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  • provisions of sub-section (2) of section 32 or sub-section (3) of section 32A or clause (ii) of sub-section (1) of section 72 or section 73 or section 74 or sub-section (3) of section 74A or sub-section (3) of section 80J.115J. (1)
  • provisions of sub-section (2) of section 32 or sub-section (3) of section 32A or clause (ii) of sub-section (1) of section 72 or section 74 or sub-section (3) of section 74A.(4)
  • SECTION 3 SICK INDUSTRIAL COMPANIES SPECIAL PROVISIONS ACT 1985
  • SECTION 17 SICK INDUSTRIAL COMPANIES SPECIAL PROVISIONS ACT 1985
  • sub-section (3) or sub-section (3A) of section 80HHC or sub-section (3) of section 80HHD,
  • provisions of Parts II and III of Schedule VI to the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956)
  • provisions of Parts II and III of Schedule VI to the Companies Act, 1956 (1
  • clause (a), (b) or (c ) of sub-section (3) or sub-section (3A) of section 80HHC.
  • SECTION 205 A COMPANIES ACT 1956
  • SECTION 210 COMPANIES ACT 1956
  • clause (a), (b) or (c ) of sub-section (3) or sub-section (3A),
  • sub-section (3) or sub-section (3A) of section 80HHC
  • sub-section (4) and sub-section (5) of section 80-IB,
  • sub-section (4) or sub-section (5) of section 80-IB;
  • provisions of sub-section (3) of section 80HHC
  • ARTICLE 136 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • SECTION 263 INCOME TAX ACT 1961
  • (c) of sub-section (3) of section 80HHC
  • sub-section (4) of section 80-IA
  • COMPANIES ACT 1956
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
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Acts
  • provisions of sub-section (2) of section 32 or sub-section (3) of section 32A or clause (ii) of sub-section (1) of section 72 or section 73 or section 74 or sub-section (3) of section 74A or sub-section (3) of section 80J.115J. (1)
  • provisions of sub-section (2) of section 32 or sub-section (3) of section 32A or clause (ii) of sub-section (1) of section 72 or section 74 or sub-section (3) of section 74A.(4)
  • SECTION 3 SICK INDUSTRIAL COMPANIES SPECIAL PROVISIONS ACT 1985
  • SECTION 17 SICK INDUSTRIAL COMPANIES SPECIAL PROVISIONS ACT 1985
  • sub-section (3) or sub-section (3A) of section 80HHC or sub-section (3) of section 80HHD,
  • provisions of Parts II and III of Schedule VI to the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956)
  • provisions of Parts II and III of Schedule VI to the Companies Act, 1956 (1
  • clause (a), (b) or (c ) of sub-section (3) or sub-section (3A) of section 80HHC.
  • SECTION 205 A COMPANIES ACT 1956
  • SECTION 210 COMPANIES ACT 1956
  • clause (a), (b) or (c ) of sub-section (3) or sub-section (3A),
  • sub-section (3) or sub-section (3A) of section 80HHC
  • sub-section (4) and sub-section (5) of section 80-IB,
  • sub-section (4) or sub-section (5) of section 80-IB;
  • provisions of sub-section (3) of section 80HHC
  • ARTICLE 136 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • SECTION 263 INCOME TAX ACT 1961
  • (c) of sub-section (3) of section 80HHC
  • sub-section (4) of section 80-IA
  • COMPANIES ACT 1956
Smart Summary

Summary of the Opinion (Consolidated Appeals for AY 2000-01 & 2001-02)

Factual and Procedural Background

Two appeals of the assessee for assessment years 2000-01 and 2001-02 were consolidated. The dispute concerns the validity of orders passed by the Commissioner of Income-tax (CIT), Shimla, under section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (both CIT orders dated 12-4-2004), which set aside assessments made by the Assessing Officer (AO).

For AY 2000-01 the assessee filed the return on 28-11-2000 declaring income of Rs. 23,51,870 after claiming deductions under section 80HHC (Rs. 21,07,522) and section 80G (Rs. 14,128). For AY 2001-02 the return filed on 25-10-2001 declared income of Rs. 53,39,230 after claiming 80HHC deduction of Rs. 62,08,242 and 80G deduction of Rs. 41,273.

The AO made assessment under section 143(3) by order dated 30-10-2002. The CIT, on examining the records, considered the AO's orders (including orders under sections 143 and 154) to be erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the revenue and issued show-cause notices under section 263. After hearing and considering objections, the CIT set aside the assessment orders and directed the AO to reframe the assessments afresh after affording opportunity of hearing.

The CIT's objections (as reflected in the section 263 orders) included alleged errors in calculation of deduction under section 80HHC (notably exclusion of job/inspection & regrinding charges totalling Rs. 36,45,148), incorrect computation under section 115JA/115JB, wrong allowance of MODVAT credit, incorrect treatment of deduction under section 80G, alleged wrong MAT credit and incorrect computation of interest under sections 234B and 234C. The assessee appealed to the Tribunal against the CIT's section 263 orders; the Tribunal heard the parties and examined the records.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the CIT validly exercised powers under section 263 to set aside the AO’s assessment orders as being "erroneous" and "prejudicial to the interests of the revenue".
  2. Whether job work/inspection & regrinding charges of Rs. 36,45,148 (received from domestic customers) should be excluded from profits for computation of deduction under section 80HHC (i.e., whether such receipts are excluded under Explanation (baa) to section 80HHC).
  3. Whether the AO incorrectly computed the deduction or reduction from book profits for the purpose of section 115JA/115JB (i.e., whether the reduction should be calculated as per clauses (a), (b) or (c) of section 80HHC(3) or otherwise).
  4. Whether the AO wrongly allowed MODVAT credit.
  5. Whether there was any wrong claim/credit of MAT by the assessee.
  6. Whether the AO wrongly allowed deduction under section 80G and/or miscomputed interest under sections 234B and 234C.

Arguments of the Parties

Assessee's Arguments

  • The CIT's order under section 263 was without jurisdiction because the AO had raised the same points (including the regrinding charges) during assessment proceedings by questionnaire dated 12-6-2002 and had received the assessee's explanations; the AO had taken a possible view in favour of the assessee.
  • Where the AO has taken a possible view after inquiry, the CIT cannot substitute his own view by invoking section 263 (relying on precedents such as Malabar Industrial Co. Ltd. v. CIT, Malabar and Punjab & Haryana High Court decisions and others cited by the assessee).
  • The assessee relied on decisions (for example, Apollo Tyres Ltd. v. CIT for the book-profit/section 115JA issue and CIT v. Indo Nippon Chemicals Co. Ltd. for MODVAT) to contend the relevant points were covered in its favour.
  • The assessee denied claiming any MAT credit (challenging the CIT's observation), and defended its claim under section 80G as permissible under law.
  • The assessee contended that debatable or arguable issues (possible views) cannot be the basis for invoking section 263.
  • Cases cited by the assessee in support included: CIT v. Rane (Madras) Ltd.; Asstt. CIT v. Herbal Isolates (P.) Ltd.; CIT v. G.M. Mittal Stainless Steel (P.) Ltd.; CIT v. Simon Carves Ltd.; CIT v. Arvind Jewellers; and others relied upon to show a "possible view" should protect the AO's order.

Revenue's (Departmental) Arguments

  • The AO's order was clearly contrary to the provisions of the Act (citing Explanation (baa) to section 80HHC) and had failed to exclude 90% of the job/charges (regrinding/inspection charges) from profits for computation of section 80HHC deduction.
  • Although the AO raised the issue by questionnaire, the AO failed to apply his mind or record reasons for accepting the assessee's view; non-application of mind renders the AO's order erroneous and prejudicial to the revenue.
  • The AO did not record a specific finding expressing his reasons for not excluding the job charges from profits; this demonstrated non-application of mind and justified intervention under section 263.
  • The revenue relied on multiple authorities where section 263 interventions were upheld where AO's orders were held to be non-speaking or passed without application of mind (cases cited include CIT v. Export House; B.S. Bajaj & Sons v. CIT; Biru Mal Pyare Lal v. Asstt. CIT; Morinda Co-operative Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Dy. CIT; Patel Cotton Co. Ltd. v. Asstt. CIT; Diamond World v. CIT; Honda Siel Power Products Ltd. v. Dy. CIT; and others).
  • The revenue also relied on jurisdictional Tribunal decisions (e.g., Asstt. CIT v. Jagraon Cycle Industries, ITA No. 640/Chd/2005) to show that service charges or scrap/service receipts are to be excluded for 80HHC computation and that the AO's acceptance contradicted the jurisdictional tribunal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Malabar Industrial Co. Ltd. v. CIT [2000] 243 ITR 83 Principles governing exercise of powers under section 263: twin conditions that (i) the AO's order is erroneous and (ii) prejudicial to the interests of the revenue; limits on invoking section 263 where a possible view is taken. The Tribunal applied Malabar to frame the legal test for section 263 and held that where one of the twin conditions is absent section 263 cannot be invoked; used Malabar to assess whether the AO's order was erroneous and prejudicial.
CIT v. G.T.N. Textiles Ltd. [2001] 248 ITR 372 (Kerala HC) Interpretation regarding reduction from book profits and treatment of deductions for book-profit based levy (cited by assessee for treatment under section 115JA/115J). Assessee relied on this decision for the 115JA/115JB book-profit reduction point; the CIT and Tribunal considered its applicability and the Tribunal noted the CIT's view that the Kerala decision (and related circulars) related to section 115J and not identical in language to section 115JA.
Apollo Tyres Ltd. v. CIT [2002] 255 ITR 273 (SC) Decision cited by assessee in relation to computation/reduction from book profits (section 115JA issues). The assessee invoked Apollo Tyres to support its position; the Tribunal recorded that the assessee relied on Apollo but noted arguments about differences in statutory language and applicability (the revenue contended Apollo was inapplicable to the facts here).
CIT v. Indo Nippon Chemicals Co. Ltd. [2003] 261 ITR 275 (SC) Authority relied upon by assessee on the issue of MODVAT credit. The assessee cited Indo Nippon to support its MODVAT position; the Tribunal recorded this reliance and addressed the MODVAT point in its analysis of the CIT's other alleged mistakes (ultimately finding no error by AO on certain small issues after explanation).
Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. Max India Ltd. [2004] 268 ITR 128 (P&H) Authority cited by assessee to support proposition that where AO takes a possible view after due inquiry, CIT should not invoke section 263. The assessee relied on this decision; the Tribunal noted such authorities but applied Malabar and other principles to conclude that where AO's order is non-speaking on legal issues and contrary to jurisdictional tribunal views, section 263 intervention may be justified.
CIT v. Export House [2002] 256 ITR 603 (P&H) Authority relied upon by revenue to show that non-recording of specific findings may indicate non-application of mind and justify section 263 intervention. The Tribunal noted this and similar authorities relied upon by the revenue to support the proposition that AO's failure to record reasons can justify the CIT's action under section 263.
B.S. Bajaj & Sons v. CIT [1996] 222 ITR 418 (P&H) Cited for proposition that AO allowed deductions without application of mind; CIT was justified in cancelling assessment under section 263. Revenue cited this case; the Tribunal recorded reliance and considered it supportive of CIT's intervention where AO did not apply mind.
Biru Mal Pyare Lal v. Asstt. CIT [2001] 79 ITD 169 (Chandigarh) ITAT decision where AO accepted cash credits without necessary inquiry; section 263 intervention upheld. Revenue relied on this ITAT decision; the Tribunal noted such precedents to support that non-application of mind can render AO's order erroneous for purposes of section 263.
Morinda Co-operative Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Dy. CIT [2001] 78 ITD 189 (Chandigarh) ITAT decision where AO wrongly allowed a claim and CIT's section 263 action was upheld. Revenue cited this to show analogous situations where the CIT's action under section 263 was sustained; Tribunal recorded it as supporting the revenue's stance on non-application of mind.
Patel Cotton Co. Ltd. v. Asstt. CIT [1998] 64 ITD 273 (Mumbai Bench 'E') ITAT decision where AO wrongly allowed deductions under sections 80HHC/80HH and the CIT's invocation of section 263 was upheld. Revenue relied on this precedent; Tribunal noted it as relevant support for allowing intervention where AO's order is erroneous in law or non-speaking.
Diamond World v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax [2004] 267 ITR 467 (Rajasthan HC) High Court decision upholding CIT's section 263 order where AO had wrongly allowed claim under section 80HHC. Revenue cited this as a jurisdictional support; the Tribunal relied on the consistency of authorities to support CIT's action regarding section 80HHC matters.
Honda Siel Power Products Ltd. v. Dy. CIT [2001] 77 ITD 123 (Delhi Bench-E) ITAT decision addressing AO passing routine orders without proper application of mind and validating section 263 intervention. Revenue relied on this to demonstrate the principle that routine non-speaking orders can invite section 263 action; Tribunal recorded and considered this precedent.
Asstt. CIT v. Jagraon Cycle Industries (ITA No. 640/Chd/2005) ITAT, Chandigarh decision treating scrap/service charges as excluded for purpose of computing deduction under section 80HHC. The revenue relied on this jurisdictional ITAT view; the Tribunal treated it as a jurisdictional precedent supporting that the AO's acceptance of assessee's treatment deviated from the jurisdictional view and could be erroneous.
Hari Iron Trading Co. v. CIT [2003] 263 ITR 437 (P&H) High Court decision discussing that the CIT may examine the entire "record" and that an AO's non-mentioning of accepted points in the assessment order does not necessarily mean lack of inquiry (where the record shows inquiries and reasons). The Tribunal discussed Hari Iron at length, distinguished it on facts (noting that in Hari Iron the AO had material and an office note explaining acceptance), and held Hari Iron inapplicable to the present facts where no reasons or supporting record existed to show why the AO preferred assessee's legal view contrary to jurisdictional authority.
Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. Vikas Chemi Gum India [2005] 276 ITR 32 (P&H) High Court decision emphasizing requirement of recording reasons by quasi-judicial authorities as integral to fair procedure. The Tribunal quoted and relied on Vikas Chemi Gum India to stress the necessity for recording reasons and to support the proposition that a quasi-judicial authority must give reasons to ensure rule of law and to enable effective appellate review.
Omar Salay Mohamed Sait v. Commissioner Of Income Tax, Madras [1959] 37 ITR 151 (SC) Principles that fact-finding tribunals must consider evidence for and against and must give clear findings; requirement that issues and reasons should be articulated. The Tribunal cited this authority to reinforce the requirement that a quasi-judicial authority must consider and record reasons and that findings should not be based on conjecture or no evidence.
CIT v. Sun Engg. Works (P.) Ltd. [1992] 198 ITR 297 (SC) Principle that judgments must be read as a whole and observations applied in context; caution against extracting isolated sentences as complete law. The Tribunal invoked Sun Engg. Works to caution about selective reliance on prior judgments and to support its careful contextual reading of precedents when applying them to the facts of this case.
CIT v. Rane (Madras) Ltd. [1999] 238 ITR 377 (Madras) Assessee-cited authority contending that regrinding charges form part of business profits. The assessee relied on Rane in support of its contention that regrinding charges are business profits; the Tribunal recorded the reliance but evaluated the matter against jurisdictional tribunal decisions and statutory interpretation.
Asstt. CIT v. Herbal Isolates (P.) Ltd. [2002] 83 ITD 310 (Cochin) Assessee-cited ITAT decision supporting the view that certain service charges may be part of business profits. The assessee cited Herbal Isolates; the Tribunal recorded this reliance as part of the competing authorities on whether service/regrinding charges should be included in profits for 80HHC computation.
CIT v. G.M. Mittal Stainless Steel (P.) Ltd. [2003] 263 ITR 255 (SC) Assessee-cited authority for the proposition that debatable issues or possible views should protect AO's order from section 263 intervention. The assessee cited G.M. Mittal; the Tribunal acknowledged such authorities but applied Malabar and other tests and distinguished facts where AO had not given reasons for a legal view contrary to jurisdictional tribunal precedents.
CIT v. Simon Carves Ltd. [1976] 105 ITR 212 (SC) Assessee-cited authority supporting protection of a possible view taken by AO. The assessee relied on Simon Carves; the Tribunal recorded it among authorities arguing that a possible view should preclude section 263 interference, but again applied Malabar and contextual distinctions.
CIT v. Arvind Jewellers [2003] 259 ITR 502 (Gujarat) Assessee-cited authority on the protection of a possible view. Recorded as relied upon by the assessee; the Tribunal noted such cases but relied on its analysis and other precedents to conclude section 263 intervention was justified on the facts.
Liberty Footwear Co. v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax [2006] 283 ITR 398 (P&H) Revenue-cited authority (by the revenue) supporting that 90% of certain charges were to be excluded from business profits for 80HHC computation. The revenue cited Liberty Footwear to support statutory interpretation of Explanation (baa) to section 80HHC; Tribunal recorded the reliance in assessing whether AO's order was contrary to law.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Tribunal proceeded by examining whether the AO's assessment order could be classified as "erroneous" and "prejudicial to the interests of the revenue" — the twin requirements for the CIT to validly exercise powers under section 263 (as set out in Malabar). The Tribunal summarized the legal principles from Malabar: an incorrect assumption of fact or incorrect application of law, and orders passed without applying principles of natural justice or without application of mind, can constitute an "erroneous" order. The Tribunal also noted the wider meaning of "prejudicial to the interests of the revenue".

Factually, the AO had raised queries by questionnaire (including a specific query about regrinding/service charges of Rs. 36,45,148), and the assessee had replied. The AO's 143(3) order, however, was silent as to reasons for accepting the assessee's position on the contested legal issues; the decision and its legal basis were not reflected in the order or by an office note. The Tribunal emphasized that a quasi-judicial authority like the AO must pass a speaking order when legal issues are involved, recording reasons and considering relevant cases; it cited decisions stressing the requirement to record reasons (Vikas Chemi Gum India, Omar Salay Mohamed Sait).

The Tribunal considered the revenue's contention that Explanation (baa) to section 80HHC required exclusion of 90% of charges recovered (job/inspection/regrinding charges) and observed that jurisdictional ITAT authority (Asstt. CIT v. Jagraon Cycle Industries, Chandigarh Bench) supports excluding such charges for 80HHC computation. The Tribunal held that where a jurisdictional tribunal's view is adverse to the assessee and the AO does not follow that view without recording reasons, the AO's order can be said to be erroneous and prejudicial.

On the book-profit issue (section 115JA/115JB), the Tribunal performed a textual comparison of section 115J and section 115JA. It noted a critical distinction in the statutory language: section 115J spoke of reduction "in the manner" specified in section 80HHC(3), whereas section 115JA(viii) referred to reduction of "the amount of profits eligible for deduction under section 80HHC, computed under clause (a),(b) or (c) of sub-section (3) or sub-section (3A)". The Tribunal concluded the AO had not appreciated this distinction and had accepted an approach applicable to section 115J rather than the specific phrasing of section 115JA; the AO had not given reasons for this interpretive choice.

The Tribunal therefore found that: (a) the AO's order was a non-speaking order on material legal points (80HHC and 115JA), (b) the AO failed to give reasons for adopting a view contrary to the jurisdictional tribunal and other relevant authorities, and (c) such non-speaking orders on legal issues fall within the category of erroneous orders enabling intervention under section 263. For other alleged mistakes (MODVAT credit, MAT credit, 80G claim, interest computations), the Tribunal accepted the assessee's explanations and found no error by the AO.

The Tribunal also addressed the relevance of precedents that protect an AO's possible view (cited by the assessee). It acknowledged those authorities but held they did not preclude section 263 intervention where the AO's view was not supported by recorded reasons and where it was contrary to the jurisdictional tribunal's view or statutory interpretation.

The Tribunal noted it was informed that the CIT in the subsequent fresh proceedings had decided the contested issues in the assessee's favour. The Tribunal clarified that its role was confined to examining the validity of the CIT's section 263 order, and that the outcome of the reassessment proceedings would follow the normal appellate course; its upholding of the CIT's power did not prejudice the right of the assessee to challenge subsequent AO decisions.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Tribunal upheld the CIT's orders passed under section 263 for assessment year 2000-01 and applied the same decision mutatis mutandis to assessment year 2001-02. The appeals of the assessee for both assessment years were dismissed.

Implications:

  • The CIT was held to have validly invoked section 263 to set aside the AO's assessments insofar as the AO's treatment of deduction under section 80HHC and computation for the purposes of section 115JA was concerned, because the AO's orders were non-speaking/erroneous on these legal issues and prejudicial to the interests of the revenue.
  • The AO was directed (via the CIT's order) to reframe the assessments afresh in accordance with law; the Tribunal noted that the CIT in fresh proceedings had decided both issues in favour of the assessee, but clarified that reassessment proceedings and any appeals arising therefrom would proceed according to law and the Tribunal's order did not prejudice those proceedings.
  • The Tribunal found no error in the AO's treatment of certain other matters (MODVAT, MAT credit, 80G, interest points) after the assessee's explanations; those aspects were not disturbed by the Tribunal.
  • No new binding precedent was proclaimed by the Tribunal; the decision applied established principles (as discussed and distinguished in the opinion) to the facts before it and confined itself to the validity of the CIT's section 263 action on the specific issues identified.

This summary is based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion and does not add or infer information beyond that text.

    Ind Sphinx Precision Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Shimla

    M.A. Bakshi, Vice President - We find it convenient to dispose of these two appeals of the assessee relating to assessment years 2000-01 and 2001-02 by this consolidated order. The dispute involved in both these appeals is relating to validity of the orders passed by the CIT, Shimla, H.P. under section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The impugned orders are both dated 12-4-2004. We have heard the parties and perused the records.

    2. The facts for both the assessment years are similar. We first take up the appeal for assessment year 2000-01 and our decision shall apply mutatis mutandis to assessment year 2001-02. For assessment year 2000-01, the assessee had filed the return of income on 28-11-2000 declaring income of Rs. 23,51,870 after claiming deduction under section 80HHC of Rs. 21,07,522 and deduction under section 80G of Rs. 14,128. Similarly, return for assessment year 2001-02 was filed on 25-10-2001 declaring income of Rs. 53,39,230 after claiming deduction under section 80HHC of Rs. 62,08,242 and deduction under section 80G of Rs. 41,273. The Assessing Officer after making detailed inquiries had made an assessment under section 143(3) vide order dated 30-10-2002. On examination of the records, the CIT, Shimla was of the view that the orders passed by the Assessing Officer under sections 143 and 154 are erroneous insofar as prejudicial to the interests of the revenue. He, accordingly, issued show-cause notice to the assessee as to why action under section 263 may not be taken and the assessment order passed by the Assessing Officer set aside. The assessee filed objections but of no avail. The CIT passed the order under section 263 setting aside the assessment order and directing the Assessing Officer to make fresh order after carefully looking into all the relevant points and affording reasonable opportunity of being heard to the assessee.

    3. Assessee is aggrieved and is in appeal before us. We have heard the parties and perused the records. It is observed from the impugned order passed under section 263 that the CIT had pointed out an error in the calculation of deduction under section 80HHC and an error in calculation of income under section 115JB, wrong credit of MODVAT, wrong claim of deduction under section 80G, wrong calculation of interests under sections 234B and 234C.

    4. The assessee is engaged in the manufacture of PCB drills and PCB Raster Bits and its sales are mostly export sales. It has been pointed out by the CIT that the assessee had receipts of Rs. 36,45,148 on account of inspection and regrinding charges received from domestic customers taken into account in the gross total income as business profits. According to the CIT, the above sum cannot be said to be the income derived from exports and thus the same was not to be taken into consideration for computation of deduction under section 80HHC as business profits. The CIT has referred to clause (baa) of Explanation to section 80HHC and held that the job work charges received by the assessee were to be excluded from the profits and gains of business for the purpose of computation of deduction under section 80HHC. The order passed by the Assessing Officer has been held to be erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the revenue.

    5. Similarly, for the purpose of computation of deduction under section 115JA, the assessee, according to the CIT, had claimed excess deduction of export profits. The CIT has pointed out under section 115JA/JB, the amount to be allowed as a deduction from book profits under clause (viii) of section 115JA(2) and 115JB(2)(iv) are the profits eligible for deduction as per clause (a), (b ) or (c) of section 80HHC(3). The CIT has also referred to the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 80HHC which provides for reduction to the extent of 90 per cent of the proportionate export incentive. According to the CIT, the reduction admissible under clause (iv) of section 115JB(2) is only with reference to the deduction computed under clause (a), ( b) or (c) of sub-section (3) of section 80HHC and it does not refer to the amount referred to in proviso to sub-section (3) of section 80HHC. The reference to the Board’s Circular made by the assessee during the course of hearing before the CIT has been held to be inapplicable. Accordingly to the CIT, the decision of Kerala High Court in the case of CIT v. G.T.N. Textiles Ltd. [2001] 248 ITR 3721, relied upon by the assessee, is not applicable to the facts of this case.

    6. In addition to the above mistakes alleged by the CIT, it has been held that there was mistake committed by the Assessing Officer in allowing the claim of MODVAT credit, excess credit of tax paid under MAT and allowance of deduction under section 80G.

    7. The assessment order was accordingly set aside and the Assessing Officer was directed to frame the assessment afresh.

    8. The assessee is in appeal before us. The ld. Counsel for the assessee contended before us that order passed by the CIT under section 263 is without jurisdiction. Our attention was invited to the show-cause notices issued by the CIT and it was pointed out that all the points raised by the CIT in the show-cause notice had been raised by the Assessing Officer in the course of original assessment proceedings. Our attention was invited to the questionnaire issued by the Assessing Officer on 12-6-2002 in which a specific query was raised about the regrinding charges of Rs. 36,45,148 and the Assessing Officer had also asked the assessee to show cause as to why the said amount should not be excluded for the purpose of calculation of deduction under section 80HHC. It was further contended that the Assessing Officer had also made inquiries about the calculation of income under section 115JA/JB with reference to MAT, deduction under section 80G etc. It was further contended that a reply was filed to the Assessing Officer in response to the questionnaires issued during the course of assessment proceedings and the Assessing Officer had taken a view in favour of the assessee. The view taken by him is a possible view. It was pointed out that after framing of fresh assessment in pursuance to the order under section 263, assessee had filed an appeal to the CIT(A) against the recalculation of deduction under section 80HHC. It was pointed out that the CIT(A) has accepted the view canvassed by the assessee and held that the calculations made by the Assessing Officer in pursuance to the directions of the CIT are not warranted. It was further contended that there is a difference of opinion in regard to the calculation of deduction under section 80HHC. According to the ld. Counsel, once a possible view has been taken by the Assessing Officer in regard to deduction under section 80HHC, the CIT has no power to set aside the same by holding the order to be erroneous insofar as prejudicial to the interests of the revenue. It was contended that it is well-settled principle of law that if an Assessing Officer takes a possible view, the CIT cannot, substitute the same with his own view.

    9. In regard to the second issue raised by the CIT pertaining to calculation of deduction under section 80HHC for reduction from book profits, it was contended that the same is covered in favour of the assessee by decision of Supreme Court in the case of Apollo Tyres Ltd. v. CIT [2002] 255 ITR 273 1. It was further contended that the issue raised by the CIT relating to MODVAT credit is also covered by the decision of Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. Indo Nippon Chemicals Co. Ltd. [2003] 261 ITR 2752 , in favour of the assessee.

    10. In regard to the issue raised by the CIT about the wrong MAT credit claimed by the assessee, it was contended that assessee had not claimed any credit for MAT and the observations of the CIT in this regard are wrong. It was further contended that the assessee had claimed deduction under section 80G as permissible in law and there was thus no justification for invoking the powers by the Commissioner under section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 relating to this issue also. Reliance was placed on the decision of Supreme Court in the case of Malabar Industrial Co. Ltd. v. CIT [2000] 243 ITR 833 and that of Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. Max India Ltd. [2004] 268 ITR 128 , to support the contention that once an assessment was framed after due inquiry and a possible view was taken by the Assessing Officer, the CIT is precluded to exercise his powers under section 263. It was accordingly pleaded that the appeal of the assessee may be allowed by setting aside the order of the CIT.

    11. The ld. D.R. on the other hand, contended that the order passed by the Assessing Officer was clearly contrary to the provisions of the Act. Our attention was invited to Explanation (baa) to section 80HHC. It was contended that the Explanation specifically refers to exclusion of 90 per cent of the ‘charges’ recovered by the assessee from the profits of business for the purpose of calculation of deduction under section 80HHC. The assessee had collected job charges to the tune of Rs. 36,45,148 and 90 per cent of the same was to be excluded from the profits of the business by virtue of Explanation ( baa) to section 80HHC. It was further contended that though the Assessing Officer had raised the issue in the course of assessment proceedings by issuing a questionnaire but he had failed to apply his mind in determining the deduction under section 80HHC. It was further contended that the non-application of mind by the Assessing Officer renders his order to be erroneous insofar as it is prejudicial to the interests of the revenue. It was contended that the Assessing Officer had not recorded specific finding expressing his opinion about the non-exclusion of job charges from the profits and gains of business. Reliance was placed on the decision of Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of CIT v. Export House [2002] 256 ITR 6031, to support the contention that where the Assessing Officer does not record a specific finding in regard to an issue, it would demonstrate the non-application of his mind. Reliance was placed on the decision of Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of B.S. Bajaj & Sons v. CIT [1996] 222 ITR 418 2, wherein the Assessing Officer had allowed deduction under section 80HH and 80J without application of mind and the CIT was held to be justified in cancelling the order under section 263. Reliance was also placed on the decision of ITAT, Chandigarh Bench in the case of Biru Mal Pyare Lal v. Asstt. CIT [2001] 79 ITD 169 , wherein the Assessing Officer had accepted the cash credits without calling for further details, the order under section 263 was held to be valid. Reliance was also placed on the decision of ITAT, Chandigarh Bench in the case of Morinda Co-operative Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Dy. CIT [2001] 78 ITD 189 wherein the Assessing Officer had wrongly allowed the claim under section 80P(a)( iii) and the CIT had cancelled the assessment under section 263 and the same was upheld. Reliance was also placed on the decision of Mumbai Bench ‘E’ of the ITAT in the case of Patel Cotton Co. Ltd. v. Asstt. CIT [1998] 64 ITD 273 , wherein the Assessing Officer had wrongly allowed deduction under section 80HHC and 80HH and the Commissioner had intervened by invoking provisions of section 263 and the action was upheld. It was further contended that similarly Rajasthan High Court in the case of Diamond World v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax [2004] 267 ITR 4671, upheld the order of the CIT under section 263 where the Assessing Officer had wrongly allowed the claim of the assessee under section 80HHC. It was contended that the Karnataka High Court upheld the order under section 263 of the CIT where the Assessing Officer had wrongly allowed deduction under section 80HHC. Reliance was also placed on the decision of the Delhi Bench-E of the ITAT in the case of Honda Siel Power Products Ltd. v. Dy. CIT [2001] 77 ITD 123, to support the contention that where the Assessing Officer had passed the assessment order in a routine manner without proper application of mind, the CIT(A) was justified in invoking his powers under section 263 of the Act. It was contended that the assessee had received job charges in respect of domestic sales and the same were to be excluded from the profits of business for the purpose of determination of deduction under section 80HHC. Reliance was placed on the decision of the ITAT, Chandigarh Bench in the case of Asstt. CIT v. Jagraon Cycle Inds. [IT Appeal No. 640 (Chd.) of 2005] for assessment year 2001-02, to support the contention that the purposes of computation of deduction under section 80HHC, scrap sale or service charges were to be excluded from the turnover as well as from the profits of business. It was pointed out that the decision of the Assessing Officer was contrary to the decision of the jurisdictional Tribunal and, therefore, the order passed by the Assessing Officer was erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the revenue.

    12. In regard to the second issue raised by the CIT, vide paras 9, 10 and 10.3 of the order, it was contended that the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Apollo Tyres Ltd. v. CIT [2002] 255 ITR 273 2, was inapplicable. It was contended that the decision of the High Court was with reference to the old provision of the Act and accordingly, it was inapplicable to this case. Reliance was also placed on the decision of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of Liberty Footwear Co. v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax [2006] 283 ITR 398 3, to support the contention that 90 per cent of the charges were to be excluded from business profits for the purpose of computation of deduction under section 80HHC. It was accordingly pleaded that the appeal of the assessee may be dismissed.

    13. The ld. Counsel for the assessee in counter reply relied upon the following decisions to support the contention that regrinding charges are part of business profits :

    (i) CIT v. Rane (Madras) Ltd. [1999] 238 ITR 3774 (Mad.)

    (ii) Asstt. CIT v. Herbal Isolates (P.) Ltd. [2002] 83 ITD 310 (Cochin)

    It was contended that the debatable issues cannot be the basis for invoking provisions of section 263. Reliance was placed on the following decisions :

    (i) CIT v. G.M. Mittal Stainless Steel (P.) Ltd. [2003] 263 ITD 25510 (SC);

    (ii) CIT v. Simon Carves Ltd. [1976] 105 ITR 212 (SC);

    (iii) CIT v. Arvind Jewellers [2003] 259 ITR 50211 (Guj.).

    It was accordingly pleaded that the order of the CIT under section 263 may be cancelled.

    14. Similar issue had also been raised for assessment year 2001-02. The CIT has set aside the assessment made by the Assessing Officer for fresh decision.

    15. For this year also, the parties advanced similar arguments as advanced for assessment year 2000-01.

    16. We have given our careful consideration to the rival contentions. In this case, the Assessing Officer had made assessment under section 143(3) for assessment year 2000-01. A perusal of the questionnaire issued by the Assessing Officer and the replies filed by the assessee placed on record undoubtedly reveal that the Assessing Officer had raised the issue relating to calculation of deduction under section 80HHC as well as income chargeable to tax under section 115JA by way of questionnaire issued to the assessee and assessee had also replied to the queries raised by the Assessing Officer. The Assessing Officer has thereafter passed an order on 30th October, 2002. The question before us is as to whether the order passed by the Assessing Officer can be said to be erroneous insofar as it is prejudicial to the interests of the revenue. It is well-settled principle of law that to enable the CIT to exercise his powers under section 263 twin conditions must be satisfied. These conditions are (i) that the order passed by the Assessing Officer is erroneous and (ii) the said order is prejudicial to the interests of the revenue. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Malabar Industrial Co. Ltd. v. CIT [2000] 243 ITR 83 12, have elaborately laid down the principles relating to the powers of the CIT under section 263. In this case, their Lordships held that if one of the two conditions required for exercise of power under section 263 is absent, the recourse to section 263 cannot be taken. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court further laid down the law that provisions of section 263 cannot be invoked to correct each and every type of mistake or error committed by the Assessing Officer. Their Lordships further laid down certain circum-stances quoted hereunder on the basis of which powers under section 263 could be exercised :

    (i)An incorrect assumption of facts or an incorrect application of law will satisfy the requirement of the order being erroneous;

    (ii)The order passed without applying the principles of natural justice or without application of mind will also satisfy the requirement of the order being erroneous.

    Their Lordships further held that the expression ‘prejudicial to the interests of the revenue’ is to be understood in its ordinary meaning and that it is of wider import and is not confined to loss of tax. Their Lordships further held that the scheme of the Act is to levy and collect tax in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the task is entrusted to the revenue. If due to an erroneous order of the ITO the revenue is losing tax lawfully payable by a person, it will certainly be prejudicial to the interests of the revenue. Their Lordships further explained that every loss of revenue as a consequence of an order of the Assessing Officer cannot be treated as prejudicial to the interests of the revenue. Giving an example, their Lordships held, "When an ITO had adopted one of the courses permissible in law and it has resulted in loss of revenue, or where two views are possible and the ITO has taken one view with which the Commissioner does not agree, it cannot be treated as an erroneous order prejudicial to the interests of the revenue unless the view taken by the ITO is unsustainable in law."

    17. In this case, we have considered the impugned order under section 263 in the light of the above broadly laid down principles of law. In this case, it has been demonstrated before us by the ld. Counsel for the assessee that the Assessing Officer had made inquiries about the calcula-tion of deduction under section 80HHC. A specific query had been raised by the ITO about the grinding/service charges. The assessee had ex-plained its position by way of replies and the Assessing Officer has not passed any order either in favour or against the assessee on the issue raised by him. Impliedly, the contentions advanced by the assessee have been accepted. On these facts, the issue arises as to whether the ITO can be said to have passed an erroneous order. At this stage, it will be necessary to point out that the Assessing Officer is a quasi-judicial authority and every quasi-judicial authority is required to pass speaking orders in regard to any issue that may be relevant for determination of the taxable income. In the present case, undoubtedly, the Assessing Officer had raised the issue and assessee had also filed the reply. Their Lordships of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. Vikas Chemi Gum India [2005] 276 ITR 3213, had emphasized the requirement of recording of reasons by the authorities. We hereunder quote the relevant portion:—

    "The requirement of recording of reasons and communication thereof has been read as an integral part of the concept of fair procedure. The necessity of giving reasons flows from the concept of rule of law which constitutes one of the corner stones of our constitutional set up. The administrative authorities charged with the duty to act judicially cannot decide the matters on considerations of policy or expediency. The requirement of recording of reasons by such authorities is an important safeguard to ensure observance of the rule of law. It introduces clarity, checks the introduction of extraneous or irrelevant considerations and minimizes arbitrariness in the decision making process. Another reason which makes it imperative for the quasi-judicial authorities to give reasons is that their orders are not only subject to the right of the aggrieved persons to challenge the same by filing statutory appeal and revision but also by filing writ petition under article 226 of the Constitution. Such decisions can also be challenged by way of appeal under article 136 of the Constitution of India. The High Courts have the power to issue writ of certiorari to quash the orders passed by a quasi-judicial authority/Tribunal. Likewise, in appeal the Supreme Court can nullify such order/decision. These powers can be effectively exercised by the superior courts only if the order under challenge contains reasons."

    18. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Omar Salay Mohamed Sait v. Commissioner Of Income Tax, Madras [1959] 37 ITR 151 , have also laid down the following principles of law in regard to the requirement for passing speaking orders:—

    "The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal is a fact finding Tribunal and if it arrives at its own conclusions of fact after due consideration of the evidence before it the court will not interfere. It is necessary, however, that every fact for and against the assessee must have been considered with due care and the Tribunal must have given its finding in a manner which would clearly indicate what were the questions which arose for determination, what was the evidence pro and contra in regard to each one of them and what were the findings reached of the evidence on record before it. The conclusions reached by the Tribunal should not be coloured by any irrelevant considerations or matters of prejudice and if there are any circumstances which require to be explained by the assessee, the assessee should be given an opportunity of doing so. On no account whatever should the Tribunal base its findings on suspicions, conjectures, or surmises; nor should it act on no evidence at all or on improper rejection of material and relevant evidence or partly on evidence and partly on suspicions, conjectures or surmises and if it does anything of the sort, its findings even though on questions of fact will be liable to be set aside by the Court."

    19. Admittedly, the above principles of law have been laid down with regard to the orders passed by the ITAT. So, however, in our considered view, the foundation for assessment is the assessment order passed by the Assessing Officer who is the quasi-judicial authority. The order of the Assessing Officer is subject to appeal to the CIT(A). The order of the Assessing Officer is also subject to the revision by the Commissioner under section 263 as well as under section 264. It is, therefore, necessary that the Assessing Officer considers every fact for and against with due care and give his finding in a manner which would clearly indicate what were the questions which arose for determination and what is the evidence pro and contra in regard to each issue and the findings recorded on such evidence. The order of the Assessing Officer is silent on the issues raised by the CIT in his order under section 263. It is only with reference to the questionnaires issued by the Assessing Officer and the replies furnished by the assessee that it comes to light that the Assessing Officer had made inquiry in regard to the issues raised by the CIT under section 263. But what is the decision of the Assessing Officer much less what is the basis of such decision is not indicated in the assessment order. Such an order passed by the Assessing Officer, in our considered view, would fall within the category of an erroneous order being a non-speaking order.

    20. There are decisions of ITAT, Chandigarh Bench in regard to calculation of deduction under section 80HHC with respect to service charges for instance, order dated 2-5-2006 (copy on record) in the case of Asstt. CIT(A), Ludhiana v. M/s. Jagraon Cycle Industries, I.T.A. No. 640/Chandi./2005. If the view of ITAT, Chandigarh Bench is taken into consideration, then the calculation of deduction under section 80HHC made by the assessee and accepted by the Assessing Officer is wrong. If the Assessing Officer had given reasons for accepting the claim of the assessee, he would, in law, be required to consider the decisions of the jurisdictional Tribunal. The assessee has drawn our attention to the decision of the Bombay Bench of the Tribunal as well as of the Hyderabad Bench of the Tribunal where a contrary view has been expressed. In our considered view when the decision of the jurisdictional Bench of the ITAT in favour of the revenue is available and the Assessing Officer does not follow the same, the order passed by the Assessing Officer can be said to be erroneous causing prejudice to the interests of the revenue. We are, therefore, satisfied that the CIT was within his jurisdiction to hold the order of the Assessing Officer to be erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the revenue in regard to deduction under section 80HHC.

    21. We are conscious of the decision of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of Hari Iron Trading Co. v. CIT [2003] 263 ITR 437 14, wherein their Lordships laid down the following principle of law:—

    "A bare perusal of the aforesaid provisions shows that the Commissioner can exercise powers under sub-section (1) of section 263 of the Act only after examining ‘the record of any proceedings under the Act.’ The expression ‘record’ has also been defined in clause (b) of the Explanation so as to include all records relating to any proceedings available at the time of examination by the Commissioner. Thus, it is not only the assessment order but the entire record which has to be examined before arriving at a conclusion as to whether the Assessing Officer had examined any issue or not. The assessee has no control over the way an assessment order is drafted. The assessee on its part had produced enough material on record to show that the matter had been discussed in detail by the Assessing Officer. The least that the Tribunal could have done was to refer to the assessment record to verify the contentions of the assessee. Instead of doing that, the Tribunal has merely been swayed by the fact that the Assessing Officer has not mentioned anything in the assessment order. During the course of assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer examines numerous issues. Generally, the issues which are accepted do not find mention in the assessment order and only such points are taken note of on which the assessee’s Explanations are rejected and additions/disallowances are made. As already observed, we have examined the records of the case and find that the Assessing Officer had made full inquiries before accepting the claim of the assessee qua the amount of Rs. 10 lakhs on account of discrepancy in stock. Not only this, he has even gone a step further and appended an office note with the assessment order to explain why the addition for alleged discrepancy in stock was not being made."

    22. It may appear that non-mentioning of the reasons for acceptance of the explanation of the assessee may not be a defect in the assessment order. So, however, in our considered view, the decision of the Hon’ble High Court has got to be read in the context in which it has been rendered. In the case of Hari Iron Trading Co. (supra), the Assessing Officer had made inquiry and collected material/explanation from the assessee. The said explanation was accepted by the Assessing Officer. The reasons for accepting the explanation were not indicated in the assessment order. So, however, the Assessing Officer had in the officer note explained as to why the addition of Rs. 10 lakhs was not being made. The record also showed that purchases from various parties had been verified by the Assessing Officer and certified copies of the statements from the parties placed on record.

    23. In the present case, the defect in the order of the Assessing Officer is not merely the acceptance of the explanation of the assessee but lack of reasons for taking the view in favour of the assessee. There is no evidence on record on the basis of which one can ascertain the reasons for taking the view in favour of the assessee and ignoring the decision of ITAT, Chandigarh Bench which is the jurisdictional Tribunal in this case.

    24. It is also pertinent to mention that where the Assessing Officer is enquiring about the facts and the assessee furnished evidence, the Assessing Officer may accept the evidence as sufficient in support of the claim. So, however, when a legal issue is involved, the interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Act is involved, it is imperative upon the Assessing Officer to indicate the reasons for interpreting the provisions of the Act in a particular manner. In this case, the Assessing Officer, as pointed out earlier, has not given reasons much less valid reasons for taking the view contrary to the view expressed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the order of the Assessing Officer is not erroneous only for accepting the explanation of the assessee but not basing the order on any reasons much less valid reasons in regard to legal issue involved.

    25. It is also pertinent to mention that the power of the Commissioner of Income-tax under section 263 can be exercised, as pointed out earlier, if twin conditions are satisfied. One of the conditions required for exercising the power under section 263 if that the order of the Assessing Officer is erroneous. In this case, the view taken by the Assessing Officer is the view canvassed by the assessee. No reasons have been given by the Assessing Officer for accepting the claim accepted in regard to interpretation of law. In any case, the view canvassed by the assessee is contrary to the decision of the Tribunal and contrary to law. Therefore, in our considered view, the decision of Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of Hari Iron Trading Co. (supra) is inapplicable to the facts of the present case.

    26. Before proceeding further, it may be relevant to refer to the following observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. Sun Engg. Works (P.) Ltd. [1992] 198 ITR 29715 :—

    "It is neither desirable nor permissible to pick out a word or a sentence from the judgment of the Supreme Court divorced from the context of the question under consideration and treat it to be the complete law declared by the Court. The judgment must be read as a whole and the observations from the judgment have to be considered in the light of the questions which were before the court. A decision of the Supreme Court takes its colour from the questions involved in the case in which it is rendered and, while applying the decision to a later case, courts must carefully try to ascertain the true principle laid down by the decision."

    27. In the case of Hari Iron Trading Co. (supra), the issue was relating to a question of fact. The assessee had furnished sufficient material to establish the claim. The Assessing Officer had in the office note explained the reasons why the explanation of the assessee was accepted. In the present case, the issue is purely legal in nature. The Assessing Officer, neither in the assessment order nor in the office note, placed on record the reasons for accepting the claim of the assessee in preference to the decision of the Tribunal etc. It may be pertinent to mention that the CIT has the power to revise the order of the Assessing Officer even when the latter has given reasons which are found to be contrary to law. The order of the Assessing Officer without any reasons cannot be on a better footing than the order containing reasons which may not be sound. We are, therefore, of the considered view that such an order passed by the Assessing Officer falls within the category of erroneous orders. Reference may also be relevant to the decision of Supreme Court in the case of Malabar Industrial Co. Ltd. (supra), wherein their Lordships held that an incorrect assumption of facts or incorrect application of law will satisfy the requirement of the order being erroneous. We are, therefore, of the considered view that the order of the Assessing Officer was erroneous in regard to determination of the claim of the assessee under section 80HHC.

    28. The next issue is relating to computation of deduction for the purpose of section 115JA. The assessee had claimed deduction on the basis of book profits in the manner as provided under clauses (a), (b) & (c ) of sub-section (3) of section 80HHC. The issue raised by the CIT in order under section 263 is that reduction of book profits has wrongly been allowed by the Assessing Officer insofar as the same was to be allowed to the extent of deduction allowed under section 80HHC. The assessee had invited the attention of the CIT to the CBDT Circular No. 555 dated 4-6-1990, 85 CTR (Statutes) 1 and Circular No. 680 dated 21-2-1994 and the decision of Kerala High Court in the case of CIT v. G.T.N. Textiles Ltd. [2001] 248 ITR 37216, to support the claim that reduction to be made from the book profits for the purpose of section 115JA was to be made by deduction under section 80HHC to be calculated with reference to the book profits in the manner as provided under clause (a), (b) or (c ) of sub-section (3) or sub-section (3A) of section 80HHC. The CIT has pointed out that the said circulars and the decision of the Kerala High Court are with reference to section 115J and the language of section 115JA differs from the language of section 115J. We have compared the language of the relevant provisions of the Act and find a distinction as rightly observed by the CIT :—

    "115J. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of this Act, where in the case of an assessee being a company (other than a company engaged in the business of generation or distribution of electricity), the total income, as computed under this Act in respect of any previous year relevant to the assessment year commencing on or after the 1st day of April, 1988 but before the 1st day of April, 1991 (hereafter in this section referred to as the relevant previous year), is less than thirty per cent of its book profit, the total income of such assessee chargeable to tax for the relevant previous year shall be deemed to be an amount equal to thirty per cent of such book profit.

    (1A) Every assessee, being a company, shall, for the purposes of this section, prepare is profit and loss account for the relevant previous year in accordance with the provisions of Parts II and III of Schedule VI to the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956).

    Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, ‘book profit’ means the net profit as shown in the profit and loss account for the relevant previous year prepared under sub-section (1A), as increased by—

    (a )the amount of income-tax paid or payable and the provision therefor; or

    (b)the amounts carried to any reserves (other than the reserves specified in section 80HHD or sub-section (1) of section 33AC, by whatever name called; or

    (c)the amount or amounts set aside to provisions made for meeting liabilities, other than ascertained liabilities; or

    (d)the amount by way of provision, for losses of subsidiary companies; or

    (e )the amount or amounts of dividends paid or proposed; or

    (f )the amount or amounts of expenditure relatable to any income to which any of the provisions of Chapter III [applies; or]

    (g )the amount withdrawn from the reserve account under section 80HHD, where it has been utilised for any purpose other than those referred to in sub-section (4) of that section; or

    (h)the amount credited to the reserve account under section 80HHD, to the extent that amount has not been utilised within the period specified in sub-section (4) of that section;

    (ha)the amount deemed to be the profits under sub-section (3) of section 33AC,

    if any amount referred to in clauses (a ) to (f) is debited or, as the case may be, the amount referred to in clauses (g) and (h) is not credited to the profit and loss account, and as reduced by,—

    (i )the amount withdrawn from reserves (other than the reserves specified in section 80HHD) or provisions, if any such amount is credited to the profit and loss account :

    Provided that, where this section is applicable to an assessee in any previous year (including the relevant previous year), the amount withdrawn from reserves created or provisions made in a previous year relevant to the assessment year commencing on or after the 1st day of April, 1988 shall not be reduced from the book profit unless the book profit of such year has been increased by those reserves or provisions (out of which the said amount was withdrawn) under this Explanation; or

    (ii)the amount of income to which any of the provisions of Chapter III applies, if any such amount is credited to the profit and loss account; or

    (iii)the amounts as arrived at after increasing the net profit by the amounts referred to in clauses (a) to (f) and reducing the net profit by the amounts referred to in clauses (i) and (ii) attributable to the business, the profits from which are eligible for deduction under section 80HHC or section 80HHD; so, however, that such amounts are computed in the manner specified in sub-section (3) or sub-section (3A) of section 80HHC or sub-section (3) of section 80HHD, as the case may be; or

    (iv)the amount of the loss or the amount of depreciation which would be required to be set off against the profit of the relevant previous year as if the provisions of clause (b) of the first proviso to sub-section (1) of section 205 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), are applicable.

    (2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall affect the determination of the amounts in relation to the relevant previous year to be carried forward to the subsequent year or years under the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 32 or sub-section (3) of section 32A or clause (ii) of sub-section (1) of section 72 or section 73 or section 74 or sub-section (3) of section 74A or sub-section (3) of section 80J.

    115J. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other provisions of this Act, where in the case of an assessee, being a company, the total income, as computed under this Act in respect of any previous year relevant to the assessment year commencing on or after the 1st day of April, 1997 but before the 1st day of April, 2001 (hereafter in this section referred to as the relevant previous year) is less than thirty per cent of its book profit, the total income of such assessee chargeable to tax for the relevant previous year shall be deemed to be an amount equal to thirty per cent of such book profit.

    (2) Every assessee, being a company, shall, for the purposes of this section prepare its profit and loss account for the relevant previous year in accordance with the provisions of Parts II and III of Schedule VI to the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956) :

    Provided that while preparing profit and loss account, the depreciation shall be calculated on the same method and rates which have been adopted for calculating the depreciation for the purpose of preparing the profit and loss account laid before the company at its annual general meeting in accordance with the provisions of section 210 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956) :

    Provided further that where a company has adopted or adopts the financial year under the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), which is different from the previous year under the Act, the method and rates for calculation of depreciation shall correspond to the method and rates which have been adopted for calculating the depreciation for such financial year or part of such financial year falling within the relevant previous year.

    Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, "book profit" means the net profit as shown in the profit and loss account for the relevant previous year prepared under sub-section (2), as increased by—

    (a )the amount of income-tax paid or payable, and the provision therefor; or

    (b)the amounts carried to any reserves by whatever name called; or

    (c )the amount or amounts set aside to provisions made for meeting liabilities, other than ascertained liabilities; or

    (d)the amount by way of provision for losses of subsidiary companies; or

    (e )the amount or amounts of dividends paid or proposed; or

    (f )the amount or amounts of expenditure relatable to any income to which any of the provisions of Chapter III applies;

    if any amount referred to in clauses (a) to (f ) is debited to the profit and loss account, and as reduced by,—

    (i )the amount withdrawn from any reserves or provisions if any such amount is credited to the profit and loss account :

    Provided that, where this section is applicable to an assessee in any previous year (including the relevant previous year), the amount withdrawn from reserves created or provisions made in a previous year relevant to the assessment year commencing on or after the 1st day of April, 1997 [but ending before the 1st day of April, 2001] shall not be reduced from the book profit unless the book profit of such year has been increased by those reserves or provisions (out of which the said amount was withdrawn) under this Explanation; or

    (ii)the amount of income to which any of the provisions of Chapter III applies, if any such amount is credited to the profit and loss account; or

    (iii)the amount of loss brought forward or unabsorbed depreciation, whichever is less as per books of account.

    Explanation.—For the purposes of this clause the loss shall not include depreciation; or

    (iv)the amount of profits derived by an industrial undertaking from the business of generation or generation and distribution of power; or

    (v)the amount of profits derived by an industrial undertaking located in an industrially backward State or district as referred to in sub-section (4) and sub-section (5) of section 80-IB, for the assessment years such industrial undertaking is eligible to claim a deduction of hundred per cent of the profits and gains under sub-section (4) or sub-section (5) of section 80-IB; or

    (vi)the amount of profits derived by an industrial undertaking from the business of developing, maintaining and operating any infrastructure facility as defined in the Explanation to sub-section (4) of section 80-IA and subject to fulfilling the conditions laid down in that sub-section; or

    (vii)the amount of profits of sick industrial company for the assessment year commencing from the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the said company has become a sick industrial company under sub-section (1) of section 17 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (1 of 1986) and ending with the assessment year during which the entire net worth of such company becomes equal to or exceeds the accumulated losses.

    Explanation.—For the purposes of this clause, "net worth" shall have the meaning assigned to it in clause (ga) of sub-section (1) of section 3 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (1 of 1986); or

    (viii)the amount of profits eligible for deduction under section 80HHC, computed under clause (a), (b) or (c ) of sub-section (3) or sub-section (3A), as the case may be, of that section and subject to the conditions specified in sub-sections (4) and (4A) of that section;

    (ix)the amount of profits eligible for deduction under section 80HHE, computed under sub-section (3) of that section.

    (3) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall affect the determination of the amounts in relation to the relevant previous year to be carried forward to the subsequent year or years under the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 32 or sub-section (3) of section 32A or clause (ii) of sub-section (1) of section 72 or section 74 or sub-section (3) of section 74A.

    (4) Save as otherwise provided in this section, all other provisions of this Act shall apply to every company, being a company, mentioned in this section."

    It is observed from clause (iii) of section 115J that reduction is provided with reference to deduction under section 80HHC to be computed in the manner specified in sub-section (3) or sub-section (3A) of section 80HHC etc. It is thus clear that Legislature intended to allow deduction with reference to the book profits to the extent the assessee would be entitled to deduction under section 80HHC which was to be calculated in the manner as provided under that section. It is clear from the language of the section that actual deduction permitted to the assessee under section 80HHC was not to be reduced from the book profits but the deduction was to be calculated with reference to the book profits as attributable to export profits to be computed in the manner under section 80HHC. So, however, there is vital distinction in section 115JA(viii) reproduced above. The sub-section provides for reduction to the extent of the profits eligible for deduction under section 80HHC computed under clause (a), (b) or (c ) of sub-section (3) or sub-section (3A). The words "in the manner" have been omitted from the language of above quoted sub-section. It is, therefore, evident that after the assessment what is to be reduced from the profits and gains of business as per the books of account is the amount of deduction under section 80HHC computed under the relevant provisions of the Act. So a plain reading of clause (viii) gives the indication that the Assessing Officer had wrongly accepted the claim of the assessee. The Assessing Officer did not notice the distinction between section 115J and section 115JA. The Assessing Officer has not given any reasons for accepting the claim of the assessee which was calculated in the manner as provided under section 115J. No reasons have been assigned to hold that sub-clause (viii) of section 115JA was different from clause (iii) of section 115J. We are, therefore, of the considered view that the order of the Assessing Officer was erroneous insofar as it was prejudicial to the interests of the revenue in regard to computation of deduction under section 115JA also.

    29. The CIT has also referred to certain other alleged mistakes such as wrong allowance of MAT credit, wrong claim of deduction under section 80G etc. The assessee has given explanations in regard to these issues and we are satisfied that there is no error committed by the Assessing Officer in regard to small issues raised by the CIT. So, however, in regard to calculation of deduction under section 80HHC and in regard to computation of profits for the purpose of section 115JA, we are of the view that the order passed by the Assessing Officer was erroneous insofar as it was prejudicial to the interests of the revenue. The CIT was accordingly justified in setting aside the assessment order and directing the Assessing Officer to make assessment afresh in accordance with law.

    30. Before winding up, it may be pertinent to mention that it was brought to our notice that the CIT in fresh proceedings has decided both the issues in favour of the assessee. In our considered view, since the CIT has asked the Assessing Officer to decide the issue afresh in accordance with law, the law will take its own course in passing of the fresh order by the Assessing Officer. The issues have got to be decided in accordance with law and assessee has the right to appeal against the order of the Assessing Officer. The order of CIT is again subject to appellate jurisdiction of the Tribunal, High Court etc. We make it clear that our order will not prejudice the outcome of such proceedings. We have confined ourselves to the validity of order under section 263 passed by the Commissioner of Income-tax. We on the basis of material on record are satisfied that the order passed by the CIT under section 263 is within his powers and there is no infirmity in his order to the extent indicated above. We accordingly uphold his order for assessment year 2000-01.

    31. As indicated earlier, but decision for assessment year 2000-01 shall apply mutatis mutandis to the appeal for assessment year 2001-02 as well.

    32. In the result, the appeals of the assessee for both the assessment years are dismissed.

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    Ind Sphinx Precision Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Shimla
    (Nov 10, 2006)