Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
  • Sri. Suresh S. Joshi, Advocate
  • Sri. N.K Patil and Sri. R.S Hegde, Advocates
Judges
  • P. Vishwanatha Shetty, J.
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Click here to upload
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
  • Sri. Suresh S. Joshi, Advocate
  • Sri. N.K Patil and Sri. R.S Hegde, Advocates
Judges
  • P. Vishwanatha Shetty, J.
See more information ...
Smart Summary

Judicial Opinion Summary — P. Vishwanatha Shetty, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner claims ownership of 2 acres and 20 guntas in Sy. No. 50 of Tavarekere Village, Begur Hobli, Bangalore South Taluk, by virtue of a registered partition deed dated 25 July 1951. The petitioner sought a direction restraining the respondents from proceeding with land acquisition concerning this plot.

The petition advanced two principal contentions: (1) the petitioner was not served notice and was not heard during the Section 5A enquiry or at the award stage, rendering the acquisition proceedings illegal; and (2) a communication dated 30 June 1981 (Annexure-C) indicated a recommendation by the 2nd respondent to the State Government to denotify 6 acres and 20 guntas in Sy. No. 50 (lands with structures and gardens), and that recommendation was awaiting government consideration — the petitioner sought denotification of her land on that basis and relied on government circulars (Annexures-B and D) stating that gardens and nurseries should be dropped from acquisition.

Counsel for the respondents opposed the petition on merits, delay and laches, and on equitable grounds, relying in part on an earlier set of writ petitions (Writ Petition No. 5508/83 and connected petitions) filed by the petitioner’s father, Munivenkatappa, which this Court had dismissed.

The record, as discussed in the opinion, includes multiple acquisition-stage events and documents: preliminary notification(s) under Section 17(1) and notification(s) under Section 19(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, award(s) passed, possession said to have been taken on 19 March 1984, and a Gazette notification evidencing taking of possession (Annexure-R1) published in the Karnataka Gazette (dates appear in the opinion and are discussed below). The petitioner did not challenge the correctness of the statutory notifications in this petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the acquisition proceedings are liable to be declared illegal because the petitioner was not served with notice and was not heard during the Section 5A enquiry and at the award stage.
  2. Whether the respondents should be directed to denotify the petitioner’s land from acquisition proceedings on the basis of Annexure-C (a recommendation for denotification pending before the State Government) and government circulars exempting gardens/nurseries from acquisition.
  3. Whether the petition is barred by delay and laches given the sequence of statutory steps (notifications, award, taking of possession) and the petitioner’s prior family litigation challenging acquisition.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant / Petitioner (Sri. Suresh Joshi)

  • The petitioner was not served with notice and was not heard during the Section 5A enquiry and at the award stage; therefore the acquisition proceedings are without authority and should be declared illegal.
  • A communication dated 30 June 1981 (Annexure-C) shows the 2nd respondent recommended denotification of 6 acres and 20 guntas (areas with structures and garden); that recommendation is pending before the State Government and the petitioner’s land should be denotified. The petitioner relied on governmental circulars dated 15 November 1978 and 1 January 1987 (Annexures-B and D) directing that lands consisting of garden and nursery proposed for acquisition by Bangalore Development Authority be dropped from acquisition.
  • The petitioner delayed approaching the Court because she had not been dispossessed and no lay-out had been formed by the Bangalore Development Authority.

Respondents (Sri. R. S. Hegde)

  • The petition should be dismissed on merits and because the petitioner’s conduct disentitles her to equitable relief; alternatively the petition is barred by delay and laches.
  • The petitioner’s title derives through her father, Munivenkatappa, who earlier filed Writ Petition No. 5508/83 and connected petitions challenging acquisition of the larger area; those petitions were dismissed and became final, and the petitioner cannot relitigate the same matter after the father’s death.
  • Preliminary notification under Section 17(1) was issued (stated in the opinion as 19 September 1977), and after objections a notification under Section 19(1) was issued on 19 March 1978; these facts show the petitioner had prior knowledge and opportunity to challenge the proceedings.
  • The petitioner’s name did not appear in revenue records on the date of the preliminary notification, limiting her ability to challenge lack of notice; possession was taken on 19 March 1984, award passed 18 February 1984 (father participated and sought enhanced compensation), and Gazette notification evidencing taking of possession was published (Annexure-R1).
  • The acquisition involved a large scheme (about 1703 acres and 10½ guntas for the Byrasandra Tavarekere Madivala Scheme — B.T.M. Lay-out), and many owners did not challenge acquisition, indicating public notice and public prejudice from late challenges.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
HARI SINGH v. STATE OF U.P., (1984) 2 SCC 624 : AIR 1984 SC 1020 The Supreme Court observed that a writ petition filed after an inordinate delay (here, about two and a half years in the cited case) challenging a notification under the Land Acquisition Act is liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches; courts may presume that statutory publication requirements were complied with and that local knowledge would have spread; late interference causes public prejudice. The High Court applied the laches principle set out in HARI SINGH to the present facts, holding that even if the petitioner claimed lack of notice, the delay in approaching the Court (coupled with the statutory steps completed and large-scale acquisition) made the petition liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the procedural history and statutory milestones in the acquisition process as set out in the petition and the respondents' filings. Key elements of the court's step-by-step analysis are:

  1. Identification of statutory steps reached: the opinion records issuance of notifications under Section 17(1) and Section 19(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, an award in respect of the land, and that possession of the land was taken (dates appear in the opinion, including references to an award and taking of possession in 1984 and a Gazette notification, Annexure-R1).
  2. Procedural posture of this petition: the petitioner did not challenge the correctness of the statutory notifications in this writ petition and instead sought a direction restraining respondents from proceeding with acquisition despite the record showing that award and possession had occurred.
  3. Finality and appropriate remedy: the court explained that when acquisition proceedings have reached finality (award passed and possession taken), a petitioner cannot, without challenging the notifications themselves, obtain a prophylactic direction preventing further steps in acquisition. On this short ground — failure to challenge notifications — the petition was vulnerable to dismissal.
  4. Delay and laches: the court found the petition barred by delay and laches. It noted the absence of any adequate explanation in the writ petition for the long delay in approaching the Court. The court relied on the principle from the Supreme Court’s HARI SINGH decision, which counsels dismissal of delayed challenges to acquisition notifications because of presumed compliance with statutory publication requirements, the likelihood of local knowledge, and the risk of public prejudice from late interference.
  5. Knowledge/participation and prior litigation: the court accepted the respondents’ contention that the petitioner’s father had earlier litigated similar challenges (Writ Petition No. 5508/83 and connected matters) which were dismissed, and that the father had participated in award proceedings and claimed enhanced compensation. The court found force in the submission that the earlier decision applies to the petitioner’s case and reinforced dismissal on that ground.
  6. Denotification contention: the court addressed the petitioner’s reliance on Annexure-C (recommendation for denotification) and government circulars exempting garden/nursery lands from acquisition, but concluded that knowledge of Annexure-C and prior attempts to get the land denotified did not excuse the inordinate delay in approaching the Court and could not sustain the present petition at this late stage.
  7. Equitable relief and conduct: although respondents argued that the petitioner’s conduct disentitled her to equitable relief, the court found it unnecessary to decide that contention because the petition failed on the other grounds (finality of acquisition, lack of challenge to notifications, and laches).

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The petition is DISMISSED.

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • The petitioner’s prayer for a direction restraining respondents from proceeding with acquisition was refused; the acquisition proceedings and earlier statutory steps (notifications, award, and taking of possession as recorded) stand.
  • The court made no order as to costs.

Broader implications:

The opinion does not purport to lay down a new legal precedent. The court applied established principles concerning finality of acquisition proceedings, the necessity of timely challenges to statutory notifications, and the doctrine of laches as articulated by the Supreme Court in HARI SINGH v. State of U.P.

Note: This summary is confined strictly to the facts, arguments, citations, reasoning and orders as stated in the provided opinion. No information has been added beyond the text of that opinion.

Show full summary ...

    Papamma v. Special Land Acquisition Officer

    P. Vishwanatha Shetty, J.:— The petitioner in this petition claims to be the owner of land measuring 2 acres and 20 guntas in Sy. No. 50 of Tavarekere Village. Begur Hobli, Bangalore South Taluk, by virtue of the allotment of the said land made in her favour by means of a registered partition deed dated 25th July 1951.

    2. In this petition, the petitioner has sought for a direction to the respondents not to proceed with the acquisition in respect of the said land. Sri. Suresh Joshi, learned counsel for the petitioner made two submissions. Firstly he submitted that since the petitioner was not served with the notice and was not heard in the course of Section 5A enquiry and also at the stage of passing of the award the respondents have no authority in law to proceed with the acquisition proceedings; and therefore the entire acquisition proceedings are required to be declared as illegal. Secondly, he submitted since a communication was issued to the petitioner on 30 June 1981, a copy of which has been produced as Annexure-C stating that the recommendations were made by the 2nd respondent to the State Government to denotify 6 acres and 20 guntas of land in Sy. No. 50 where structures and garden are existing, the respondents must be directed to denotify the land in question from the acquisition proceedings. According to the learned counsel the recommendation made by the 2 respondent as per Annexure-C is pending consideration before the State Government. He further submitted that under similar circumstances, the Government has denotified the lands of several others recently. In support of this plea he relied upon the Circular dated 15 November 1978 and 1st January 1987, copies of which have been produced as Annexures-B and D respectively wherein the Government has notified that wherever the land proposed to be acquired by the Bangalore Development Authority consists of garden and nursery, the said lands should be dropped from acquisition proceedings.

    3. So far as the delay in approaching this Court is concerned, learned counsel points out since the petitioner has not been dispossessed from the land in question, the petitioner did not approach this Court earlier. He submits that the lay-out has not yet been formed on the land in question by the Bangalore Development Authority.

    4. Sri. R.S Hegde, learned counsel for the respondents strongly resisted the prayer of the petitioner. He submitted that this petition has to be dismissed on merits and also on the ground that the conduct of the petitioner disentitles her for any equitable relief at the hands of this Court and also on the ground of delay and laches on the part of the petitioner in approaching this Court. So far as the merits is concerned, Sri. Hegde points out that evan according to the petitioner's showing, she is the daughter of one Munivenkatappa through whom she claims title to the land in question; and the said Munivenkatappa had earlier filed Writ Petition No. 5508/83 and connected writ petitions before this Court challenging the acquisition of the entire 6 acres and 20 guntas of land in Sy. No. 50 and two other items of land and this Court had dismissed the said writ petitions and the order made in the said writ petitions having become final, the petitioner cannot be permitted to urge the same matter over again after the death of her father. He points out even assuming that the father of the petitioner had no interest in the lands in question since the challenge made regarding the acquisition of the land in question having been examined by this Court and negatived by this Court, what has been stated by this Court in the said writ petition holds good so far as the case of the petitioner is concerned. He also submitted that the petitioner who is aware of all these facts, by suppressing the said facts has filed this petition and therefore, the conduct of the petitioner disentities her for any equitable relief at the hands of this Court.

    5. Sri. Hegde pointed out that the preliminary Notification under subsection (1) of Section 17 of the Act was issued on 19 September 1977 and after considering the objections of all the interested persons, recommendations were made by the Land Acquisition Officer for acquisition of this land and various other items of land and a Notification under subsection (1) of Section 19 of the Act came to be issued on 19 March 1978. It is also the submission of Sri. Hegde that even according to the case of the petitioner, the petitioner was pleading before the authorities for denotification of the land long prior to the year 1981 and therefore it is clear that the petitioner had knowledge of the acquisition proceedings so far as the lands in question are concerned prior to the year 1981 itself.

    6. He further points out that the name of the petitioner was not shown in the revenue records on the date of issue of preliminary Notification and therefore it is not permissible for the petitioner to challenge the acquisition proceedings on the ground that she had no notice of the acquisition proceedings. He further submits that the possession of the land in question was taken on 19 March 1984 and evidencing the fact of taking possession a Notification dated 7 May 1985 was published in Karnataka Gazette on 31 October 1985, a copy of which has been produced as Annexure-R1 as provided under subsection 2 of Section 16 of the Act. He also submitted that the award in respect of the land in question was passed on 18 February 1984 and the father of the petitioner had participated in the award proceedings and has also claimed for payment of enhanced compensation. Therefore, he submits that the petitioner having kept quiet all these years cannot now be permitted to challenge the acquisition proceedings solely on the ground in Annexure-C it was stated by the Land Acquisition Officer that the Bangalore Development Authority had recommended for dropping the acquisition of the land in question.

    7. It is his further submission that in the said Notifications issued under Section 19(1) of the Act in all land measuring 1703 acres and 10 ½ guntas were sought to be acquired for the purpose of formation of a layout known as Byrasandra Tavarekere Madivala Scheme (B.T.M Lay-out).

    8. I do not find any merit in this petition. This petition is liable to-be rejected on every one of the grounds urged by the learned counsel for the respondents. As noticed by me earlier, the Notification under subsection (1) of Section 17 of the Act was issued on 19 September 1987 and Notification under subsection (1) of Section 19 of the Act was issued on 9 March 1978 and award was passed on 8 February 1984 and a Notification evidencing taking possession of the said land on 19 March 1984 came to be issued on 19 May 1985 as per Annexure-R1. In this petition, the petitioner has not challenged the correctness of the said Notifications. On the other hand the prayer of the petitioner is for a direction to the respondents not to proceed with the acquisition proceedings. The narration of facts stated above clearly shows that the acquisition proceedings have become final and the possession of the land was taken as back as 19 March 1984. Under these circumstances, I am unable to understand as to how the petitioner can seek for a direction to the respondents not to proceed with the acquisition proceedings without challenging the acquisition proceedings and more particularly the Notifications issued under Section 17(1) and 19(1) of the Act. On this short ground alone this petition is liable to be dismissed. Further, as rightly pointed out by Sri. Hegde, the acquisition proceedings having reached finality by taking possession of the said land on 19 March 1984, the petitioner cannot be at this stage, permitted to challenge the acquisition proceedings. This petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches on the part of the petitioner. However, Sri. Suresh Joshi tried to submit that the petitioner had no notice of the acquisition proceedings. I am unable to accede to the assertion made by the learned counsel on behalf of the petitioner. In the entire writ petition there is no explanation given for the delay caused in filing this writ petition what is stated in paragraph 9 cannot in my view be considered as an explanation for the inordinate delay in apporoaching this Court. Further, the contention that under similar circumstances the authorities have denotified the lands belonging to others from acquisition that cannot be treated as an explanation for the inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in approaching this Court. As noticed by me earlier, Annexure-C shows that the petitioner had knowledge of the acquisition proceedings and she moved the authorities to drop the land in question from acquisition proceedings. Under these circumstances when the petitioner had notice of the acquisition proceedings prior to the year 1981, the petitioner cannot now be permitted to challenge the acquisition proceedings on the ground that the recommendation made by the Bangalore Development Authority to denotify the lands in question has been pending consideration before the State. I am unable to accept the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner at the stage of hearing of this petition that the petitioner had no notice of passing of the award and also taking possession of the land in question. It is not in dispute that more than 1700 acres of land was acquired along with the lands in dispute. Under these circumstances, even if the petitioner had no notice of the proceedings as claimed by the petitioner, this writ petition is also liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches on the part of the petitioner. It is necessary to point out that the Supreme Court in the case of HARI SINGH v. STATE OF U.P reported in (1984) 2 SCC 624 : AIR 1984 SC 1020 at paragraph 4 has observed as follows:

    “4. At the out set we are of the view that the writ petition filed in July, 1982 questioning the notification issued in January 1980 after a delay of nearly two and a half years is liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches only. It is no doubt true that the appellants have pleaded that they did not know anything about the notifications which had been published in the Gazette till they came to know of the notices issued under Section 9(3) of the Act but they have not pleaded that there was no publication in the locality of the public notice of the substance of the notification as required by Section 4(1) of the Act. It should be presumed that official acts would have been performed duly as required by law. It is significant that a large number of persons who own the remaining plots have not challenged the acquisition proceedings. The only othsr petition in which these proceedings are challenged in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 11476 of 1982 on the file of the High Court filed subsequently by Amar Singh and four others. Moreover in a small place like Kheragarh where these plots are situate the acquisition of these lands would be the talk of the town in a short while and it is difficult to believe that the appellants who are residents of that place would not have known till July, 1982 that the impugned notification had been published in 1980. Any interference in this case filed after two and a half years with the acquisition proceedings is likely to cause serious public prejudice. This appeal should, therefore, fail on the ground of delay alone.”

    9. The principle laid down by the Supreme Court in the above case fully applies to the facts of this case even assuming that the petitioner had no notice of the acquisition proceedings. This writ petition is liable to be dismissed on merits also. It is the case of Sri. Hegde, that in Writ Petition No. 5508/1983 and connected petitions this Court had gone into the legality of the acquisition of the land in question and this Court having upheld the acquisition of the land in question, the principle laid down by this Court in the said decision must be applied to the case of the petitioner. I find considerable force in the said submission of Sri. Hegde. Therefore, on this ground also this petition is liable to be dismissed. In the light of the discussion made above, though Sri. Hegde strongly urged that this petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground that the conduct, of the petitioner disentitles her for any equitable relief at the hands of this Court. I find it is unnecessary to consider the said contention.

    10. In the light of what is stated above, I do not find any merit in this petition. Accordingly, this petition is dismissed. However, no order is made as to costs.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.
    Try AI Pro free for 7 days Upgrade to AI Pro

    Comments

    Papamma v. Special Land Acquisition Officer
    (Mar 16, 1998)