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Equivalent Citations
citation codes
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  • section 11(3) of assessment year 1984-85 1,98,756 9,56,617 Less : Expenses 1,54,127 7,99,490
  • clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1)
  • section 11(2) 1,07,624 Total
  • section 11(2) of the IT Act.
  • section 11(3) of IT Act
  • sub-section (5), or(c)
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • section 11(3) of assessment year 1984-85 1,98,756 9,56,617 Less : Expenses 1,54,127 7,99,490
  • clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1)
  • section 11(2) 1,07,624 Total
  • section 11(2) of the IT Act.
  • section 11(3) of IT Act
  • sub-section (5), or(c)
Smart Summary

Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion (Per D. Manmohan, Judicial Member)

Factual and Procedural Background

The assessee is a trust established to carry on charitable activities. In assessment year (AY) 1983‑84 the trust was permitted to accumulate Rs. 1,98,756 under section 11(2) of the Income‑tax Act, subject to utilisation for specified charitable purposes within ten years from the date of accumulation.

For AY 1993‑94 the accumulated amount of Rs. 1,98,756 (from AY 1983‑84) remained unutilised by the relevant previous year. The Assessing Officer (AO) consequently treated that unutilised amount as deemed income under section 11(3) and brought it to tax. The assessee contended that the deemed income should be included as income of the relevant previous year and that the assessee should be allowed the 25% deduction and further accumulation under section 11 (including making a fresh accumulation under section 11(2)(a)). The AO rejected this claim, assessing a total income of Rs. 1,98,756 and allowing accumulation under section 11(1)(a) only to the extent of Rs. 1,08,740.

The assessee appealed to the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) [CIT(A)], who confirmed the AO's order. The assessee then filed the present appeal before the Tribunal (per D. Manmohan, Judicial Member).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether income deemed as income of the previous year under section 11(3) (because amounts accumulated under section 11(2) were not utilised within the permitted period) can be treated as the assessee's income of that previous year for purposes of allowing (a) the 25% accumulation deduction under section 11(1)(a) and (b) fresh accumulation under section 11(2)(a).
  2. Whether a legal fiction embodied in section 11(3) must be carried to its logical conclusion so as to permit the deemed income to be treated exactly like real income for the limited purpose of accumulation and deduction under section 11.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Assessee's) Arguments

  • Counsel for the assessee (Shri Irani) argued that the amount deemed to be income under section 11(3) in the year it becomes deemed income should be treated as the assessee's income of that year.
  • On that basis, the assessee should be permitted to claim the 25% deduction and to accumulate under section 11(2)/(1)(a) in that year, i.e., the legal fiction of deeming should be carried to its logical conclusion so as to allow the reliefs available under section 11.
  • The assessee relied primarily on the Calcutta High Court decision in Commissioner of Income‑Tax v. Natwarlal Chowdhury Charity Trust [1991] 189 ITR 656 (Cal.), and on authorities concerning the doctrine that a legal fiction should be carried to its logical conclusion (including Caltex Oil Refining (India) v. CIT [1993] 202 ITR 375 (Bom.), CIT v. Surat Cotton Spg. & Wvg. Mills (P) Ltd. [1993] 202 ITR 932 (Bom.), and A.S. Glittre D/5 I/S Garonne v. CIT [1997] 225 ITR 739 (SC)).
  • The assessee placed before the Tribunal a detailed computation showing how adding the deemed amount to the declared income, then deducting expenses and 25% and allowing for object expenditure and accumulation, would result in nil total income.

Respondent's (Department / CIT(A)) Arguments

  • The Departmental Representative supported the orders of the AO and CIT(A) and relied upon CBDT Circular No. 29 dated 23rd August 1969, which expressed the view that benefits of accumulation (including the 25% concession) are not available in respect of income brought to tax under section 11(3).
  • The CIT(A) held that income deemed under section 11(3) is a separate source distinct from the income derived from property contemplated in section 11(1)(a)/(b), and therefore accumulation under section 11(2) or the 25% deduction cannot be allowed from that deemed income; he upheld the AO's assessment on that basis.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Commissioner Of Income‑Tax v. Natwarlal Chowdhury Charity Trust [1991] 189 ITR 656 (Cal.) Held (per the assessee) that a legal fiction in section 11(3) should be carried to its logical conclusion so that deemed income can be treated as income of the year for section 11 purposes. The Tribunal disagreed with the Calcutta High Court's view in this case, stating the court did not analyse the statutory language distinction between “income derived from property” and “income of such person” correctly for section 11 purposes.
Caltex Oil Refining (India) v. CIT [1993] 202 ITR 375 (Bom.) Authority cited for the general proposition that a legal fiction should be carried to its logical conclusion. The Tribunal acknowledged the general proposition but held it could not be extended so as to frustrate the object and plain meaning of section 11; it declined to apply it to permit accumulation of deemed income under section 11(3).
CIT v. Surat Cotton Spg. and Wvg. Mills (P) Ltd. [1993] 202 ITR 932 (Bom.) Also cited in support of the view that legal fictions are to be carried to their logical conclusions. The Tribunal accepted the general maxim but rejected the submission that it required treating deemed income under section 11(3) as eligible for section 11 benefits.
A.S. Glittre D/5 I/S Garonne v. CIT [1997] 225 ITR 739 (SC) Authority on the limits of applying legal fictions and on carrying a fiction to its logical conclusion (as relied upon by the assessee). The Tribunal agreed with the legal principle generally but emphasized that a fiction cannot be extended so as to defeat the object of a particular statutory provision (section 11).
Director Of Income‑Tax (Exmp.) v. Girdharilal Shewnarain Tantia Trust [1993] 199 ITR 215 (Cal.) Established that the 'income' contemplated by section 11 is real income actually received by the assessee and not merely income assessed or assessable. The Tribunal relied on this decision to support the proposition that deemed income (which may not be in the assessee's possession) cannot be treated as real income available for accumulation under section 11.
CIT v. Jayshree Charity Trust [1986] 159 ITR 280 (Cal.) Held that deeming provisions cannot make income which is not available to the assessee capable of being spent or accumulated for charitable purposes. The Tribunal cited this decision as authority for the proposition that deemed income cannot be treated as income available for application/accumulation under section 11.
CIT v. Rao Bahadur Calavala Cunnan Chelty Charities [1982] 135 ITR 485 (Mad.) Observed that 'income' in section 11(1)(a) means income available in the hands of the assessee; accumulation is possible only from income actually available. The Tribunal referenced this decision to reinforce its conclusion that deemed income under section 11(3) is not the kind of income from which the 25% accumulation concession can be claimed.
CIT v. Thane Electric Supply Co. [1994] 206 ITR 727 (Bom.) Decision of the Bombay High Court relied upon by the Tribunal to support the view that deemed income brought to tax under section 11(3) is not eligible for accumulation benefits under section 11. The Tribunal relied on this Bombay High Court decision (among others) to hold that the assessee is not entitled to the benefit of accumulation of deemed income under s.11(3).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Tribunal's analysis proceeds from a close textual reading of section 11 and related provisions (section 12 and Explanation (1) to section 11(1)). Its reasoning, in sequential points, is as follows:

  1. Statutory language: The Tribunal emphasized that the exemptions and privileges in section 11 are repeatedly framed in terms of "income derived from property" (section 11(1)(a), (b), (c)) and that where the legislature intended to include other categories (for example, voluntary contributions) it did so expressly (section 11(1)(d) and section 12 and the Explanation to section 11(1)).
  2. Scope of section 11(2): Section 11(2) expressly deals with the "income referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) of sub‑section (1)" read with the Explanation—that is, income derived from property (including voluntary contributions deemed to be income derived from property under section 12/Explanation).
  3. Different expressions in the statute: Section 11(3) uses the phrase "shall be deemed to be the income of such person of the previous year", differing from the "income derived from property" language used where the accumulation and 25% concession are expressly permitted. That choice of words indicates that the income deemed under section 11(3) is not to be assimilated into the category of "income derived from property" for the limited purpose of section 11(1)/(2) benefits unless the statute so provides.
  4. Real availability principle: The Tribunal adopted and relied on precedents that interpret "income" in section 11 to mean real income actually available in the hands of the trust. It reasoned that accumulation and application under section 11 presuppose that the amount is in the possession of the trust and genuinely available for application or accumulation; a deemed income that has already been applied for non‑charitable purposes may not be available for future application or accumulation.
  5. Limits of legal fictions: While agreeing with the general legal principle that a legal fiction is to be carried to its logical conclusion, the Tribunal held that such a fiction cannot be stretched to an extent that frustrates the object or plain meaning of the specific provision being construed (section 11). Applying the fiction to treat section 11(3) deemed income as income derived from property for accumulation purposes would produce anomalous and unintended results.
  6. Support from administrative view: The Tribunal noted that CBDT Circular No. 29 (dated 23‑8‑1969) takes the view that accumulation benefits are not available for income brought to tax under section 11(3); the Tribunal found this position consonant with the legislative intent and the statutory language.
  7. Consequent conclusion: On these textual and purposive grounds, and in light of supporting judicial authorities identifying "income" for section 11 as real/available income, the Tribunal concluded that deemed income under section 11(3) cannot be treated as the kind of income from which the 25% concession or accumulation under section 11(2) can be claimed.

Holding and Implications

Holding: THE APPEAL IS DISMISSED.

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • The Tribunal upheld the Assessing Officer's assessment that the unutilised accumulated amount of Rs. 1,98,756 (from AY 1983‑84) is taxable as deemed income under section 11(3) for the relevant assessment year (1993‑94).
  • The Tribunal held that the assessee is not entitled to claim the 25% accumulation deduction or to treat the deemed income as income from which further accumulation under section 11(2) or section 11(1)(a) may be made.
  • The orders of the AO and the CIT(A) were affirmed; the assessee's computation claiming nil total income by treating the deemed income as eligible for 25% accumulation was rejected.

Broader implications: The Tribunal's decision rests on a textual and purposive construction of section 11 and on authorities emphasizing that "income" for section 11 purposes is real income available to the trust. The Tribunal refused to extend the legal fiction in section 11(3) so as to allow accumulation and deduction benefits, thereby aligning with the CBDT Circular and certain High Court decisions cited. The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel statutory principle beyond its textual application in this case.

This summary is confined strictly to the materials and statements contained in the provided opinion.

    The Trustees, The B.N. Gamadia Parsi Hunnarshala v. Assistant Director of Income-tax (Exemption)

    Per D. Manmohan, Judicial Member. —This appeal filed by the assessee-trust is directed against the order of the CIT(A)‑XVIII, Bombay.

    2. The facts of the case in short are that the assessee is a trust established with the main intention of carrying on charitable activities. In the assessment year 1983-84, the assessee was allowed to accumulate an amount of Rs. 1,98,756 under section 11(2) of the IT Act. In order to avail the benefit under section 11 of the IT Act, assessee has to utilise accumulated amount for the specified purposes within 10 years from the date of accumulation.

    3. We are concerned with the assessment year 1993-94. The amount which was allowed to be accumulated in the assessment year 1983-84 was not utilised till the previous year relevant to the assessment year 1993-94. While completing assessment for the assessment year 1993-94 the Assessing Officer observed that the aforementioned unutilised amount is taxable under section 11(3) of the Act as deemed income of the assessee. There is no grievance about the applicability of deeming provision section 11(3) of the Act, in the instant case. However, the assessee claimed that such deemed income should be included as the income earned by the assessee in the relevant previous year and on such total income assessee should be allowed to accumulate under section (2) of the Act in addition to deduction of 25 per cent of the unutilised amount. This claim was not accepted by the Assessing Officer. He, therefore, completed the assessment on a total income of Rs. 1,98,756. It may be noted that he allowed accumulation under section 11(1)(a) of the Act to the extent of Rs. 1,08,740 only which is arrived as under :

    4. Aggrieved assessee, challenged the order of Assessing Officer before of the CIT(A). The CIT(A) confirmed the action of the Assessing Officer. The operative portion of his order reads as under:

    CIT(A)’s order

    "3. I have considered the facts and I find that the income which is derived from property held under the trust is considered under section 11 for the expenses on charitable and other specific purposes. Similarly the 25 per cent deduction is only allowed from such income. The accumulation is also allowed from such income. The accumulation is also allowed for the remaining income which had the above source.

    3.1. In the present case the deeming income under section 11(3) of IT Act which is not applied for charitable or religious purposes within the time allowed shall be deemed to be the income of such person of the previous year. It is a deeming income and is a separate source than acquired under section 11 of IT Act. I therefore, agree with the Assessing Officer that the accumulation under section 11(2) or the deduction of 25 per cent cannot be allowed from the deeming income. It has to be assessed separately and the order of the Assessing Officer is upheld."

    5. Further aggrieved, assessee is in appeal before us. Learned counsel Shri Irani submitted before us that the amount accumulated under section 11 of the IT Act would be deemed to be the income of the assessee in the year in which the amount was applied to for the purposes other than charitable or religious purposes or which was not utilised within the period for which the accumulation was allowed. He submitted that in the instant case the assessee could not utilise the accumulated amount within the period of 10 years and thus the Assessing Officer treated the accumulated amount as the deemed income of the assessee under section 11(3) of the Act. He contended that a deeming provision has to be carried to its logical conclusion in which event the deemed income should be treated as the income of the assessee of this year in which event the assessee should be allowed to accumulate 25 per cent of the total income in addition to the right to seek permission for further accumulation under section 11(2)(a) of the Act. In this regard, he heavily relied upon the decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. Natwarlal Chowdhury Charity Trust. [1991] 189 ITR 656 (Cal.). He also relied upon the following decisions in support of his contention i.e., a legal fiction has to be carried to its logical conclusion and it would be proper and necessary to assume all those facts on which alone the fiction can operate :

    (i) Caltex Oil Refining (India) v. CIT [1993] 202 ITR 375 (Bom.);

    (ii) CIT v. Surat Cotton Spg. and Wvg. Mills (P) Ltd. (Bom.) [1993] 202 ITR 932 (Bom.), at 940; and

    (iii) A.S. Glittre D/5 I/S Garonne v. CIT [1997] 225 ITR 739 (SC)

    On the strength of the aforesaid judgments, learned counsel submitted that the income as computed by the assessee deserves to be accepted. The mode of assessee’s computation is extracted here for immediate reference :

    Income from other sources as declared : 7,54,861
    Add : Amount deemed as income under section 11(3) of assessment year 1984-85 1,98,756
      9,56,617
    Less : Expenses 1,54,127
      7,99,490
    Less : 25 per cent of 799,490 **1,99,872
      5,99,618
    Less : Expenditure on object of the trust 4,91,994
      1,07,625
    Less: Accumulation under section 11(2) 1,07,624
    Total income NIL
    **Claim under dispute  

    6. On the other hand, learned, Departmental Representative relied upon the orders of the tax authorities and also Circular No. 29, dated 23rd Aug. 1969, issued by the CBDT wherein the Board expressed the opinion that the assessee would not be entitled to the benefits of accumulation of 25 per cent of income which is brought to tax under section 11(3) of the Act.

    7. We have carefully considered the rival submissions and perused the record. We are unable to persuade ourselves to agree with the view taken by the Hon’ble Calcutta High Court (cited supra). A careful perusal of the language employed in section 11 of the Act makes it crystal clear that exemption is available only on the ‘income (within the meaning of section 11 and not on the ‘deemed income’). Consequently, the assessee cannot accumulate deemed income either under section 11(1)(a) or 11(2) of the Act. Section. 11(1)(a) reads as under :

    "Sec. 11(1): Subject to the provision of sections 60 to 63, the following income shall not be included in the total income of the previous year of the person in receipt of the income :

    (a) income derived from property held under trust wholly for charitable or religious purposes, to the extent to which such income is applied to such purposes in India; and, where any such income is accumulated or set apart for application to such purposes in India, to the extent to which the income so accumulated or set apart is not in excess of twenty-five per cent of the income from such property."

    [underlining, italicised in print, is ours]

    Sec. 11(1)(d) speaks of income in the form of voluntary contributions.

    Explanation (1) to section 11 reads as under :

    "For the purposes of clause (a) and (b)

    (1) in computing the twenty-five per cent of the income which may be accumulated or set apart, any such voluntary contributions as are referred to in section 12 shall be deemed to be part of the income."

    Section 12 in turn says that any voluntary contributions received by a trust shall for the purposes of section 11 be deemed to be income derived from property. Again section 11(2) speaks of the ‘income referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) r/w the Explanation to that sub-section’. Thus, section 11(2) also deals with the income derived from property held under trust. Sub-clause of 11(2) permits the assessee to accumulate some amount up to a period not exceeding 10 years. Section 11(3) of the Act deals with the consequences if the amount accumulated is not utilised for the specified purposes.

    Section 11(3) is extracted here for immediate reference

    "Section 11(3): Any income referred to in sub-section (2) which—

    (a) is applied to purposes other than charitable or religious purposes as aforesaid or ceases to be accumulated or set apart for application thereto, or

    (b) ceases to remain invested or deposited in any of the forms or modes specified in sub-section (5), or

    (c) is not utilised for the purposes for which it is so accumulated or set apart during the period referred to in clause (a) of that sub-section or in the year immediately following the expiry thereof,

    shall be deemed to be the income of such person of the previous year in which it is so applied or ceases to be so accumulated or set apart or ceases to remain so invested or deposited or, as the case may be, of the previous year immediately following the expiry of the period aforesaid."

    [underline, italicised in print, is ours]

    8. It may be noted that wherever the legislature intended to confer any benefit to the assessee under section 11 of the Act, the benefit was restricted to the ‘income derived from property’ as could be seen from section 11(1)(a), (b) and (c ) of the Act. Section 11(1)(d) uses the expression ‘income’ in the form of voluntary contributions. However, specific exemption was granted if such income is received with a specific direction that they shall form part of the corpus of the trust. In other words, voluntary contributions for the purposes of incurring day-to-day expenditure of the trust would not fall under sub-clause (d). Section 12 of the Act governs such voluntary contributions wherein it was stated that such contributions would be deemed to be income derived from property held under trust. Thus, income from voluntary contributions are deemed as income specified under section 11(1)(a), (b) and (c ) of the Act. The intention of the legislature, as could be seen from a reading of section 11 of the Act, is to allow a charitable trust to accumulate a portion of income derived from property and not other incomes. However, by virtue of section 12, voluntary contributions are deemed to be income from property and, therefore, Explanation (1) was added to section 11(1) of the Act which specified that in computing twenty-five per cent of the income which may be accumulated, voluntary contributions should be taken into account as they are deemed to be part of the income. Thus, it can be seen that wherever the legislature intended to include deemed income as part of the income ‘derived from property’ it was spelt out clearly. However, section 11(3) of the Act uses the expression ‘income of such person’ in contradistinction to the words ‘income derived from property’ used in other sub-sections of section 11. Thus, it cannot be said that deemed income under section 11(3) of the Act should be taken as part the income derived from property for the purposes of allowing the benefit of accumulation.

    9. The matter may also be looked from another angle. The assessee would be allowed to accumulate income if there is real income. Something which is not in the possession of the assessee cannot be accumulated or utilised at a later date. Under section 11(3) the sum which is applied to the purposes other than the charitable or religious purposes would also be treated as deemed income of the assessee though the accumulated income is not available with the assessee because it was applied for a different purpose. Reversing to section 11(1)(a) and 11(2) of the Act, 25 per cent of the income can be accumulated or set apart for an application to some specified purposes in India which means such amount should be available with the assessee for application. In the case of deemed income where the amount is already spent by an assessee (for the purposes other than charitable purposes) it cannot be said that the assessee accumulates with an intention to apply it for a rightful purpose. Thus, even on the limited count the assessee cannot claim the benefit of accumulation because the accumulation is allowed only if the intention of the assessee is to apply the same for a specific purpose. Thus, assessee cannot claim the benefit of accumulation with respect to the deemed income. In the case of Director Of Income-Tax (Exmp.) v. Girdharilal Shewnarain Tantia Trust [1993] 199 ITR 215 (Cal.), the Hon’ble High Court of Calcutta analysed the meaning of the word ‘income’ used in section 11 of the Act. The Hon.’ble Calcutta High Court observed that the ‘income’ contemplated by the provisions of section 11 is the real income and not income as assessed or assessable. They have also followed the earlier decision of the same High Court in the case of CIT v. Jayshree Charity Trust [1986] 159 ITR 280 (Cal.) wherein the Hon’ble Court observed that what is deemed to be income can neither be spent nor accumulated for charitable purposes and the word ‘application’ or accumulation’ can only be of real income which has actually been received by assessee. Their Lordships further observed that the deeming provisions should not be construed in a way to frustrate the object of section 11, the objects of section 11 being application of income received by it for charitable purposes.

    10. The Hon’ble Calcutta High Court has also referred to the decision of Hon’ble Madras High Court in the case of CIT v. Rao Bahadur Calavala Cunnan Chelty Charities [1982] 135 ITR 485 (Mad.) and agreed with the view expressed by the Hon’ble Madras High Court: It may be noted that the Hon’ble Madras High Court observed that in the context of section 11(1)(a) of the Act "income" means the income which is available in the hands of the assessee because accumulation of 25 per cent is possible only from the income available with the assessee and not the deemed income. It could thus be seen that deemed income under section 11(3) of the Act is different from the income contemplated under section 11(1)(a) and 11(2) of the Act and, therefore, the assessee is not entitled to claim the benefit of accumulation out of such deemed income.

    11. In the case of CIT v. Natwarlal Chowdhury ( cited supra), the Hon’ble High Court, with due respect, has not analysed this section in the correct perspective. In our humble opinion the different expressions i.e., ‘income derived from property’ and ‘income’, used by the legislation under sections 11 and 12 of the Act missed the attention of their Lordships or the impact of the difference in the expressions were not brought to their Lordships notice. In fact, a different view was expressed by the Hon’ble Calcutta High Court in [1993] 199 ITR 215 (Cal.) (supra) in a later decision. Under these circumstances, and in the light of the decision of the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case of CIT v. Thane Elec. Supply Co. [1994] 206 ITR 727 (Bom.) at 738 we hold that the assessee is not entitled to the benefit of accumulation of deemed income which is taxable under section 11(3) of the Act.

    12. The assessee relied upon certain decisions in support of its contention that a legal fiction has to be carried to its logical conclusion. We fully agree with this proposition that a legal fiction no doubt has to be carried to its logical conclusion but at the same time it cannot be stretched to an extent that frustrates the object of the particular provision. In the instant case, we have highlighted one possibility where an assessee might have applied the income for the purposes other than charitable purposes and thus there is no money available with the assessee in which event it cannot be said that the assessee can accumulate deemed income for some specified purposes. Such an interpretation would lead to anomalous situation which is not contemplated under section 11(1)(a) and 11(2) of the Act because an assessee is entitled to exemption only on such income which is either applied for charitable purposes or intended to be applied for charitable purposes and not otherwise.

    13. The circular issued by the CBDT (supra) is in consonance with the intention of the legislature and also the plain meaning that can be ascribed to section 11 of the Act. Under these circumstances, we do not find any infirmity in the orders of tax authorities. We, therefore, dismiss the appeal filed by the assessee.

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    Comments

    The Trustees, The B.N. Gamadia Parsi Hunnarshala v. Assistant Director of Income-tax (Exemption)
    (Apr 12, 2001)