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Court Opinion Summary — Writ Petition No. 768 of 2014

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner is the Indian Coffee Workers' Co-operative Society (Indian Coffee House, SDF Canteen, Seepz, Andheri (East), Mumbai) — a cooperative society of catering workers where workmen are shareholders and run day-to-day affairs themselves. The petitioner applied annually to the State Government for exemption from the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 (ESI Act).

Procedural and factual events relevant to this petition (as stated in the opinion):

  • Exemption for the year 01/04/2008 to 31/03/2009 was granted (up to 31/03/2009).
  • An application for exemption for the period 01/04/2009 to 31/03/2010 (made around 01/04/2009) was not granted; a subsequent application for 01/04/2010 to 31/03/2011 (made 01/04/2010) received no favourable response.
  • In the interim Section 91-A of the ESI Act was amended to provide that exemptions may be granted only prospectively.
  • The petitioner made reminders/representations. Exemption for the later period 01/04/2011 to 31/03/2012 was granted by Notification dated 09/02/2012 (effective 09/02/2012 to 08/02/2013). Exemption for 06/04/2013 to 05/04/2014 was also granted.
  • For the period 01/04/2009 to 08/02/2012 the petitioner’s applications were rejected. By letter dated 29/03/2010 the State informed the petitioner that exemption could not be granted because ESIC facilities were superior to those provided by the petitioner.
  • The Joint Director of ESIC by letter dated 07/02/2011 referred to the 29/03/2010 communication and noted the amended Section 91-A, stating that exemptions could only be granted prospectively.
  • The impugned communication which the petitioner challenges in this writ petition is a letter dated 15/05/2013 from the State of Maharashtra (Industries, Energy & Labour Department) informing that exemption cannot be granted for the claimed period because of the amendment to Section 91-A and that the file had been referred to the Law & Judiciary Department for its opinion.
  • The petitioner invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to challenge the 15/05/2013 communication.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the petitioner could be granted exemption for the period 01/04/2009 to 09/02/2012 in view of the amended Section 91-A of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 which provides that notifications granting exemption "may be issued so as to take effect [prospectively] on such date as may be specified therein".
  2. Whether the amendment to Section 91-A operates retrospectively so as to take away any vested right of the petitioner (and of the employees) to seek exemption or to retain previously existing rights.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The amendment to Section 91-A could not be applied to the period 01/04/2009 to 31/03/2010 because that period predates the amendment coming into force (the amended provision came into force on 01/04/2008 according to the petitioner's submissions).
  • The amendment cannot be operated retrospectively to take away the petitioner's vested right to seek exemption, nor to take away the vested rights of the employees to seek benefits from the petitioner.
  • Reliance was placed on three Supreme Court judgments: Govinddas & others v. The Income Tax Officer (AIR 1977 SC 552), P. D. Aggarwal & others v. State of U.P. & others (AIR 1987 SC 1676), and Employees' State Insurance Corporation & ors. v. Jardine Henderson Staff Association & Ors. (AIR 2006 SC 2767) in support of the contention that retrospective operation or deprivation of vested rights should not be lightly permitted.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The respondents (both the State and Respondent No.2) supported the impugned communication dated 15/05/2013 and contended that, in view of the amended Section 91-A, it is not possible to grant exemption with retrospective effect for the period 01/04/2009 to 31/03/2010 (and, by extension, the relevant earlier period up to 09/02/2012).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Govinddas & others v. The Income Tax Officer and another, AIR 1977 SC 552 The principle that, unless a statute expressly provides or necessarily requires retrospective operation, retrospective operation should not be given so as to take away or impair an existing right or create a new obligation or impose a new liability. The Court observed the principle but held that the precedent did not further the petitioner’s case on the facts — in part because the petitioner had already been told by letter dated 29/03/2010 that exemption could not be granted on specified grounds and because, even if the impugned communication were set aside, any fresh consideration would have to be under the amended Section 91-A (prospective operation).
P. D. Aggarwal & others v. State of U.P. & others, AIR 1987 SC 1676 Rule affecting seniority rights was held to take away vested rights and was violative of Articles 14 and 16; principle that a retrospective rule which takes away vested rights may be unconstitutional. The Court noted the principle from this case but found it inapplicable to advance the petitioner’s position on the facts before it; it did not lead to a different result given Section 91-A's clear prospective mandate and the prior communications rejecting exemption.
Employees' State Insurance Corporation & ors. v. Jardine Henderson Staff Association & Ors., AIR 2006 SC 2767 Applied principles including Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit (no party shall be prejudiced for the act of Court) and held that an amendment was to be implemented prospectively so as not to saddle parties with liability for past years. The Court considered this authority but concluded it did not assist the petitioner. The opinion observed that the present statutory text (Section 91-A) explicitly contemplates prospective operation and that, practically, any reconsideration now would have to follow Section 91-A's prospective mandate.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in a stepwise manner rooted in the text of the amended provision and the administrative chronology recorded in the record:

  1. Textual analysis of Section 91-A: The Court set out the amended provision (Section 91-A) which provides: "Any notification granting exemption under section 87, section 88, section 90 or section 91 may be issued so as to take effect [prospectively] on such date as may be specified therein." The Court construed that language to mean that exemptions are to take effect prospectively (i.e., on a specified future date) and that notifications may be issued to take effect prospectively.
  2. Identification of the relief sought: The petitioner sought exemption for the period 01/04/2009 to 09/02/2012. The Court considered whether, under the amended Section 91-A, such retrospective exemption could be granted.
  3. Administrative history and prior communications: The Court emphasized that the petitioner had already received a rejection communicated by letter dated 29/03/2010 stating that exemption could not be granted because ESIC facilities were superior to those provided by the petitioner. The ESIC's Joint Director also wrote on 07/02/2011 referring to the 29/03/2010 letter and noting that exemptions could only be granted prospectively under the amended Section 91-A. The impugned 15/05/2013 letter reiterated that exemption could not be granted in view of the amendment and stated that the matter was referred to the Law & Judiciary Department.
  4. Nature of the impugned communication: The Court observed that the 15/05/2013 communication was an administrative decision by the State Government and not a decision rendered by an appellate or specially empowered statutory authority. Nevertheless, it was treated as the last administrative decision in the line concerning the petitioner's exemption applications.
  5. Practical consequence of remanding or setting aside the communication: The Court reasoned that even if the 15/05/2013 communication were set aside and the matter remanded for de novo consideration by the State, "no useful purpose would be served" because any reconsideration today would have to be done pursuant to Section 91-A and therefore could not result in retrospective exemption. The Court thus treated attempts to obtain retrospective relief as foreclosed by the statutory language.
  6. Consideration of precedents relied on by the petitioner: The Court reviewed the three cited Supreme Court authorities and explained their principles (against retrospective impairment of vested rights, protection of vested seniority rights, and prospective application in particular circumstances). The Court concluded that those authorities did not further the petitioner's case in the particular statutory and factual matrix before it.
  7. Conclusion from combined analysis: Given the clear language of Section 91-A directing that exemptions would take effect prospectively, and the antecedent administrative communications rejecting exemption on substantive (ESIC facilities superior) grounds, the Court concluded that retrospective exemption for the period in question could not be granted.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The Writ Petition is DISMISSED. The Rule is discharged, with no order as to costs.

Implications and immediate consequences (as expressly indicated in the opinion):

  • The petitioner is not entitled to retrospective exemption for the period 01/04/2009 to 09/02/2012 in light of Section 91-A's prospective operation requirement.
  • Setting aside the 15/05/2013 communication and remitting the matter for fresh consideration would not achieve the petitioner’s objective because any fresh consideration would be governed by Section 91-A and therefore could not result in retrospective operation.
  • The Court did not record any finding that this decision creates a new legal precedent beyond applying the plain language of Section 91-A to the facts; the decision limits itself to the direct effect on the parties by dismissing the petition and refusing retrospective relief.

Judgment delivered orally on 17 October 2018 by R. M. Savant and Nitin W. Sambre, JJ.

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    Indian Coffee Workers' Co-Op. Society Ltd. Petitioner. v. Secretary, Industries, Energy And Labour Department, Mumbai And Another S

    (37) wp-768.14.doc

    IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

    ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION

    WRIT PETITION NO.768 OF 2014

    The Indian Coffee Workers' Co-op. ] Society Ltd. Indian Coffee House ] SDF Canteen, Seepz, Andheri (East) ] Mumbai - 400 096 ]..... Petitioner. Versus

    1] The Secretary, ] Industries, Energy & Labour ] Department, Government ] of Maharashtra, Mantralaya ] Mumbai 400032. ]

    ]

    2] The Regional Director, ] Sub Regional Office - Marol ] Employees State Insurance ] Corporation, Panchdeep ] Bhawan, MIDC, Andheri (E) ] Mumbai - 400 097 ]..... Respondents. Mr. S C Naidu I/by Mr. M S Roy for the Petitioner. Mr. Dushyant Kumar, AGP, for the Respondent No.1 Mr. P M Palshikar for the Respondent No.2.

    CORAM : R. M. SAVANT &

    NITIN W. SAMBRE, JJ.

    DATE : 17th OCTOBER 2018

    ORAL JUDGMENT : [PER R. M. SAVANT, J]

    1 Rule, with the consent of the learned counsel for the parties made returnable forthwith and heard.

    2 The writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the

    1

    Constitution of India is invoked against the letter/communication dated 15/05/2013 of the State of Maharashtra in the Industries, Energy and Labour Department by which the Petitioner is communicated that exemption cannot be granted to the Petitioner for the period claimed for the reasons mentioned in the said letter.

    3 The facts giving rise to the filing of the above Writ Petition can in brief be stated thus :-

    The Petitioner is a Co-operative Society of workers engaged in the field of catering. The workmen employed with the Petitioner Society are the shareholders of the Society. The day-to-day affairs of the Petitioner Society are managed by the employees themselves. The Petitioner has been rendering services for about 54 years. The Petitioner has been making application for exemption every year from the application of the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948 to the State Government which is empowered to consider the said application being the appropriate Authority under the provisions of the said Act. Such applications have been made by the Petitioner in April of that particular year. The Petitioner has been granted exemptions albeit at times belatedly. It seems that for the period of 01/04/2008 to 31/03/2009 the Respondents i.e. the State Government granted exemption to the Petitioner up to 31/03/2009. For the period 01/04/2009 to 31/03/2010 the Petitioner made application for exemption in or around 01/04/2009, however, the said

    2

    exemption was not granted. The Petitioner thereafter made application for exemption on 01/04/2010 for the period of 01/04/2010 to 31/03/2011, however, no favourable response was received in respect of the said application. In the interregnum the provisions relating to the grant of exemption i.e. Section 91-A came to be amended and the amended provisions postulate that exemption can be granted only prospectively.

    4 In view of the fact that the Petitioner's applications for exemption for the period of 01/04/2009 to 31/03/2010 was pending and thereafter for the period of 01/04/2010 to 31/03/2011, the Petitioner made two representations to the State Government as and by way of reminder in respect of the applications made by the Petitioner for the said two periods. It seems that for the subsequent period i.e. between 01/04/2011 to 31/03/2012 the Petitioner had made application for exemption which came to be granted vide Notification dated 09/02/2012 and the Petitioner was accordingly exempted from 09/02/2012 to 08/02/2013. The Petitioner thereafter made application for exemption for the period of 06/04/2013 to 05/04/2014 which exemption also came to be granted.

    5 In so far as period of 01/04/2009 to 08/02/2012 is concerned, as indicated above, the Petitioner was denied the exemption, and the impugned letter discloses that the said applications for exemption made by the Petitioner

    3

    were rejected on the ground that the exemption could not be granted retrospectively in view of the amendment to Section 91-A of the said Act. However, prior thereto by letter dated 29/03/2010 the State Government has informed the President of the Petitioner Society that the exemption cannot be granted to the Petitioner as the facilities given by the ESIC are superior than the facilities provided by the Petitioner. It seems that the said letter resulted in the Petitioner approaching the higher authority in the State Government i.e. the Hon'ble Minister for Labour. The Joint Director of the ESIC addressed a letter dated 07/02/2011 to the State Government, in paragraph 3 thereof the Joint Director referred to the communication dated 29/03/2010 of the State Government and stated that the said Department of the State Government had rightly rejected the application of the Petitioner for grant of exemption during the said period i.e. 01/04/2009 to 31/03/2010. In the said letter a reference is made to the amended Section 91-A and it is stated that all exemptions can be granted with prospective effect only and not with retrospective effect as was the case earlier. The Petitioner thereafter has received the impugned communication dated 15/05/2013. In the said communication it is mentioned that as per the directions of the Hon'ble Minister the file was referred to the Law and Judiciary Department of the Government of Maharashtra for it's opinion. The said communication further referred to the amendment which has been carried out to Section 91-A of the said Act whereby the said word

    "retrospectively has been substituted by the word "prospectively". It is lastly

    4

    stated that in view of the said amendment it would not be proper to grant exemption with retrospective effect as the same would be against law. As indicated above it is the said communication dated 15/05/2013 which is taken exception to by way of the above Writ Petition.

    6 The learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner Shri S C Naidu would submit that though Section 91-A has been amended the period of 01/04/2009 to 31/03/2010 being the period prior to the amendment coming into force which was on 01/04/2008 the amendment could not be applied. It was also the submission of the learned counsel for the Petitioner that the amendment to Section 91-A cannot be operated retrospectively to take away the vested right of the Petitioner to seek exemption, as also the vested right of the employees to seek benefits from the Petitioner. The learned counsel in support of the said contentions sought to place reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court reported in AIR 1977 SC 552 in the matte of Govinddas and others v/s. The Income Tax Officer and another; AIR 1987 SC 1676 in the matter of P D Aggarwal and others v/s. State of U.P. and others; and AIR 2006 SC 2767 in the matter of Employees' State Insurance Corporation & ors. V/s. Jardine Henderson Staff Association and Ors. The learned counsel would also contend that the communication dated 15/05/2013 having been issued in super-session of the letter dated 29/03/2010 the factum of rejection having been conveyed to the Petitioner by letter dated 29/03/2010 on the

    5

    ground that the facilities provided by the ESIC are superior than the facilities provided by the Petitioner would be of no avail.

    7 Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the Respondent No.2 Shri P M Palshikar and the learned AGP Shri Dushyant Kumar would support the impugned communication dated 15/05/2013. Both the learned counsel for the Respondent No.2 and the learned AGP would contend that in the teeth of the amended Section 91-A it is not possible to grant exemption to the Petitioner with retrospective effect for the period 01/04/2009 to 31/03/2010.

    8 We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at some length. We have bestowed our anxious consideration to the rival contentions. The issue which falls for our consideration is whether the Petitioner could be granted exemption for the period 01/04/2009 till 09/02/2012 having regard to the amended Section 91-A . In so far as Section 91-A is concerned, the same reads thus :-

    91-A. Exemptions to be either prospective or

    retrospective --- Any notification granting exemption under section 87, section 88, section 90 or section 91 may be issued so as to take effect [prospectively] on such date as may be specified therein"

    A reading of Section 91-A therefore discloses that any exemption under sections 87, 88, 90 and 91 may be issued so as to take effect prospectively i.e.

    6

    on such date as may be specified. It is required to be borne in mind that the Petitioner is seeking exemption for the period 01/04/2009 to 09/02/2012. In so far as the period 01/04/2009 to 31/03/2010 is concerned, it is required to be noted that by letter dated 29/03/2010 the Petitioner was communicated that the exemption could not be granted to the Petitioner as the facilities given by the ESIC are superior than than the facilities provided by the Petitioner. Hence the rejection of the Petitioner's applications for the said period was on the ground that the facilities given by the ESIC are superior than the facilities provided by the Petitioner.

    9 The Petitioner it seems thereafter carried the matter to the higher authority i.e. the Hon'ble Minister in the Labour Department of the Government of Maharashtra. It seems that before the Hon'ble Minister, the ESIC through its Joint Director made its submission in the form of the letter dated 07/02/2011 which was addressed to the Secretary, Labour Department, Government of Maharashtra. The said letter makes a reference to the background of the Petitioner making applications for exemption however, what is significant to note in the context of the controversy which is raised in the above Writ Petition is the fact that the Joint Director has referred to the letter dated 29/03/2010 of the State Government and has opined that the rejection of the Petitioner's application for grant of exemption was correct. The Joint Director as indicated above has thereafter referred to the amended provisions

    7

    of Section 91-A and has mentioned in the said letter that all exemptions could now be granted with prospective effect and not with retrospective effect. The said letter at the highest can be said to be an input for the Hon'ble Minister since the Petitioner had taken the issue in respect of exemption to him. In the letter dated 15/05/2013 of the Government of Maharashtra the fact that the issue was referred to the Law and Judiciary Department of Government of Maharashtra has been mentioned and it is also mentioned that the exemption cannot be granted to the Petitioner in view of the amended provisions of Section 91-A and if exemption is granted than the same would result in acting contrary to law. Hence the letter dated 15/05/2013 which is impugned in the present Writ Petition though can be said to be last in the line of the decisions which have been taken in respect of the applications for exemption filed by the Petitioner cannot be said to be a decision taken either by the Appellate Authority or by the Competent Authority under the statute but can be said to be an administrative decision taken by the State Government. Hence what is required to be noted in the instant case is that by letter dated 29/03/2010 addressed to the Petitioner, the Petitioner was already informed that the application for exemption made by the Petitioner cannot be granted as the facilities given by the ESIC are superior than the facilities provided by the Petitioner.

    10 The matter has to be looked at from one more perspective

    8

    assuming that the final rejection of the Petitioner's application, is on the ground that the application for exemption, in view of Section 91-A cannot be granted retrospectively as stated in the communication dated 18/05/2013 of the State Government. The fact remains that for the period 01/04/2009 to 09/02/2012 the application, even if considered today, would have to be considered on the touchstone of Section 91-A. In so far as the said provision is concerned, it only states that any notification granting exemption may be issued so as to take effect prospectively. There is nothing in the said provision i.e. Section 91-A which states that same applies with retrospective effect. The fact that the said provision has come into force and the Petitioner's application for the said period would undoubtedly have to be considered today, would mean that the Petitioner's applications would have to be considered having regard to Section 91-A. The question which arises is whether the Petitioner could be granted exemption with retrospective effect. The answer has to be in the negative in view of the clear language of Section 91-A which directs that any notification granting exemption would only take effect prospectively.

    11 Now coming to the judgments cited on behalf of the Petitioner, In

    Govinddas asnd others' case (supra), the Apex Court was concerned with Section 171(6) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The said provision a radical departure was made from the old Act. By the said provision for the first time imposed joint and several liability on the members for the tax assessed on the

    9

    Hindu Undivided Family and this was was a personal liability as distinct from liability limited to the joint family property received on partition. The Apex Court held that unless the terms of a statute expressly so provide or necessarily require it, retrospective operation should not be given to a statute so as to take away or impair an existing right or create a new obligation or impose a new liability.

    In P. D. Aggarwal and others' case (supra), the Apex Court was concerned with a Rule of Seniority namely Rule 23 of the U.P. Service of Engineers Class II Rules (Buildings and Roads Branch), 1936. There were earlier rules of 1936 as amended in 1969 and 1971 which provided seniority to be reckoned from the date of the order of appointment in a substantive vacancy. The said Rule in so far as it took away the vested right in respect of seniority was held to be violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.

    In Jardine Henderson Staff Association's case (supra), the Apex Court was concerned with Section 2(9)(b) and Rules 5, 51 and 54 of the Employees' State Insurance (Central) Rules 1950. The wage limit for coverage of an employee was enhanced by the amendment. By an interim order the High Court stayed the operation of the said enhancement. The Employer in view of the stay was prevented from making contribution, however, spent large

    10

    amount of money on employees and provided medical facilities. The High Court held the amendment as valid and directed that employers will implement amendment prospectively with effect from 16/03/2004 though amendment came into force with effect from 01/01/1997. The Apex Court applied the principles of Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit i.e. No party shall be prejudiced for the act of Court; and held that the Employer cannot be made liable to pay contribution for past several years.

    12 In our view, the judgments (supra) cited on behalf of the Petitioner would not further the case of the Petitioner having regard to the facts involved in the instant case. In the instant case apart from the fact that the Petitioner was informed by letter dated 29/03/2010 by the State Government that the exemption cannot be granted for the reason that the facilities provided by the ESIC are superior than the facilities provided by the Petitioner. Even if the communication dated 15/05/2013 is held to supersede the letter dated 29/03/2010 and the said communication is required to be set aside by this Court and the application of the Petitioner is required to be relegated back to the authority i.e. the State Government for a de-novo consideration. In our view, no useful purpose would be served, as the application for the Petitioner even if considered today would have to be considered on the touchstone of Section 91-A, which clearly states that the exemption would take effect prospectively. In our view, therefore, no case for

    11

    interdiction with the communication dated 15/05/2013 in the Writ Jurisdiction of this Court is made out. The above Writ Petition is accordingly dismissed. Rule discharged with no order as to costs.

    [NITIN W. SAMBRE, J] [R. M. SAVANT, J]

    12

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