Rajendra, A.M:— Challenging the order dtd. 13.03.2012 of the CIT(A)-1, Mumbai, Assessing Officer (AO) has raised following grounds of appeal:
1. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) was right in holding that the assessee is entitled to exemption u/s. 11 of the I.T Act, 1961.
2. Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case and in law, the Hon'ble High Court was right in ignoring the ratio of Hon'ble Supreme Court judgments in the case of Escorts Ltd. v. Union of India (199 ITR 43) wherein Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that double deduction cannot be presumed if the same is not specifically provided by law, in addition to normal deduction.
3. The Appellant prays that the order of the Ld. CIT(A)-1, Mumbai be set aside and that of the Assessing Officer be restored.
4. The Appellant craves leave to amend or alter nay ground or add a new ground which may be necessary.
2. Assessee-trust filed its return of income on declaring nil income. Assessment was finalised by the AO u/s. 143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961(Act) on 27.12.2010 determining the total income at Rs. 25,49,830/-. First ground of appeal is about deletion of addition made by the AO under the head donation amounting to Rs. 30.5 lakhs. During the assessment proceedings AO found that assessee had received donation amounting to Rs. 30,50,000/-. He directed the assessee to file explanation in this regard. After considering the reply of the assessee he held that trust was taking donations for giving admissions in the school, that it amounted to selling of education, that assessee was not entitled to benefits of exemption u/s. 11 of the Act, that assessee was not carrying charitable activities. Relying on the case of Vodithala Education Trust Society (20 SOT 353) he denied the trust benefits of section 11 of the Act.
2.1 Assessee preferred an appeal before the First Appellate Authority (FAA). After considering the submissions of the assessee and the assessment order he held that assessee was not collecting capitation fees, that out of total donation a sum of Rs. 1.98 lakhs was received from the parents of the students, that finding given by the AO were against the provisions of law, that imparting education was part of charitable activities, that running of courses resulting in profit did not make the activities of the trust non charitable, that profits earned were utilised for the objects of the of the trust, that AO had not pointed out even a single instance about contravention of the provisions of sections 11-13 of the Act. Relying upon the judgments of Gujarat Maritime Board (295 ITR 561) and Surat City Gymkhana (300 ITR 214) delivered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court he deleted the addition made by the AO.
2.2 Before us, Departmental Representative (DR) submitted that the assessee had collected capitation fees, that activities carried out by the assessee were not charitable in nature, that donations were over and above the fees paid by the stundents.
2.3 We have heard the rival submissions and perused the material before us. It is found that out of the total donation of Rs. 30.5 lakhs a sum of Rs. 1.98 lakhs was received from the students. AO has not doubted the fact that the assessee is imparting education and as per the settled law of taxation imparting education is covered by the word charitable activity. If income earned by a trust is utilised for charitable purposes it cannot be held that trust is carrying out business. FAA has rightly pointed out that there is no evidence on record that profit earned by the assessee-trust were not utilised by it for non charitable purposes. It is also a fact that there is no instances of violation of provisions of sections 11-13 of the Act by the trust. In our opinion principles enumerated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Gujarat Maritime Board and Surat City Gymkhana are applicable to the case under consideration. Therefore, we are of the opinion that assessee-trust was carrying out charitable activities and was entitled to exemption. Therefore, confirming the order of the FAA we decide Ground No. 1 against the AO
3. Next Ground of appeal is about disallowance of claim of depreciation amounting to Rs. 5.58 lakhs. During the assessment proceedings, AO held that the provisions of section 11 of the Act provided for deduction on expenditure incurred for objects of the trust and the deduction of depreciation on capital assets would amount to double deduction, that depreciation could not be allowed in the case of allowance of exemption u/s. 11 of the Act. He relied upon the judgments of Escorts Ltd. (199 ITR 43) and J.K Synthatics (65 Taxman 420) delivered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
3.1 Assessee preferred an appeal before the First Appellate Authority (FAA). After considering the submissions of the assessee and the assessment order he held that trust was registered u/s. 12A of the Act, that AO had not doubted that capital expenditure was towards the objects of the trust. Following the order of the Hon'ble Jurisdictional High Court delivered in the case of Institute of Banking Personal Selection, Bombay (264 ITR 110) he held that depreciation claimed by the assessee had to be allowed. As a result, addition made by the AO was deleted.
3.2 Before us, Departmental Representative (DR) submitted that assessee was not enetiled to claim double deductions.
4. We have heard the rival submissions and perused the material before us. We find that issue of double deduction was dealt by the Hon'ble High Court in the case of Institute of Banking Personal Selection (supra), it was held by the Hon'ble High Court that in case of trusts, so called double deductions are allowable. We would like to quote a portion of the said judgment:
“….. the first question which requires consideration by this Court is: whether depreciation was allowable on the assets, the cost of which has been fully allowed as application of income under s. 11 in the past years? In the case of CIT v. Munisuvrat Jain (1994) Tax LR 1084 (Bom) the facts were as follows. The assessee was a charitable trust. It was registered as a public charitable trust. It was also registered with the CIT, Pune. The assessee derived income from the temple property which was a trust property. During the course of assessment proceedings for asst. yrs. 1977–78, 1978–79 and 1979–80, the assessee claimed depreciation on the value of the building @ 2-1/2 per cent and they also claimed depreciation on furniture @ 5 per cent. The question which arose before the Court for determination was: whether depreciation could be denied to the assessee, as expenditure on acquisition of the assets had been treated as application of income in the year of acquisition? It was held by the Bombay High Court that s. 11 of the IT Act makes provision in respect of computation of income of the trust from the property held for charitable or religious purposes and it also provides for application and accumulation of income. On the other hand, s. 28 of the IT Act deals with chargeability of income from profits and gains of business and s. 29 provides that income from profits and gains of business shall be computed in accordance with s. 30 to s. 43C. That, s. 32(1) of the Act provides for depreciation in respect of building, plant and machinery owned by the assessee and used for the business purposes. It further provides for deduction subject to s. 34. In that matter also, a similar argument, as in the present case, was advanced on behalf of the Revenue, namely, that depreciation can be allowed as deduction only under s. 32 of the IT Act and not under general principles. The Court rejected this argument. It was held that normal depreciation can be considered as a legitimate deduction in computing the real income of the assessee on general principles or under s. 11(1)(a) of the IT Act. The Court rejected the argument on behalf of the Revenue that s. 32 of the IT Act was the only section granting benefit of deduction on account of depreciation. It was held that income of a charitable trust derived from building, plant and machinery and furniture was liable to be computed in normal commercial manner although the trust may not be carrying on any business and the assets in respect whereof depreciation is claimed may not be business assets. In all such cases, s. 32 of the IT Act providing for depreciation for computation of income derived from business or profession is not applicable. However, the income of the trust is required to be computed under s. 11 on commercial principles after providing for allowance for normal depreciation and deduction thereof from gross income of the trust. In view of the aforestated judgment of the Bombay High Court, we answer question No. 1 in the affirmative i.e, in favour of the assessee and against the Department.
4. Question No. 2 herein is identical to the question which was raised before the Bombay High Court in the case of Director of Income-tax (Exemption) v. Framjee Cawasjee Institute (1993) 109 CTR 463 (Bom). In that case, the facts were as follows: The assessee was the trust. It derived its income from depreciable assets. The assessee took into account depreciation on those assets in computing the income of the trust. The ITO held that depreciation could not be taken into account because, full capital expenditure had been allowed in the year of acquisition of the assets. The assessee went in appeal before the AAC. The appeal was rejected. The Tribunal, however, took the view that when the ITO stated that full expenditure had been allowed in the year of acquisition of the assets, what he really meant was that the amount spent on acquiring those assets had been treated as ‘application of income’ of the trust in the year in which the income was spent in acquiring those assets. This did not mean that in computing income from those assets in subsequent years, depreciation in respect of those assets cannot be taken into account. This view of the Tribunal has been confirmed by the Bombay High Court in the above judgment. Hence, question No. 2 is covered by the decision of the Bombay High Court in the above judgment. Consequently, question No. 2 is answered in the affirmative i.e, in favour of the assessee and against the Department.”
Respectfully following the above, we decide Ground No. 2 against the AO.
As a result appeal filed by the AO stands dismissed.