AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2018 INSC 1031
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 302, Section 376(2)(f), and Section 342 of the Penal Code, 1860 (for short “IPC”)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2018 INSC 1031
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 302, Section 376(2)(f), and Section 342 of the Penal Code, 1860 (for short “IPC”)
Smart Summary

This appeal is filed by the appellant who has been convicted for the offences under Sections 302, 376(2)(f) and 342 of the Penal Code, 1860 (for short “IPC”). He was awarded death penalty for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC by the trial court vide its judgment dated 27-9-2013 in Sessions Case No. 87 of 2012. For the offence under Section 376(2)(f) IPC, the appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment and for the offence under Section 342 IPC, the trial court awarded simple imprisonment for two months.

Reverting to the issue of death penalty, the learned Senior Counsel submitted that the case did not fall under the category of the rarest of rare cases and, therefore, the capital punishment was not a desirable punishment in the instant case. After examining the matter at length, we are of the opinion that the instant case would not fall in the category of the rarest of rare cases and it would be in the interest of justice if the death sentence is commuted into life imprisonment. At the same time, we are also of the opinion that life sentence should be with a cap of 20 years' rigorous imprisonment (RI) which would mean that the appellant shall not be entitled to make any representation for remission till he completes 20 years of RI. It is more so, keeping in view the age of the appellant who is at present more than 60 years of age, and has no history of any other criminal activity, possibility of reform, as the learned counsel for the respondent State could not point out blameworthy conduct depicted by him in jail.

The appeal is partly allowed in the aforesaid terms.

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    Babasaheb Maruti Kamble (S) v. State Of Maharashtra (S).

    Dr A.K. Sikri, J.— Leave granted. We have heard the counsel for the parties at length.

    2. This appeal is filed by the appellant who has been convicted for the offences under Sections 302, 376(2)(f) and 342 of the Penal Code, 1860 (for short “IPC”). He was awarded death penalty for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC by the trial court vide its judgment dated 27-9-2013 in Sessions Case No. 87 of 2012. For the offence under Section 376(2)(f) IPC, the appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment and for the offence under Section 342 IPC, the trial court awarded simple imprisonment for two months.

    3. Since sentence of death was imposed on the petitioner, the Sessions Judge made a reference to the High Court for confirmation of death sentence. The petitioner also challenged his conviction and sentences imposed by filing Criminal Appeal No. 80 of 2014 before the High Court. The said appeal as well as reference were heard together by the High Court. The High Court upheld the conviction under the aforesaid provisions and also confirmed death sentence of the petitioner vide its judgment dated 10-7-2014 2014 SCC OnLine Bom 1288. It is this judgment which is assailed in the present appeal.

    4. In the first instance, we have heard the learned counsel for the parties on the question as to whether the conviction of the appellant has been rightly recorded by the trial court, and affirmed by the High Court. The learned counsel for both the parties have taken us through the material on record as well as relevant evidence which was produced by the prosecution before the trial court. No doubt it is a case of circumstantial evidence as there are no eyewitnesses. At the same time, we find that the circumstances produced before the trial court weave an unbroken chain which point accusing finger towards the appellant thereby proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. These circumstances are recorded by the High Court as well in para 8 of the judgment. There are as many as eleven incriminating circumstances which have been proved on record. These include the circumstances of last seen, namely, the appellant was found talking with the victim girl and taking her to his house. Such an occurrence was seen by PW 4 Dharmendra, PW 5 Shrikant, PW 15 Survarna and PW 21 Radheshyam. The Court has also gone into the conduct of the appellant when the mother of the victim girl went to his house to enquire about her daughter. The appellant had replied that he had not sent her daughter anywhere and that he was not aware of the whereabouts of her daughter. However, the dead body of the victim girl was found in his house under the bed on which he was lying down, when enquired. Slippers and clothes of the victim girl were also recovered from the house of the appellant. Likewise there was a seizure of bloodstained chadar. The medical evidence produced by the prosecution including DNA report and post-mortem report of the girl completely corroborated the aforesaid circumstances. Above all, the appellant had not offered any plausible explanation about the presence of the dead body of the victim girl in his house or about other incriminating circumstances, when his statement was recorded under Section 313 CrPC. There is an elaborate discussion about the deposition of various witnesses who proved the aforesaid circumstances.

    5. Mr Naphade, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant, was unable to point out any flaw in the impugned judgment of the High Court upholding the conviction of the appellant under the provisions of Sections 302, 376(2)(f) and Section 342 IPC. In fact, conscience of the limitation of the appellant's case insofar as his conviction is concerned, main emphasis of Mr Naphade was on the death sentence which is imposed upon the appellant for the offence under Section 302 IPC. For the aforesaid reasons, insofar as conviction of the appellant under the aforesaid provisions of IPC is concerned, the same is maintained and upheld.

    6. Reverting to the issue of death penalty, the learned Senior Counsel submitted that the case did not fall under the category of the rarest of rare cases and, therefore, the capital punishment was not a desirable punishment in the instant case. We have given our serious thoughts on this aspect. After examining the matter at length, we are of the opinion that the instant case would not fall in the category of the rarest of rare cases and it would be in the interest of justice if the death sentence is commuted into life imprisonment. At the same time, we are also of the opinion that life sentence should be with a cap of 20 years' rigorous imprisonment (RI) which would mean that the appellant shall not be entitled to make any representation for remission till he completes 20 years of RI. It is more so, keeping in view the age of the appellant who is at present more than 60 years of age, and has no history of any other criminal activity, possibility of reform, as the learned counsel for the respondent State could not point out blameworthy conduct depicted by him in jail.

    7. The appeal is partly allowed in the aforesaid terms. Insofar as sentences given under Sections 376 and 342 IPC are concerned, those are maintained with clarification that all the sentences shall run concurrently.

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    Babasaheb Maruti Kamble (S) v. State Of Maharashtra (S).
    (Nov 1, 2018)