D. K. Srivastava, Accountant Member - These are cross appeals filed by the assessee/Board and the Revenue against the order passed by the CIT(A) on 09.07.2010. Both of them relate to assessment year 2007-08. Since they are cross-appeals arising from the same order of the CIT(A), we find it convenient to dispose of both of them by a consolidated order.
2. The assessee-Board has been constituted and established under the Haryana Housing Board Act, 1971 as extended by the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, vide their Notification dated 14.01.1975, to the Union Territory of Chandigarh with a view, as the Preamble to the said Act says, to "deal with and satisfy the need of housing accommodation." For this purpose, the assessee-Board is authorized by section 20 of the said Act to incur expenditure and undertake works/schemes framed by it as also those entrusted to it by the Administrator, Union Territory of Chandigarh, for execution.
3. The assessee-Board filed its return of income for the assessment year under appeal on 30.10.2007 before the Assessing Officer (AO) returning its total income at Rs. 36,55,36,530/-. A note was appended to the return of income in which it was stated: "Chandigarh Housing Board is also working as nodal agency for the Chandigarh Government and other authorities. The Receipts and Interest received and fund utilized as per their direction and the balance amount is shown as surplus funds payable to the concerned departments in the balance sheet." The return was taken up for scrutiny pursuant to which assessment u/s 143(3) of the Income-tax Act was completed on 28.12.2009 assessing the total income of the assessee at Rs.853,02,05,450/-. Perusal of the assessment order shows that the AO has made following additions/disallowances to the income returned by the assessee:
(a) Addition of Rs. 800,89,75,168/- (Receipts being Rs. 821,21,21,210 - Expenses being Rs. 20,31,46,042) on account of taxable surplus In RGCTP account on sale of development rights to M/s Parsvnath Developers Ltd., being the Developer.
(b) Addition amounting to Rs. 9,01,57,799/- being interest income on FDRs.
(c) Disallowance of interest amounting to Rs. 6,45,33,684/-as a result of capitalization under the head 'Work in Process', and
(d) Addition of Rs. 10,02,268/- on account of closing stock.
4. The AO has given detailed reasons for making the aforesaid additions/disallowances in his assessment order running into 343 pages. On appeal by the assessee, the ld. CIT(A) has confirmed major portion of the additions/disallowances made by the AO against which the assessee is now in appeal before this Tribunal. The ld. CIT(A) has granted some relief to the assessee against which the Department is in appeal before this Tribunal.
ITA No. 1075/Chd/2010 : Appeal by the assessee
5. Ground No. 1 taken by the assessee-Board is general in nature and therefore does not require adjudication.
6. Ground Nos. 2, 3 and 4 taken by the assessee-Board are inter-related. They are directed against the order passed by the ld. CIT(A) confirming addition of Rs. 800,89,75,168/-, being taxable surplus in RGCTP account on sale of development rights to M/s Parsvnath Developers Ltd., made by the AO. They read as under:
"2 That the CIT(A) has fallen in error while upholding the addition of Rs. 800,89,75,168/-ln the hands of the Assessee/Appellant on account of surplus generated for sale of development rights in RGCTP Project in as much as the said amount belonged to the Chandigarh Administration and the Assessee Appellant was merely acting as a Nodal Agency duly appointed by the Chandigarh Administration on 1st November 2005 for development of the project. The order passed by the CIT(A) is contrary to the provisions of sections 20,23,63 of the Haryana Housing Board Act as extended to the Union Territory of Chandigarh.
That strictly in the alternative and without prejudice to the above ground:-
3. That the CIT(A) has fallen in error in sustaining the addition of Rs. 800,89,75,168/- on account of surplus generated for transfer of development rights in the RGCTP Project on accrual basis as the right to receive the entire consideration had not crystallised in the relevant assessment year and was inchoate subject to fulfilment of conditions precedent by the developer.
4. That the Commissioner of Income Tax Appeals has failed to consider the explicit provisions of the development agreement dated 6.10.2006 in which it has been stated clearly that the Chandigarh Housing Board is acting as a Nodal Agency on behalf of the Chandigarh Administration for development of Rajiv Gandhi Chandigarh Technological Park Project.
5. That the CIT(A) had fallen in error in upholding the additions of Rs. 704,29,365/- being bank interest that accrued on funds generated from RGCTP Habitat Project.
6. That the CIT Appeals had fallen in error in disallowing the sum of Rs. 645,33,684/-being bank interest on overdrafts obtained against FDRs for earning high rate of interest."
7. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the aforesaid grounds of appeal are that the Chandigarh Administration had carried out a bio-metric survey of the slum areas in March 2006 during which it was found that there were several slum colonies located in different parts of the city. With a view to develop the slum areas and rehabilitate the slum dwellers, the Chandigarh Administration notified a scheme called "The Chandigarh Small Flats Scheme-2006" for allotment of one room residential flats to poor/slum dwellers on monthly licence basis. In order to generate funds for the Slum Rehabilitation Project as also to create infrastructure for development of residential, commercial and other related facilities for the personnel employed in Rajiv Gandhi Chandigarh Technology Park, the Chandigarh Administration introduced a scheme called Rajiv Gandhi Chandigarh Technology Park (RGCTP) Habitat Project on public private partnership basis. For giving shape to the aforesaid projects, the assessee-Board was required to start the process for a joint venture with a private developer without forming a joint venture and therefore the Chandigarh Administration, according to the assessee, directed the assessee-Board to engage SBI Caps Ltd. as consultants to fine tune the financial package and to prepare the bid documents. To facilitate the development, the assessee-Board purchased 123.79 acres of land from Chandigarh Administration on payment of Rs. 18.50 crores by the assessee-Board in addition to payment of stamp-duty amounting to Rs. 1.11 Crores. After completing the process of bidding, M/s Parsvnath Developers Ltd. was selected by the assessee-Board as developer of RGCTP as a result of which Lease Agreement and Development Agreement were simultaneously executed on 6.10.2006 between the assessee-Board and M/s Parsvnath Developers Ltd. The assessee-Board leased 83.119 acres of land to the Developer for 99 years and also granted development rights on the said land to the Developer. As per the Development/Lease Agreement dated 06.10.2006 executed between the assessee-Board and Parsvanath Developers Ltd., the Developer was required to pay Rs. 821.21 crores in addition to 30% share in the revenue generated from the sale of residential units, to the assessee-Board. The AO felt that the said sum of Rs. 821.21 Crores was in the nature of business receipts in the hands of the assessee-Board and therefore liable to be taxed in its hands. He, therefore, called upon the assessee to explain as to why the aforesaid sum should not be taxed. The main plea of the assessee-Board before the AO was that the said surplus did not belong to it as it was executing the RGCTP project as agent of the Chandigarh Administration and therefore not liable to be taxed in its hand. The AO however did not agree with the submission of the assessee-Board and accordingly taxed the surplus in RGCTP account in the hands of the assessee-Board, for the detailed reasons given in the assessment order.
8. Though the AO has recorded his findings on several issues in the assessment order in support of his decision to tax the impugned sum in the hands of the assessee, the assessee did not, however, challenge all of them before the CIT(A), which is evident from the observations made by the CIT(A) in para 28 of her appellate order, which reads thus: "28. It is pertinent to mention here that while the assessee has made submissions only on the issue of Nodal Agency for the execution of RGCTP Project, no submission or argument was given for a number of other related issues on the basis of which the Assessing Officer built up his case." In para 30 of her appellate order, the ld. CIT(A) has observed as follows: "30. Since as already stated, the appellant submitted only with regard to whether RGCTP Project was undertaken by the appellant as an agent of Chandigarh Administration or in its own absolute ownership right, I don't feel the need to discuss other issues elaborated by the Assessing Officer in the assessment order. "Before this Tribunal also, the assessee has challenged only two issues, namely, that the CIT(A) was not justified (i) in not treating the assessee as an agent of the Chandigarh Administration; and (ii) in confirming the action of the AO in taxing the entire amount on accrual basis in the hands of the assessee in the year under appeal. The findings of the AO in his assessment order in so far as they relate to the aforesaid two issues are, in brief, as under:
"(i) According to the AO, the assessee is engaged in the business of executing housing schemes and therefore the acquisition of land by it against payment of consideration as also its lease and grant of development rights on the said land in favour of the Developer are part of its business and hence the amount accruing to it as a result thereof was liable to be taxed as trading receipts.
(ii) According to the AO, the assessee follows mercantile system of accounting and therefore the amount accruing to it on sale of development rights is liable to be considered for levy of income-tax in the year of accrual and not in the year of actual receipt.
(iii) The AO has further held that the Development Agreement and Lease Agreement were executed by the assessee in the under appeal by which the assessee had not only conveyed leasehold rights but also development rights on the said land to the Developer on agreed consideration of Rs. 821.21 crores and therefore the assessee had acquired right to receive the said consideration upon execution of lease agreement and development agreement. According to him, the mere fact that the Developer was allowed to make the payment in a staggered manner would not defeat the accrual of income in the year under appeal as payments were to be made by the Developer in pursuance of the right that had already accrued to the assessee upon signing of the Lease Agreement and Development Agreement in the year under appeal.
(iv) According to the AO, the assessee was obliged to include the amount accruing to it on sale of development rights in its account as trading receipts. Since the assessee did not do so, the AO invoked section 145(3) of the I-T Act and treated the same as trading receipt in the hands of the assessee.
(v) After considering the provisions of the Haryana Housing Board Act and the submissions made by the assessee in that behalf, the AO has held that the assessee-Board is a separate legal entity and its existence as a legal entity is independent of the Chandigarh Administration. He has also held that the assessee-Board has neither been constituted as agent of the Chandigarh Administration by the said Act nor has it ever been appointed as agent of the Chandigarh Administration in respect of the projects envisaged by section 20 of the said Act. In this view of the matter, he held that the amount accruing to the assessee on sale of development rights was liable to be taxed in the hands of the assessee.
(vi) After considering the plea of the assessee-Board that it has been described as "nodal agency" by the Chandigarh Administration for implementation of RGCTP projects in several of its communications/documents and therefore it should be treated as agent of the Chandigarh Administration, the AO has held that the mere use of the words "nodal agency" in the documents are not decisive of the issue. According to him, the assessee is not agent of the Chandigarh Administration for the reason that the Chandigarh Administration has neither undertaken to reimburse the expenses incurred by the assessee in respect of the said project nor to indemnify the assessee against the losses and liabilities in respect thereof and also for the reason that the elements necessary for constituting principal-agent relationship between the Chandigarh Administration and the assessee-Board in terms of the requirements of law of contract were absent."
9. On appeal, the ld. CIT(A) has confirmed the order of the AO in this behalf.
10. Aggrieved by the order passed by the CIT(A), the assessee-Board is now in appeal before this Tribunal. In support of appeal, the ld. counsel for the assessee, apart from filing written submissions, has made detailed submissions at the time of hearing. The main plank of his submission was that the assessee-Board was acting as an agent of the Chandigarh Administration in implementing the RGCTP project and therefore all receipts/expenses relating to the aforesaid project belonged to the Chandigarh Administration and not to the assessee-Board and hence the assessee-Board was not liable to be taxed in respect of surplus/profits arising from the said project. In support of his argument that the assessee-Board was an agent of the Chandigarh Administration, the ld. counsel for the assessee submitted as under:
(i) Referring to section 20 of the Haryana Housing Board Act, the ld. counsel for the assessee submitted that the assessee-Board, in terms of section 20 of the said Act, was authorized to "undertake works in any area for the framing and execution of such housing schemes as it may consider necessary from time to time or as may be entrusted to it by the Administrator." He also referred to the provisions of sections 23, 24, 25 and 38 of the said Act for the proposition that the schemes framed as well as implemented by the assessee-Board were treated differently under the said Act from those which were entrusted to it by the Chandigarh Administration for implementation. Relying on sections 23 to 25 and 38 of the said Act, he submitted that the assessee-Board was required to prepare and forward the details, e.g., programme, budget, etc., of the schemes/works framed by it for implementation, to the Administrator for his sanction while similar details in respect of the schemes entrusted to it by the Chandigarh Administration were not required to be forwarded to the Administrator for his sanction. He also referred to sub-section (1) of section 63 of the said Act, which empowers the Administrator to transfer building, land or any other property to the assessee-Board for its use and management, and sub-section (2) of section 63, which empowers the Administrator to transfer such schemes or work-in-progress to the assessee-Board as the Administrator may deem fit for the purposes of the said Act. Relying upon the aforesaid provisions, he submitted that the Haryana Housing Board Act envisages two types of projects: one, the projects/schemes framed by the Chandigarh Administration and entrusted to the assessee-Board for implementation; and two, the projects/schemes framed as well as implemented by the assessee-Board. It was submitted that a conjoint reading of the aforesaid provisions indicated that the Chandigarh Administration could frame schemes for implementation by the assessee-Board. According to him, the schemes thus framed by the Chandigarh Administration are implemented at its instance by the assessee-Board as an agent of the Chandigarh Administration and therefore all receipts and payments in respect of such projects belong to the Chandigarh Administration and that the assessee-Board has no right to any income arising from the schemes framed by the Chandigarh Administration and implemented by the assessee-Board. He submitted that RGCTP project was a scheme which was framed by the Chandigarh Administration for implementation by the assessee-Board as its agent and therefore the surplus/profit arising from the execution of that scheme did not belong to the assessee but to the Chandigarh Administration.
(ii) Referring to clause 3(i) of the Notification dated 6-11-2006 issued by the Chandigarh Administration (Finance Department) notifying "The Chandigarh Small Flats Scheme 2006", the ld. counsel for the assessee submitted that the term "Nodal Agency" in that clause has been defined to mean "Chandigarh Housing Board or any other agency prescribed by the Chandigarh Administration as such". According to him, the nomination of the assessee as a "Nodal Agency" in the said Scheme amply clarified that the assessee-Board was acting merely as an agent of the Chandigarh Administration in so far as that scheme was concerned.
(iii) It was further submitted that the Chandigarh Administration had simultaneously decided to create Rajiv Gandhi Chandigarh Technology Park (RGCTP) for development of residential, commercial and other infrastructure facilities. Referring to 2nd paragraph of the Order dated 15.11.2005 (endorsements are dated 1.12.2005) issued by the Chandigarh Administration (Finance Department), he submitted that the Chandigarh Administration had nominated the assessee-Board as its nodal agency for executing the aforesaid project, which, according to him, further confirmed the fact that the assessee-Board was a mere agent of the Chandigarh Administration in so far as the execution of RGCTP project was concerned and therefore all the receipts and payments in respect thereof would belong to the Chandigarh Administration and not to the assessee-Board. In this connection, he also referred to the minutes of the meeting held on 30.3.2006 in the office of the Adviser to the Administrator in which the officials of the assessee-Board were present to work out the modalities of RGCTP project, in support of his plea that the RGCTP scheme was the scheme framed by the Chandigarh Administration and hence the role of the assessee was limited to executing the same as its agent.
(iv) It was further submitted that the assessee-Board had invited bids/proposals pursuant to the Order dated 15.11.2005 (endorsements are dated 1.12.2005) issued by the Chandigarh Administration (Finance Department), from the pre-qualified applicants and, after their evaluation, accepted the proposal submitted by M/s Parsvanath Developers and accordingly issued a letter of acceptance dated 9.6.2006 to the said Developer.
(v) The ld. counsel for the assessee referred to the recital in Development Agreement and Lease Agreement executed simultaneously between the assessee-Board and Parsvnath Developers on 06.10.2006 in which it is stated that the Chandigarh Administration has "appointed the CHB as nodal agency for execution of the project vide Chandigarh Administration (Finance Department) Order No. Endst. No. 2689-UTFI(4)-2005/8321 dated 01.12.2005" and submitted that the aforesaid recital in the Development Agreement made it very clear that the assessee-Board was not only acting as Nodal Agency on behalf of the Chandigarh Administration for execution of RGCTP Chandigarh project but that this fact was also disclosed to the Developer.
(vi) He also referred to the Development Agreement and Lease Agreement dated 06.10.2006 by which M/s Parsvnath Developers Ltd. was granted lease of land measuring 83.119 acres out of total project land measuring 123.79 acres. He submitted that no lease deed was executed for the remaining land measuring 40.671 acres, being free hold, as this land was to be used for residential units for which a separate conveyance deed through tripartite agreement involving purchasers of residential units, the developer and the assessee-Board was required to be executed on completion of the construction of residential units. The procedure for transfer of 40.67 acres of land was enumerated in clause No. 4.1.5 of the Development Agreement in which it was mentioned that the assessee-board was acting as a nodal agency for the development of the project.
(vii) He also relied upon the Office Order dated 31.10.2006 issued by the assessee-Board constituting a steering group for the purpose of guiding, monitoring and taking all operational level decisions in respect of RGCTP project. He also referred to the letter dated 15.12.2006 issued by the Finance Secretary, Chandigarh Administration to the Chief Executive Officer of the assessee-Board by which it was desired that any surplus out of the said project was to be utilized and kept apart as directed by the Chandigarh Administration and was not to be utilized as per plans of the assessee-Board.
(viii) It was further submitted that the assessee-Board had maintained, as an agent of the Chandigarh Administration, a separate account for all the receipts arising from the execution and development of RGCTP project and that this fact also showed that the assessee always treated itself to be a mere agent of the Chandigarh Administration in so far as that project was concerned.
(ix) He submitted that the assessee-Board, as a nodal agency of the Chandigarh Administration for development of RGCTP project, has maintained a separate account for all the receipts, which accrued under the said project and utilised the sale proceeds towards construction of dwelling units under the slum rehabilitation project as directed by the Chandigarh Administration. He further submitted that the Chandigarh Administration had thereafter issued detailed instructions regarding the utilization of the amount received under RGCTP project. In this connection, he referred to the Order dated 3rd September 2008 (Endorsement is dated 4.9.2008) issued by Chandigarh Administration laying down the terms & conditions for accounting revenue accruals of RGCTP as under:
(i) The entire amount of bid money and revenue share received from the project shall belong to the Chandigarh Administration.
(ii) The bid amount and revenue share received by the Chandigarh Housing Board shall be kept in a separate escrow account in the joint names of the Joint Secretary Finance, Chandigarh Administration and the chief Executive Officer, Chandigarh Housing Board and the joint account shall be jointly operated by the Joint Secretary Finance and the Chief Executive Officer, Chandigarh Housing Board.
(iii) Payment towards cost of construction of multistorey flats and other projects of Chandigarh Administration specifically identified and executed by Chandigarh Housing Board shall be made from this joint account.
(iv) The Chandigarh Housing Board shall be entitled to payment of entire expenditure on the construction and other projects of Chandigarh Administration.
11. In support of his plea that the assessee-Board was acting as agent of Chandigarh Administration and therefore the impugned sum was not taxable in its hands, the ld. counsel has also made the following legal submissions:
"(i) Assessee-Board was agent of the Chandigarh Administration for RGCTP project and hence not taxable: Referring to the sequence of events/facts as stated earlier, the ld. counsel submitted that the assessee-Board was an agent of the Chandigarh Administration for implementation of the RGCTP project in terms of the provisions of section 182 of the Indian Contract Act. Referring to section 230 of the Indian Contract Act, he submitted that it was not necessary for an agent to always disclose the factum of agency to third parties. Relying upon the judgments AIR 1960 SC 1269; AIR 1954 SC 364; AIR 1962 538; AIR 1977 SC 1275; AIR 1958 SC 269; AIR 1953 SC 140; and AIR 1973 SC 637, he submitted that a person appointed u/s 182 of the Indian Contract Act was different from a servant working under the general directions of the principal in that the principal directs what work is to be done and not how it is to be done. He also referred to sections 186, 187 and 188 of the said Act and submitted that the authority of an agent may be express or implied and that an agent has the necessary authority to do every lawful thing which is necessary to carry out the work as an agent. According to him, no separate agreement appointing the assessee as agent was necessary in view of the nomination of the assessee-Board as nodal agency by the Chandigarh Administration for the RGCTP project. He submitted that the ld. CIT(A) has failed to consider the cumulative effect of the aforesaid facts and the legal provisions in this behalf and therefore her order in this behalf should be vacated.
(ii) Legal ownership not conclusive of the right to receive income: The ld. counsel submitted that the assessee-Board was given no authority to deal with the property except in the manner directed by the Chandigarh Administration though the land on which RGCTP project was developed was conveyed to and stood in the name of the assessee-Board. Referring to the judgment in RB Jodhamal Kuthiala v. CIT [1971] 82 ITR 575 (SC), he submitted that the owner is a person who can exercise the rights of the owner not on behalf of the owner but in his own right. He also referred to the judgments in CIT v. Podar Cement (P.) Ltd. [1997] 226 ITR 625 / 92 Taxman 541 (SC) and Mysore Minerals Ltd. v. CIT [1999] 239 ITR 775 / 106 Taxman 166 (SC) in this regard. He contended that though the land was conveyed to the assessee-Board for the development of RGCTP project yet the rights of the assessee-Board in the land were subject to the directions of the Chandigarh Administration and therefore it was the Chandigarh Administration, which was de-fact owner of the land in question and resultantly income arising from the said project belonged to the Chandigarh Administration and not to the assessee notwithstanding the fact that the assessee was the legal owner of the land.
(iii) Accrual of income: Without prejudice to the submission that the assessee-Board was an agent of the Chandigarh Administration in so far as the RGCTP project was concerned and therefore the income arising from the said project was not taxable in the hands of the assessee, the ld. counsel for the assessee made an alternate submission to the effect that the amount taxed by the AO has never accrued to the assessee. He claimed that development rights granted to M/s Parsvanath Developers were subject to several conditions; namely, (i) payment of consideration as per Schedule 5 of the Development Agreement, (ii) non-creation of any encumbrance or lien on any of the assets, and (iii) fulfilment of the conditions specified in Article 3 of the Development Agreement, i.e., inability to provide bank guarantee, the developer achieving financial closure and obtaining approvals as required for the commencement of the project. He submitted that the assessee-Board had the right to terminate the agreement if the Developer failed to fulfil the aforesaid conditions and to forfeit the bid amount but the assessee had no right to enforce the payments of the remaining consideration. According to him, the right of the assessee to receive the amount taxed by the AO was inchoate and subject to the aforesaid limitations and therefore the said amount could not be said to have accrued to the assessee. In support of his submissions, the ld. counsel for the assessee relied upon the judgments in ED Sassoon & Co. Ltd. v. CIT [1954] 26 ITR 27 (SC) and CIT v. Hindustan Housing & Land Development, 161 ITR 524 (SC). He also relied upon the decision in CIT v. Chandigarh Industrial & General Development Corpn., 319 ITR 91 (P&H) for the proposition that "till the assessee received payment of annual instalments during the year it is inchoate right in favour of the assessee as in the event of failure on the part of the allottee/lessee the Managing Director of the Corporation has only a right to resume but cannot enforce the payment of the balance amount".
(iv) Application of doctrine of diversion of income by overriding title: The ld. counsel submitted that the doctrine of diversion of income by overriding title has been misconstrued by the AO. According to him, the assessee-Board was acting as a nodal agency for the Chandigarh Administration and thus it was under a legal obligation to transfer all the funds received on account of RGCTP project to the Chandigarh Administration or alternatively apply the same as per the directions of its principal, namely, the Chandigarh Administration. In support of his submissions, he relied upon the decisions in CIT v. Sitaldas Tirathdas, [1961] 41 ITR 367 (SC) and Moti Lal Chhadami Lal Jain v. CIT [1991] 190 ITR 1/56 Taxman 4A (SC).
(v) Erroneous application of section 145: According to the ld. counsel for the assessee, the AO has found no infirmity in the accounts of the assessee-Board and that the only reason given by the AO for rejecting the books of account was that the funds relating to RGCTP project were not included by the assessee in its accounts without appreciating the fact that the assessee-Board was acting as nodal agency for the Chandigarh Administration in implementing the said project. He submitted that the rejection of the books of account by the assessee was incorrect on the facts of the case as also in law."
12. In reply, the ld. Commissioner representing the Revenue (CIT-DR) supported the order of assessment passed by the AO as also the appellate order passed by the CIT(A) confirming the order of the AO in this behalf. He also invited our attention to the findings recorded by the AO in the assessment order in which each of the aforesaid submissions made by the assessee has been rebutted. His submissions, in brief, were as under:
"(i) The land on which RGCTP was developed was purchased by the assessee-Board from the Chandigarh Administration through a registered sale deed and possession of the land was also taken from the Chandigarh Administration in pursuance thereof. Since the legal ownership as well as the possession of the land vests in the assessee, the profit arising from the commercial exploitation of the said land would, in law, belong to the assessee and not to the Chandigarh Administration.
(ii) Development Agreement was executed between the assessee-Board and the Developer under which the assessee had a legally enforceable right to receive the entire bid money (Rs. 821,21,21,210/-) as also 30% share in the revenue generated from the sale of residential units. According to him, the Chandigarh Administration is neither a party to the Development Agreement nor has the Development Agreement been signed by the assessee-Board as an agent of the Chandigarh Administration nor has the Chandigarh Administration anything to do with that project and therefore Development Agreement cannot be construed as a document constituting the assessee as agent of the Chandigarh Administration.
(iii) The plea of the assessee that the funds of RGCTP were to be utilized as per the directions of the Chandigarh Administration is not of much consequence for the reason that all the schemes are required to be implemented as per the directions of the Chandigarh Administration and funds have to be utilized after getting sanction of the Chandigarh Administration.
(iv) According to section 3 of the Haryana Housing Board Act, the assessee-Board is a body corporate and therefore it has independent and separate existence of its own. Though the activities of the assessee are regulated by the Chandigarh Administration, it does not dilute the status of the assessee as a taxable entity under the I-T Act.
(v) The assessee has only one legally established fund, namely, the "Housing Board Fund" created u/s 56(1) of the Haryana Housing Board Act. The act of the assessee in creating a separate RGCTP Fund or Escrow account within the Housing Board Fund would therefore not change the character of the Housing Board Fund as such funds would always be part of the Housing Board Fund for the reason that the said Act does not authorize the assessee to create any other fund.
(vi) The sale of development rights through commercial exploitation of land owned by the assessee was part of the business activities of the assessee and therefore income arising therefrom was taxable as trading receipts in the hands of the assessee. Development rights in land were sold by the assessee-Board as it was the owner of the land and therefore profits arising therefrom were rightly taxed by the AO in the hands of the assessee.
(vii) Referring to sections 20, 24 and 28 of the Haryana Housing Board Act, he submitted that the assessee-Board was statutorily obliged to execute the housing schemes regardless of whether they were framed by the assessee-Board itself or entrusted to it by the Administrator after their approval by the Administrator. Hence the submissions made by the assessee-Board to distinguish between the schemes framed by the assessee-Board and the schemes entrusted to it by the Administrator were completely irrelevant. According to him, neither the phrase "agent" nor "agency" nor 'Nodal Agency' has been used in section 20 or any other section of the Haryana Housing Board Act and therefore the submission of the assessee that it was a 'Nodal Agency' for Chandigarh Administration in respect of the schemes entrusted to it by the Administrator was completely misplaced and not supported by any provision of the said Act. He submitted that section 20 of the Haryana Housing Board Act does not say that the income of the housing schemes framed by the assessee-Board would be the income of the assessee-Board or that the income of the housing schemes entrusted by the Administrator to it would be that of the Chandigarh Administration.
(viii) Referring to section 63 of the Haryana Housing Board Act relied upon by the assessee-Board, the ld. DR submitted that the Government has every right to attach conditions while transferring the property but that does not vitiate either the transfer of property or its ownership by the person to whom it is conveyed or the accrual of income arising from such schemes in the hands of the assessee.
(ix) Referring to section 71 of the Haryana Housing Board Act on which reliance was placed by the assessee-Board, the ld. DR submitted that the assessee-Board being a body corporate under the administrative control of the Chandigarh Administration was subject to its control and directions but that does not mean that the assessee-Board does not have its own legal existence or that its income belongs to the Government.
(x) As regards the provisions contained in sections 23 to 25, 38, and 63 in the Haryana Housing Board Act as referred to by the ld. counsel for the assessee, the ld. DR submitted that they merely provided for administrative arrangement between the Chandigarh Administration and the assessee-Board. According to him, none of the aforesaid provisions would affect either the ownership of the property by the assessee or accrual of income arising from commercial exploitation of such property in the hands of the assessee.
(xi) Referring to the provisions of section 39 of the Haryana Housing Board Act, he submitted that the assessee-Board was authorized by law to acquire, purchase, exchange or take on lease any land whether from any person including Chandigarh Administration. Referring to the provisions of Section 39, he submitted that the assessee-Board and the Chandigarh Administration were completely separate and distinct entities as far as the acquisition of land was concerned. Relying upon section 39 of the Haryana Housing Board Act, he submitted that if the assessee-Board acquired any property either from the Chandigarh Administration or anyone else, then it would be the property of the assessee-Board and of none else. In such a case, the seller regardless of whether the seller is the Chandigarh Administration or any other party would have no right over such property after its purchase by the assessee. He further submitted that the land for the project was acquired by the assessee-Board against payment of Rs. 18.5 crores from Chandigarh Administration, vide Conveyance Deed dated 31.03.2006. Once the Deed of Conveyance has been executed in favour of the assessee-Board and the possession of the land has also been given to the assessee-Board, then the assessee-Board would be the legal owner of the property and not the Chandigarh Administration and therefore neither Chandigarh Administration nor the Administrator could claim any rights over such property after it has been purchased by the assessee-board though they could regulate its use/disposal. According to him, sale consideration mentioned in the Deed of Conveyance is the finally determined price and not the tentative price. He further submitted that the fact that Stamp Duty as paid by the assessee-Board was finally accepted by the Sub-Registrar also shows that the sale consideration reflected market price.
(xii) Referring to the provisions of Section 44 of the Haryana Housing Board Act, 1971, he submitted that the assessee-Board was fully empowered by law to dispose of any land vested in it."
13. We have heard both the parties and carefully considered their submissions. Apropos ground Nos. 2 to 4, two distinct issues arise for consideration and adjudication. They are as under:
"Issue No.1: Whether the CIT(A) is right in confirming the action of the AO in not treating the assessee-Board as agent of the Chandigarh Administration in respect of the RGCTP project framed by the Chandigarh Administration and implemented by the assessee-Board?
Issue No. 2: Whether the CIT(A) is right in confirming the action of the AO in holding that the impugned amount has accrued to the assessee in the year under appeal and taxing the same as such in the hands of the assessee?"
14. The ld. counsel for the assessee has relied upon sections 20, 23-25, 38 and 63 of the Haryana Housing Board Act in support of his submission that the said Act envisages two types of schemes, namely, (i) the schemes framed by the Chandigarh Administration and implemented assessee-Board, and (ii) the schemes framed as well as implemented by the assessee-Board. According to him, the assessee-Board acts as mere agent for the Chandigarh Administration in respect of the schemes framed by the Chandigarh Administration like the RGCTP and implemented by it and therefore income arising from such schemes does not belong to the assessee but to the Chandigarh Administration and, in that view of the matter, it would not be taxable in the hands of the assessee. The Revenue, on the other hand, claims that the assessee-Board cannot be treated as agent of the Chandigarh Administration as none of the provisions in the said Act declares the assessee-Board as agent of the Chandigarh Administration. According to the Revenue, the said Act merely defines the objects of the assessee-Board as also the manner in which they would be carried out.
15. We have perused the relevant provisions of the Haryana Housing Board Act. Section 20 deals with "Duty of Board to undertake housing schemes". As the marginal note to section 20 of the said Act itself says, section 20 sets out the duties of the assessee-Board or, in other words, the objects of the assessee-Board. It authorises the assessee to undertake only housing schemes, whether framed by the Board itself or entrusted to it by the Government, and nothing else. Thus section 20 bars the assessee-Board from undertaking any activity other than those specified therein. Section 20 is in the nature of objects clause as in the memorandum of association of a company. It does nothing more than specifying the objects of the assessee-Board. It does not say either expressly or even by implication that the assessee-Board would be the agent of the Government or the Chandigarh Administration in respect of either of the aforesaid schemes mentioned therein. Likewise, section 23 deals with "Preparation and submission of annual housing programme, budget and establishment schedule", section 24 deals with "Sanction to programme, budget and establishment schedule", section 25 deals with "Publication of sanctioned programme", section 38 deals with "Schemes entrusted to Board by the Government" and provides that the provisions of sections 21, 23 to 29 shall not be applicable to the programmes/schemes entrusted by the Government, and section 63 deals with "transfer of assets and liabilities". While the schemes framed by the assessee-Board u/s 20 require approval/sanction, etc., of the Administrator in terms of sections 21, 23 to 29 of the said Act, the schemes entrusted by the Government/Chandigarh Administration to the assessee do not require such approval/sanction, etc., in view of the provisions of section 38 as such schemes are entrusted to the assessee-Board by the Government itself. The provisions referred to by the ld. counsel for the assessee either lay down the range of activities that can be undertaken by the assessee-Board or the procedure and the manner in which such activities can be undertaken or carried out by the assessee. Neither the aforesaid provisions nor any other provision in the said Act can be read or interpreted as appointing the assessee-Board as an agent of the Chandigarh Administration. In fact there is no provision in the said Act which declares the assessee-Board as an agent of the Chandigarh Administration. In this view of the matter, all the submissions made by the ld. counsel for the assessee in this behalf are rejected.
16. We have also perused the documents referred to by the ld. counsel for the assessee at the time of hearing before us. In "The Chandigarh Small Flats Scheme-2006" notified by the Chandigarh Administration, the assessee-Board has been mentioned as "Nodal Agency" for the implementation of the Scheme, which, in simple terms, means that it was held out to be a body responsible for implementing the Scheme and not as a body for the actions of which the Chandigarh Administration would be legally liable. As regards the Development Agreement, the Chandigarh Administration is not a party to the said Agreement and hence it cannot form the basis for creating agent-principal relationship between the assessee and the Chandigarh Administration. Though the assessee-Board has been described in several documents, e.g., Order dated 15th November, 2005 (endorsements are dated 1.12.2005) issued by the Chandigarh Administration (Finance Department), as "nodal agency" for implementing the RGCTP project and the Chandigarh Small Flats Scheme 2006, none of them says or declares that the assessee-Board shall be the agent of the Chandigarh Administration or then the Chandigarh Administration shall be legally liable for the actions of the assessee as in the case of principal-agent relationship. The use of the expression "nodal agency" in the documents referred to by the ld. counsel is contextual. The mere use of the word "Agency" does not necessarily mean the existence of relationship of principal and agent as understood in the law of agency and more particularly under Chapter X of the Indian Contract Act for the reason that the word "agency" has several meanings. While the word "agency" may signify the relation between a principal and his agent, it may also signify a business that serves other businesses, or administrative unit or organization of the Government. Similarly the word "nodal agency" in its normal connotation would mean a body or organization having convergence of functions. It signifies a body which connects or brings things together. The creation of a body as a "nodal agency" simply means constitution of a body or organization to exclusively deal with the matters entrusted to it. In the context in which the term "nodal agency" has been used in the documents referred to by the ld. counsel, the mere use of the term "nodal agency" in them is not sufficient to treat the assessee-Board as agent of the Chandigarh Administration. "Agency" in law connotes the relation which exists where one person (i.e., agent) has an authority or capacity to create legal relations between a person occupying the position of principal (i.e., Chandigarh Administration) and third parties. In the case before us, this relationship is completely absent.
17. Section 182 of the Indian Contract Act, 1972 defines 'agent' and 'principal' thus: "An 'agent' is a person employed to do any act for another or to represent another in dealings with third persons. The person for whom such act is done, or who is so represented is called a 'principal'. "Agency in law connotes the relation which exists where one person has an authority or capacity to create legal relations between a person occupying the position of principal and third parties": Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Reissue, Volume 1(2), para 1. The essential feature of an agent is his power of making the principal answerable to third persons, i.e., enabling the principal to sue third parties directly, and render him liable to be sued directly by the third party. The test of agency is whether the person is entering into transaction on behalf of the principal or not so as to create, modify or terminate contractual obligations between his principal whom he represents, and some third parties. Representative character and derivative authority may briefly be said to be the distinguishing features of an agent. The function of an agent is to enter into contractual relations on behalf of his principal with third parties, No document has been placed before us to show that the assessee-Board had the legal capacity to make the Chandigarh Administration in its capacity as principal answerable and legally liable to third persons, viz., enabling the Chandigarh Administration to sue third parties directly or render it liable to be sued directly by the third parties. The documents and the materials placed before us clearly indicate that the assessee-Board has entered into the transactions with the Developer and other parties in its own right and on its own strength.
18. In this connection, we are reminded of the observations made by Lord Herschell in Kennedy v. De Trafford 1897 A.C. 180 that "No word is more commonly and constantly abused than 'agent'. Same observations apply with equal force to the word "agency". Mere use of the word 'agent' or "agency" in itself really means very little. In Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd. v. STO 1977/3 SCC 147, the assessee was a manufacturer of sugar and also ran in the mill premises a petrol pump selling high speed diesel oil, petrol and other lubricant oils of Caltex. A part of these oils was consumed by the assessee for its own trucks and other vehicles. The Sales-tax authorities assessed to tax the petrol consumed by the appellant for its own use as well. On appeal, the Commissioner of Sales Tax held that since the appellant was an agent of Caltex, title to the property in the goods sold by it remained with the principal and as such that part of the petrol and other oils consumed by it was also a sale exigible to tax. Allowing the appeal, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held:
"It is well settled that while interpreting the terms of the agreement, the Court has to look to the substance rather than the form of it. The mere fact that the word 'agent' or 'agency' is used or the words 'buyer' and 'seller' are used to describe the status of the parties concerned is not sufficient to lead to the irresistible inference that the parties did in fact intend that the said status would be conferred. Thus the mere formal description of a person as an agent or buyer is not conclusive, unless the context shows that the parties clearly intended to treat a buyer as a buyer and not as an agent. Learned counsel for the appellant relied on several circumstances to show that on a proper construction of the agreement it could not but be held to be a contract of sale. Learned counsel strongly relied on a decision of this Court in Sri Tirumala Venkateswara Timber and Bamboo Firm v. Commercial Tax Officer, Rajahmundry, 21 S.T.C. 313; 316 where this Court held the transaction to be a sale in almost similar circumstances. Speaking for the Court, Ramaswami, J., observed as follows:
"As a matter of law there is a distinction between a contract of sale and a contract of agency by which the agent is authorised to sell or buy on behalf of the principal. The essence of a contract of sale is the transfer of title to the goods for a price paid or promised to be paid. The transferee in such a case is liable to the transferor as a debtor for the price to be paid; and not as agent for the proceeds of the sale. The essence of agency to sell is the delivery of the goods to a person who is to sell them, not as his own property but as the property of the principal who continues to be the owner of the goods and will therefore be liable to account for the sale proceeds."
It is clear from the observations made by this Court that the true relationship of the parties in such a case has to be gathered from the nature of the contract, its terms and conditions, and the terminology used by the parties is not decisive of the said relationship. This Court relied on a decision in W.T. Lamb & Sons v. Goring Brick Company Ltd., L.R. [1932] I K.B.D. 710, 717 where despite the fact that the buyer was designated as sole selling agent, the Court held that it was a contract of Sale. Lord Scrutton, with whom other Lords agreed, observed as follows:
"Now it is well known that in certain trades the word "agent" is often used without any reference to the law of principal and agent. The motor trade offers an obvious example, where persons described as "agents' are not agents in respect of any principal, but are purchasers who buy from manufacturers and sell independently of them; and many difficulties have arisen from this habit of describing a purchaser, sometimes a purchaser upon terms, as an agent."
In an earlier decision of this Court in Gordon Woodroffe & Co. v. Sheikh M.A. Majid & Co. [1966] Supp. S.C.R. 134, it was observed thus:
"The essence of sale is the transfer of the title to the goods for price paid or to be paid. The transferee in such case becomes liable to the transferor of the goods as a debtor for the price to be paid and not as agent for the proceeds of the sale. On the other hand, the essence of agency to sell is the delivery of the goods to a person who is to sell them, not as his own property but as the property of the principal who continues to be the owner of the goods and who is therefore liable to account for the proceeds."
19. The principles laid down in the aforesaid judgment squarely cover the case before us. In the case before us also, the assessee-Board has first acquired the land in its own right on payment of consideration and thereafter granted development rights on the same to the Developer against consideration. The mere fact that it acquired that land from Chandigarh Administration would not make it an agent of Chandigarh Administration. The said land was purchased by the assessee in its own right and therefore it had a legal right to dispose off or commercially exploit the same. The assessee has commercially exploited the said land by granting leasehold rights and development rights on it to the Developer. It is thus a case where the assessee-Board has dealt with its own property and not the property of the Chandigarh Administration. If the assessee had been the agent of the Chandigarh Administration, there would have been no necessity for the assessee to purchase the land on payment of consideration from the Chandigarh Administration, for the reason that the assessee, as an agent in that case, could have directly dealt with the same on behalf of the Chandigarh Administration.
20. Turning once again to the documents referred to by the ld. counsel, the mere use of the words "nodal agency" in them is not sufficient to confer authority in the assessee-Board to bind the Chandigarh Administration either in relation to Developer/third parties or the Developer/third parties in relation to the Chandigarh Administration. Secondly, no document has been placed before us to show that the assessee-Board has ever acted or executed any document/deed for and on behalf of the Chandigarh Administration or as its agent. Thirdly, even the tripartite agreements required to be executed on allotment of flats under the Chandigarh Small Flats Scheme 2006 are required to be signed by the assessee-Board in its own right as its owner and not on behalf of the Chandigarh Administration or as its agent. Fourthly, the entire RGCTP project has been carried out by the assessee-Board in its own right and in its own name. Fifthly, no document has been placed before us to show that the assessee-Board has been given the authority to act as an agent of the Chandigarh Administration so as to bind the Chandigarh Administration in relation to third parties or third parties in relation to third parties or third parties in relation to the Chandigarh Administration. Sixthly, the use of the words "nodal agency" in the documents placed before us merely denote that the assessee-Board was to exclusively deal with the project entrusted to it and do all the things necessary for its implementation. It does not therefore have the effect of creating the relationship of agent and principal between the assessee-Board and the Chandigarh Administration.
21. Undoubtedly, the assessee-Board is an instrumentality of State under Article 12 of the Constitution but that is for the limited purpose of Part III of the Constitution. In law, the assessee-Board is different from the State or Chandigarh Administration. Provisions of section 3 of the Haryana Housing Board Act declaring the assessee-Board as a body corporate, sections 39 and 44 vesting the power to purchase, lease, acquire and dispose of the land in the assessee-Board in its own right and several other provisions in the Haryana Housing Board Act amply clarify the position that the assessee-Board has been constituted as a legal entity independent from the Chandigarh Administration. Both of them are separate entities in law. They sue and are sued in their own capacities. For any contractual liability of the assessee-Board no person can sue the Chandigarh Administration, because the assessee-Board in itself is not Chandigarh Administration but a separate legal entity in its own right. It is settled by catena of decisions that the properties of a statutory corporation/board or a Government-owned company or authority established by the Government by or under law are not the properties of the Government. In the case before us, the land on which the project has been developed is owned by the assessee-Board. The land acquired by the assessee on payment of consideration has been commercially exploited by the assessee itself using its own resources. Conveyance deeds have been executed by the assessee-Board in its own right and not on behalf of the Chandigarh Administration. Proceeds flowing from commercial exploitation of land have been received by the assessee-Board and deposited in its own bank account. Besides, agency is created by contract and not unilaterally by one party. The assessee-Board and the Chandigarh Administration are not natural persons but juristic entities and hence there cannot be any oral agreement between them to create agency. The admitted position is that there is no written contract between them to create agency. After taking into account all the materials brought on record including the legal position, we confirm the finding of the AO/CIT(A) that the assessee-Board was not an agent of the Chandigarh Administration in so far as the said project is concerned. All the pleas taken by the assessee in this behalf are therefore rejected.
22. The more pertinent question than the question of agency is whether the documents including the Development Agreement and the Chandigarh Small Flats Scheme referred to by the ld. counsel for the assessee create overriding title so as to the divert the receipts/income arising from the aforesaid project at source itself from the hands of the assessee to Chandigarh Administration before it reaches the assessee. While the case of the assessee is that the income from the aforesaid project stood diverted at source in favour of the Chandigarh Administration, the case of the Department is just opposite. According to it, it is a case of application of income and not of diversion of income at source by any overriding title.
23. We have considered the rival submissions. Sometimes, a portion of the income arising out of the corpus held by the assessee is consumed at the source itself for the purpose of meeting some recurring or non-recurring expenditure arising out of an obligation imposed on the assessee by contract or by statute or by the law of the land. In such cases, a question arises whether such portion of the income so consumed or expended is to be treated as income assessable to tax in the hands of the assessee. The answer is that if the income, before it reaches the assessee, is diverted away by superior title so that the assessee, when he receives the income, has to pass it on to a third party, the portion passed on, or is liable to be passed on, is not the income of the assessee but of the person to whom it is passed on or is liable to be passed on. In cases of diversion of income, 'it is the existence of superior title which not only deprives the assessee of his title to the income but also requires him to part with the same in favour of a third party as the assessee in receipt of the income would be receiving it both on behalf of himself and the third party by virtue of the overriding title and not exclusively for himself. In cases of diversion of income, the income does not accrue to the assessee at all; it, in fact, accrues to the third party in that the destination of income is not towards the assessee in whose hands the money is placed but towards a third party in whose favour and for whose benefit the title is created. Resultantly, the assessee, after the income stands diverted at source by a superior title to a third party, would no longer be concerned with that income.
24. In CIT v. Sitaldas Tirathdas [1961] 41 ITR 367 (SC) a part of income from property paid as maintenance allowance to the dependants under a decree of the court, without the maintenance allowance being charged upon the property yielding income, was held to be a case of application of income. In CIT v. Sijua (Jharriah) Electric Supply Co. Ltd., [1984] 140 ITR 740 (Cal.), the Hon'ble High Court has considered the judgment in Sitaldas Tirathdas' case (supra) and held as under:
"......... The concept of real income or diversion of income by an overriding title was explained by Hidayatullah, J. in the case of Sitaldas Tirathdas (supra) at pages 374-375:
In our opinion, the true test is whether the amount sought to be deducted, in truth, never reached the assessee as his income. Obligations, no doubt, there are in every case, but it is the nature of the obligation which is the decisive fact. There is a difference between an amount which a person is obliged to apply out of his income and an amount which by the nature of the obligation cannot be said to be a part of the income of the assessee. Where by the obligation the income is diverted before it reaches the assessee, it is deductible; but where the income is required to be applied to discharge an obligation after such income reaches the assessee, the same consequence, in law, does not follow. It is the first kind of payment which can truly be excused and not the second. The second payment is merely an obligation to pay another a portion of one's own income, which has been received and is since applied. The first is case in which the income never reaches the assessee, who even if he were to collect it, does so, not as part of his income, but for and on behalf of the person to whom it is payable.
23. If this test is applied, it will be seen that there has been no diversion of income by an overriding title at all. The amount appropriated to the contingencies reserve was collected by the assessee as its revenue from sale of electricity. The amount remained at the disposal of the assessee and for the benefit of the assessee. It could be used only for a few specified purposes but the purposes for which the fund could be used were all business purposes of the assessee-company. Payment of compensation to workers, replacement of plant and machinery or other expenditure envisaged in para V, which we have set out earlier, are all normal business expenditure of a company. This is not a case of diversion of income before it reaches the assessee, but only a case of setting apart of a portion of the assessee's income under compulsion of law for the use and benefit of the assessee although the mode and the objects of the expenditure are statutorily restricted."
25. On perusal of catena of decisions on the subject, it transpires that in order to constitute diversion of income at source by overriding title following facts must be established:
(i) There must be income arising out of the corpus held by the assessee;
(ii) A portion of the income so generated must be charged to the source itself by an overriding title in favour of a third party or, in other words, the obligation must attach to the source of income in that the income itself should not accrue to the receiver and not to the receiver of the income to apply it in a particular manner;
(iii) The income so charged must be passed on or is required to be passed or, in other words, is required to be diverted in favour of a third party before it reaches the assessee; and
(iv) The assessee, after the income stands diverted at source by a superior title, is no longer concerned with that income or, in other words, the assessee must be completely divested of any kind of dominion over the income.
26. If the aforesaid tests are applied to the facts of the case, it will be seen that there is no diversion of income arising from the commercial exploitation of land owned by the assessee by an overriding title in favour of the Chandigarh Administration. The deed of conveyance by which the assessee has purchased the land from Chandigarh Administration does not contain any recital in this behalf. So is the case with the Development Agreement. None of them creates antecedent title by virtue of which the income from the said project would stand diverted to the Chandigarh Administration at source itself without reaching the assessee. Correspondence/notes exchanged between the parties merely require application of a income after it has reached the assessee. The amount in question was collected by the assessee as its revenue from commercial exploitation of development rights. The amount remained at the disposal of the assessee and for the benefit of the assessee. Though it could be used only in the manner and for the purposes specified by the Chandigarh Administration yet the purposes for which the funds could be used were all business purposes of the assessee-Board. in terms of section 20 of the Haryana Housing Board Act. This is not a case of diversion of income before it reaches the assessee, but only a case of setting apart a portion of the assessee's income under compulsion of directions issued by the Chandigarh Administration for the use and benefit of the assessee and that too for the purposes specified in section 20 of the said Act. In this view of the matter, it is held that the impugned sums accruing to the assessee in pursuance of the Development Agreement did not stand diverted at source by any over-riding title, which is antecedent in point of time, in favour of the Chandigarh Administration. The directions issued by the Chandigarh Administration in this behalf after the income from sale of development rights has accrued to the assessee merely prescribe the manner in which and the purposes for which the said receipts would be utilized and therefore they are in the nature of directions as to application of funds after they have reached the assessee. It is well-settled that tax is attracted at the point when the income is earned. Taxability of income is not dependent upon its destination or the manner of its utilisation. It is also well-settled that income attracts tax as soon as it accrues. The application or destination of the income has nothing to do with its accrual or taxability.
27. Apropos Issue No. 2, i.e., whether the AO is right in holding that the impugned amount has accrued to the assessee in the year under appeal and taxing the same as such in the year under appeal, the facts of the case are that leasehold rights and development rights were granted by the assessee to the Developer by Development Agreement and Lease Agreement simultaneously executed between the assessee-Board and the Developer in the year under appeal against consideration of Rs. 821,21,21,210/- a part of which was paid and the remaining part was promised to be paid as per Schedule IV of the said Agreement. By Lease Deed, the assessee-Board leased the land on which development was to be carried out in favour of the assessee in consideration of the amount paid or promised to be paid. By Article 2 of the Development Agreement, the assessee-Board granted development rights on the said land to the Developer in consideration of Rs. 821.21 crores. It also provided that the development period would be total period of 36 months "starting from the Agreement Date". Article 3.1 of the said Agreement sets out the "Conditions Precedent" according to which the assessee-Board could at its option terminate the Development Agreement if the Developer failed (i) to provide bank guarantee as stipulated by Article 6.12; (ii) to furnish a certificate evidencing financial disclosure; (iii) to obtain approvals as required for the commencement of the Project. Article 3.2 of the said Agreement authorized the assessee-Board to extend the time period for fulfilling the "Conditions Precedent". By Article 5.1 of the said Agreement, the Developer promised to pay the agreed amount of consideration to the assessee-Board in consideration of its granting the development rights to the Developer on the said land. It is stated in Article 5.2 that the "Bid Price" means the total amount payable by the Developer to the assessee-Board, i.e., Rs. 821,21,21,210/-, being the consideration payable by the Developer for receiving the right to develop the project land. The assessee-Board has acknowledged in the Development Agreement to have received Rs. 100 crores being a part of the bid price required to be paid upfront by the Developer. By the said Article, the Developer agreed to pay the balance amount to the assessee-Board as per timelines specified in Schedule IV of the said Agreement. Schedule IV to the Agreement gives Break-up of the Bid Price according to which the Developer has paid Rs.100 crores as upfront bid price and the remaining part of the bid price was to be paid in six quarterly instalments as per time schedule given therein. Article 5.2.2 stipulated that the assessee-Board could charge interest in case of delay on the part of the Developer to pay any instalment of bid price as specified in Schedule IV. Article 13 specifies events of default on the part of the Developer. Article 13.2 lays down the procedure for termination of contract. The fact that a sum of Rs. 100 crores was paid as upfront bid price at the time of signing the Development Agreement and Lease Agreement is admitted by both the parties. Both the parties also admit that the first instalment of bid price was payable and was also accordingly paid by the Developer to the assessee in the year under appeal.
28. The case of the AO is that the assessee follows mercantile system of accounting and hence the entire bid price amounting to Rs. 821.21 crores being consideration for granting the leasehold and development rights to the Developer has accrued to the assessee in the year under appeal and therefore is chargeable to tax in the year under appeal. According to him, the assessee not only acquired a legal right to receive the entire bid price on signing of the Development/Lease Agreement in the year under appeal but the Developer was also under legal obligation to pay the same.
29. The case of the assessee, on the other hand, is that the transfer of development rights by the assessee to the developer was subject to fulfilment of several conditions being "Conditions Precedent" as mentioned in Article 2.2 of the said Agreement and also subject to payment of instalments as agreed upon between the parties and therefore right to receive the entire amount of consideration for transfer of development rights was inchoate and subject to several limitations. According to him, the property transferred by the assessee to the developer would revert back to it on failure of the developer to fulfil the stipulated conditions and, in that view of the matter, there was no accrual of income of Rs. 821.21 crores in the hands of the assessee. In support of his submissions, he relied upon the judgments in ED Sassoon & Co. Ltd. v. CIT [1954] 26 ITR 27 (SC); CIT v. Hindustan Housing & Land Development [1986] 27 Taxman 450A (SC); and CIT v. Chandigarh Industrial & General Development Corpn. [2009] 319 ITR 85 (P&H).
30. We have heard both the parties and carefully considered their submissions. Facts of the case are not in dispute. Development Agreement and Lease Agreement were executed between the assessee-Board and M/s Parsvanath Developers in the year under appeal by which lease and development rights were granted by the assessee to the Developer in consideration of Rs. 821.21 crores out of which a sum of Rs. 100 crores was paid as upfront money at the time of signing the Agreement. Remaining amount was agreed to be paid in six quarterly instalments out of which first instalment was paid in the year under appeal. Remaining instalments required to be paid fell in the succeeding years. The action of the AO in taxing the entire consideration in the year under appeal is subject matter of dispute between the parties.
31. The assessee follows accrual method of accounting. In the accrual method, income and expenses are recognized as they occur, regardless of whether or not cash has actually changed hands. An excellent example is a sale on credit. The sale is entered into the books when the invoice is generated rather than when the cash is collected. Likewise, an expense occurs when materials are ordered or when a workday has been logged in by an employee and not when the cheque is actually written or cash is paid. The downside of this method is that one pays income tax on revenue before he has actually received it. Thus income may accrue to an assessee without actual receipt of the same. If the assessee acquires a right to receive the income, the income can be said to have accrued to him though it may be received later on its being ascertained: Cit, Bombay City Ii v. Shri Goverdhan Ltd., Bombay, [1968] 69 ITR 675 (SC); CIT v. Nandram Hunatram [1976] 103 ITR 433 (Ori.). In Commissioner Of Income Tax, Gujarat v. Ashokbhai Chimanbhai [1965] 56 ITR 42 (SC), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held:
"Under the IT Act, income is taxable when it accrues, arises or is received, or when it is by fiction deemed to accrue, arise or is deemed to be received. Receipt is not the only test of chargeability to tax; if income accrues or arises it may become liable to tax. For the purpose of this case it is necessary to dilate upon the distinction between income "accruing" and "arising". But there is no doubt that the two words are used to contra-distinguish the word "receive". Income is said to be received when it reaches the assessee; when the right to receive the income becomes vested in the assessee, it is said to accrue or arise."
32. In E D Sassoon's case (supra), it was held that the office of managing agents and all their rights and benefits under the Managing Agency Agreement had been assigned and since the source of income itself had been assigned, the income had been diverted by overriding title and no part of the income from the agency would then become includible in the hands of the assignor. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:
"........It is clear, therefore, that income may accrue to an assessee without the actual receipt of the same. If the assessee acquires a right to receive the income, the income can be said to have accrued to him though it may be received later on its being ascertained. The basic conception is that he must have acquired a right to receive the income. There must be a debt owed to him by somebody. There must be as is otherwise expressed debitum in praesenti, solvendum in futuro; see W.S. Try Ltd. v. Johnson (Inspector of Taxes) (1946) 1 All ER 532 at 539, and Webb v. Stenton & Ors., Garnishees 11 QBD 518 at 522, 527. Unless and until there is created in favour of the assessee a debt due by somebody it cannot be said that he has acquired a right to receive the income or that income has accrued to him."
33. The judicial authorities are thus consistent in the view that the transactions in the accrual system of accounting are recognised as soon as a right to receive revenue and a corresponding obligation/liability on the part of the other party to pay is created. In the case before us, the assessee-Board has granted lease of the land as also the development rights on the said land to the developer on agreed consideration of Rs. 821.21 crores. The right to receive consideration has thus vested in the assessee upon signing of the Agreement. The assessee-Board has acquired simultaneously with the signing of the said Agreement a legal right to receive Rs.821.21 crores from the developer and the developer was also simultaneously placed under a legal liability to pay the aforesaid amount to the assessee-Board. It is in pursuance of the right acquired by the assessee under the said Agreement to receive the agreed consideration and the corresponding liability of the developer to pay the same to the assessee-Board that the developer was obliged to pay the same on due date(s). If the liability to pay had not been created by the said Agreement, the developer would not have been obliged to pay/discharge the same later. In this connection, reference also deserves to be made to Article 5.2 of the Development Agreement. Article 5.2 of the Development Agreement specifically contains a recital, which reads thus: "Under no circumstances, except provided in this Agreement, the Bid price accepted shall be altered and this is the essence of this Agreement". Article 5.2.2 of the said Agreement stipulates payment of interest by the Developer in case of delay to pay any instalment of the bid price in addition to the Development Fee. The aforesaid recitals in the Agreement also confirm the fact that a legal right was vested in the assessee-Board to receive the agreed consideration upon the signing of the said Agreement.
34. True, the Developer was required to discharge the liability/debt, which stood created by the Agreement, as per agreed schedule of payment but the factum of actual receipt/payment is irrelevant in the accrual system of accounting which the assessee has admittedly followed. It is only in the cash system of accounting that the income and expenses are recognised according to real-time cash flow. In cash system of accounting, income is recorded upon receipt of funds, rather than based upon when it is actually earned, and expenses are recorded as they are paid, rather than as they are actually incurred. Therefore the factum of actual receipt of consideration is not of much relevance in the case before us as the assessee has followed accrual system of accounting. As stated earlier, a sale on credit, in the accrual system of accounting, is entered into the books when the invoice is generated rather than when the cash is collected while the same sale on credit, in the cash method of accounting, is recorded in the books when the sale proceeds are actually received. In the case before us, the benefit of staggered payment given to the Developer is, in substance, like extending credit facility to the Developer to discharge a liability/debt that stood created by the Agreement executed in the year under appeal. Therefore the fact that the entire consideration was not actually received in the year under appeal cannot defeat the accrual in the year under appeal as the Agreement had vested a legal right in the assessee to receive the agreed amount of consideration for granting development rights to the Developer and corresponding liability/debt on the Developer to pay/discharge the same.
35. In the case before us, the assessee has not offered the impugned sum either on accrual basis in the year under appeal or on receipt basis in the years of actual receipt. It has been held that it is not open to the ITO, if income has accrued to the assessee, and is liable to be included in the total income of a particular year, to ignore the accrual and thereafter to tax it as income of another year on the basis of receipt: Laxmipat Singhania v. Commissioner Of Income Tax, U.P. [1969] 72 ITR 291 (SC); ITO v. Bachu Lai Kapoor, Kewal Ram [1966] 60 ITR 74 (SC). Since the assessee has followed accrual system of accounting, the AO has rightly taxed the impugned sum in the year of accrual, i.e., the year under appeal, and not on the basis of receipt or in the years of actual receipt.
36. It was contended by the ld. counsel for the assessee that the agreed amount of consideration was not liable to be taxed in the year under appeal as the right to receive the agreed consideration was inchoate and subject to certain limitations. In support of the aforesaid submission, the ld. counsel has relied upon the judgment in Hindustan Housing & Land Development's case (supra). We have perused the aforesaid judgment. The facts in that case were that an award was made by the arbitrator on 29th July 1955, enhancing the amount of compensation payable to the assessee but the entire amount was in dispute in the appeal filed by the State Government. The dispute was regarded by the Court as real and substantial, because the assessee was not permitted to withdraw the sum of Rs. 7,36,691 deposited by the State Government on 25th April 1956, without furnishing a security bond for refunding the amount in the event of the appeal being allowed. There was no absolute right to receive the amount at that stage. If the appeal had been allowed in its entirety in that case, the right to payment of the enhanced compensation would have fallen altogether. It was in this fact-situation that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:
"Khan Bahadur Ahmed Alladin & Sons (supra) and Topandas Kundanmal (supra) were relied on by the Gujarat High Court in Addl. CIT v. New Jehangir Vakil Mills Co. Ltd. (1979) 10 CTR (Guj) 61: (1979) 117 ITR 849 (Guj): TC 22 R. 196 for reaffirming that it was on the final determination of the amount of compensation that the right to such income in the nature of compensation would arise or accrue and till then there was no liability in praesenti in respect of the additional amount of compensation claimed by the owner of the land. It is unnecessary to refer to all the cases cited before us. It is sufficient to point out that there is a clear distinction between cases such as the present one, where the right to receive payment is in dispute and it is not a question of merely quantifying the amount to be received, and cases where the right to receive payment is admitted and the quantification only of the amount payable is left to be determined in accordance with settled or accepted principles. We are of the opinion that the High Court is right in the view taken by it and, therefore, this appeal must be dismissed."
37. As evident from the aforesaid observations that it was a case where the right to receive compensation was in dispute and that dispute was perceived to be real and substantial. It was in this context that it was held that it was on the final determination of the amount of compensation that the right to such income in the nature of compensation would arise or accrue and till then there was no liability in praesenti in respect of the additional amount of compensation claimed by the owner of the land. In the case before us, there is no dispute either with regard to the liability of the Developer to pay the agreed amount of consideration or with regard to the quantification of the amount of consideration to be paid by the Developer to the assessee. The liability to receive had crystallized upon signing of the Agreement. Perusal of the assessment order shows that substantial part of consideration had already been paid by the time the assessment order was passed.
38. It was submitted by the ld. counsel that the right of the assessee to receive agreed consideration was inchoate and subject to certain limitations and therefore could not be said to have accrued in favour of the assessee. In this connection, he has referred to various "Conditions Precedent" enumerated in Article 3 of the Development Agreement and to Article 5.2.2 which stipulates that in case of delay on the part of the Developer to pay any instalment of the Bid Price, then, without prejudice to the assessee's rights of termination and reversion, the assessee may charge interest on such delayed payments. The aforesaid stipulations in the Development Agreement do not, in our view, make the right of the assessee to receive the amount of agreed consideration inchoate. They are in the nature of consequences that would follow in the event of breach of agreement. They do not therefore defeat the right of the assessee to receive consideration arising from the execution of the Agreement.
39. In support of appeal, the ld. counsel has also referred to the following observations made in Chandigarh Industrial & General Development Corpn. (supra):
"Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, it is undisputed that the assessee allots an industrial shed on leasehold basis in which premium is required to be paid over 10 years period and the rights are transferred in favour of the allottee/lessee on the payment of final instalment. Further, till the assessee received payment of annual instalment during the year, it is an inchoate right in favour of the assessee as in the event of failure on the part of the allottee/lessee, the managing director of the corporation has only right to resume but cannot enforce the payment of the balance amount. Still further, the Revenue since 1979 had been treating the accrual of profits on yearly basis on instalments due till the payment of last instalment was made and there is no justification for the Revenue in deviating from the said approach which is in conformity with law. Viewed from this, the approach of the Tribunal was correct and it had rightly held that even under mercantile system of accounting, the income would accrue on receipt of instalment on year to year basis and not on the allotment of land or industrial sheds."
40. In the aforesaid case, the assessee had allotted industrial sheds on leasehold basis in which premium was required to be paid over 10 years period and the rights were to be transferred in favour of the allottee/lessee on the payment of final instalment. The premium was required to be paid on the basis of allotment letters and not in consequence of conveyance of the property. It was in this fact-situation that the Hon'ble High Court held that income would accrue on receipt of instalment on year to year basis and not on the allotment of land or industrial sheds. The fact-situation in the case before us is altogether different. In the case before us, the property has been conveyed to the Developer against agreed amount of consideration. The right to receive the agreed amount of consideration has accrued to the assessee upon signing of the Lease Agreement and Development Agreement by which land was leased and development rights on the said land were granted to the Developer. Liability to pay has been acknowledged by the Developer and in pursuance thereof the amount of agreed consideration has been promised to be paid. In this view of the matter, the aforesaid judgment does not help the assessee before us.
41. It was also submitted by the ld. counsel for the assessee that the AO has found no infirmity in the accounts of the assessee-Board and that the only reason given by the AO for rejecting the books of account was that the funds relating to RGCTP project were not included by the assessee in its accounts without appreciating the fact that the assessee-Board was acting as nodal agency for the Chandigarh Administration in implementing the said project. He submitted that the rejection of the books of account by the assessee was incorrect on the facts of the case as also in law. We have considered the submissions made on behalf of the assessee in this regard. It is true that the Supreme Court has very often referred to accounting practice for ascertainment of profit made by an assessee or value of the assets of an assessee. But when the question is whether a particular receipt of money is taxable or not or whether certain deductions from that receipt are permissible in law or not, the question has to be decided according to the principles of law and not in accordance with accountancy practice. Accounting practice cannot override the provisions of the Income-tax Act: Tuticorin Alkali Chemicals & Fertilizers Ltd. v. CIT [1997] 227 ITR 172 / 93 Taxman 502 (SC). The AO has taxed the impugned income in conformity with law. Therefore the issue of rejection of books of account by the AO is not of much relevance on the facts of the case.
42. In view of the foregoing, the finding of the AO as upheld by the CIT(A) that the assessee-Board is not an agent of the Chandigarh Administration in respect of RGCTP project is confirmed. His further finding that the income arising from the commercial exploitation of land owned by the assessee did not get diverted at source by any over-riding title in favour of the Chandigarh Administration is also confirmed. His next finding that the amount of agreed consideration has accrued to the assessee upon signing of the Lease Agreement and Development Agreement in the year under appeal is also confirmed. Resultantly, Ground Nos. 2, 3 and 4 taken by the assessee are dismissed.
43. Ground No. 5 taken by the assessee reads as under:
"5. That the CIT(A) had fallen in error in upholding the additions of Rs. 704,29,365/- being bank interest that accrued on funds generated from RGCTP Habitat Project."
44. The ld. CIT(A) has dealt with the aforesaid issue in paras 32 and 33 of her Order as under:
"32. The issue involved in this ground is as to whether interest income of Rs. 9,01,57,799/- on FDR created from funds received from RGCTP Habitat Project and conversion of Industrial Plots to Commercial Plots belong to the Chandigarh Administration or the appellant. The appellant submitted that a sum of Rs. 7,04,29,365/- was bank interest that accrued on the funds generated from the RGCTP Habitat Project and balance Rs. 1,97,28,435/- was accrued on the funds that related to conversion fee on account of conversion of Industrial Plots to Commercial Plots.
33. Regarding the bank interest that accrued on the funds generated from RGCTP Habitat Project, the Appellant in its support submitted that these FDRs belonged to Chandigarh Administration and therefore, the income therein also belonged to Chandigarh Administration. I have already adjudicated the issue as to whether the income from RGCTP Habitat Project belonged to the Chandigarh Administration or to the Appellant in Ground No. 2. As per my findings and conclusions in Ground No. 2, I have held that the RGCTP Habitat Project belonged to the Appellant and it is the Appellant who sold the land to the developer and earned the income from the sale of land and other shared revenue and therefore, the funds generated from such transactions belonged to the Appellant and the Appellant did not act as an agent/Nodal Agency of Chandigarh Administration. In view of my findings and conclusions in Ground No. 2, the interest income on such funds is the income of the Appellant not the income of Chandigarh Administration."
45. We have heard both the parties. The assessee has not credited the impugned interest income on FDRs taken out of funds lying in the RGCTP project a/c on the plea that the assessee was a mere agent of the Chandigarh Administration in so far as the RGCTP Project was concerned and hence both the interest income as well as the principal amount on which the impugned interest was received belonged to the Chandigarh Administration. We have confirmed the finding of the CIT(A) that the assessee was not an agent of the Chandigarh Administration. In this view of the matter, the order of the CIT(A) with regard to taxability of the impugned interest is also confirmed. Ground No.5 is dismissed.
46. Ground No.6 taken by the assessee reads as under:
"6. That the CIT Appeals had fallen in error in disallowing the sum of Rs. 645,33,684/-being bank interest on overdrafts obtained against FDRs for earning high rate of interest."
47. The ld. CIT(A) has dealt with the aforesaid issue in paras 38 and 39 of her Order as under:
"38. The issue involved is that the AO disallowed a sum of Rs. 6,45,33,684/- being bank interest on overdraft obtained against FDR and taken to the balance sheet under the head work-in-progress. The Appellant submitted that the original FDRs were made at 6% interest. During the year under consideration, the rate of interest of FDRs increased from 10% to 11%. The Appellant availed overdraft against the old FDRs @ 1% above FDR rates i.e. around 7% and invested the funds so raised in the fresh FDRs bearing higher rate of interest of 10 % -11 %. The Appellant submitted that it acted as a prudent person and the excess interest so earned had been offered for tax. On the other hand the AO made an observation that the Appellant did not provide the balance statement, cash flow statement, Bank Certificate, and other relevant documents in its support. The AO further made a finding that initially the Appellant had taken a plea that overdraft against FDRs was raised for utilization on various ongoing projects of the Appellant, but later changed its stand that the overdraft against the old FDRs was utilized to make fresh FDRs for earning higher rate of interest. However, the AO made a finding that the Appellant did not file any document in its support and further that the work in progress of the Appellant had increased from Rs. 76,79,01,913/- to Rs. 1,06,96,32,995/-during the year. Due to increase, the Appellant had created additional work in progress amounting to Rs. 30.17 Crores.
39. I do not find any merit in the contentions of the Appellant in the absence of any evidence or material on record. It is a fact that during the year additional work in progress amounting to Rs. 30.17 Crores was created and there would be corresponding inflow of funds to fund this additional work in progress. In view of the above this ground of Appeal is dismissed."
48. We have heard both the parties. The case of the assessee as initially made out before the Departmental authorities was that the amounts taken from the overdraft a/c were utilized to fund the on-going projects. The said stand was later changed by the assessee and it was submitted original FDRs carried interest @ 6% while the rate of interest had gone up to 10-11% in the year under appeal. In order to maximize the interest income, the assessee claimed to have taken overdraft against the old FDRs with the result that it had to pay interest which was 1% higher than the rate of interest carried by the old FDRs. According to the assessee, the overdraft so taken was utilized for investment in the new FDRs which carried higher rate of interest. The assessee claimed before the Departmental authorities that it had acted wisely and decided to pay interest on overdraft in order to invest the same in the new FDRs carrying higher rate of interest. According to the assessee, it has offered the excess interest so earned to tax.
49. Perusal of para 28.9 of the assessment order shows that the assessee had first submitted before the AO that the funds overdrawn were utilized for funding various works. The assessee changed its stand later and submitted that the funds overdrawn were utilized for investments in new FDRs. Perusal of para 38 of the appellate order passed by the CIT(A) shows that neither relevant details in support of the claim were provided by the assessee to the AO nor did it substantiate its claim before him. Both the AO and the CIT(A) have recorded a finding of fact that additional work-in-progress undertaken by the assessee in the year under appeal would have required corresponding inflow of funds meaning thereby that the amounts drawn from the overdraft account were utilized for meeting the expenses on additional work-in-progress. It is not that the AO has disallowed interest payments. He has carried the same to the work-in-progress a/c as per the regular method of accounting followed by the assessee. In this view of the matter, the order passed by the CIT(A) in this behalf is confirmed. Ground No.6 is dismissed.
50. In view of the foregoing, the appeal filed by the assessee is dismissed.
ITA No. 1198/CHD/2010 - Department's Appeal
51. Ground No.1 taken by the Department reads as under:
"1.That on the facts and circumstances of the case and in law, ld. CIT(A) has erred in deleting the addition of Rs. 1,97,28,435/- which was made by the assessing officer on account of accrued interest on the funds relating to conversion fee.
52. The Assessing Officer has dealt with the issue in paras 27.36 to 27.40 in his assessment order according to which the interest amounting to Rs. 1,97,28,435/- accrued to the assessee on fixed deposit receipts taken out of amount received by the assessee on conversion of industrial plots to commercial plots in Industrial Area, Chandigarh. It was submitted by the assessee before the AO that the FDRs as well as interest thereon belong to Chandigarh Administration and therefore it has not been offered to tax. The Assessing Officer however did not accept the explanation of the assessee in this behalf and consequently taxed the said sum in the hands of the assessee.
53. On appeal, the CIT(A) has accepted the explanation of the assessee that it was acting as an agent of the Chandigarh Administration as it received conversion fee on conversion of industrial plots into commercial plots as per directions of the Chandigarh Administration. As evident from para 24 of the appellate order passed by the CIT(A), the assessee seems to have filed a letter dated 29th October 2009 giving details of FDRs relating to conversion of industrial plots into commercial plots as per which FDRs for a sum of Rs. 54,68,48,520/- were taken by the assessee. The aforesaid letter was perceived by the ld. CIT(A) as a document supporting the claim of the assessee that it acted as agent of the Chandigarh Administration. According to her, the Principal-Agent relationship between the Chandigarh Administration and the assessee has not been as clearly, forcefully and conclusively demolished by the AO as it has been done in the case of RGCTP Project. She therefore held that the FDRs as well as interest thereon belong to Chandigarh Administration and not to the assessee. Consequently, she deleted the impugned addition.
54. Aggrieved by the order passed by the CIT(A) the Department is now in appeal before this Tribunal. In support of appeal, it was submitted that there was no evidence on record to hold that the assessee was acting as an agent of the Chandigarh Administration while carrying out the conversion of industrial plots into commercial plots and therefore the order passed by the CIT(A) holding that the impugned interest belongs to the Chandigarh Administration should be vacated.
55. In reply, the ld. counsel for the assessee supported the order passed by the CIT(A).
56. We have heard both the parties and considered their submissions. Perusal of para 34 of the appellate order passed by the CIT(A) shows that a letter dated 29th October 2009 was filed by the assessee before her in which details of FDRs relating to conversion of industrial plots into commercial plots were given as per which FDRs for a sum of Rs. 54,68,48,520/- were taken by the assessee. The aforesaid letter was perceived by the CIT(A) as supporting the claim of the assessee that it was an agent of the Chandigarh Administration in this behalf. Mere furnishing of details of FDRs or interest thereon is not, in our view, sufficient to establish principal-agent relationship. The ld. CIT(A) has not referred to any document to support her finding except the letter referred to above. According to her, the AO has not demolished the claim of the assessee that it was acting as agent of the Chandigarh Administration. It was the assessee who was claiming to be an agent of the Chandigarh Administration and therefore the burden lay on it to prove it. There is no reference to any such evidence in the entire order of the CIT(A). Principal-agent relationship cannot be accepted unless relevant evidence is brought on record to establish such a relationship. Mere assertion that the assessee was acting as agent of the Chandigarh Administration is not sufficient. In this view of the matter, the order passed by the CIT(A) in this behalf is set aside and the matter is restored to him for a fresh decision in the matter in conformity with law after giving reasonable opportunity of hearing to both the parties. Ground No.1 is treated as allowed with the aforesaid observations.
57. Ground Nos.2 and 3 taken by the Department read as under:
"2. That on the facts and circumstances of the case and in law, Ld. CIT(A) has erred in deleting the addition of Ld. CIT(A) has erred in deleting the addition of Rs. 9,30,632/-which was made by the assessing officer on account of different on account of stock of house and booths which was pointed out by the auditors.
3. That on the facts and circumstances of the case and in law, ld. CIT(A) has erred in deleting the addition of Rs. 71,636/-which was made by the assessing officer relying upon the auditors report on account of short fall in the account of closing stock of material in hand."
58. The CIT(A) has dealt with the issues under appeal in paras 40 and 41 of the appellate order as under:-
"40. There are two issues involved in this ground. One relates to addition of Rs. 9,30,632/- on account of difference in the account of stock of houses and booths. The AO relied upon the auditor's report dated 30.10.2007 which is part of the assessment record where the auditor pointed out that a difference of Rs. 9,30,632/- in the account of stock of houses and booths need to be reconciled with the records of the colony branch. The AO further made a finding that the auditors have physically verified the difference in the stock and pointed out in the audit report. On the other hand, the Appellant submitted that the difference was due to the fact that closing stock value of stock of booths and houses was taken at Rs. 6,96,30,390/- on 31.3.2007 while the same was Rs. 6,86,99,758/- as intimated by the concerned section and there were further sale of houses to slum dwellers of colonies amounting to Rs. 74,30,005/- since 01.04.2006. Despite sale of houses of Rs. 74,30,005/- which were sold at no profit no loss, the closing stock as on 31.3.2006, was carried to the next financial year at Rs. 6,96,30,390/- which is on a higher side despite the sale of houses since last year. As per the Appellant since the closing stock has already been shown on a higher side by Rs. 74,30,005/- as no profit is charged on sale of houses, the difference of Rs. 9,30,632/- as pinpointed by the AO already got merged with the closing value as on 31.3.2007 and therefore, there should not be any further addition on this account as the difference of Rs. 9,30,632/- has already been offered for taxation as part of the higher value of the closing stock by Rs. 74,30,005/-. I am convinced with the submissions of the Appellant and therefore, addition made by the AO amounting to Rs. 9,30,632/- is deleted.
41. The other issue involved is regarding an addition of Rs. 71,636/- on account of short fall in the account of closing stock of material in hand when compared with the physical balance report of the engineering wing of the Appellant as per audit report dated 30.10.2007. The AO did not give any findings and any cogent reasons on this. On the other hand the Appellant submitted that the closing stock of material was Rs. 59,84,134/- as compared to the physical verification of Rs. 60,55,370/-. The Appellant further submitted that the Auditor got an entry of Rs. 71,636/- made in the books to rectify the same through a voucher by debiting the stock and crediting the material consumption and accordingly showed the closing stock at Rs. 60,55,370/- in the balance sheet. As a shortfall of Rs. 71,636/- which represented difference on account of revision of the issue rates of the material, had already been added in the closing stock and accordingly in the balance sheet: as on 31.3.2007 before giving the audit report by the statutory auditor, therefore, the addition of Rs. 71,636/- on this account will tantamount to addition being made twice. I find merit in the submissions of the appellant and, therefore, the addition of Rs. 71,636/- made by the AO is hereby deleted.
59. We have heard both the parties and carefully perused the materials on record. The ld. CIT(A) has given cogent reasons for deleting the impugned additions. We are in agreement with them and therefore confirm the order passed by her in this behalf. Ground Nos. 2 and 3 are dismissed.
60. Ground Nos. 4 and 5 taken by the Department are general in nature and therefore do not require any adjudication.
61. Appeal filed by the Department is partly allowed.