Shri Shanker Raju: Heard the learned counsel for the parties.
2. It is trite in law that delay defeats justice and one who sleeps over his right looses the remedy as well. The Apex Court in State of M.P. v. S.S. Rathore, AIR 1990 SC 10 ruled in the context of Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, more particularly, Section 21 that a repeated representation would not extend limitation.
3. In the above backdrop, applicant, a Constable in Delhi Police, has impugned respondents order dated 23.10.1998 imposing upon him a major punishment of forfeiture of two years approved service by reducing his pay by two stages as well as an order dated 19.8.1999 passed by the appellate authority affirming the punishment. Also assailed is an order passed by the Lt. Governor dated 30.3.2009 whereby the representation preferred by the applicant after his acquittal from the criminal charges has not been entertained as not maintainable.
4. Applicant, who was involved in criminal case under Sections 323/341/34 IPC of withholding forcibly and assaulting a public person while attached as wireless operator to Shri Sajjan Kumar, was proceeded against in departmental proceedings for the allegations constituting misconduct and simultaneously the offence after investigation was proceeded in an appeal. Although an order passed by the respondents while the applicant was not transferred kept the inquiry in abeyance but this order has not been revoked on his transfer by the Additional Commissioner of Police. A representation to hold the inquiry in abeyance was also turned down by the respondents on 17.8.1993. The inquiry was completed and when a major penalty was inflicted, applicant by way of his appeal informed the appellate authority to have cognizance of Rule 12 of Delhi Police (Punishment & Appeal) Rules, 1980 (for short Rules 1980) and thereafter to decide the issue. However, when such a consideration has not taken place on acquittal by the trial court on 12.3.2008 whereby the prosecution has failed to prove the ingredients of the offence, applicant has preferred a representation to the head of the department seeking quashing of the punishment order on 4.6.2008, which when rejected as not maintainable on 30.3.2009 gives rise to the present OA.
5. Learned counsel for applicant states that the cause of action, if any, has arisen to him in view of statutory rule 12 of the Rules 1980 is only on 12.3.2008 when he was acquitted from the offence with an opportunity to make a representation to the authorities to correct the illegality already committed. The orders passed without waiting for the trial to be concluded passed by the disciplinary authority are void ab initio as per Rule 12 of Rules 1980. As such, the head of the department when approached under the guise of treating a representation as revision, rejecting the same without dealing with the merits is non-consideration of application of mind and deprives a reasonable opportunity to him.
6. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondents vehemently opposed the contentions and preliminary objection as to limitation has been raised. Learned counsel states that right to appeal once exercised by the applicant, he is now estopped on waiver to question the illegality of the orders merely on the basis of a subsequent event, which has taken place about 10 years back from the date of order passed by the disciplinary authority, as affirmed by the appellate authority. It is further stated that the applicant now at this belated stage cannot re-open the things, which have already attained finality.
7. On careful consideration of the rival contentions of the parties, in our considered view, for the purpose of Limitation Act as well as Section 23 of Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 the cause of action would not have to be construed strictly in the sense that the impugned order since being passed by the appellate authority within one year, one has no right to challenge. In fact, the cause of action arises to him when he gets legal right to assail the impugned orders on the basis of statutory rule. Rule 12 of Rules 1980 clearly mandates disciplinary authority not to exercise the power to punish till the outcome of the criminal trial is not known and thereafter keeping in light the provisions and exceptions contained therein, a conscious decision to inflict penalty is the appropriate stage on which the disciplinary proceedings would come to an end, as provided under Rule 16 of the Rules 1980. What is not precluded to the respondents is to hold an inquiry simultaneously with the criminal trial, which they have continued. This fact has not been considered by the disciplinary authority. The cause of action is not an isolated fact or issue in this case. In legal parlance, cause of action consists of bundle of facts and constituting a chain, which results into creation of a legal right and remedy to an aggrieved person to challenge the illegality or otherwise of an order by which he has been punished. Applicant has not only impugned the punishment order but also the act of the disciplinary authority whereby in oblivion and in total disagreement of rule 12 of the Rules 1980 disciplinary authority has not taken into consideration the rule position and this act of the disciplinary authority is a coram non judice. Disciplinary authority has no jurisdiction to pass orders before outcome of the criminal trial, which is known only on 12.3.2008. As such, the cause of action having arisen on 12.3.2008, applicant immediately preferred a representation and exercised the right of alternate remedy by way of departmental appeal to the authorities and this could not have been done to the disciplinary or appellate authorities, as they had already passed orders and had become functus officio. It is only the higher authority than the appellate authority, which would have been the appropriate authority in the circumstances to decide. Having not taken cognizance of the appeal/representation preferred by the applicant and rejecting the same as not maintainable is certainly an act, which speaks volume about non-application of mind to the rules and law on the subject.
8. Leaving other grounds open, we find that the impugned orders cannot be sustained in the light of rule 12 of the Rules 1980. OA is allowed. Impugned orders are set aside. However, the disciplinary authority is at liberty to examine the decision of the trial court and thereafter take a final decision as per the judgment of trial court in accordance with rules within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs. ( Dr. Veena Chhotray ) ( Shanker Raju ) Member (A) Member (J) /sunil/