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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2018 INSC 560
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 302 IPC, Section 84 of the Penal Code read with Section 105 of the Evidence Act
  • Article 136 of the Constitution
  • Sections 302 and 324 of the Penal Code, 1860 (IPC)
  • Chapter XXV of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • Section 335 or 339 of the Criminal Procedure Code
  • Article 21 of the Constitution of India
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2018 INSC 560
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 302 IPC, Section 84 of the Penal Code read with Section 105 of the Evidence Act
  • Article 136 of the Constitution
  • Sections 302 and 324 of the Penal Code, 1860 (IPC)
  • Chapter XXV of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • Section 335 or 339 of the Criminal Procedure Code
  • Article 21 of the Constitution of India
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

On the morning of 26-09-2006, the appellant suddenly seized a sickle in a village ironsmith’s shop and inflicted injuries on three persons, causing the death of Harish Chandra Chauhan and wounding Santosh Jadhav and Ulhas Rathor. Villagers apprehended him and handed him to the police. He was tried for offences under Sections 302 and 324 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The Additional Sessions Judge, Akola rejected the appellant’s plea of unsoundness of mind and convicted him; the Bombay High Court affirmed the conviction (2014 SCC OnLine Bom 4878). The present judgment is the Supreme Court’s decision on the appellant’s further appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appellant was legally insane at the time of the offence so as to attract the exception in Section 84 IPC, thereby negating the requisite mens rea.
  2. Whether, in view of the insanity plea and the evidence on record, the concurrent findings of guilt under Sections 302 and 324 IPC were sustainable.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • Absence of mens rea renders the conviction under Section 302 IPC unsustainable, relying on Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakkar v. State of Gujarat.
  • Defence evidence (DW 1 and DW 2) showed longstanding mental illness; poor family circumstances explained absence of preserved medical records.
  • Medical treatment by Dr Kelkar and extensive prison records of antipsychotic medication created a preponderance of probability in favour of insanity under Section 84 IPC read with Section 105 of the Evidence Act.
  • Prosecution offered no rebuttal evidence; reliance placed on Elavarasan v. State.

State's Arguments

  • The appellant failed to establish prima facie unsoundness of mind; the trial judge had repeatedly verified his fitness to stand trial.
  • Conduct during and after the assaults—repeated blows, disposal of the sickle, and attempt to flee—showed conscious wrongdoing, incompatible with insanity.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakkar v. State of Gujarat (1964) 7 SCR 361 Burden of proof in insanity pleas: prosecution must prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt; accused may rebut presumption of sanity on balance of probabilities. Used as the primary yardstick for assessing whether the appellant had created reasonable doubt regarding his mental state.
Elavarasan v. State (2011) 7 SCC 110 Failure of prosecution to rebut a plausible insanity defence. Cited to underline that no rebuttal evidence was led against the appellant’s medical history.
Deepak Kumar v. Ravi Virmani (2002) 2 SCC 737 Supreme Court’s reluctance to disturb concurrent findings, with exceptions in the interest of justice. Justified re-appraisal of evidence despite concurrent convictions below.
Bapu alias Gujraj Singh v. State of Rajasthan (2007) 8 SCC 66 Investigator’s duty to obtain medical examination where insanity is suggested; omission creates infirmity. Held that prosecution’s withholding of immediate medical evidence created serious doubt.
Surendra Mishra v. State of Jharkhand (2011) 11 SCC 495 Accused’s onus under Section 105 Evidence Act is only preponderance of probability. Supported shifting burden back to prosecution once prima facie insanity was shown.
State of Rajasthan v. Shera Ram alias Vishnu Dutta (2012) 1 SCC 602 Distinction between legal insanity and medical insanity; criteria for Section 84 IPC. Used to affirm that long-term psychosis evidenced by medication could satisfy legal insanity.
Ratan Lal v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1970) 3 SCC 533 Relevant time for insanity is the moment of the crime; burden on accused is civil standard. Guided evaluation of pre-incident, incident, and post-incident conduct.
Vijayee Singh v. State of U.P. (1990) 3 SCC 190 Reasonable doubt regarding mental condition entitles acquittal. Formed part of the rationale for extending benefit of doubt.
State of Rajasthan v. Ani (1997) 6 SCC 162 Judge’s duty to actively elicit truth by questioning witnesses. Court faulted trial judge for not probing missing medical evidence.
Rama v. State of Rajasthan (2002) 4 SCC 571 Appellate court must independently re-appraise evidence in criminal appeals. Used to criticise High Court for superficial review of the record.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court re-examined the entire record, focusing on medical evidence and investigative omissions:

  • Prison and court records revealed at least 12 medical visits and continuous administration of strong antipsychotic drugs (Haloperidol, Olanzapine, Diazepam, Trinicalm), indicating chronic psychosis that pre-dated the incident.
  • Police Sub-Inspector (PW 14) admitted the appellant was hospitalised immediately after the assault; yet prosecution supplied no hospital records or testimony from treating doctors, suggesting deliberate withholding of crucial evidence.
  • Both trial and appellate courts incorrectly judged sanity based on the appellant’s courtroom demeanour years later, ignoring the stabilising effect of ongoing medication.
  • Applying the principles in Dahyabhai and allied cases, the Court held that the appellant had discharged his lighter burden of proving insanity on a balance of probabilities, thereby casting a reasonable doubt on the prosecution’s case.
  • The investigative lapse identified in Bapu alias Gujraj Singh further weakened the prosecution case and entitled the appellant to the benefit of doubt.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Allowed – Conviction set aside and appellant acquitted.

Direct consequences: the appellant is to be released unless required in another case. The Court also directed appropriate authorities to consider action under Sections 335 or 339 CrPC to ensure continued medical care, recognising the appellant’s Article 21 rights.

Broader implications: while no new legal test was formulated, the decision reinforces judicial duty to scrutinise insanity pleas thoroughly, mandates prosecutorial transparency regarding medical evidence, and stresses appellate obligation to reappraise evidence independently.

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    Devidas Loka Rathod v. State Of Maharashtra .

    Navin Sinha, J.— The appellant assails his conviction under Sections 302 and 324 of the Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), rejecting his defence that he was of unsound mind.

    2. In the morning of 26-9-2006, the appellant suddenly picked up a sickle from the shop floor of the ironsmith and attempted to assault Gulab Pawar (PW 11), but which injured Santosh Jadhav (PW 5) on the jaw and cheek and gave a further blow on his shoulder. The same day, he later assaulted Ulhas Rathor (PW 3) on his back and neck and rained blows on the back and stomach of the deceased Harish Chandra Chauhan, when the latter tried to intervene. The appellant then tried to flee, throwing the sickle en route, when he was apprehended by the villagers and handed over to the police.

    3. The Additional Sessions Judge, Akola rejected the defence plea for unsoundness of mind, citing insufficient evidence relying on the evidence of Dr Sagar Srikant Chiddalwar (CW 1) that the appellant was not mentally sick and fit to face trial. The subsequent conduct of the appellant while in custody, his demeanour during the trial, were further relied upon to conclude that the appellant was conscious of his wrongful acts which were deliberate in nature, evident from the repeated assaults and running away from the place of occurrence after throwing the sickle. The High Court declined 2014 SCC OnLine Bom 4878 to interfere with the conviction.

    4. Ms Aparna Jha appearing on behalf of the appellant urged that in the absence of any mens rea, conviction under Section 302 IPC was unsustainable, relying upon Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakkar v. State of Gujarat (1964) 7 SCR 361, AIR 1964 SC 1563, (1964) 2 Cri LJ 472. It was next contended that the evidence of Mankarna Chavan (DW 1) and Gograbai Rathod (DW 2), with regard to the unsoundness of mind of the appellant has not been properly appreciated and wrongly rejected as insufficient. The appellant belonged to a very poor family and they could not be expected to keep his medical records and prescriptions meticulously. The defence witnesses had deposed that the appellant was under the treatment of Dr Kelkar at Akola. There existed sufficient evidence for a plausible defence for unsoundness of mind under Section 84 of the Penal Code read with Section 105 of the Evidence Act on a preponderance of the probability. The prosecution failed to lead any evidence in rebuttal, for which reliance was placed on Elavarasan v. State (2011) 7 SCC 110. The conviction was, therefore, unjustified and the appellant was entitled to acquittal.

    5. The learned counsel for the State, Shri Katneshwarkar, opposing the appeal, submitted that the appellant had failed to prima facie establish a case for unsoundness of mind on probability. The trial Judge had taken adequate precautions in calling for medical reports from time to time and satisfying himself with regard to the ability of the appellant to defend himself quite apart from also noticing his demeanour in court. The conduct of the appellant in making repeated assaults, running away from the place of occurrence, throwing the sickle on the way, were all sufficient to establish the commission of the offence knowingly by him, incompatible with the defence of unsoundness of mind.

    6. We have considered the respective submissions. Normally, this Court is reluctant to interfere with concurrent findings of facts by two courts, under Article 136 of the Constitution, as also observed in Deepak Kumar v. Ravi Virmani (2002) 2 SCC 737. But this does not preclude it in appropriate cases to reappraise evidence in the interest of justice, if it entertains any doubt about the nature of evidence and its appreciation or non-appreciation. There can be no hard-and-fast rule in this regard, and much will depend on the concept of justice in the facts of a case, coupled with the nature of acceptable evidence on record.

    7. The prosecution, including the injured witnesses, undoubtedly denied that the appellant was of unsound mind. But the evidence of Police Sub-Inspector Chandusingh Mohansingh Chavan (PW 14), coupled with the reference to the medical reports of the appellant, persuaded us to examine the original records of the trial court ourselves in order to satisfy us that there had been proper and complete appreciation of all evidence and that the findings were not perverse or obviated by non-consideration of relevant materials, so that justice may ultimately prevail.

    8. That the appellant was a very poor person stands established by PW 14, and which consequently necessitated legal assistance to him for his defence by the District Legal Services Authority, Akola as also before the High Court and also before this Court by the legal aid cell.

    9. PW 14, in his examination-in-chief, stated that the appellant was caught immediately after he made the assault on 26-9-2006 and brought to the police station. The FIR was registered the same day. But the appellant was taken in custody only on 28-9-2006 because he was not keeping well and had been admitted in the hospital. The information of his arrest was not given to his sister or mother, but only to his friend Nagorao Baghe, who has not been examined. In view of the previous history of insanity of the appellant as revealed, it was the duty of an honest investigator to subject the accused to a medical examination immediately and place the evidence before the court and if this is not done, it creates a serious infirmity in the prosecution case and the benefit of doubt has to be given to the accused, as observed in Bapu v. State of Rajasthan (2007) 8 SCC 66. The admitted facts in the present case strongly persuade us to believe that the prosecution has deliberately withheld relevant evidence with regard to the nature of the appellant's mental illness, his mental condition at the time of assault, requiring hospitalisation immediately after the assault and hindering his arrest, the diagnosis and treatment, the evidence of the treating doctor, all of which necessarily casts a doubt on the credibility of the prosecution evidence raising more than reasonable doubts about the mental condition of the appellant. Unfortunately, both the trial court and the High Court, have completely failed to consider and discuss this very important lacuna in the prosecution case, decisively crucial for determination or abjurement of the guilt of the appellant.

    10. The law undoubtedly presumes that every person committing an offence is sane and liable for his acts, though in specified circumstances it may be rebuttable. The doctrine of burden of proof in the context of the plea of insanity was stated as follows in Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakkar v. State of Gujarat (1964) 7 SCR 361, AIR 1964 SC 1563, (1964) 2 Cri LJ 472: (AIR p. 1568, para 7)

    “(1) The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had committed the offence with the requisite mens rea, and the burden of proving that always rests on the prosecution from the beginning to the end of the trial.
    (2) There is a rebuttable presumption that the accused was not insane, when he committed the crime, in the sense laid down by Section 84 of the Penal Code: the accused may rebut it by placing before the court all the relevant evidence, oral, documentary or circumstantial, but the burden of proof upon him is no higher than that rests upon a party to civil proceedings.
    (3) Even if the accused was not able to establish conclusively that he was insane at the time he committed the offence, the evidence placed before the court by the accused or by the prosecution may raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as regards one or more of the ingredients of the offence, including mens rea of the accused and in that case the court would be entitled to acquit the accused on the ground that the general burden of proof resting on the prosecution was not discharged.”

    11. Section 84 IPC carves out an exception, that an act will not be an offence, if done by a person, who at the time of doing the same, by reason of unsoundness of mind, is incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or what he is doing is either wrong or contrary to law. But this onus on the accused, under Section 105 of the Evidence Act is not as stringent as on the prosecution to be established beyond all reasonable doubts. The accused has only to establish his defence on a preponderance of probability, as observed in Surendra Mishra v. State of Jharkhand (2011) 11 SCC 495, after which the onus shall shift on the prosecution to establish the inapplicability of the exception. But, it is not every and any plea of unsoundness of mind that will suffice. The standard of test to be applied shall be of legal insanity and not medical insanity, as observed in State of Rajasthan v. Shera Ram (2012) 1 SCC 602, as follows: (Shera Ram case (2012) 1 SCC 602)

    “19. … Once, a person is found to be suffering from mental disorder or mental deficiency, which takes within its ambit hallucinations, dementia, loss of memory and self-control, at all relevant times by way of appropriate documentary and oral evidence, the person concerned would be entitled to seek resort to the general exceptions from criminal liability.”

    12. The crucial point of time for considering the defence plea of unsoundness of mind has to be with regard to the mental state of the accused at the time the offence was committed collated from evidence of conduct which preceded, attended and followed the crime as observed in Ratan Lal v. State of M.P. (1970) 3 SCC 533, as follows:

    “2. It is now well settled that the crucial point of time at which unsoundness of mind should be established is the time when the crime is actually committed and the burden of proving this lies on the accused. In Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakkar v. State of Gujarat (1964) 7 SCR 361, AIR 1964 SC 1563, (1964) 2 Cri LJ 472 it was laid down that ‘there is a rebuttable presumption that the accused was not insane, when he committed the crime, in the sense laid down by Section 84 of the Penal Code, the accused may rebut it by placing before the court all the relevant evidence — oral, documentary or circumstantial, but the burden of proof upon him is no higher than that which rests upon a party to civil proceedings’.”

    13. If from the materials placed on record, a reasonable doubt is created in the mind of the Court with regard to the mental condition of the accused at the time of occurrence, he shall be entitled to the benefit of the reasonable doubt and consequent acquittal, as observed in Vijayee Singh v. State of U.P. (1990) 3 SCC 190

    14. We shall now consider the sufficiency of other medical and defence evidence to examine if a reasonable doubt is created with regard to the mental state of the appellant at the time of commission of the assault on a preponderance of probability, coupled with the complete lack of consideration of the evidence of PW 14. Merely because an injured witness, who may legitimately be classified as an interested witness for obvious reasons, may have stated that the appellant was not of unsound mind, cannot absolve the primary duty of the prosecution to establish its case beyond all reasonable doubt explaining why the plea for unsoundness of mind taken by the accused was untenable.

    15. The accused was taken into custody on 28-9-2006. Charge-sheet was submitted on 29-12-2006 and commitment done on 16-2-2007. The trial court records reflect several medical visits in prison, even weekly, 12 in number, between the period from 9-1-2007 to 7-4-2007, administering of antipsychotic drugs such as tablet Haloperidol and tablet Olanzapine and tablet Diazepam to the appellant with the impression recorded by the doctor that the patient is psychotic and needs continuation of treatment. The significance of use of the words “continuation” cannot be lost sight of, and have obviously been used with regard to a pre-existing ailment and which includes the period prior to and from 26-9-2006 to 28-9-2006. On 3-5-2007, an application was moved on behalf of the appellant under Chapter XXV of the Code of Criminal Procedure that he was not fit to face trial. A fresh medical report was called for on 14-6-2007 which opined on 19-6-2007 that the appellant was a chronic patient of psychosis who has been evaluated time and again by Mental Hospital, Nagpur, the present doctor at Akola and also by the psychiatrist. On 13-7-2007, the trial court directed him to be sent to the Mental Hospital and called for a fresh report. On 11-4-2008, fresh report was called for and the appellant was prescribed Trinicalm Forte tablet/Trinicalm Plus tablet amongst other medicines. The treating doctor, Dr Pramod Thakare, opined in writing on 20-5-2009 as follows:

    “(1) Abovenamed prisoner is suffering from mental illness (psychosis) since unknown duration. He is being treated and examined by several psychiatrists attached to Government Medical College and Hospital, Akola since January 2008 during specialists' visit to prison.
    (2) This prisoner showed suicidal tendency, aggressive behaviour, disturbed sleep, poor communication and occasional erratic behaviour.
    (3) He was treated with various antipsychotic drugs since January 2008 till today.

    …. At present he is under control with antipsychotic drugs and is still maintained on drugs. He may be referred to Mental Hospital, Nagpur for further investigations and expert opinion, for further proceedings.”

    16. The nature of illness of the appellant, and its correlation to the nature of treatment required may appropriately be set out as follows:

    (i) Haloperidol is used to treat certain mental/mood disorders (e.g. schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorders). This medicine helps you to think more clearly, feel less nervous, and take part in everyday life. It can also help prevent suicide in people who are likely to harm themselves. It also reduces aggression and the desire to hurt others. It can decrease negative thoughts and hallucinations.
    (ii) Olanzapine is an antipsychotic medication that affects chemicals in the brain. Olanzapine is used to treat the symptoms of psychotic conditions such as schizophrenia and bipolar disorder (manic depression).
    (iii) Diazepam is used to treat anxiety, alcohol withdrawal, and seizures. It is also used to relieve muscle spasms and to provide sedation before medical procedures. This medication works by calming the brain and nerves. Diazepam belongs to a class of drugs known as benzodiazepines.
    (iv) Trinicalm Forte tablet is a combination of three medicines: Chlorpromazine, Trihexyphenidyl and Trifluoperazine. Chlorpromazine is a typical antipsychotic. It works by blocking the action of dopamine, a chemical messenger in the brain that affects thoughts and mood. Trihexyphenidyl is an anticholinergic which works on the nervous system and corrects some of the side effects occurring during antipsychotic treatment. Trifluoperazine is a typical antipsychotic. It works by blocking the action of dopamine, a chemical messenger in the brain that affects thoughts and mood.
    (v) Trinicalm Plus 5 mg/2 mg tablet is a combination of two medicines: Trifluoperazine and Trihexyphenidyl. Trifluoperazine is a typical antipsychotic. It works by blocking the action of a chemical messenger (dopamine) in the brain that affects thoughts and mood. However, it may cause side effects such as involuntary movements (shaking of hands, muscle spasms). Trihexyphenidyl is added to treat and prevent these side effects.

    17. CW 1 was also examined by the defence as DW 3 and deposed that he had no materials with regard to the previous history of the appellant, that none of his relatives were present at the time of such examination, and he could not therefore say anything regarding any pre-existing mental disorder of the appellant.

    18. DW 1, the sister of the appellant, and his mother DW 2, had stated that the appellant had to be tied up at times and was unable to take care of himself, including clothing on his person. The prosecution did not deny the fact of a treating Psychiatrist at Akola, by the name of Dr Kelkar, mentioned by the witness. The appellant and his family were poor people and could hardly be expected to meticulously preserve medical papers or lead expert evidence as observed in Ratan Lal (1970) 3 SCC 533. Merely because five years later in the witness box the witness may have stated that there was no complaint from the police with regard to the conduct of the appellant in custody, the trial Judge manifestly erred in his conclusion with regard to the mental state of the appellant at the time of occurrence by testing it on the touchstone of the present demeanour in court and present conduct of the appellant, without any reference to the medication that was being provided to the appellant while in custody. Naturally, if the appellant was being provided proper medical treatment during custody, his condition would certainly improve over time.

    19. The trial Judge erred in proper consideration and appreciation of evidence, virtually abjuring all such evidence available raising doubts about the mental status of the appellant at the time of commission of the offence, so as to leave his conviction as a foregone conclusion. The trial Judge unfortunately did not consider it necessary to put further questions to PW 14 with regard to the hospitalisation of the appellant immediately after the occurrence and why the prosecution had not placed the necessary evidence in this regard before the court. The truth therefore remained elusive, and justice thus became a casualty. The trial Judge therefore erred in his duty, as observed in State of Rajasthan v. Ani (1997) 6 SCC 162 as follows:

    “12. Reticence may be good in many circumstances, but a Judge remaining mute during trial is not an ideal situation. A taciturn Judge may be the model caricatured in public mind. But there is nothing wrong in his becoming active or dynamic during trial so that criminal justice being the end could be achieved. Criminal trial should not turn out to be a bout or combat between two rival sides with the Judge performing the role only of a spectator or even an umpire to pronounce finally who won the race. A Judge is expected to actively participate in the trial, elicit necessary materials from witnesses in the appropriate context which he feels necessary for reaching the correct conclusion. There is nothing which inhibits his power to put questions to the witnesses, either during chief examination or cross-examination or even during re-examination to elicit truth. The corollary of it is that if a Judge felt that a witness has committed an error or a slip it is the duty of the Judge to ascertain whether it was so, for, to err is human and the chances of erring may accelerate under stress of nervousness during cross-examination. Criminal justice is not to be founded on erroneous answers spelled out by witnesses during evidence-collecting process. It is a useful exercise for trial Judge to remain active and alert so that errors can be minimised.”
    (emphasis in original)

    20. The appellate court also had a duty to consider the nature of the evidence led by PW 14 and the other medical evidence available on record with regard to the appellant. Unfortunately, it appears that the appellate court also did not delve into the records in the manner required, as observed in Rama v. State of Rajasthan (2002) 4 SCC 571:

    “4. … It is well settled that in a criminal appeal, a duty is enjoined upon the appellate court to reappraise the evidence itself and it cannot proceed to dispose of the appeal upon appraisal of evidence by the trial court alone especially when the appeal has been already admitted and placed for final hearing. Upholding such a procedure would amount to negation of valuable right of appeal of an accused, which cannot be permitted under law.”

    21. We are therefore of the considered opinion, that the appellant has been able to create sufficient doubt in our mind that he is entitled to the benefit of the exception under Section 84 IPC because of the preponderance of his medical condition at the time of occurrence, as revealed from the materials and evidence on record. The prosecution cannot be said to have established its case beyond all reasonable doubt. The appellant is therefore entitled to the benefit of doubt and consequent acquittal. The appeal is allowed. He is directed to be released from custody unless wanted in any other case.

    22. In view of our conclusions and findings based on the medical evidence with regard to the appellant, it is considered necessary to give further directions under Section 335 or 339 of the Criminal Procedure Code, as the case may be, so that the appellant is not exposed to vagaries and receives proper care and support befitting his right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. A copy of this order be sent to the District Legal Services Authority, Akola for the needful.

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    Devidas Loka Rathod v. State Of Maharashtra .
    (Jul 2, 2018)