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AMICUS AI
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2018 INSC 677
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  • Section 3(1) of the Evidence Act
  • Section 3(2) of the Evidence Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act is not present in this excerpt. However, it is mentioned that the accused were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year each in default of payment of fine of Rs 1000 and also convicted for the offence under Section 302 and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and a fine of Rs 5000 each
  • Section 3 and Section 30 of the Evidence Act, 1872
  • Section 3 of the Evidence Act, 1872
  • Section 27 of the Evidence Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2018 INSC 677
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 3(1) of the Evidence Act
  • Section 3(2) of the Evidence Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act is not present in this excerpt. However, it is mentioned that the accused were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year each in default of payment of fine of Rs 1000 and also convicted for the offence under Section 302 and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and a fine of Rs 5000 each
  • Section 3 and Section 30 of the Evidence Act, 1872
  • Section 3 of the Evidence Act, 1872
  • Section 27 of the Evidence Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Truck No. BR-24-M-8171, owned by Sita Devi and her brother-in-law Binod Agrawal (PW-2), was hijacked on 4-12-1999 while returning from Balrampur to Latehar. The bodies of Sita Devi (found inside the cabin with her hands tied and neck slit), the driver, and the cleaner were discovered near the abandoned truck in Aamjharia Valley. After the local police station initially refused to register a case, PW-2 lodged an FIR at Chandwa Police Station on 7-12-1999.

Five persons were prosecuted. The trial court (17-5-2002 & 18-5-2002) acquitted Accused 5 but convicted Accused 1–4 under Sections 392 and 302 IPC, sentencing them to seven years’ RI (with fine) for robbery and life imprisonment (with fine) for murder. The High Court of Jharkhand (12-1-2009) affirmed the convictions.

Special Leave Petitions filed by Accused 2 and 3 were dismissed in limine. Separate SLPs by Accused 1 and 4 were admitted on 30-8-2010, culminating in the present appeals.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the convictions of Accused 1 and Accused 4 could lawfully rest on extra-judicial confessions allegedly made by co-accused (A-2 and A-3) in the absence of independent corroborative evidence.
  2. Whether the recovery of a rope pursuant to A-3’s statement under Section 27 of the Evidence Act provided sufficient incriminatory linkage to sustain the convictions.
  3. Whether dismissal of the co-accused’s SLPs in limine created any bar (res judicata or affirmation) against reconsideration of the present appellants’ case.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants (Accused 1 & 4)

  • Convictions are based solely on extra-judicial confessions attributed to co-accused A-2 and A-3; such confessions are a weak form of evidence and cannot sustain conviction without corroboration (Gopal Sah; Pancho).
  • The alleged confession of A-2 was conveyed to PW-2 only through PW-1 (who turned hostile); consequently, the evidence is hearsay and inadmissible.
  • The rope recovered on A-3’s disclosure is a commonplace object; no forensic linkage to the crime was established, failing the requirements of Section 27 Evidence Act.

State of Jharkhand

  • Supported the concurrent findings of the trial court and High Court, urging that the extra-judicial confessions and recovery were sufficient to affirm guilt.
  • No additional substantive arguments beyond upholding the impugned judgments were recorded.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala (2000) 6 SCC 359 Dismissal of an SLP in limine does not affirm the lower court judgment nor create res judicata. Held that prior dismissal of co-accused’s SLPs had no bearing on present appeals.
State of Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar (2011) 14 SCC 770 Same principle on dismissal of SLP in limine. Reinforced that present appellants’ claims were open for reconsideration.
Gopal Sah v. State of Bihar (2008) 17 SCC 128 Extra-judicial confession is intrinsically weak; conviction requires corroboration. Relied upon to doubt sole reliance on such confessions.
Pancho v. State of Haryana (2011) 10 SCC 165 Conviction cannot rest only on extra-judicial confession absent “sterling” corroboration. Formed core basis for overturning convictions.
Haricharan Kurmi v. State of Bihar AIR 1964 SC 1184 Confession of a co-accused is not substantive evidence; may only lend assurance after independent evidence. Court treated confessions as non-substantive and found no independent evidence to assure guilt.
Sahadevan v. State of T.N. (2012) 6 SCC 403 Enumerates conditions for reliability of extra-judicial confession. Applied to assess that conditions (voluntariness, corroboration, credibility) were unmet.
Jagroop Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) 11 SCC 768 Affirms Sahadevan principles. Cited as confirmatory authority on weakness of such confessions.
Tejinder Singh @ Kaka v. State of Punjab (2013) 12 SCC 503 Reiterates criteria for relying on extra-judicial confessions. Referenced for the same proposition.
Vijay Shankar v. State of Haryana (2015) 12 SCC 644 Same line of authority on extra-judicial confession. Cited to underscore need for corroboration.
Pakkirisamy v. State of T.N. (1997) 8 SCC 158 Extra-judicial confession is insufficient without cogent corroboration. Used to buttress acquittal.
Makhan Singh v. State of Punjab 1988 Supp SCC 526 Weak evidentiary value of extra-judicial confession. Referenced in same context.
Baldev Singh v. State of Punjab (2009) 6 SCC 564 Reaffirms limited worth of extra-judicial confession. Added to chain of authorities.
Satish v. State of Haryana (2018) 11 SCC 300 Continues the judicial caution on extra-judicial confessions. Relied upon generically.
Geejaganda Somaiah v. State of Karnataka (2007) 9 SCC 315 Court must be vigilant in applying Section 27; risk of misuse by police. Guided the Court in discounting rope recovery.
Pulukuri Kotayya v. King Emperor 1946 SCC OnLine PC 47 Section 27 limits admissibility to facts actually discovered. Referred to emphasise limited evidentiary reach of Section 27.
Jaffar Hussain Dastagir v. State of Maharashtra (1969) 2 SCC 872 Further authority on confined use of Section 27. Supported rejection of reliance on rope recovery.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court scrutinised the entire evidentiary record and found that the prosecution case against Accused 1 and 4 rested almost exclusively on:

  • Alleged extra-judicial confessions by co-accused A-2 and A-3.
  • Recovery of a rope pursuant to A-3’s statement.

Regarding the confessions, the Court observed:

  • PW-2’s testimony was hearsay; he only learned of A-2’s supposed confession through PW-1, who later turned hostile.
  • Even accepting the High Court’s view that A-2 confessed directly to PW-2, it would still be a solitary, uncorroborated extra-judicial confession—an evidentiary category consistently characterised as weak by this Court.
  • Confessions given to police officers (by A-2 & A-3) are inadmissible under the Evidence Act.

Applying the principles from Gopal Sah, Pancho, Haricharan Kurmi, and subsequent authorities, the Court held that conviction cannot be founded solely on such uncorroborated confessions.

On the Section 27 recovery, the Court reasoned:

  • The only item recovered was a rope—an ordinary, commonly available object.
  • No forensic evidence linked the rope to the offence; hence the essential “fact discovered” requirement under Section 27 was not satisfied.
  • Following guidelines in Geejaganda Somaiah, Pulukuri Kotayya, and Jaffar Hussain Dastagir, the Court declined to attribute incriminatory value to this recovery.

Because the prosecution lacked any other cogent evidence (eyewitnesses, forensic linkage, motive, or recovery of stolen items), the Court concluded that the guilt of Accused 1 and 4 was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Holding and Implications

HELD: The convictions and sentences of Accused 1 and Accused 4 under Sections 392 and 302 IPC are set aside; both appellants are ACQUITTED OF ALL CHARGES. The appeals are allowed.

Implications: The immediate effect is the release of the appellants and nullification of the concurrent findings of the trial court and High Court. The decision re-emphasises the judiciary’s longstanding caution against basing convictions solely on uncorroborated extra-judicial confessions and reiterates the narrow operation of Section 27 Evidence Act. No new legal principle has been announced, but the judgment consolidates existing jurisprudence on these evidentiary issues.

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    Kusal Toppo And Another v. State Of Jharkhand .

    Order

    1. These appeals by special leave are directed against the judgment and order dated 12-1-2009 passed by the High Court of Judicature of Jharkhand at Ranchi in Mahendra Prasad v. State of Jharkhand 2009 SCC OnLine Jhar 2382, (2009) 2 JLJR 134.

    2. These appeals have been filed by Accused 1 and Accused 4 questioning the conviction and sentence passed by the trial court on 17-5-2002 and 18-5-2002 wherein the accused were convicted for the offence under Section 392 and were sentenced to seven years' rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs 1000 each and in default of payment, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year each and also convicted for the offence under Section 302 and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and a fine of Rs 5000 each and in default of payment to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a term of 2 years each.

    3. The judgment passed by the trial court was subsequently challenged before the High Court. The High Court also confirmed the sentence and conviction passed by the trial court.

    4. In the present case there were as many as five accused. A-5 was acquitted by the trial court itself. The other two accused A-2 and A-3 had filed Special Leave Petitions (Criminal) Nos. 2572-73 of 2009 against the judgment and order of the High Court, which were dismissed 2009 SCC OnLine SC 13 by this Court at the time of admission itself. In criminal cases, it is well settled that a dismissal of an SLP in limine, would neither mean that the lower court judgment stands affirmed nor the principle of res judicata would be applicable (refer Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala (2000) 6 SCC 359, AIR 2000 SC 2587; State of Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar (2011) 14 SCC 770, AIR 2012 SC 364). Therefore, the dismissal of the SLP of the co-accused will not have any effect accordingly.

    5. In the instant special leave petitions filed by the accused A-1 and A-4, leave was granted by this Court on 30-8-2010 2010 SCC OnLine SC 21.

    6. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties.

    7. The prosecution story in brief is that on 3-12-1999, Truck No. BR-24-M-8171 had gone to Balrampur having loaded the lac of one Adit Sah of Latehar. The truck was returning from Balrampur after unloading the lac in question on 4-12-1999 and reached Ranchi at 4 p.m. The aforesaid truck had picked up its owner Sita Devi from Seva Sadan, Ranchi and proceeded for Latehar. When the truck did not reach Latehar till the morning of 5-12-1999, PW 2, Binod Agrawal (the joint owner of the truck and brother-in-law of Sita Devi, and the informant in this case) tried to search for the truck; in the course of his search he went to Line Hotel, owned by PW 1, Bindeshwar Sah, situated at Ranchi Road, Kuru where the truck usually used to stop for refreshment for its staff.

    8. The informant learnt from the aforesaid hotel owner that his truck had stopped at the hotel on 4-12-1999 at about 6.45 p.m. The driver, Suresh Singh alias Bulet Singh, and the khalasi (i.e. cleaner of the truck), Jitendra Thakur, had taken four cups of special tea, one for their employer Sita Devi, two for themselves and one for a third person in the truck, but the third person did not take tea and the same was returned. The driver was heard to say that A-2, Mahendra, the third person inside the truck, would not take tea. Thereafter, the truck proceeded for its destination, having taken the owner Sita Devi, the khalasi Jitendra Thakur, and the third person, Mahendra (apart from the driver himself). The informant also came to know from the hotel owner that an unknown person aged about 25 years had also come to the hotel at 5.00 p.m. on 4-12-1999, who had enquired from the hotel owner whether Suresh Singh alias Bulet Singh, the driver, had come to the hotel with the truck. The hotel owner had replied to the unknown person that the truck had not reached yet.

    9. Subsequently, the informant gathered information from others at Kuru that the truck had crossed Kuru Chowk for its destination (i.e. Latehar), but it was hijacked by some criminals near Kuru PS and taken away towards the forest. He further came to know that the truck was lying abandoned in Aamjharia Valley with two dead bodies lying near the truck and one dead body of a woman lying inside the cabin of the truck. On such information, he went to Aamjharia Valley and found the truck, where he found the dead body of Sita Devi inside the truck, with her hands tied and neck slit, and the bodies of the driver and khalasi thrown outside. The informant then went to Kuru PS to lodge an FIR, but the police of Kuru PS did not entertain his information. He then went to Lohardaga to approach the SP, who was not available, but the reader of the SP told him that the FIR had to be lodged in the police station in the jurisdiction of which the dead bodies had been recovered. Therefore, the informant lodged the FIR at Chandwa Police Station on 7-12-1999 at 10 a.m., which is the basis of the case.

    10. Mr Annam D.N. Rao, learned Amicus Curiae appearing on behalf of the accused mainly contended that the trial court as well as the High Court had convicted the accused by relying upon the extra-judicial confessions made by Mahendra Prasad and Chanchal Bhaskar (A-2 and A-3). Mr Rao contended that the accused could not be convicted merely on the basis of extra-judicial confessions, relying upon the settled proposition of law that an extra-judicial confession is a weak piece of evidence, and an accused cannot be convicted on such basis in the absence of other reliable evidence establishing guilt. He placed reliance on the decisions of this Court to this effect in Gopal Sah v. State of Bihar (2008) 17 SCC 128 and Pancho v. State of Haryana (2011) 10 SCC 165.

    11. The learned counsel, while arguing, has taken us through the depositions of various witnesses. PW 1 is Bindeshwar Sah, the hotel owner, who according to PW 2, Binod Agrawal, first revealed the information to him that the truck party had come to his hotel on the date of the incident, and left the place after taking some tea. Based on the said information, PW 2 further inquired about the matter. PW 2 also deposed that PW 1 had told him that A-2 Mahendra was inside the truck, and that A-2 had confessed to him (i.e. PW 1) that the accused had committed the murder of the three persons and further committed theft of a gold bangle and chain belonging to Sita Devi, an amount of Rs 2 lakhs and a demand draft for Rs 32,000. PW 2 admitted so in his cross-examination as well as stated so before the police. At the time of trial, however, PW 1, the owner of Line Hotel, turned hostile. He denied saying anything to PW 2 as alleged.

    12. Thus, according to PW 2, A-2 made a confession to PW 1. In addition, the confessions of A-2 and A-3 were also recorded by the police. As per the testimony of PW 6, the investigating officer in the case, on the basis of the confession of A-3, a rope was recovered from the place of occurrence.

    13. The learned counsel for the appellants contended that rope is a common material or thing which is available anywhere in the market and in every household.

    14. Apart from this, the learned counsel for the State is unable to show any other material indicating the guilt of the appellants. The learned counsel for the State argued in support of the impugned judgment.

    15. The evidence relating to the extra-judicial confession made by the accused Mahendra is found in two places in the evidence of PW 2 i.e. in paras 8 and 27. If we read both the paragraphs, it is clear that PW 2 got the information from PW 1 (the owner of Line Hotel, Bindeshwar Sah) about the factum of confession made by the accused Mahendra before PW 1. In other words, PW 2 has not deposed in so many words and clearly that the accused Mahendra made a confession before him.

    16. On the other hand, it is the specific deposition of PW 2 that the accused Mahendra confessed before PW 1, and in turn PW 1 told about the same fact to PW 2. This means that the information received by PW 2 from PW 1 about the extra-judicial confession is hearsay, inasmuch as there is no confession made by the accused Mahendra before PW 2 directly. Hence, such hearsay evidence of PW 2 relating to the so-called confession cannot be relied upon. Even otherwise, PW 1, who had allegedly informed PW 2 about the confession allegedly made before him by the accused Mahendra, has turned hostile. Thus, there is no supporting material to corroborate the evidence of PW 2 regarding the extra-judicial confession.

    17. However, the first appellate court as well as the High Court, probably relying upon the version of PW 2 in paras 29 to 30 of his deposition, concluded that the accused Mahendra did confess before PW 2 directly. Even if we take it that the accused Mahendra did confess before PW 2 directly, the same may not further or better the case of the prosecution, inasmuch as this is the solitary piece of material against the accused Mahendra, and that too in the form of an extra-judicial confession.

    18. As argued by the learned amicus curiae appearing for the accused, an extra-judicial confession is a weak piece of evidence, and an accused cannot be convicted on its basis in the absence of other reliable evidence establishing the guilt of the accused. It will be pertinent to advert to the decisions relied upon by the learned amicus curiae at this juncture i.e. Gopal Sah (2008) 17 SCC 128 and Pancho (2011) 10 SCC 165.

    19. In Gopal Sah (2008) 17 SCC 128, the Court held that an extra-judicial confession is, on the face of it, a weak piece of evidence and should not be relied upon to record a conviction, in the absence of a chain of cogent circumstances. In Pancho (2011) 10 SCC 165 as well, the Court refused to convict the accused on the basis of an extra-judicial confession, in the absence of other evidence of sterling quality on record, establishing his involvement.

    20. In Pancho (2011) 10 SCC 165, the Court discussed the evidentiary value of an extra-judicial confession, as laid down by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Haricharan Kurmi v. State of Bihar AIR 1964 SC 1184, (1964) 2 Cri LJ 344. In this case, referring to Section 3 and Section 30 of the Evidence Act, 1872, the Court came to the conclusion that an extra-judicial confession cannot be treated as a substantive piece of evidence against the co-accused, holding that the proper judicial approach is to use it only to strengthen the opinion formed by the Court after perusing other evidence placed on record.

    21. It is pertinent to refer to the observations in Pancho (2011) 10 SCC 165 in this regard:

    “26. In Haricharan Kurmi v. State of Bihar AIR 1964 SC 1184, (1964) 2 Cri LJ 344 the Constitution Bench of this Court was again considering the same question. The Constitution Bench referred to Section 3 of the Evidence Act, 1872 and observed that confession of a co-accused is not evidence within the meaning of Section 3 of the Evidence Act. It is neither oral statement which the court permits or requires to be made before it as per Section 3(1) of the Evidence Act nor does it fall in the category of evidence referred to in Section 3(2) of the Evidence Act which covers all documents produced for the inspection of the court. This Court observed that even then Section 30 provides that a confession may be taken into consideration not only against its maker, but also against a co-accused. Thus, though such a confession may not be evidence as strictly defined by Section 3 of the Evidence Act, “it is an element which may be taken into consideration by the criminal court and in that sense, it may be described as evidence in a non-technical way”. (Haricharan case AIR 1964 SC 1184, (1964) 2 Cri LJ 344, AIR p. 1188, para 11a.)
    27. This Court in Haricharan case AIR 1964 SC 1184, (1964) 2 Cri LJ 344 further observed that Section 30 merely enables the court to take the confession into account. It is not obligatory on the court to take the confession into account. This Court reiterated that a confession cannot be treated as substantive evidence against a co-accused. Where the prosecution relies upon the confession of one accused against another, the proper approach is to consider the other evidence against such an accused and if the said evidence appears to be satisfactory and the court is inclined to hold that the said evidence may sustain the charge framed against the said accused, the court turns to the confession with a view to assuring itself that the conclusion which it is inclined to draw from the other evidence is right.
    28. This Court in Haricharan case AIR 1964 SC 1184, (1964) 2 Cri LJ 344 clarified that though confession may be regarded as evidence in generic sense because of the provisions of Section 30 of the Evidence Act, the fact remains that it is not evidence as defined in Section 3 of the Evidence Act. Therefore, in dealing with a case against an accused, the court cannot start with the confession of a co-accused; it must begin with other evidence adduced by the prosecution and after it has formed its opinion with regard to the quality and effect of the said evidence, then it is permissible to turn to the confession in order to receive assurance to the conclusion of guilt which the judicial mind is about to reach on the said other evidence.”

    22. Furthermore, in Sahadevan v. State of T.N. (2012) 6 SCC 403, this Court culled out certain principles regarding the reliability of an extra-judicial confession, which have also been relied upon in Jagroop Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) 11 SCC 768, Tejinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2013) 12 SCC 503, and Vijay Shankar v. State of Haryana (2015) 12 SCC 644. The principles as stated in Sahadevan (2012) 6 SCC 403 are reproduced below:

    “16. Upon a proper analysis of the abovereferred judgments of this Court, it will be appropriate to state the principles which would make an extra-judicial confession an admissible piece of evidence capable of forming the basis of conviction of an accused. These precepts would guide the judicial mind while dealing with the veracity of cases where the prosecution heavily relies upon an extra-judicial confession alleged to have been made by the accused:
    (i) The extra-judicial confession is a weak evidence by itself. It has to be examined by the court with greater care and caution.
    (ii) It should be made voluntarily and should be truthful.
    (iii) It should inspire confidence.
    (iv) An extra-judicial confession attains greater credibility and evidentiary value if it is supported by a chain of cogent circumstances and is further corroborated by other prosecution evidence.
    (v) For an extra-judicial confession to be the basis of conviction, it should not suffer from any material discrepancies and inherent improbabilities.
    (vi) Such statement essentially has to be proved like any other fact and in accordance with law.”

    23. The proposition that extra-judicial confessions are a weak type of evidence and should not be relied upon in the absence of corroborative evidence has also been affirmed by this Court in several other decisions, such as Pakkirisamy v. State of T.N. (1997) 8 SCC 158, Makhan Singh v. State of Punjab 1988 Supp SCC 526, Baldev Singh v. State of Punjab (2009) 6 SCC 564, and even recently in Satish v. State of Haryana (2018) 11 SCC 300.

    24. Taking into consideration all the facts and position of law, discussed supra, we are of the opinion that the appellants herein cannot be convicted on the basis of only two extra-judicial confessional statements of the co-accused which were not corroborated by any cogent or reliable evidence. Needless to say, that the confessions of A-2 and A-3 made before the police are inadmissible. Now coming to the limited aspect concerning appending weightage to their recovery of rope in furtherance of the statement of A-3, before the police under Section 27 of the Evidence Act.

    25. The law under Section 27 of the Evidence Act is well settled now, wherein this Court in Geejaganda Somaiah v. State of Karnataka (2007) 9 SCC 315, has observed as under:

    “22. As the section is alleged to be frequently misused by the police, the courts are required to be vigilant about its application. The court must ensure the credibility of evidence by police because this provision is vulnerable to abuse. It does not, however, mean that any statement made in terms of the aforesaid section should be seen with suspicion and it cannot be discarded only on the ground that it was made to a police officer during investigation. The court has to be cautious that no effort is made by the prosecution to make out a statement of the accused with a simple case of recovery as a case of discovery of fact in order to attract the provisions of Section 27 of the Evidence Act.”

    26. The basic premise of Section 27 is to only partially lift the ban against admissibility of inculpatory statements made before the police, if a fact is actually discovered in consequence of the information received from the accused. Such condition would afford some guarantee. We may additionally note that, the courts need to be vigilant while considering such evidence.

    27. This Court in multiple cases has reiterated the aforesaid principles under Section 27 of the Evidence Act and only utilised Section 27 for limited aspect concerning recovery (refer Pulukuri Kotayya v. King Emperor 1946 SCC OnLine PC 47, (1946-47) 74 IA 65; Jaffar Hussain Dastagir v. State of Maharashtra (1969) 2 SCC 872, AIR 1970 SC 1934). As an additional safeguard we may note that reliance on certain observations made in certain precedents of this Court without understanding the background of the case may not be sustainable. There is no gainsaying that it is only the ratio which has the precedential value and the same may not be extended to an obiter. As this Court being the final forum for appeal, we need to be cognizant of the fact that this Court generally considers only legal aspects relevant to the facts and circumstances of that case, without elaborately discussing the minute hyper-technicalities and factual intricacies involved in the trial.

    28. Coming back to the factual aspects of this case, on the basis of the above confession of Chanchal Bhaskar (A-3), the only recovery which was made was one rope, which was used in committing the offence, which the counsel rightly pointed, is a common material or thing which is available anywhere in the market or at every household. Further, we may note that, there is no investigation to link the rope recovered with the crime as no report concerning the forensic aspects of the fibre or any recovered strands are part of the record. Therefore, the major condition for application of Section 27 of the Evidence Act is not fulfilled. Accordingly, we cannot append any value to the confession of Chanchal Bhaskar (A-3).

    29. In light of the discussion above, we set aside the orders passed by the trial court as well as by the High Court 2009 SCC OnLine Jhar 2382, (2009) 2 JLJR 134 and acquit the accused from all charges and the appeals are, accordingly, allowed. We appreciate the assistance given by Mr Annam D.N. Rao, learned Amicus Curiae in disposing of these appeals.

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    Kusal Toppo And Another v. State Of Jharkhand .
    (Aug 7, 2018)