further order/s to be passed by this Court in present proceedings.

    We are exercising this power under Article 142 read with Article 141 of the Constitution of India and declare that this order is a binding order within the meaning of Article 141 on all Courts/Tribunals and authorities.

    This order may be brought to the notice of all High Courts for being communicated to all subordinate Courts/Tribunals within their respective jurisdiction.

    Issue notice to all the Registrars General of the High Courts, returnable in four weeks.”

    Issue arising for consideration:

    5. Section 167 of Cr.PC lays down the procedure to be followed when investigation cannot be completed in 24 hours. Section 167 (1) and (2) of the Code is as under :

    167. Procedure when investigation cannot be completed in twenty-four hours.-(1) Whenever any person is arrested and detained in custody and it appears that the investigation cannot be completed within the period of twenty-four hours fixed by Section 57, and there are grounds for believing that the accusation or information is well-founded, the officer in charge of the police station or the police officer making the investigation, if he is not below the rank of sub-inspector, shall forthwith transmit to the nearest Judicial Magistrate a copy of the entries in the diary hereinafter prescribed relating to the case, and shall at the same time forward the Accused to such Magistrate.

    (2) The Magistrate to whom an Accused person is forwarded under this Section may, whether he has or has not jurisdiction to try the case, from time to time, authorize the detention of the Accused in such custody as such Magistrate thinks fit, for a term not exceeding fifteen days in the whole; and if he has no jurisdiction to try the case or commit it for trial, and considers further detention unnecessary, he may order the Accused to be forwarded to a Magistrate having such jurisdiction:

    Provided that (a) the Magistrate may authorise the detention of the Accused person, otherwise than in the custody of the police, beyond the period of fifteen days, if he is satisfied that adequate grounds exist for doing so, but no Magistrate shall authorise the detention of the Accused person in custody under this paragraph for a total period exceeding,--(i) ninety days, where the investigation relates to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years; (ii) sixty days, where the investigation relates to any other offence, and, on the expiry of the said period of ninety days, or sixty days, as the case may be, the Accused person shall be released on bail if he is prepared to and does furnish bail, and every person released on bail under this Sub-section shall be deemed to be so released under the provisions of Chapter XXXIII for the purposes of that Chapter; (b) no Magistrate shall authorise detention in any custody under this Section unless the Accused is produced before him; (c) no Magistrate of the second class, not specially empowered in this behalf by the High Court, shall authorise detention in the custody of the police.”

    Sub-section (2) stipulates that the magistrate cannot authorise detention of the accused in custody on expiry of such period of 90 days or 60 days as the case may be and shall release him on bail, if the accused person is prepared to and furnishes bail. The question of law to be answered is whether the order passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court will apply to Section 167(2) of Cr.Pc also.

    Analysis:

    6. The order passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court is not only under Article 142 but also under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. It is binding on all the Courts and Tribunals including the High Courts. No one has the right to interpret the orders and directions passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. This is well settled. Yet when a case of this nature arises, I have no option but to examine the issue and answer to the best of my lights.

    7. It has been held in Achpal v. State of Rajasthan (2019) 14 SCC 599 that the provisions of the Code do not empower any one to extend the period within which the investigation must be completed. If on the expiry of the period aforesaid mentioned, the accused applies for bail and is ready to furnish sureties, an indefeasible right would accrue in his favour.

    8. The Hon'ble Supreme Court taking note of the extraordinary situation obtaining in the country has ordered as mentioned above that the period of limitation shall stand extended until further orders. This was to obviate the difficulties faced by the litigants and to ensure that they and their lawyers do not have to come physically to file in the respective Courts and Tribunals. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has not mentioned that police investigations would also be covered by the said order.

    9. What has been extended is the period of limitation prescribed under the general law of limitation or under special laws. Section 2(j) of the Limitation Act reads as follows :

    “period of limitation” means the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by the Schedule, and “prescribed period” means the period of limitation computed in accordance with the provisions of this Act.”

    Black's Law Dictionary defines limitation as “1. The act of limiting; the quality, state, or condition of being limited. 2. A restriction. 3. A statutory period after which a lawsuit or prosecution cannot be brought in the court.” P. Ramanatha Aiyar's Advanced Law Lexicon gives the following meaning :

    “In its ordinary sense, restriction or circumspection; in its ordinary legal and popular sense, the word refers to the time within which an action may be brought, or some act done, to preserve a right.

    Period beyond which legal proceedings cannot be brought; the period usually commences when the cause of action arises.

    The term “Limitation” has been defined to mean the time which is prescribed by the authority of the law, during which a title may be acquired to property by virtue of a simple adverse possession and enjoyment, of the time at the end of which no action or suit can be maintained”.

    The limitation barrier prescribed for institution of suits is impregnable and cannot be breached. However, Section 5 of the Limitation Act provides for extension of prescribed period in certain cases. If Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not excluded either expressly or by implication, the power to condone delay in filing the appeal or application can always be invoked. The special laws also contain special periods of limitation with or without power to condone delay.

    10. The point to note is after the expiry of the limitation period, the application or appeal cannot be straightaway admitted. That is why, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in its benevolence has ordered that the period of limitation shall stand extended during this lock-down period. Thus, the litigants will not lose their rights. But, filing of final report stands on a different footing altogether. Section 167 (2) of Cr.Pc does not bar the filing of final report even after the period specified therein. The implication of Section 167 (2) is that if the final report is not filed within the time limit prescribed therein, the magistrate will be divested of the jurisdiction to authorise the detention of the accused person beyond the said period, if the accused is prepared to and does furnish bail. The expiry of the period results in accrual of right in favour of the accused. Even though this time limit is referred to as period of limitation, technically it is not. It is only Chapter XXXVI of Cr.Pc that deals with limitation for taking cognizance of certain offences. Even Section 167 (5) of Cr.Pc has been interpreted to mean that the magistrate shall only make a direction for stopping further investigation in a summons case if it is not concluded within the period of six months and the said period has not been extended and it does not bar the magistrate from taking cognizance based on the final report filed thereafter. Hence, Section 167 of Cr.PC cannot be construed as containing the period of limitation for filing of final reports.

    11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court had passed one more order on 06.05.2020 in the very same Suo Motu Writ Petition in respect of proceedings in relation to Section 29 (A) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and initiation of proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 in I.A No. 48411/2020. The said order reads as follows :

    In view of this Court's earlier order dated 23.03.2020 passed in Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No. 3/2020 and taking into consideration the effect of the Corona Virus (COVID 19) and resultant difficulties being faced by the lawyers and litigants and with a view to obviate such difficulties and to ensure that lawyers/litigants do not have to come physically to file such proceedings in respective Courts/Tribunal across the country including this Court, it is hereby ordered that all periods of limitation prescribed under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881 shall be extended with effect from 15.03.2020 till further orders to be passed by this Court in the present proceedings.

    In case the limitation has expired after 15.03.2020 then the period from 15.03.2020 till the date on which the lockdown is lifted in the jurisdictional area where the dispute lies or where the cause of action arises shall be extended for a period of 15 days after the lifting of lockdown.

    In view of the above, the instant interlocutory application is disposed of.”

    This order also does not deal with Section 167 of Cr.Pc.

    12. It is not as if crimes have not taken place during these pandemic times. Arrests are also being made and accused are being remanded. Therefore, the respondent is not justified in citing the closure of the courts and the general extension of the limitation period. Section 167 (2A) of contemplates the situation when the judicial magistrate is not available. In such circumstances for a short period, even the executive magistrate may pass detention orders. In this case, nothing stopped the respondent from formally presenting the final report before the stipulated date and getting the initial of the jurisdictional magistrate. This Court would definitely have construed the same as sufficient compliance of the requirement of law. Such is not the case here.

    13. This Court can take note of the fact the Government has come out with the Taxation and Other Laws (Relaxation of Certain Provisions) Ordinance, 2020 on 01.04.2020. The ordinance provides relaxations related to compliance, such as extension of time limit and waiver of penalty, in relation to certain specified laws. The time limits for compliance or completion of certain actions under the specified laws, falling during the period March 20, 2020 to June 29, 2020, have been extended. No similar change has been effected in respect of Section 167(2) of Cr.Pc. If the executive had actually intended that the period specified in Section 167 of Cr.Pc should be extended, it ought to have come out with an appropriate formal measure. The executive must exhibit nimble footwork and not hide behind judicial orders. Only little children hide behind the saree end (pallu) of their mothers.

    14. Personal liberty is too precious a fundamental right. Article 21 states that no person shall be deprived of his personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. So long as the language of Section 167(2) of Cr.Pc remains as it is, I have to necessarily hold that denial of compulsive bail to the petitioner herein will definitely amount to violation of his fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The noble object of the Hon'ble Supreme Court's direction is to ensure that no litigant is deprived of his valuable rights. But, if I accept the plea of the respondent police, the direction of the Hon'ble Supreme Court which is intended to save and preserve rights would result in taking away the valuable right that had accrued to the accused herein.

    15. Of course, the construction placed by me will have no application whatsoever in the case of certain offences under certain special laws, such as Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 and NDPS Act, 1985. For instance Section 36-A (4) of the NDPS Act enables the investigation officer to apply to the special court for extending the period mentioned in the statute from 180 days to 1 year if it is not possible to complete the investigation. Thus, under certain statutes, the prosecution has a right to apply for extension of time. In those cases, the benefit of the direction of the Hon'ble Supreme Court made 23.03.2020 in Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No. 3 of 2020 will apply. But, in respect of the other offences for which Section 167 of Cr.Pc is applicable, the benefit of the said direction cannot be availed.

    Result:

    16. In view of the reasons set out above, I conclude that the petitioner is entitled to default bail. Of course, as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rakesh Kumar Paul vs. State of Assam (2017) 15 SCC 67 this order does not prohibit the arrest or rearrest of the petitioner on cogent grounds in respect of the subject charge and in that event, the petitioner will have to move a regular application for grant of bail which of course will be considered on its own merits.

    17. Accordingly, the petitioner is ordered to be released on default bail, subject to the following conditions;

    (i) the petitioner shall execute a bond for a sum of Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand Only) with two sureties, each for a like sum to the satisfaction of the learned Judicial Magistrate No. II, Thanjavur District.

    (ii) the petitioner is directed to appear before the respondent police as and when required for interrogation.

    (iii) on breach of any of the aforesaid conditions, the Magistrate/Trial Court is entitled to take appropriate action against the petitioner in accordance with law as if the conditions have been imposed and the petitioner released on bail by the Magistrate/Trial Court himself as laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in P.K Shaji Alias Thammanam Shaji v. State Of Kerala . [(2005) AIR SCW 5560].

    G.R.S., J.

    08.05.2020

    Index : Yes/No

    Internet : Yes/No

    Note : The soft copy of the order as uploaded in the website can be acted upon and there is no need for obtaining a certified copy.

    1. The Superintendent, Central Prison, Trichy.

    2. The Inspector of Police, Vallam Police Station, Thanjavur District. (Crime No. 10 of 2020).

    3. The Additional Public Prosecutor, Madurai Bench of Madras High Court, Madurai.

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    Comments

    Settu Petitioner/Accused v. State, Rep. By Inspector Of Police /Complainant.
    (May 8, 2020)