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Neutral Summary of Opinion — High Court of Delhi (Navin Chawla, J.) — 30 November 2018

Factual and Procedural Background

These matters comprise four petitions (ARB.P. 749/2018, ARB.P. 750/2018, ARB.P. 752/2018 and ARB.P. 753/2018) filed under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 by the petitioner, Virgo Softech Ltd., seeking appointment of an arbitrator to adjudicate disputes arising under agreements executed between the parties. The petitions raised a common issue and were heard together by this Court.

During the proceedings an interlocutory application (I.A. No.16365/2018 in ARB.P.749/2018) seeking condonation of a delay of 19 days in filing a rejoinder was also considered; that application was allowed and the delay was condoned.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the High Court of Delhi has territorial jurisdiction to entertain petitions under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, given the wording of Clause 8.2 of the General Conditions of Contract (GCC) which provides that "arbitration proceedings shall be held in New Delhi" but also states that "The courts in Chandigarh only shall have exclusive jurisdiction to try and entertain any dispute arising therefrom."
  2. Whether the contractual reference to New Delhi constitutes the "seat" of arbitration (thereby conferring jurisdiction on the courts at New Delhi) or merely a "venue" (leaving territorial jurisdiction with the courts at Chandigarh as expressly provided in the clause).

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent's Arguments

  • The respondent raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the petitions before the High Court of Delhi on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction.
  • Relying on Clause 8.2 of the GCC (identical across the agreements), the respondent submitted that only the High Court of Punjab and Haryana (i.e., courts at Chandigarh) have jurisdiction to entertain petitions under Section 11 of the Act.

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner argued that Clause 8.2(b) of the GCC (and a similarly worded provision in the Special Conditions of Contract) provides for the arbitration "to be held in New Delhi", which the petitioner treated as the seat of arbitration.
  • The petitioner relied on several authorities (including the Supreme Court decision in Bharat Aluminium Company v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc., Indus Mobile Distribution v. Datawind Innovations, and other decisions of this Court) to contend that where the seat is New Delhi, this Court would have exclusive jurisdiction to entertain petitions under Section 11.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bharat Aluminium Company v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc. (Supreme Court) Principle that the "seat" of arbitration determines the jurisdiction of the court. The Court held this precedent to be distinguishable and not applicable because the agreements in the present case provide only for a venue (arbitration to be held in New Delhi) while expressly conferring jurisdiction on the courts at Chandigarh.
Indus Mobile Distribution Pvt. Ltd. v. Datawind Innovations Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. (Supreme Court) Authority relied upon by petitioner concerning jurisdiction/seat issues. The Court considered this authority distinguishable on the facts of the present case (no detailed factual overlap identified in the opinion).
M/s NJ Construction (Through its Proprietor) v. Ayursundra Health Care Pvt. Ltd. (Delhi High Court) Considered situation where two clauses prescribed different forums; where seat was prescribed as New Delhi, Delhi High Court had jurisdiction for arbitration-related disputes. The Court observed NJ Construction was distinguishable because that case involved a separate clause prescribing the seat as New Delhi; in the present case the clause expressly confers exclusive jurisdiction on courts at Chandigarh.
Raman Deep Singh Taneja v. Crown Realtech Pvt. Ltd. (Delhi High Court) Construction of contractual clause conferring jurisdiction; whether it applied to arbitration matters. The Court noted that in Raman Deep Singh Taneja the jurisdiction conferred on that Court was not for arbitration matters; relied on this distinction in analysis.
Rohit Bhasin and Anr. v. Nandini Hotels (Delhi High Court) Authority cited by petitioner in support of Delhi having jurisdiction where seat is at New Delhi. The Court treated this decision as one of the authorities relied upon by the petitioner but found it distinguishable on the facts/terms of the agreements before it.
Calderys India Refractries Ltd. v. A2Z Powercom Ltd. (Delhi High Court) Previous Delhi High Court decision touching upon arbitration-seat/venue and jurisdiction issues. The Court observed that the petitioner's reliance on this Court's earlier decisions was not persuasive on the facts here and found those decisions distinguishable.
Union of India v. Hardy Exploration and Production (India) INC (Supreme Court) Clarification of the distinction between "seat" and "venue" of arbitration; discussion of Articles 20 and 31(3) of the UNCITRAL Model Law and how "place" and "seat" operate; explanation that a venue does not ipso facto become a seat without additional indicia. The Court relied on this decision for the proposition that mention of a place (e.g., New Delhi) may be only a venue and does not automatically determine the seat; used it to conclude New Delhi was a venue in the present agreements, not the seat.
Sumitomo Heavy Industries Ltd.; Reliance Industries Limited (II); Bhatia International (referenced within Hardy) These authorities are referenced in the Hardy exposition concerning the development of law on seat/venue and implied exclusion of Part I of the Act; the opinion notes the Sumitomo principle was referred to and distinguished in Reliance Industries Limited (II), and mentions Bhatia International in relation to implied exclusion. The Court reproduced passages from Hardy which reference these authorities; the Hardy decision (quoted) treated these authorities in its discussion of seat vs venue. The present Court relied on the Hardy exposition rather than applying Sumitomo/Reliance/Bhatia directly.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined Clause 8.2 of the GCC in the agreements. Clause 8.2(a) permits arbitration under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and provides for a sole arbitrator; Clause 8.2(b) states that "arbitration proceedings shall be held in New Delhi" and that the language shall be English. Crucially, Clause 8.2(b) goes on to provide that "The courts in Chandigarh only shall have exclusive jurisdiction to try and entertain any dispute arising therefrom."

The Court's analysis proceeded as follows:

  • The Court read Clause 8.2 holistically and observed the specific stipulation that the courts in Chandigarh shall have exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising out of the arbitration proceedings.
  • Given that express grant of jurisdiction to the courts at Chandigarh, the reference to New Delhi in Clause 8.2(b) was interpreted as specifying the venue (i.e., the physical place where proceedings may be held) rather than the "seat" of arbitration (which determines jurisdiction of courts under arbitration law).
  • The Court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Union of India v. Hardy, which clarifies the distinction between seat and venue, explains the role of Articles 20 and 31(3) of the UNCITRAL Model Law, and indicates that a "place" is not necessarily the "seat" unless additional indicia are present to convert a venue into a seat.
  • Applying Hardy, the Court concluded that the contractual wording in the present case did not constitute an express naming of New Delhi as the seat; instead, the contracts expressly assigned jurisdiction to the courts at Chandigarh, thereby making New Delhi a venue only.
  • The Court examined and distinguished the authorities relied upon by the petitioner (including Bharat Aluminium and other decisions). For example, Bharat Aluminium's principle that the seat determines jurisdiction did not help the petitioner because here there was no contractual seat at New Delhi; the clause conferred exclusive jurisdiction on Chandigarh.
  • Based on that construction, the Court held it did not have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the petitions under Section 11 of the Act.

Holding and Implications

Final Ruling: The petitions were dismissed on the ground that the High Court of Delhi lacks territorial jurisdiction to entertain them because Clause 8.2(b) of the General Conditions of Contract expressly confers exclusive jurisdiction on the courts at Chandigarh for disputes arising out of the arbitration proceedings.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The petitions under Section 11 were dismissed for want of territorial jurisdiction; the petitioner was left free to pursue its remedies before the court of competent jurisdiction (i.e., the courts at Chandigarh) as may be available in law.
  • Procedure: The interlocutory application for condonation of delay in filing the rejoinder (I.A. No.16365/2018) was allowed and the delay of 19 days was condoned.
  • Costs: There was no order as to costs.
  • Broader precedent: The opinion does not purport to lay down any novel rule of law beyond applying existing principles (in particular the distinction between "seat" and "venue" as explained by the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Hardy). The Court did not indicate that it was establishing any new rule beyond its conclusion on contract construction in these cases.

Source: Opinion delivered by Hon'ble Mr. Justice Navin Chawla, High Court of Delhi, dated 30 November 2018, covering ARB.P. 749/2018, ARB.P. 750/2018, ARB.P. 752/2018 and ARB.P. 753/2018. The summary above is strictly limited to and derived from the content of that opinion.

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    Virgo Softech Ltd. v. National Institute Of Electronics And Information Technology .

    ARB.P.749/2018, 750/2018, 752/2018 & 753/2018 Page 1 $~3 to 6

    * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI Date of decision: 30th November, 2018

    + ARB.P. 749/2018 + ARB.P. 750/2018 + ARB.P. 752/2018 + ARB.P. 753/2018 VIRGO SOFTECH LTD. ..... Petitioner Through Mr.Akhil Sacher and Ms.Sunanda Tulayan, Advs.

    versus

    NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ELECTRONICS AND

    INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY. ..... Respondent Through Mr.Vinod Diwakar, CGSC alongwith Mr.Susheel Kr.

    Gabgotra, Addl. Director.

    CORAM:

    HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAVIN CHAWLA

    NAVIN CHAWLA, J. (Oral) I.A. No.16365/2018 (Delay) in ARB.P.749/2018

    This is an application seeking condonation of 19 days delay in filing of the rejoinder.

    For the reasons stated in the application, the delay is condoned and application stands allowed.

    1

    ARB.P. 749/2018 ARB.P. 750/2018 ARB.P. 752/2018 ARB.P. 753/2018

    1. These petitions under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the „Act") have been filed by the petitioner seeking appointment of an Arbitrator for adjudicating the disputes that had arisen between the parties in relation to the Agreement(s) executed between the parties. As a common issue arises in these petitions, they are being disposed of by this common order.

    2. Counsel for the respondent has raised a preliminary objection on the maintainability of the present petitions before this Court on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. Relying upon the Clause 8.2 of the General Conditions of Contract (GCC), which is identical in all the Agreement(s), he submits that only the High Court of Punjab and Haryana would have the jurisdiction to entertain the petition(s) under Section 11 of the Act.

    3. Clause 8.2 of the GCC is quoted hereinbelow:

    "8.2 Arbitration

    a) In the case of dispute arising upon or in relation to or in connection with the contract between the Purchaser and MSP-1, which has not been settled amicably, any party can refer the dispute for Arbitration under (Indian) Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Such disputes shall be referred to the sole arbitrator nominated by DIT.

    2

    b) Arbitration proceedings shall be held in New Delhi and the language of the arbitration proceedings and that of all documents and communications between the parties shall be English.

    The decision of the arbitrators shall be final and binding upon both parties. The expenses of the arbitrators as determined by the arbitrators shall be shared equally by the Purchaser and MSP-1. However, the expenses incurred by each party in connection with the preparation, presentation shall be borne by the party itself. All arbitration awards shall be in writing and shall state the reasons for the award. The courts in Chandigarh only shall have exclusive jurisdiction to try and entertain any dispute arising there from." (Emphasis supplied)

    4. Counsel for the petitioner submits that Clause 8.2(b) of the GCC provides for seat of arbitration to be at New Delhi. Relying upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Bharat Aluminium Company v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc. ., 2012(8) SCALE 333; Indus Mobile Distribution Pvt. Ltd. v. Datawind Innovations Pvt. Ltd. and Anr, AIR 2017 SC 2105 and of this Court in M/s NJ Construction (Through its Proprietor) v. Ayursundra Health Care Pvt. Ltd, 2018(168) DRJ 274; Mr.Raman Deep Singh Taneja v. Crown Realtech Pvt. Ltd., 2017 SCC OnLine Del 11966; and Rohit Bhasin and Anr. v. Nandini Hotels, 2013 SCC OnLine Del 2300, he submits that the seat of the arbitration being at New Delhi, this Court would have exclusive jurisdiction to entertain the present petitions.

    5. He also placed reliance of Clause 8.2(b) of the Special Conditions of Contract (SC), which reads as under:

    3

    "8.2 (b) The Arbitration proceedings shall take place in New Delhi in India."

    6. I have considered the submissions made by the counsel for the petitioner, however, find no merit in the same. Clause 8.2(b) of the GCC which has been reproduced hereinabove, clearly provides that though the arbitration proceedings shall be conducted at New Delhi, the "courts in Chandigarh only shall have exclusive jurisdiction to try and entertain any disputes arising there from". The Agreement(s) therefore, clearly provides that all disputes, including those arising out of the arbitration proceedings, have to be necessarily tried by the Court at Chandigarh alone. In view of the above specific Clause, the stipulation that the arbitration proceedings shall be held at New Delhi, would make New Delhi only a „venue" of the arbitration and not the „seat" of the arbitration.

    7. In Union of India v. Hardy Exploration and Production (India) INC, 2018 SCC OnLine SC 1640, the Supreme Court has again considered the law in relation to the difference between the „seat" and the „venue" of arbitration and has held as under:

    "27. In view of the aforesaid development of law, there is no confusion with regard to what the seat of arbitration and venue of arbitration mean. There is no shadow of doubt that the arbitration clause has to be read in a holistic manner so as to determine the jurisdiction of the Court. That apart, if there is mention of venue and something else is appended thereto, depending on the nature of the prescription, the Court can come to a conclusion that there is implied exclusion of Part I of the Act. The principle laid down in Sumitomo Heavy Industries Ltd. (supra) has been referred

    4

    to in Reliance Industries Limited (II) and distinguished. In any case, it has no applicability to a controversy under the Act. The said controversy has to be governed by the BALCO principle or by the agreement or by the principle of implied exclusion as has been held in Bhatia International.

    xxx

    34. On a perusal of Articles 20 and 31(3) of the UNCITRAL Model Laws, we find that the parties are free to agree on the place of arbitration. Once the said consent is given in the arbitration clause or it is interpretably deduced from the clause and the other concomitant factors like the case of Harmony Innovation Shipping Ltd. which states about the venue and something in addition by which the seat of arbitration is determinable. The other mode, as Article 20 of the UNCITRAL Model Law provides, is that where the parties do not agree on the place of arbitration, the same shall be determined by the Arbitral Tribunal. Such a power of adjudication has been conferred on the Arbitral Tribunal. Article 31(3) clearly stipulates that the Award shall state the date and the place of arbitration as determined in accordance with Article 20(1).

    xxx

    40. The said test clearly means that the expression of determination signifies an expressive opinion. In the instant case, there has been no adjudication and expression of an opinion. Thus, the word „place" cannot be used as seat. To elaborate, a venue can become a seat if something else is added to it as a concomitant. But a place unlike seat, at least as is seen in the contract, can become a seat if one of the conditions precedent is satisfied. It does not ipso facto assume the status of seat. Thus understood, Kuala Lumpur is not the seat or place of arbitration and the interchangeable use will not apply in stricto sensu.

    5

    8. The judgments being relied upon by the counsel for the petitioner are clearly distinguishable.

    9. In Bharat Aluminium Company (supra), the Supreme Court has held that the „seat" of the arbitration shall determine the jurisdiction of the Court. In the present case, as the Agreement(s) only provide for „venue" of arbitration at New Delhi, the said judgment is not applicable.

    10. Similar is the position with respect to the judgments of Supreme Court in Indus Mobile Distribution (supra) and of this Court in M/s Calderys India Refractries Ltd. v. A2Z Powercom Ltd,. 2014 SCC OnLine Del 7473.

    11. In NJ Construction (supra) the Court was confronted with two separate Clauses in the Agreement; one conferring the jurisdiction in the Courts at Guwahati, while the other in the addendum to the Agreement stipulating that the seat of the arbitration shall be at New Delhi. It was in these circumstances, the Court found that as the seat of the arbitration has been prescribed to be at New Delhi, for disputes relating to arbitration this Court alone would have jurisdiction.

    12. In Raman Deep Singh Taneja (supra) this Court again found that the jurisdiction conferred on this Court by Clause 24 of the Agreement therein was not for matters relating to arbitration.

    13. In the present case, Clause 8.2 (b) of the GCC clearly confers exclusive jurisdiction in the Court at Chandigarh to entertain all disputes arising out of or in relation to the arbitration proceedings.

    6

    14. In view of the above, as Clause 8.2 (b) of the GCC confers exclusive jurisdiction in the Courts at Chandigarh in relation to the disputes arising out of the arbitration proceedings, this Court would not have the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the present petitions.

    15. The petitions are, therefore, dismissed, leaving it open to the petitioner to take appropriate legal remedy as may be available to it in law, before the court of competent jurisdiction.

    16. There shall be no order as to cost. Dasti.

    NAVIN CHAWLA, J

    NOVEMBER 30, 2018/Arya

    7

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    Virgo Softech Ltd. v. National Institute Of Electronics And Information Technology .
    (Nov 30, 2018)