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  • Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
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  • Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Rajesh Shankar, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The present petition sought quashing of the order dated 05.08.2009 passed by the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Hazaribagh in Complaint Case No. C-703/08, whereby the learned Magistrate took cognizance of offences punishable under Sections 420, 467 and 468 of the Indian Penal Code against the petitioners.

The complaint (filed by O.P. No. 2) alleged that in May 2006 the petitioners prepared forged and fabricated documents to claim that they had purchased land apportioned to Khata No. 39, Village Kawatu, P.S. Ichak, District Hazaribagh from one Most. Deojani Devi. The complaint asserts that after the death of Ram Tahal Upadhyaya (the son of the recorded tenant), his wife Most. Deojani Devi moved to the family of the complainant's ancestor and the entire share came into possession of the sons of Sheo Nath Upadhyaya. It was further alleged that the person named as identifier for Most. Deojani Devi in the sale deed—Ramdeo Upadhayaya, son of Sheonath Upadhyaya—had already died on 12.11.1986, whereas the sale deed bears the execution date 09.01.1990, suggesting use of an imposter. The complaint alleged deliberate suppression and delayed use of the sale deed; Most. Deojani Devi is said to have died in 2003.

Procedurally, the complaint was referred to police under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. After investigation, the police submitted a final form; the complainant filed a protest petition. The Judicial Magistrate then passed the impugned order dated 05.08.2009 taking cognizance under Sections 420/467/468 IPC. The petition before the High Court challenged that cognizance order under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the High Court should quash the impugned order of cognizance dated 05.08.2009 (Complaint Case No. C-703/08) under Section 482 Cr.P.C.?
  2. Whether the allegations in the complaint disclose only a civil dispute (rendering criminal prosecution unwarranted) or prima facie disclose criminal offences under Sections 420, 467 and 468 IPC?
  3. Whether the complaint was instituted with mala fides, was barred by delay, or otherwise constituted an abuse of the process of the court such that quashing is warranted?
  4. Whether the complainant had locus standi to file the complaint (given alleged family relationships and succession facts)?

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • A title suit is pending between the parties, and on the given facts the dispute is civil in nature; criminal prosecution is therefore unwarranted.
  • The complainant should have sought relief in a competent Civil Court to declare the sale deed null and void.
  • The complaint was instituted after a long delay and is malicious; the prosecution is brought to harass the petitioners.
  • The complainant lacks locus standi and is not an agnate/descendant of the person who executed the sale deed.
  • The allegations are based on conjecture; no death certificate of Late Ramdeo Upadhyay was produced or proved in any court (according to petitioners).

O.P. No. 2's Arguments (Respondent / Complainant)

  • On obtaining a certified copy of the sale deed, O.P. No. 2 learned it was alleged to have been executed and registered by Most. Deojani Devi.
  • Most. Deojani Devi lived with and was looked after by the family of Ramdeo Upadhyaya; the complainant is a grandson of Ram Swaroop Upadhyaya and hence asserts interest in the matter.
  • The sale deed is forged and fabricated; some other lady was engaged to execute and register the deed in place of Most. Deojani Devi.
  • The identifier, Ramdeo Upadhyaya, had died on 12.11.1986—before the deed's execution date—evidenced by a death certificate annexed as Annexure-B to the counter affidavit.
  • The petitioners did not assert any claim to the land while Most. Deojani Devi was alive; the deed bears a left thumb impression (LTI) for Deojani Devi whereas she used to write her name, thus casting doubt on execution.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd., (2006) 6 SCC 736 The judgment sets out principles relating to exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash complaints and criminal proceedings (including the five enumerated principles summarized in the opinion). The High Court relied on the principles summarized in this judgment (including points (i)–(v)) to frame the standard for quashing and to assess whether interference with the Magistrate's cognizance order was warranted.
Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandroji Angre, (1988) 1 SCC 692 Listed among decisions cited in Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd. concerning Section 482 principles. Referred to as an authority cited in Indian Oil; the present court treated such authorities collectively as supporting the principles applied.
State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 Listed among decisions cited in Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd. concerning quashing jurisdiction. Included in the compilation of authorities relied upon through Indian Oil; the court applied the distilled principles rather than re‑examining each cited case individually.
Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill, (1995) 6 SCC 194 Listed among decisions cited in Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd. regarding quashing powers. Cited as part of the body of authority underlying the principles the High Court applied to the facts of this petition.
Central Bureau of Investigation v. Duncans Agro Industries Ltd., (1996) 5 SCC 591 Listed among decisions cited in Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd. on Section 482 jurisprudence. Used as part of the precedent framework incorporated by the High Court through Indian Oil.
State of Bihar v. Rajendra Agrawalla, (1996) 8 SCC 164 Listed among decisions cited in Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd. concerning quashing of criminal proceedings. Counted among the authorities supporting the principles the court applied; particulars of application are those set out in Indian Oil.
Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi, (1999) 3 SCC 259 Listed among decisions cited in Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd. on exercise of quashing power. Treated as part of the judicial backdrop for the Section 482 principles the High Court applied.
Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. v. Biological E. Ltd., (2000) 3 SCC 269 Listed among decisions cited in Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd. relating to quashing jurisdiction. Included as supporting authority within the Indian Oil compilation; the court applied the distilled principles instead of re‑articulating this case's specifics.
Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar, (2000) 4 SCC 168 Listed among decisions cited in Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd. on Section 482. Referenced indirectly through Indian Oil as part of the jurisprudential basis for the High Court's approach.
M. Krishnan v. Vijay Singh, (2001) 8 SCC 645 Listed among decisions cited in Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd. supporting principles for quashing. Counted among the authorities relied upon via Indian Oil to inform the court's analysis of whether quashing was appropriate.
Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque, (2005) 1 SCC 122 Listed among decisions cited in Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd. concerning the power to quash criminal proceedings. Identified as one of the precedents forming the legal foundation for the principles the court applied on the question of quashing.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The High Court heard the parties and reviewed the record. The core contention advanced by the petitioners was that the dispute is essentially civil and that a criminal prosecution is therefore impermissible. The Court proceeded to test that contention against the established principles governing the exercise of the High Court's quashing jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C., as summarized from Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd.

The Court set out the legal framework (drawn from Indian Oil) including these key points: (i) a complaint can be quashed where, even accepting allegations at face value, no offence is prima facie made out; (ii) quashing is appropriate where proceedings are an abuse of process or instituted with mala fides; (iii) quashing power should be exercised sparingly; (iv) complaints need not reproduce verbatim every legal ingredient if necessary factual foundation is present; and (v) facts may give rise to purely civil wrongs, purely criminal offences, or both, and the availability of a civil remedy does not automatically oust criminal jurisdiction.

Applying these principles, the Court observed that at the stage of cognizance the Magistrate is required to examine the complaint, the complainant's statement on oath and the inquiry witnesses' statements to determine if allegations prima facie make out an offence. The Court emphasized that the High Court should not prematurely terminate a prosecution in the absence of compelling circumstances and is not to conduct a detailed inquiry into the genuineness or reliability of the complaint at the quashing stage.

In the present case the Magistrate had considered the complaint, the complainant's statement on oath and inquiry witness evidence which included factual narrations: that Most. Deojani Devi and the identifier Ramdeo Upadhyaya used to make signatures whereas the sale deed bears thumb impressions; and the allegation that the identifier had died before the execution date of the sale deed. These are factual disputes which the Court held were fit for examination at the appropriate stage by the Magistrate and trial court rather than being resolved by quashing at the High Court stage.

Consequently, the High Court concluded there were no compelling grounds to exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 to interfere with the cognizance order.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition challenging the cognizance order dated 05.08.2009 is DISMISSED. The impugned order of cognizance passed by the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Hazaribagh in Complaint Case No. C-703/08 requires no interference under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

Implications:

  • The Magistrate's order taking cognizance of offences under Sections 420, 467 and 468 IPC stands and the criminal proceedings may continue in the ordinary course.
  • The petitioners remain at liberty to raise all available points and defences before the learned Court below at the appropriate stage; dismissal of the petition does not prejudice their right to defend those points in trial.
  • The Court expressly applied established principles limiting the use of Section 482; the decision resolves only the petition to quash and does not declare any new broader legal principle beyond applying settled authority.

Disposition: The present petition is dismissed. I.A. No. 1026/2010 is also disposed of accordingly.

    Ram Krishna Upadhyaya And Another v. State Of Jharkhand And Another Opposite Parties.

    Rajesh Shankar, J.:— The present petition has been filed for quashing the order dated 05.08.2009 passed by the Judicial Magistrate, 1 Class, Hazaribagh in Complaint Case No. C-703/08 whereby the learned Court below has taken cognizance of the offences under Sections 420/467/468 of the IPC against the petitioners.

    2. The brief facts of the case, as stated in the present petition, is that Complaint Petition No. C-703/08 was filed by the O.P. No. 2 alleging that in the month of May, 2006 the petitioners by preparing forged and fabricated documents, made claim that they had purchased the land appertaining to Khata No. 39, Village-Kawatu, P.S-Ichak, District-Hazaribagh from one Most. Deojani Devi. The true fact is that after the death of Ram Tahal Upadhyaya (the son of the recorded tenant), his wife Most. Deojani Devi moved the family of the complainant's ancestor and the entire share of Ram Tahal Upadhyaya came in possession of the sons of Sheo Nath Upadhyaya. It has further been alleged that the person named as identifier of Most. Deojani Devi in the sale deed, namely, Ramdeo Upadhayaya, son of Sheonath Upadhyaya, had already died on 12.11.1986 whereas the sale deed was said to be executed on 09.01.1990 and thus an imposter was set up to execute the said sale deed as well as to identify the executant. It has also been alleged that the petitioners deliberately suppressed the alleged execution of the sale deed and waited to use it at a later stage conveniently after the death of Most. Deojani Devi, who incidentally died in the year 2003.

    3. The said complaint was referred to the police for investigation of the case under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C and after investigation, the police submitted final form in the matter. The complainant filed protest petition and thereafter the Judicial Magistrate vide the impugned order dated 05.08.2009, took cognizance of the offences under Sections 420/467/468 IPC against the petitioners.

    4. The learned counsel for the petitioners submits that one title suit is also pending between the parties. It is well settled principle of law that if on the given facts of a case, a civil dispute is made out, a criminal prosecution is unwarranted. If the complainant had any grievance, he should have filed a suit before the competent Civil Court for declaring the sale deed as null and void. Moreover, the present complaint has been instituted after a long delay. Thus, the entire prosecution case is malicious. The complainant has got no locus standi to file the complaint case as he is not an agnate/descendant of the person who has executed the sale deed and in fact, Most. Deojani Devi died much after execution of the sale deed. The allegation made in the complaint is merely based on conjecture. The present complaint case has been instituted only to harass the petitioners as neither the death certificate of Late Ramdeo Upadhyay has been produced nor the same has been proved in any competent Court of law.

    5. On the contrary, the learned counsel for the O.P. No. 2 submits that only when the O.P. No. 2 obtained a certified copy of the sale deed, he came to know that the same was alleged to have been executed and got registered by Most. Deojani Devi, who started living with the family of Ramdeo Upadhyaya and was being looked after by him. Ramdeo Upadhyaya had three brothers, namely, Sajiwan Upadhyaya, Ram Swaroop Upadhyaya and Udit Upadhyaya. The O.P. No. 2 is the grandson of Ram Swaroop Upadhyaya. It is further submitted that the alleged sale deed was neither executed nor got registered by Most. Deojani Devi in favour of the petitioners, rather the said sale deed is a forged and fabricated one. Some other lady was engaged to execute and to get the sale deed registered in place of Most. Deojani Devi. The identifier of Most. Deojani Devi in the said sale deed namely Ramdeo Upadhyay had already died on 12.11.1986 i.e. before the execution of the sale deed as would be evident from the death certificate of Late Ramdeo Upadhyay annexed as Annexure-B to the counter affidavit filed by the O.P. No. 2. The petitioners did not claim the land in question when Most. Deojani Devi was alive. Moreover, Most. Deojani Devi used to write her name, but in the alleged sale deed, the LTI in her name has been put which casts serious question in the manner the said sale deed got executed.

    6. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. The thrust of the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the dispute raised by the O.P. No. 2 is civil in nature for which no criminal case is tenable in law.

    7. To appreciate the said contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners, it would be relevant to go through the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd., reported in (2006) 6 SCC 736 wherein it has been held as under:—

    “Re: Point (i)

    12. The principles relating to exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash complaints and criminal proceedings have been stated and reiterated by this Court in several decisions. To mention a few— MadhavraoJiwajiraoScindia v. SambhajiraoChandrojira oAngre [(1988) 1 SCC 692 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 234], State of Haryana v. BhajanLal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426], RupanDeol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill [(1995) 6 SCC 194 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 1059], Central Bureau of Investigation v. Duncans Agro Industries Ltd. [(1996) 5 SCC 591 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 1045], State of Bihar v. RajendraAgrawalla [(1996) 8 SCC 164 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 628], Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi [(1999) 3 SCC 259 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 401], Medchl Chemicals &Pharma (P) Ltd. v. Biological E. Ltd. [(2000) 3 SCC 269 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 615], HridayaRanjan Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar [(2000) 4 SCC 168 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 786], M. Krishnan v. Vijay Singh [(2001) 8 SCC 645 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 19] and Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. SharafulHaque [(2005) 1 SCC 122 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 283]. The principles, relevant to our purpose are:

    (i) A complaint can be quashed where the allegations made in the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out the case alleged against the accused. For this purpose, the complaint has to be examined as a whole, but without examining the merits of the allegations. Neither a detailed inquiry nor a meticulous analysis of the material nor an assessment of the reliability or genuineness of the allegations in the complaint, is warranted while examining prayer for quashing of a complaint.

    (ii) A complaint may also be quashed where it is a clear abuse of the process of the court, as when the criminal proceeding is found to have been initiated with mala fides/malice for wreaking vengeance or to cause harm, or where the allegations are absurd and inherently improbable.

    (iii) The power to quash shall not, however, be used to stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. The power should be used sparingly and with abundant caution.

    (iv) The complaint is not required to verbatim reproduce the legal ingredients of the offence alleged. If the necessary factual foundation is laid in the complaint, merely on the ground that a few ingredients have not been stated in detail, the proceedings should not be quashed. Quashing of the complaint is warranted only where the complaint is so bereft of even the basic facts which are absolutely necessary for making out the offence.

    (v) A given set of facts may make out: (a) purely a civil wrong; or (b) purely a criminal offence; or (c) a civil wrong as also a criminal offence. A commercial transaction or a contractual dispute, apart from furnishing a cause of action for seeking remedy in civil law, may also involve a criminal offence. As the nature and scope of a civil proceeding are different from a criminal proceeding, the mere fact that the complaint relates to a commercial transaction or breach of contract, for which a civil remedy is available or has been availed, is not by itself a ground to quash the criminal proceedings. The test is whether the allegations in the complaint disclose a criminal offence or not.”

    8. It would thus emerge that merely because a civil remedy is available to an aggrieved person, the jurisdiction of the Criminal Court to proceed with the complaint is not ousted, if the same prima facie discloses commission of a criminal offence by an accused.

    9. The very purpose of Section 482 of the Cr.P.C is to prevent an abuse of process of Court and to secure the ends of justice. The power of quashing of a criminal proceeding should be exercised by the High Court sparingly with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases. The High Court while hearing a quashing petition, is not supposed to embark upon an enquiry as to the genuineness and reliability of the complainant. Moreover, the learned Court below at the stage of cognizance is only required to go through the complaint, peruse the statements of the complainant and the enquiry witnesses on oath and, thereafter, to pass an order of cognizance, if the said allegation prima facie makes out a case against an accused. The defence of an accused is to be taken into consideration at subsequent stage in terms with the provisions of the Cr.P.C.

    10. It is a settled proposition of law that while considering the case for quashing of criminal proceeding, the High Court should not put an appropriate prosecution to an end prematurely unless there are compelling circumstances to do so.

    11. In the present case, while passing the impugned order of cognizance dated 05.08.2009, the learned Court below has taken into consideration the complaint, the statement of the complainant on S.A as well as the evidence of the inquiry witnesses wherein it has been stated that Most. Deojani Devi and the identifier Ramdeo Upadhayaya used to make their signatures. However, in the sale deed, their thumb impressions are alleged to have been put. Moreover, as per the complaint, the identifier had already died before the execution of the sale deed in question. All these narrations are factual in nature, which are required to be examined at appropriate stage by the learned Court below.

    12. Under the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the impugned order of cognizance dated 05.08.2009 passed by the Judicial Magistrate, 1 Class, Hazaribagh in Complaint Case No. C-703/08 needs no interference of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. However, the petitioners shall be at liberty to raise all the points available with them before the learned Court below at appropriate stage and the dismissal of the present petition shall not prejudice their case in the trial.

    13. The present petition is dismissed.

    14. I.A. No. 1026/2010 also stands disposed of accordingly.

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    Ram Krishna Upadhyaya And Another v. State Of Jharkhand And Another Opposite Parties.
    (Jan 29, 2019)