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  • provisions contained in clause (ii) of sub-section (1),
  • section 133(6) of the IT Act, 1961Taxability
  • sub-section (b) by the Finance Act, 1999
  • INCOME TAX ACT 1961
  • section 282(2)(c) of the IT Act
  • section 282(2)(b) of the IT Act.
  • FINANCE ACT 1999
  • section 282(2)(c)
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • provisions contained in clause (ii) of sub-section (1),
  • section 133(6) of the IT Act, 1961Taxability
  • sub-section (b) by the Finance Act, 1999
  • INCOME TAX ACT 1961
  • section 282(2)(c) of the IT Act
  • section 282(2)(b) of the IT Act.
  • FINANCE ACT 1999
  • section 282(2)(c)
  • section 9(1)(ii)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

These consolidated appeals by the assessee (Indo-Nissin Foods Ltd. — a joint venture incorporated in India in 1990) challenge the order of the learned CIT(A)-V, Bangalore dated 29 November 2001, confirming penalties imposed under section 271C of the Income-tax Act in respect of assessment years 1992-93 to 1998-99.

Indo-Nissin had Japanese shareholder Nissin Food Products Co. Ltd. (30%) which deputed expatriate employees to the Indian company. The assessee paid salaries and allowances to expatriates in India, offered them to tax and deducted TDS; Revenue accepts there was no dispute as to the Indian salary payments and TDS remitted by the assessee. However, the expatriates also received payments in Japan from Nissin (described as retention/continuation pay linked to a lien on the employees' services), and those payments were not offered to tax in India nor subject to TDS by Nissin initially.

A letter under section 133(6) dated 29 January 1999 sought information from the assessee about payments made abroad for services rendered in India. In April 1999, Nissin (voluntarily, without departmental proceedings) paid tax and interest under section 201 on overseas payments for the years in question. Subsequently, the Department issued notices dated 28 February 2000 under section 271C alleging short deduction of tax on payments made in Japan by Nissin. The assessee objected; the Jt. CIT levied penalty by order dated 31 August 2000 and the CIT(A) confirmed that order on 29 November 2001. The appeals to the Tribunal followed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the penalty notices under section 271C were validly issued (in particular, whether notices addressed without the word "Limited" and not addressed to the principal officer as required under section 282(2)(b) were valid).
  2. Whether the penalty proceedings initiated in February 2000 (for years back to 1992-93) were barred by limitation or constituted unreasonable delay.
  3. Whether the payments made by the Japanese parent (Nissin) in Japan to expatriate employees (characterised as retention/continuation pay on account of a lien) were taxable in India under section 9(1)(ii) as salaries earned in India for services rendered in India (taking into account the amendment by Finance Act, 1999 effective 1 April 2000).
  4. Whether, before imposing penalty under section 271C, an order declaring the person an 'assessee in default' under section 201(1) should have been passed.
  5. Whether the assessee-company had an obligation under section 192(2) to deduct tax on the amounts paid abroad by Nissin (including the role of Form 12B and the word "may" in section 192(2)).
  6. Whether reasonable cause existed so as to preclude imposition of penalty under section 271C (including the effect of voluntary payment of tax and interest by Nissin prior to detection by the Department).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Assessee's) Arguments

  • The penalty notices were invalid: they omitted the word "Limited", did not state the status of the assessee and were not addressed to the principal officer as required by section 282(2)(b); such a defect is not curable under section 292B.
  • The penalty notices and proceedings were barred by limitation or at least constituted issuance beyond a reasonable time; reliance placed on authorities holding four years to be a reasonable period for similar notifications.
  • The payments made by Nissin in Japan were retention/continuation pay linked to a lien on employment in Japan and therefore not connected to services rendered in India; prior to the Finance Act, 1999 amendment (effective 1 April 2000) such payments were not taxable in India under section 9(1)(ii).
  • The expatriate employees were non-resident/not ordinarily resident and sums earned outside India would not be taxable in India; the Supreme Court decision in CIT v. Morgenstern Werner (2003) was relied upon.
  • The department had no established liability on either the assessee or Nissin; mere voluntary payment of tax by Nissin does not prove legal liability or preclude refund claims or appeals.
  • No order under section 201(1) had been passed declaring any person an assessee in default prior to initiation of penalty under section 271C; section 201(1) and 271C have different standards (good and sufficient reason vs. reasonable cause).
  • Section 192(2) does not create an automatic obligation on the employer; the obligation arises when prescribed particulars (Form 12B) are furnished by the employee and the word "may" in the provision was relied on to argue the limited scope of obligation. Tribunal precedents (Blue Star Ltd.) were cited supporting this view.
  • There was bona fide confusion among Japanese multinationals about liability; many cases had been regularised or penalties dropped (cited Azadi Bachao Andolan and related examples).

Respondent's (Revenue's) Arguments

  • The defective form of the notices was not fatal because the assessee participated in proceedings, received a hearing and was aware of the charge; participation cured any irregularity.
  • No statutory time limit bars issuance of penalty notices; limitation for passing the penalty order (six months from end of month in which notice issued) was complied with — notice dated 28 Feb 2000 and penalty order 31 Aug 2000 — thus within limitation.
  • Voluntary payment of TDS and interest by Nissin demonstrates existence of liability; payment/remittance establishes there is no doubt about liability in India.
  • The Supreme Court decision in Morgenstern Werner was fact-specific and not applicable to the present circumstances; reliance on Circular No. 685 (CBDT) and other authorities justified the Department's stance.
  • Reliance on the notion that exceptional circumstances may justify longer time for detection/actions when multinationals conceal relevant facts and Revenue had no means of discovering overseas payments earlier.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
P.N. Sasikumar v. CIT [1988] 170 ITR 80 (Kerala HC) Notice to an AOP must be addressed to the principal officer; failure to do so renders proceedings void and not curable under section 292B. The court relied on this authority to support the conclusion that notices not addressed properly (omitting status/principal officer) are invalid; this formed a principal ground for cancelling the penalty.
Sri K. Abdul Gafoor (Tribunal, Bangalore Bench) — IT(SS)A No. 26 (Bang.) of 1998 dated 11-7-2001 Authority cited in support of the proposition that defective notices addressed improperly are invalid (as argued by the assessee). Referred to as part of the body of tribunal decisions supporting the assessee's contention that defective notices cannot be cured.
V.V.S. Alloys Ltd. v. Asstt. CIT [Tribunal Allahabad] Notice under specified provision (158BC in that case) addressed improperly to company rather than principal officer was wholly deficient and assessment based on it was void ab initio. Used as supporting authority to show that defective notices can render whole proceedings void; court treated it as analogous in principle.
Raymond Woollen Mills Ltd. v. ITO [1997] 57 ITD 536 (Bombay "D" Bench) Held that a period of four years may constitute a reasonable time for levy of interest under section 201(1A); the four-year yardstick discussed as reasonable time in certain contexts. Assessee relied on this for limitation argument; the Tribunal considered it but found delay excusable in this factual context because Revenue lacked knowledge until voluntary payment by Nissin.
Simplex Concrete Piles (India) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT [2003] 262 ITR 605 (Calcutta HC) Supported the proposition that four years is a reasonable period for issue of a notice in reassessment contexts. Cited by the assessee for the reasonable-time argument; the Tribunal discussed the authority but did not uphold a blanket limitation because of facts showing Revenue's lack of knowledge.
CIT v. Morgenstern Werner [2003] 259 ITR 486 (Supreme Court) On similar facts, salary paid to a foreign technician in Germany was held not liable to tax in India under the proviso to section 5(1)(c) (i.e., sums earned abroad by non-residents under certain conditions). The Tribunal held this decision "clinches the issue" in favour of the assessee on non-liability for tax on payments made in Japan and relied on it to reject Revenue's contention on taxability.
Azadi Bachao Andolan v. Union of India [2001] 252 ITR 471 (Delhi HC) Noted numerous similar cases and that Department had dropped penalty proceedings in many instances where tax was voluntarily paid; used to show widespread confusion and bona fide belief. The Tribunal relied on this decision as evidence of reasonable cause and bona fide belief by foreign companies; used to support cancellation of penalty.
Asstt. CIT v. Yokogawa Electric Corporation (ITA Nos. 356–360/Bang./2002, Tribunal Bangalore Bench ‘A’) Tribunal had confirmed penalty under section 271C in the Yokogawa case. The assessee relied on factual distinctions to argue Yokogawa was not applicable; the Tribunal in the present case distinguished Yokogawa and did not follow it.
Sequoia Construction Co. (P.) Ltd. v. P.P. Suri, ITO [1986] 158 ITR 496 (Delhi HC) Discussed standards such as "good and sufficient reason" in relation to section 201(1) (liability for failure to deduct tax). Cited by the assessee to stress differing standards and mitigation under section 201(1); the Tribunal considered these distinctions in its analysis of default and penalty.
Marubeni Corpn. (Liaison Office) v. Joint CIT [2002] 83 ITD 577 (Del. Trib. C Bench) Held that order under section 201(1) ought to precede or be relevant before initiation of penalty proceedings under section 271C (supporting the view that proper default adjudication is required). The Tribunal relied on Marubeni to support vacating the penalty on the ground that no order under section 201(1) had been passed before initiating 271C proceedings.
Blue Star Ltd. [ITA Nos. 137–140 (Bang.) of 2002, Tribunal Bangalore] Accepted the assessee's contention on the limited applicability of section 192(2) where prescribed particulars (Form 12B) are not furnished by the employee. The Tribunal applied the Blue Star precedent to hold section 192(2) was not applicable in the present facts and used it as one ground for cancelling the penalty.
Tribunal Bangalore decisions (e.g., ITA Nos. 833 & 834/Bang./2001 and other Bangalore Bench authorities) Referenced on issues of reasonable cause and tax liability in similar cases involving foreign companies and expatriates. Used alongside other precedents to support findings of reasonable cause and to cancel penalties on similar factual matrices.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Tribunal considered the factual matrix, statutory provisions, amendment history and authorities cited by both sides and proceeded in a stepwise analytical fashion:

  1. Notice validity: The Tribunal found it was an admitted fact the notices did not bear the word "Limited" and were not addressed to the principal officer as required by section 282(2)(b). It surveyed precedent (notably P.N. Sasikumar and analogous tribunal decisions) holding such defects to be fundamental and not curable under section 292B. On this ground alone the Tribunal held the notices invalid and the assessee entitled to succeed.
  2. Limitation/delay: The Tribunal acknowledged delay in initiating proceedings but examined the cause of delay. It found the Revenue only became aware of overseas payments after Nissin's voluntary remittance of tax and interest in April 1999; hence Revenue was prevented from earlier knowledge. In view of this factual position the Tribunal concluded the delay was not inordinate and therefore the limitation/“reasonable time” objection failed on the particular facts.
  3. Taxability under section 9(1)(ii): The Tribunal examined section 9(1)(ii) as it stood prior to the Finance Act, 1999 amendment (effective 1 April 2000). It relied on the legislative note and memorandum to show the amendment expanded the Explanation prospectively from AY 2000-01. Prior to amendment, remuneration preceding/ succeeding services in India (and pay linked to employment in Japan) were not regarded as income earned in India. The Tribunal therefore held the retention/continuation pay paid in Japan by Nissin could not be taxed in India for the years before the amendment.
  4. Precedent and interpretation: The Tribunal found the Supreme Court decision in CIT v. Morgenstern Werner supported the conclusion of non-liability under the circumstances. Consequently, Circular No. 685 (CBDT) relied upon by the Department was held inconsistent with the Supreme Court's exposition and thus unhelpful to Revenue.
  5. Effect of voluntary payment: The Tribunal rejected Revenue's contention that voluntary payment of tax and interest by Nissin established legal liability. It emphasized that payment does not conclusively prove liability and that statutory provisions permit claims for refund and avenues of appeal; hence voluntary payment cannot be treated as determinative of legal liability.
  6. Requirement of section 201(1) order: The Tribunal agreed with the assessee that no order under section 201(1) (declaration of ‘assessee in default’) had been passed before initiating penalty under section 271C. Relying on Marubeni and relevant tribunal decisions, it held this procedural omission was an independent ground to vacate the penalty.
  7. Reasonable cause and mala fides: The Tribunal found reasonable cause existed because taxes were voluntarily paid before departmental detection, the section 133(6) inquiry addressed only two financial years, and the Department had no prior knowledge. The Tribunal treated the voluntary payments and contemporaneous practices among Japanese companies (including instances where penalties were dropped) as supporting bona fide belief and not contumacious conduct.
  8. Applicability of section 192(2): Following the Blue Star precedent, the Tribunal held section 192(2) did not impose the asserted obligation on the assessee in absence of prescribed particulars by the employees (Form 12B), and therefore assessee could not be held liable to deduct tax for payments made abroad by Nissin.
  9. Overall conclusion: On multiple independent grounds — defective notices, non-liability to tax for payments in Japan prior to the 2000 amendment, absence of section 201(1) order, existence of reasonable cause, and non-applicability of section 192(2) — the Tribunal cancelled the penalties.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

All appeals are allowed and the penalty orders under section 271C for assessment years 1992-93 to 1998-99 are cancelled.

Implications (direct effects and scope):

  • The direct practical effect is that the penalty levied on Indo-Nissin Foods Ltd. for the stated assessment years is vacated and the assessee succeeds on all consolidated grounds raised before the Tribunal.
  • The Tribunal based its decision on several independent grounds (invalidity of notices for want of proper addressing/principal officer, absence of liability to tax for the overseas retention/continuation pay for years prior to the Finance Act, 1999 amendment, failure to pass a section 201(1) order before initiating 271C, existence of reasonable cause, and non-applicability of section 192(2)). Any relief granted therefore rests on the particular combination of facts and authorities considered.
  • Nothing in the opinion purports to lay down a broad new legal principle beyond the application of existing authorities and statutory interpretation to the facts. The Tribunal relied on earlier decisions (including the Supreme Court in Morgenstern Werner and various tribunal/high court decisions) and legislative materials to reach its conclusions.

    Indo Nissin Foods Ltd. v. Joint Commissioner of Income-tax

    P. Mohanarajan, J.M. - All these appeals by the assessee are directed against the order of the learned CIT(A)-V, Bangalore dated 29th Nov., 2001. These appeals related to assessment years 1992-93 to 1998-99 arising out of the order passed under section 271C of the Act. The issue being common in all these appeals, they are being disposed of by the single consolidated order.

    2. We have heard both the sides and perused the records. The brief facts of the case are as follows:

    2.1 The assessee-company, viz., Indo-Nissin Foods Ltd., ("INF") is a joint venture company incorporated in India in the year 1990 and commercial production started in 1991. The shareholders and their respective holding in the previous year relevant to assessment year 1992-93 were:

    (a) Nissin Food Products Co. Ltd., Japan ("Nissin") 30%
    (b) Brooke Bond India Ltd. 26%
    (c) Itochu Corporation Ltd., Japan 10%
    (d) Accelerated Freeze Drying Co. Ltd. 34%

    2.2 Subsequent to the collaboration, M/s. Nissin, Japan has been deputing their personnel (having technical/other expertise) to assessee-company. Accordingly in the previous years relevant to assessment years 1992-93 to 1998-99, certain persons having technical and other expertise ("the expatriate employees") were deputed by M/s. Nissin, Japan to the assessee-company. The expatriate employees had received salary and other allowances from the assessee-company. These were offered to tax and the assessee-company had also deducted TDS at the applicable rates. There is no issue either on the remuneration paid by the assessee-company to the expatriate employees or the tax deducted and remitted to the Government by the assessee-company. This position is also confirmed by the Revenue.

    3. During the relevant assessment years, the expatriate employees, while rendering services to and receiving remuneration from the assessee-company in India, also received certain payments in Japan from their Japanese employer, i.e., M/s. Nissin, Japan. This payment was not offered to tax in India by the expatriate employees nor had M/s. Nissin deducted any tax at source and remitted the same to the Government of India. The Asstt. CIT, TDS II vide letter dated 29th Jan., 1999, addressed to the assessee-company, stated as follows:

    "Sub: Inquiry under section 133(6) of the IT Act, 1961—Taxability of salary, allowances, perquisites paid abroad to expatriate salaried employees for services rendered in India, reg.

    You are required to furnish full and complete details of allowances paid or provided abroad to the expatriate salaried employees of your company for services rendered in India for the period relevant to financial years 1996-97, 1997-98.

    Please note that the clause, "not ordinarily resident" or "non-resident" does not preclude a person receiving such amounts abroad for services rendered in India from being taxed in India.

    It has been noted that the expatriate salaried employees are declaring only their Indian income for tax purposes, whereas they are to necessarily furnish details of sums received overseas for services rendered in India.

    Failure to comply with the above directions will result in an adverse inference being drawn against you. You are therefore, requested to treat this as important. You may furnish the details called for by 15th Feb., 1999, repeat 15th Feb., 1999."

    4. The said letter was replied to by the assessee-company giving details of the expatriate employees on their rolls and the remuneration paid to them and further informing that they had not paid any remuneration outside India to the expatriate employees. However, during April, 1999, M/s. Nissin, Japan, on their own, paid taxes and interest under section 201 on the payment made by them in Japan to the expatriate employees relating to assessment years 1992-93 to 1998-99. It will be of significance to mention here that the said tax and interest was paid by M/s. Nissin, Japan, against whom no enquiry or proceedings were initiated by the Depart- ment. Thus payment by M/s. Nissin, Japan is voluntary without any enquiry or investigation by the Department. In fact, from the fact on record it can be easily inferred that, but for the payment by M/s. Nissin, Japan the Department had no knowledge of these payments overseas. Further, the letter seeking information under section 133(6) (extracted supra) was only addressed to the assessee-company. In spite of this, the Department initiated proceedings under section 271C by issuing notices dated 28th Feb., 2000, relevant to the assessment years under appeal against the assessee-company alleging non-deduction of tax at source on the payments made in Japan to the expatriate employees by Nissin, Japan. All the notices are similar and, for the sake of convenience, only one notice for the assessment year 1992-93 is extracted herein :

    "Sub : Penalty notice under section 271C of the IT Act, 1961.

    It has been observed from the survey conducted by Dy. CIT (TDS)-II that there is a short deduction of tax to the extent of Rs. 52,04,652 in respect of TDS made under section 192 for the assessment year 1992-93.

    2. You are hereby requested to appear before me on 21st March, 2000 at 11.30 a.m. and show cause why an order imposing penalty on you should not be made under section 271C of Income-tax Act, 1961. If you do not wish to avail of this opportunity of being heard in person or through an authorised representative you may show cause in writing on or before the said date, which will be considered before any such order is made under section 271C.

    3. If the opportunity to explain is not availed, it would be presumed that you have nothing to say in this matter and the levy of penalty will be decided on the basis of the information available in this office."

    5. Though the notices mention that a survey was conducted by Dy. CIT, TDS-II it was gathered during the hearing that no such survey was conducted and further nowhere in the order of penalty is there a mention of such a survey. The appellant-company filed its objection by its letter dated 6th April, 2000. However, the Jt. CIT, TDS, Bangalore, rejected the objections of the appellant-company and levied the penalty vide his order dated 31st Aug., 2000. This order was confirmed in appeal by the CIT((A) vide his common order dated 29th Nov., 2001. The penalty levied for various years are as under :

    Assessment year Penalty  
    1992-93 52,04,652  
    1993-94 67,37,561  
    1994-95 51,43,557  
    1995-96 51,43,557  
    1996-97 63,24,203  
    1997-98 67,59,400  
    1998-99 41,23,730  

    The fact emerging from a perusal of the order, which has been termed as undisputed by the CIT(A), is that while deputing the expatriate employees to the assessee-company, the Japanese company, viz., M/s. Nissin had kept a lien on the services of the expatriate employees. The payment made in Japan by the Japanese company was towards retention/continuation pay on account of the said lien. This was treated by the Department as falling within the scope of section 9(1)(ii) of the Act, as stood at the relevant point of time, extracted herein :

    "Income which falls under the head ‘Salaries’, if it is earned in India.

    Explanation.—For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that income of the nature referred to in this clause payable for services rendered in India shall be regarded as income earned in India.

    The said section has been amended w.e.f. 1st April, 2000 by the Finance Act, 1999."

    6. The Assessing Officer was of the view that the assessee-company did not deduct taxes at source in respect of salary paid abroad to its expatriate employees nor paid the tax under the provision of section 192 of the Act. Therefore, he levied penalty under section 271C of the Act for these assessment years. Aggrieved with the order of the Assessing Officer, the assessee carried the matter before the first appellate authority, wherein the learned CIT(A) upheld the order of the Assessing Officer. Hence the assessee is in appeal before us.

    7. The learned authorised representative of the assessee Shri K.R. Pradeep vehemently contended that the authorities below did not consider the facts in proper perspective. He advanced the following arguments.

    8. First it was canvassed that the notices issued under section 271C extracted supra are invalid inasmuch as they are addressed to M/s. Indo Nissin Foods, whereas the assessee-company is a limited company. The notices are silent about the status of the assessee-company. Further, the notices are not addressed to the principal officer of the company as required under section 282(2)(b) of the Act. The defect in the notices is not curable under section 292B and further has not been cured till date. In support, he relied on the decision of the Kerala High Court in P.N. Sasikumar v. CIT [1988] 170 ITR 801 (Ker.) extracted herein:

    "We have already held that the issue and service of a notice under section 148 is a condition precedent or a matter of jurisdiction. In that view, before assessing an ‘AOP’ as enjoined by section 282(2)(c) of the IT Act the notice should be addressed to the principal officer or a member thereof. Admittedly, it has not been done in this case. That means, there was no notice to the ‘AOP’ which was assessed to tax. We are of the view that it is a case where ‘no notice’ was sent to ‘the assessee’, the ‘AOP’ as enjoined by law. The entire proceedings are, in the circumstances, void and illegal and totally without jurisdiction. Such a fundamental infirmity cannot be called a ‘technical objection’ or a mere ‘irregularity’ and such vital infirmity cannot be cured or obliterated by relying on section 292B of the IT Act."

    He also relied on the decision of the Tribunal, Bangalore Bench, in [IT(SS)A No. 26 (Bang.) of 1998 dated 11-7-2001] the case of Sri K. Abdul Gafoor. He further relied on the decision of Tribunal Allahabad ‘A’ Bench in V.V.S. Alloys Ltd. v. Asstt. CIT [IT Appeal No. 1376 (All.) of 1997 dated 11-11-1999 in [2000] 68 TTJ (All.) 516.

    Relevant portion in para 16.2 summarised as :

    "Notice under section 158BC is not merely a procedural requirement but a condition precedent for assuming jurisdiction; notice under section 158BC addressed to assessee-company and not to its principal officer and not mentioning the status in which return was required to be furnished and not specifying exactly the ‘person’ who is required to file the return and the block period was wholly deficient; assessment made on the basis of said notice was bad in law and void ab initio."

    On this basis it was submitted that the notices and all subsequent proceedings culminated with order of penalty are invalid and unsustainable.

    9. Sri K.R. Pradeep contended that the notices and order of penalty are barred by limitation. The notices for all the years, i.e., from assessment years 1992-93 to 1998-99 were mechanically issued on 28th Feb., 2000. Though the Act does not prescribe any limitation for issue of notice, yet notice for penalty or other proceedings cannot be issued beyond a reasonable period of time. It was submitted that the Tribunal, Bombay "D" Bench, in Raymond Woollen Mills Ltd. v. ITO [1997] 57 ITD 536 has held a period of 4 years to constitute a reasonable time for levy of interest under section 201(1A) of the Act. The said period was arrived at after analysing and taking into account various periods of limitation under the Act ranging from 2 to 4 years barring in exceptional circumstances. Recently the Calcutta High Court in Simplex Concrete Piles (India) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT [2003] 262 ITR 605, while dealing with the validity of a notice in the case of reassessment, has also held a period of 4 years should be considered reasonable time for issue of notice. Accordingly, in this case, the notice for assessment years 1992-93 to 1995-96 should be beyond the reasonable period of 4 years and hence barred by limitation.

    10. Sri K.R. Pradeep contended that the penalty under section 271C is not automatic. First of all there must be a failure to deduct tax prescribed under the Act. Such a failure must be on account of a pre-existing responsibility for deduction of tax explicitly provided under the Act. It was pleaded that unless there is a liability to tax the question of deduction would not arise. In this case, the payments made in Japan by M/s. Nissin to the expatriate employees was on account of retention/continuation pay arose on account of lien on the services of the expatriate employees by the parent Japanese company. Consequently, these payments made cannot be attributed to the services rendered by the expatriate employees in India nor can it be connected with their employment in India. The source for retention/continuation pay is for their lien on their services in Japan and not their employment in India. Consequently, it was pleaded that section 9(1)(ii) would not be applicable as these payments cannot be related to remuneration earned in India. A perusal of the amended section 9(1)(ii) w.e.f. 1st April, 2000 extracted herein :

    "Income which falls under the head ‘Salaries’, if it is earned in India.

    Explanation.—For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that income of the nature referred to in this clause payable for—

    (a)service rendered in India; and

    (b)the rest period or leave period which is preceded and succeeded by services rendered in India and forms part of the service contract of employment,

    shall be regarded as income earned in India;"

    clearly indicates that leave salary or rest salary in connection with employment prior to or after the employment in India has been included by the above amendment. This amendment is prospective in effect as explained in the Finance Act, 1999. Resultantly, prior to the amendment, any payment under the said classification could not be treated as part of the salary earned in India. In the present case the assessment years involved are prior to the amendment and hence the payments made in Japan was not taxable.

    11. The authorised representative for the assessee further contended that the present case involves Japanese expatriate employees who were all non-resident and/or not ordinarily residents under section 6 of the Act and consequently any sum earned by them outside India would not be liable for tax in India. The Supreme Court in CIT v. Morgenstern Werner [2003] 259 ITR 486 under similar circumstances as in the present case held that the salary paid to foreign technician in Germany was not liable to tax as per the proviso to section 5(1)(c) of the Act. It was submitted that the decision of the Supreme Court was rendered after the penalty order was passed in the present case and consequently the authorities below had no occasion to hold that neither the assessee-company nor Nissin had any liability towards deduction of tax under the Act in relation to the payments made to the expatriate employees in Japan. The Department had placed reliance on Circular No. 685 dated 17th/20th June, 1994 issued by the CBDT extracted supra. It was pleaded that the said circular was factually not applicable and legally incorrect. Factually, the circular applies only to foreign companies operating in India. In this case, Nissin was not operating in India inasmuch as it is only a shareholder in the assessee-company and had no independent operation. Hence, the circular was not applicable. Legally, the circular is contrary to the decision of the Supreme Court in Morgenstern Werner’s case (supra). Consequently, the circular cannot be treated as valid. Further, the circular granted certain amnesty up to a particular period and such a period has lapsed long ago. As such, the circular is not in existence for period (supra) beyond the period specified in the circular. In the absence of any specific liability under the Act on either the assessee-company or Nissin, it cannot be said that there was any failure to deduct TDS under the Act. Hence, the levy of penalty, without establishing failure to deduct the tax or liability under the Indian IT Act, is bad in law.

    12. Sri K.R. Pradeep contended that no order has been passed against the assessee-company or Nissin on the liability under the Act inasmuch as the assessee-company had never been held to be an ‘assessee in default’ under section 201 or under section 221 of the Act. Section 201(1) prescribes liability for failure to deduct tax and declares the assessee as ‘in default’. In cases where good and sufficient reason is found to exist, the action under these sections is mitigated. The cause of action in section 201(1) and section 271C on establishing a reasonable cause whereas under section 201(1) the yardstick is establishing "good and sufficient reason". He relied on the decision of Delhi High Court in Sequoia Construction Co. (P.) Ltd. v. P.P. Suri, ITO [1986] 158 ITR 4961.

    13. Sri K.R. Pradeep pleaded that there was considerable confusion insofar as the liability to pay tax on the payments made in Japan to the expatriate employees by Nissin. The confusion and doubt about the liability to pay tax was not restricted only to the assessee-company and/or Nissin, Japan. The situation was prevalent among the Japanese multinationals. This can be amply proved by referring to the decision of Delhi High Court in Azadi Bachao Andolan v. Union of India [2001] 252 ITR 4712. In this case, the Delhi High Court noticed as many as 93 cases wherein similar delays in payment of taxes had occurred. Further, the Department had dropped penalty proceedings in large number of cases where payment of tax was voluntarily made.

    14. The learned authorised representative for the assessee brought to our notice that the Tribunal, Bangalore Bench ‘A’ in the case of Asstt. CIT v. Yokogaawa Electric Corporation ITA Nos. 356 to 360/Bang./2002, Japan had confirmed the penalty under section 271C. Sri K.R. Pradeep submitted that this decision would not be applicable to the present case as the assessee in that case was aware of the liability and there was no doubt on the liability under the IT Act. Further, the payments therein were additional salary for services rendered in India, whereas in the present case the impugned payments were towards retention/continuation pay on account of the lien on the services of the expatriate employees in Japan. As far as the liability for tax is concerned, the circumstances were different. Further the Tribunal had no occasion to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Morgenstern Werner’s case (supra) as well as no reference has been made to the decision of the Delhi High Court in Azadi Bachao Andolan’s case (supra). Hence, factually and legally, Yokogaawa order cannot be relied on in deciding the present case.

    15. It was contended that there was no application of mind as the delay for the assessment year 1992-93 which is about 6 to 7 years has been treated on par with the delay for the assessment year 1998-99 which is hardly few months. It was submitted that in the present case there was no absolute failure and, by the time of issue of notices, the tax along with the interest and already been remitted voluntarily. Hence, the plea for cancellation of levy of penalty.

    16. Sri K.R. Pradeep further submitted that the assessee-company had already deducted tax from the salary paid to expatriate employees in India. It had also periodically filed Form 24, etc., and there was no failure on its part. The assessee-company had no responsibility to deduct tax on the payments made by Nissin in Japan. Invoking section 192(2) to pin the responsibility on the assessee-company is incorrect. The said section uses the word "may" to furnish such particulars in prescribed form and only thereupon the assessee-company had any obligation. The scheme envisaged under section 192(2) was such that first of all the expatriate employees had an option to furnish the details to the assessee-company and furnishing of such details should have been in the prescribed form i.e., Form 12B and it is thereafter that the assessee-company was obliged to deduct the tax. Even in such cases, the deduction cannot be more than the salary paid by the assessee-company. In the present case no such form has been furnished by any of the expatriate employees. In similar circumstances the Tribunal, Bangalore Bench in the case of Blue Star Ltd. India [ITA Nos. 137 to 140 (Bang.) of 2002] has held in favour of the assessee’s contention as found in para 8(v). For the above reasons it was submitted that the order of penalty should be cancelled.

    17. The learned Departmental Representative Shri Y. Rajendra vehemently contended that the authorities below were justified in imposing penalty under section 271C. Further he had objection to the contentions of the authorised representative of assessee-company relating to validity of notice limitation and liability to tax, etc. The learned Departmental Representative submitted that the defective notice is not fatal to the proceedings inasmuch as the assessee had participated in the subsequent proceedings. The assessee was never in dark as to the charge against it and reasonable opportunity was also provided. No objection was taken in the initial stages of the proceeding and objection now is only an after thought.

    18. On the issue of limitation, he submitted that the law has not placed any time limit for issue of notice. However, the penalty proceedings would be barred by limitation only if the order of penalty is passed after a period of 6 months from the end of the month in which the penalty notice was issued. In this case, the notice was dated 28th Feb., 2000 and the order of penalty was made on 31st Aug., 2000. Consequently the order of penalty is within the limitation. The issue of reasonable time as a yardstick should be applied in rarest of the rare circumstances especially when multinational companies with huge financial resources do not comply with law and the Department has no details or means of knowing the evasion placing restriction not specially provided by the statute would adversely affect the Revenue proceedings. Further, in exceptional cases, even section 148 provides a limitation longer than 4 years and the present case should be construed as an exception.

    19. Insofar as the liability to tax in the hands of Nissin, Japan or the assessee-company is concerned, the same is beyond question as the TDS and interest on the payments made in Japan has already been remitted. The payment/remittance of tax and interest establishes the fact that there is no income of the assessee of doubt on the existence of liability in India. The argument of liability at this stage serves no purpose after effecting the payment.

    20. The learned Departmental Representative contended that the decision of the Supreme Court in Morgenstern Werner’s case (supra) was rendered on facts typical to the case under consideration and is not applicable to the present circumstances. In reply Sri K.R. Pradeep, the authorised representative of the assessee-company submitted that the defect in the notice is not curable and participation does not render proceeding valid which is in law invalid. Insofar as the objection on limitation is concerned, the decision in Raymond Woollen Mills Ltd.’s case (supra) and Simplex Concrete Piles (India) Ltd.’s case (supra ) clinches the issue in favour of the assessee-company. He further submitted that mere payment of tax cannot lead to a presumption that there was a liability under the the Act. In fact, the law itself does not preclude from claiming refund of taxes paid in excess of liability. The refund can also be claimed even if the TDS has been paid in excess by mistake. Section 246 of the Act provides right of appeal for any liability of TDS. Further section 248 provides specific appeal even without an order merely on payment of TDS. Hence, the law does not support a presumption that mere payment of tax would necessarily imply existence of a liability.

    21. We have considered the arguments advanced by both the sides and perused the records and the citations relied on by both of them. It is an admitted fact that the notices in the case are not addressed to the assessee-company. The word "limited" in the notice is conspicuously absent. Further, the notices are also not addressed to the principal officer as required under section 282(2)(b) of the IT Act. In similar circumstance, various Courts and Tribunals mentioned in the argument of the assessee-company have held that the notice cannot be cured under section 292B and consequently have held it to be invalid. The Hon’ble Karnataka (sic-Kerala) High Court considered the issue relating to issuance of notice under section 282(2)(c) on the appropriate person and came to the conclusion that "We are of the view that it is a case where ‘no notice’ was sent to the assessee, the ‘AOP’ as enjoined by law. The entire proceedings are, in the circumstances, void and illegal and totally without jurisdiction. Such a fundamental infirmity cannot be called a ‘technical objection’ or a mere ‘irregularity’ and such vital infirmity cannot be cured or obliterated by relying on section 292B of the IT Act". Accordingly, we hold the notices to be invalid. On this ground itself the assessee-company is entitled to succeed. However, since arguments were advanced at length on all issues, we feel that our findings are required on all aspects of the case.

    22. We are not impressed with the stand taken by the assessee in relation to the matter of limitation, while initiating penalty proceedings. It is true that there was a delay in initiating the proceedings. However, it has to be seen as to what are the reasons for such delay. It is an admitted position that only after the Japanese company deposited the TDS amount for the salaries paid in Japan to the expatriate employees, the Revenue has become aware of the payments of salary at Japan by the Japanese company. From these facts, it is clear that the Revenue was prevented from gaining knowledge about the so-called salary paid in Japan. Therefore, in view of the factual position, we feel that the delay in initiating proceedings cannot be treated as an inordinate delay. This ground raised by the assessee fails.

    23. In this issue relating to the liability for tax on the payment of remuneration by Nissin in Japan to its employees towards retention/continuation pay it has to be examined from the point of view of section 9(1)(ii). The amendment by insertion of sub-section (b) by the Finance Act, 1999 has been brought into statute from 1st April, 2000. Further, a perusal of the note relating to clause 5 in Notes on Clauses of Finance Bill, 1999 extracted herein :

    "Clause 5 seeks to amend section 9 relating to income deemed to accrue or arise in India. Under the existing provisions contained in clause (ii) of sub-section (1), the income, which falls under the head ‘salaries’ if it is earned in India, is deemed to accrue or arise in India. The Explanation in this clause clarifies that salary payable for services rendered in India shall be regarded as income earned in India. It is proposed to amend the Explanation to clarify that any income under the head ‘salaries’ payable for rest periods or leave periods which is preceded and succeeded by services rendered in India and forms part of the service contract of employment shall be regarded as income earned in India. This amendment will take effect from 1st April, 2000 and will accordingly, apply in relation to the assessment year 2000-2001 and subsequent years."

    And relevant portion of the memorandum explaining the provisions in the Finance Bill, 1999 extracted herein :

    "Modification in respect of provisions regarding non-residents section 9 of the IT Act details the income which is deemed to accrue or arise in India. Under the existing provisions, it is stated that income which falls under the head ‘salaries’, if it is earned in India will be deemed to accrue or arise in India. It is proposed to expand the existing explanation which states that salary paid for services rendered in India shall be regarded as income earned in India, so as to physically provide that any salary payable for rest period or leave period which is both preceded and succeeded by service in India, will also be regarded as salary earned in India.

    The proposed amendment will take effect from 1st April, 2000 and will accordingly, apply in relation to assessment year 2000-2001 and subsequent years."

    Clarify that the amended provision was effective from assessment year 2001-2002. Further, the memorandum explains that the amendment intends to expand the existing explanation. From this, it is clear that prior to amendment, remuneration paid preceding and succeeding the service in India was not regarded as salary earned in India. This amendment though not addressed the issue of retention/continuation pay, it clearly brings about a principle that all remuneration earned from a source of employment in India would be taxable in India. Such a comprehensive definition was not available prior to the amendment. Inversely if the source of salary was not the employment in India or services in India, then in the case of non-resident and not ordinarily residents, it cannot be taxed in India. Only in the case of residents that the world wide income is liable to tax in India. In this case, retention pay is linked to the employment in Japan and not in India. Further, the pay is on account of the lien of employment in Japan and not for services rendered in India. Accordingly, we are of the opinion that such payment cannot be brought to tax in India at least prior to the amendment made by the Finance Act, 1999. We refrain from expressing any opinion on the applicability of amended provisions from assessment year 2000-2001 as such an issue is not before us. Further, the decision of the Supreme Court in Morgenstern Werner’s case (supra) also clinches the issue in favour of the proposition that there was no liability to pay tax in India under the circumstances in this case. Consequently Circular No. 685, being contrary to the law explained by the Supreme Court, does not help the Department. Further, mere payment of tax cannot lead to any conclusion or presumption about the existence of liability under the Act. Tax liability under the Act should be with reference to the explicit provisions and should be arrived at on the basis of charge and computation provisions. There is no scope for presumption or surmise in this regard. Argument of the Department that voluntary deposit of advance tax, TDS or 140A, would necessarily mean existence of liability cannot be upheld as it would lead to disastrous consequences as conversely in every case of non-deposit of tax the assessee may argue that there is no liability. Deposit of tax cannot be a conclusion on lability. Hence, we hold that there was no liability for tax in India on the remuneration paid in Japan by Nissin.

    24. On the issue of not passing order under section 201(1) before initiation of proceedings under section 271C, we are inclined to agree with the assessee’s contention and rely on the decision of the Tribunal Delhi ‘C’ Bench in Marubeni Corpn. (Liaison Office) v. Joint CIT [2002] 83 ITD 577 (Del.) and the decision of Tribunal Bangalore Bench in ITA Nos. 137 to 140/Bang./2002, on this ground also, the order of penalty stands vacated.

    25. The issue relating to existence of reasonable cause, we hold in favour of the assessee by relying on the decision of the Delhi High Court in Azadi Bachao Andolan’s case (supra), Tribunal Delhi Bench in Marubeni Corpn.’s case (supra) and Tribunal Bangalore Bench in ITA Nos. 833 & 834/Bang./2001. We find that the taxes were paid voluntarily before any detection by the Department. Even the so-called notice under section 133(6) is only for a period of two years, i.e., financial years 1996-97 and 1997-98 and does not cover all the years. Issue of such notice clearly establishes that the Department had no prior knowledge of the payment of remuneration in Japan. The voluntary payment of tax and interest, albeit with delay, cannot be construed as an act of mala fide or a proof of conduct contumacious or dishonest in nature. We are inclined to hold that there was a bona fide belief in this case by M/s. Nissin similar to other Japanese companies in whose cases the penalty had been dropped by the Department as found in the decision of the Delhi High Court in Azadi Bachao Andolan’s case (supra). On this ground also, the penalty has to go.

    26. Insofar as the applicability of section 192(2) to the assessee in this case, we find the issue is covered by the decision of the Tribunal Bangalore in the case of Blue Star Ltd. [IT Appeal Nos. 137 to 140 (Bang. of 2002)]. Accordingly, we cancel the penalty on the grounds of defective notice, liability to tax, existence of reasonable cause as well as non-applicability of section 192(2) of the Act. Hence, the order of the penalty stands cancelled.

    27. In the result, all the appeals are allowed.

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    Indo Nissin Foods Ltd. v. Joint Commissioner of Income-tax
    (Sep 30, 2003)