Order
1. Heard the learned Solicitor General appearing for the petitioner, Mr Dhruv Mehta, learned Senior Counsel for Respondents 1 and 2 and Dr A.M. Singhvi, learned Senior Counsel for Respondents 3 to 5.
2. This Court, speaking through several different Benches, has explained the provisions of Section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter “the 2013 Act”). This includes the oft and ubiquitously cited three-Judge Bench decision in Pune Municipal Corpn. v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki (2014) 3 SCC 183. An adumbration of the law can also be found in the decision of this very Bench in Govt. (NCT of Delhi) v. Jagjit Singh (2015) 8 SCC 544, (2015) 8 SCC 554.
3. At the commencement of the hearing of this SLP, we were of the view that this SLP also deserved similar dismissal. However, the learned Solicitor General has vehemently contended that the facts obtaining in the present SLP are singularly and significantly different to the others, and that the present matter requires detailed consideration. He has emphasised that there is no controversy regarding the fact that the possession of the subject land has been taken over by the Delhi Development Authority (for short “DDA”) several years ago; the latter asserts that this transpired in January 2000. The learned Solicitor General has painstakingly taken us through the litigation filed by late Khyali Ram and continued by his legal representatives, as also the other respondents who claim to have purchased these lands from Khyali Ram. Reliance has been placed on the decision of this Court in Meera Sahni v. Lt. Governor of Delhi (2008) 9 SCC 177 in which, in essence, it was concluded that it was legally impermissible for Khyali Ram to have sold the lands to Respondents 3 to 5 after the issuance of the Notification under Section 4 on 24-10-1961, followed by the Declaration under Section 6 on 4-1-1969, sequentially followed by the issuance of Section 9 Notification on 26-4-1983 and the publication of the award. The conveyance of the land by Khyali Ram to Respondents 3 to 5 before us is beyond cavil.
4. The dismissal of the writ petition filed by Khyali Ram by the Single Judge of the Delhi High Court as well as in appeal by its Division Bench, followed by the dismissal in this Court is beyond challenge. This is also the position so far as the contentions and prayers in the writ petitions filed on behalf of Respondents 3 to 5 are concerned. It also appears that Respondents 3 to 5 had issued notices to DDA setting up their claims respectively of ownership, in denial of any subsisting ownership of Khyali Ram and/or his legal representatives. Therefore, the dispute inter se the respondents was well within the knowledge of not only the Land Acquisition Collector (for short “LAC”) but also DDA, who avowedly is the beneficiary of this acquisition. The fruitless challenge to the subject acquisition and the award that has been passed, at the instance of Khyali Ram as also Respondents 3 to 5 to whom the former endeavoured to convey the land is, as already mentioned, also beyond disputation.
5. Predicated on these facts, it is contended by the learned Solicitor General that the provisions of Section 31(2) of the Land Acquisition Act are facially attracted; and that the decision in Pune Municipal Corpn. (2014) 3 SCC 183 as well as several other precedents are inapplicable. Repeated reliance has been made on paras 31 and 38 of Meera Sahni (2008) 9 SCC 177. It is contended that since there was genuinely a controversy as to which party was entitled to compensation, the action of DDA in depositing the compensation pursuant to the orders passed by the High Court of Delhi in December 2011 would legitimise this action and complete the acquisition under the old Land Acquisition Act. Therefore, the provisions of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, would be of no avail to the respondents. References to the pleadings in the present SLP proceedings including paras 12 on p. 52 and para 6 on p. 127 have been drawn by the learned Solicitor General.
6. Mr Mehta, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents contends that all the postulations in Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act are in place; that DDA being the beneficiary, cannot rely on the disputed question of ownership. In this regard, we may immediately recall the decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Gyan Devi (1995) 2 SCC 326 which is, inter alia, to the effect that the beneficiary of an acquisition of land is competent and possesses requisite locus standi to raise questions pertaining to any aspect of the acquisition. It is further countered by the learned Solicitor General that notice is yet to be issued to LAC whose objections and views have, therefore, not yet been elicited till this date. The learned Solicitor General has also submitted that an SLP has in fact already been filed by LAC.
7. Dr Singhvi, learned Senior Counsel appearing for Respondents 3 to 5 has supported Mr Mehta in his contentions and has additionally submitted that the defence of DDA is dishonest and it is patently an afterthought. He has reiterated that it is LAC who alone can be heard, and DDA should not be permitted to fight a proxy litigation. As we see it, there is only a self-serving and temporary truce between these respondents. Prima facie, there is substance in the contention raised by the learned Solicitor General that the impleadment of the subsequent purchasers (Respondents 3 to 5 before us) in the proceedings in the High Court in which the impugned order 2014 SCC OnLine Del 6448 came to be passed is mala fide and perfidious; that the subsequent purchasers had not sought substitution on the strength of their conveyance deed, etc. We cannot lose sight of the fact that for over five years late Khyali Ram or his legal representatives had not initiated any action on the premise of their continued ownership. It is in the background of these myriad submissions that we are presently of the view that it is the Land Acquisition Act and not the 2013 Act that may be relevant, thereby rendering Pune Municipal Corpn. (2014) 3 SCC 183 as well as Govt. (NCT of Delhi) v. Jagjit Singh (2015) 8 SCC 544, (2015) 8 SCC 554 inapplicable.
8. Delay condoned. Leave granted. All submissions of fact and law left open.
9. Issue notice to the unrepresented respondents, namely, Respondents 6 and 7 returnable in six weeks. Status quo with regard to possession, title and interest shall be maintained till orders to the contrary.