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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 41 of the City Policy Act.9. Section 41 of the Madras City Police Act
  • Section 3 (1) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967
  • Section 41 (3) (b) of the Tamil Nadu City Police Act,
  • Section 41 of the Madras City Police Act, 1888.
  • Section 41 of the Madras City Police Act
  • Section 33 (1) (o) of the Bombay Police Act
  • Madras City Police Act
  • Rule 7 of the Rules
  • BOMBAY POLICE ACT
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 41 of the City Policy Act.9. Section 41 of the Madras City Police Act
  • Section 3 (1) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967
  • Section 41 (3) (b) of the Tamil Nadu City Police Act,
  • Section 41 of the Madras City Police Act, 1888.
  • Section 41 of the Madras City Police Act
  • Section 33 (1) (o) of the Bombay Police Act
  • Madras City Police Act
  • Rule 7 of the Rules
  • BOMBAY POLICE ACT
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The writ petition was filed by the President of Tamizhar Desiya Iyakkam, a political party said to be registered with the Election Commission of India. The petitioner challenged the action of the 3rd respondent, the Commissioner of Police, Madurai, who allegedly withdrew or cancelled an earlier permission to hold a public meeting (a "Tamils Warning Conference") scheduled for 19.1.1997 at Madurai.

The petitioner's affidavit states that initial permission was given by the Commissioner to hold the Conference at Tamukkam grounds (under Madurai Corporation control). The Corporation refused the petitioner's application on 17.1.1997 citing the Commissioner's objection. The petitioner's district president was issued a notice dated 15.1.1997 to appear for an inquiry. The petitioner then attempted to shift venue to a hotel, but the hotel owner refused. The petitioner requested reasons for withdrawal; the Commissioner replied by letter dated 25.1.1997, and the petitioner sought quashing of that letter.

The Commissioner's letter stated that though permission had initially been granted under Section 41(3)(b) of the Tamil Nadu City Police Act, intelligence enquiries and interaction with the Madurai public indicated a likelihood of untoward incidents if the conference proceeded—chiefly because it was likely to voice support for the LTTE, an organisation banned in India. The letter also referred to press reports concerning earlier meetings organized by the petitioner (for instance, a Bangalore meeting on 5.12.1996) where pro-LTTE slogans allegedly were raised. The Commissioner noted a press statement of the petitioner dated 17.1.1997 that the proposed conference had been postponed and consequently dropped further proceedings.

The petitioner alleged mala fide motives, asserting that respondents acted to avoid embarrassment to the Chief Minister who was to depose before the Jain Commission on 17–18.1.1997. The Commissioner filed an elaborate counter-affidavit asserting that the petitioner supported the LTTE (declared unlawful under Section 3(1) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967), that support for the organisation threatened public order, and that intelligence and press material justified revocation of permission. Annexures included press cuttings and police intelligence reports.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the cancellation/withdrawal of permission to hold the public meeting on 19.1.1997 violated the petitioner's fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.
  2. Whether the Commissioner's action in withdrawing permission fell within or exceeded the permissible scope of Section 41 of the Madras City Police Act (i.e., valid exercise of power to regulate or prohibit assemblies and meetings).
  3. Whether the respondents acted with mala fide intention (forbidden purpose) in withdrawing permission for reasons unrelated to legitimate public-order concerns.
  4. Whether the apprehension of threat to public order relied upon by the Commissioner had the necessary proximate nexus to justify restriction of Article 19 rights.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The impugned order (withdrawal/cancellation of permission) violated the petitioner's fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a) and rights of assembly and expression.
  • The action was beyond the protective ambit of Section 41 of the Madras City Police Act and the reasons given were untenable and insufficient to deny the petitioner's rights.
  • The respondents acted with mala fide intention to avoid embarrassment to the Chief Minister, using police power to suppress dissent rather than to preserve public order.
  • Blanket denial of permission constituted an impermissible prior restraint on constitutional rights.

Respondents' Arguments (Commissioner / State)

  • The petitioner and its association persistently supported LTTE, declared an unlawful association under Section 3(1) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967; support to a banned organisation is prejudicial to national security and territorial integrity.
  • Intelligence reports and press cuttings evidenced that the proposed meeting would likely rouse feelings in support of the banned organisation and could cause breach of public tranquility and public safety.
  • The apprehension of law-and-order disturbance was real and direct (not remote or farfetched); therefore cancellation of permission after notice to the petitioner complied with Section 41 requirements.
  • The challenge was to the exercise of the power under Section 41, not to the constitutional validity of Section 41 itself.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Himat Lal v. Police Commissioner, Ahmedabad (1973 Crl. L.J. 204) (Constitution Bench) Struck down an executive rule (Rule 7 under Bombay Police Act rules) that conferred unguided arbitrary discretion to refuse permission for meetings; held that "regulating" can include prohibition but restrictions must not amount to arbitrary or excessive discretion; majority supported reasonable regulation for public order. The court relied on the case to emphasize that police powers to regulate meetings must not be arbitrary; the principle guided evaluation of whether Section 41 powers were being exercised with constitutionally permissible limits and safeguards.
Superintendent, Central Prison v. Dr. Lohia (AIR 1960 S.C. 633) Defined "public order" as public peace, safety and tranquility (local disturbances) and held that restrictions on Article 19 must have a proximate connection to public order and not be remote or hypothetical. The principle was applied to assess whether the apprehended danger relied upon by respondents had the required proximate nexus to justify restricting Article 19 freedoms.
S. Ramakrishna v. The President, District Board, Nellore (I.L.R 1953 Madras 57) Held that fundamental rights (e.g., freedom of association) cannot be made subject to arbitrary administrative or executive discretion or prior administrative censorship. The court invoked this decision to underline that administrative discretion to permit or withhold fundamental-rights activity must not amount to prior restraint or censorship.
S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram (1989) 2 S.C.C. 574 Clarified the scope of Article 19(1)(a) and Article 19(2): freedom of speech is subject to reasonable restrictions, which must strike a balance and have proximate/directed danger (not remote); the "spark in a powder keg" metaphor for imminent danger. The court used this authority as the central test for whether the restriction on speech/assembly was justified—requiring proximate and direct nexus between expression and danger to public order before restricting Article 19 rights.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded by situating the dispute within the framework of Article 19 rights and the statutory powers under Section 41 of the Madras City Police Act. The court stressed that rights under Article 19 are "precious" and cannot be lightly restricted; any regulation must serve the purposes permitted by Article 19 and must be exercised to subserve the larger public good rather than to suppress dissent or protect political interests.

The court examined the statutory scheme of Section 41 (described in the opinion): powers to direct conduct of assemblies, to prescribe routes/timing, to prohibit assemblies subject to State Government sanction (limited duration), to grant/deny permission where applications are made five days prior, to impose conditions, to afford an opportunity to show cause before refusal, and to deputize police officers to be present and report on proceedings.

The court reviewed precedent law establishing two related constraints: (1) that administrative rules or practices must not confer arbitrary discretion to refuse meetings (Himat Lal and S. Ramakrishna), and (2) that restrictions on Article 19 rights must have a proximate and direct nexus to public order and not be founded on remote, hypothetical or conjectural apprehensions (Dr. Lohia; S. Rangarajan).

Applying these principles to the material before it, the court observed that:

  • The power under Section 41 is sweeping and must be exercised with care and caution; pre-Constitution enactments must be applied consistent with constitutional values.
  • Intelligence reports and press cuttings suggest a policing mindset that may not fully accommodate democratic norms; the mere unpopularity of views is not a sufficient ground to prohibit expression.
  • The petitioner association had not been declared unlawful; if unlawful acts occurred, prosecution under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act would be open, but that does not ipso facto justify prior prohibition of a meeting.
  • A blanket refusal to permit a meeting is not the appropriate method of regulating the exercise of fundamental rights where alternative, less intrusive measures (such as deputing police officers to monitor the meeting) are available under Section 41.
  • The presence of some persons not regarded as supporters of a banned organisation does not disprove that the meeting was intended to express support for a banned organisation; conversely, that fact alone cannot justify a blanket executive prohibition without proximate evidence of imminent danger.

The court therefore required that, for future applications, authorities should be able to demonstrate that refusal of permission falls strictly within the permissible grounds under Article 19 and that mere apprehensions insufficiently grounded in proximate and direct danger would not justify blanket prohibitions.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Writ Petition was DISPOSED OF by the court. The court ordered no costs. The connected application W.M.P. 3389/97 was dismissed.

Implications and observable consequences from the opinion (as stated in the text):

  • Direct effect on the parties: the writ petition has been disposed of; no costs were awarded; W.M.P. 3389/97 is dismissed.
  • The court did not grant the petitioner's prayer for a direction that respondents permit any future meeting; it explicitly declined to direct permission for future meetings because factual circumstances at the date of any proposed meeting cannot be determined in advance.
  • The court directed (by observation) that when fresh applications are made the respondents must consider them according to law and in light of the principles set out in the judgment—namely, that restrictions must fit within Article 19 permissible grounds, be reasonable, and be supported by proximate evidence of danger to public order.
  • No claim in this opinion is made that a new precedent was laid down; rather, the court applied and reiterated established principles (from the cited precedents) about reasonable restrictions, proximate nexus to public order, and constraints on executive discretion in regulating assemblies.

Note: This summary is based exclusively on material contained in the provided opinion. No facts, findings, or outcomes have been added beyond those expressly stated in the text.

    Nedumaran v. State Of Tamil Nadu And Others

    This Writ Petition is filed by the President of Tamizhar Desiya Iyakkam. It is stated in his affidavit that he is the President of a political party viz., Tamizhar Desiya Iyakkam, which party is said to be registered with the Election Commission of India. The petitioner's grievance is that the 3rd respondent Commissioner of Police, Madurai has unlawfully withdrawn or cancelled the permission which had been given for holding a public meeting on 19.1.1997 at Madurai.

    2. In the affidavit, it is averred that the petitioner's forum is vitally interested in the happenings of Sri Lanka, and the Conference that had been organised at Madurai on 19.1.1997 was intended to make known what this organisation regarded as atrocities in Sri Lanka, to the larger public. The Conference had been christened by it as “Tamils Warning Conference”. Persons of repute like a religious leader, a former Judge and a Member of Parliament were said to have agreed to participate in that Conference.

    3. Initially permission sought was granted by the Commissioner to hold the Conference on 19.1.1997 at Tamukkam grounds at Madurai. That ground is under the control of the Madurai Corporation. An application was also made by the petitioner to the Corporation. That application was refused by the Corporation on 17.1.1997 on the ground that the Commissioner of Police had objected to the holding of the Conference. The District President of the Petitioner's Association, it is stated, was served with notice dt. 15.1.1997 issued by the Commissioner of Police requiring him to take part in an enquiry to be held on 15.1.1997 It is averred that the petitioner changed the venue to a Hotel, but the owner of the hotel also refused to permit the meeting to be held. The petitioner, thereafter, called upon the Commissioner to state his reasons as to why the permission granted earlier was being withdrawn and, on 25.1.1997, the Commissioner stated his reasons. The petitioner has produced the letter dated 25.1.1997, and sought for the quashing of the same.

    4. In that letter, it is stated, that though initially permission had been granted under Section 41 (3) (b) of the Tamil Nadu City Police Act, subsequently, discreet enquiries made by the Intelligence Agencies and interaction with the cross-section of the Madurai public revealed that if this Conference was to be allowed, there was a likelihood of some untoward incident happening affecting the law and order and maintenance of peace in Madurai City, since the Conference was likely to voice its support to LTTE, an organisation banned by the Government of India. Reference was made by the Commissioner to number of Press cuttings reporting the speeches made at a Conference held by the petitioner's organisation in Bangalore on 5.12.1996, wherein, slogans supporting LTTE were stated to have been raised. It is also noted in that letter that on 17.1.1997, the petitioner had issued a press statement that the proposed Conference had been postponed, and in the light of that announcement, the Commissioner dropped further proceedings in the matter.

    5. The petitioner has in his affidavit alleged that the refusal to permit the Conference was really on account of an anxiety on the part of the respondents to avoid any embarrassment to the Chief Minister who was to have deposed before the Jain Commission on 17.1.1997 and 18.1.1997 and to enable him to claim that he had prevented the holding of a Pro-L.T.T.E Conference in Tamil Nadu.

    6. An elaborate counter-affidavit has been filed by the Commissioner of Police, Madurai City, wherein, he has stated that the petitioner association is always supporting L.T.T.E which was banned by the Government of India by issue of a Notification under Section 3 (1) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 as the object of L.T.T.E is for a homeland for all Tamils by creating a broadened Tamil land annexing Tamil Nadu with northern Sri Lanka which disrupts the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India and thus falls within the ambit of an unlawful activity. The declaration banning the L.T.T.E in India first made in the year 1992 had been continued in the years 1994 and 1996, and was in force at the time the Conference was proposed to be held at Madurai by the petitioner. The acts of the petitioner in the earlier meetings conducted by him and his agents showed, according to the Commissioner, total disrespect to the law of the land, and had the effect of adversely affecting the diplomatic relationship between India and Srilanka. The open praise, glorification and support of a banned organisation which is accused of having indulged in activities prejudicial to the security of the nation could not be allowed and go unchecked. The Commissioner has averred that in the light of reliable information received by him that if the conference is allowed, public peace and public safety will be affected, the permission granted earlier was cancelled. It is averred that the internecine clashes between Srilankan Tamil groups due to their ideological differences was not uncommon, and that the sympathy or support shown to one group always attracted ill will of a rival group. It is also averred that the order made was in the public interest and safety. He has further averred that the permission granted earlier which was subsequently revoked, was in the nature of Executive direction. He has denied that the order was made at the instigation of the Chief Minister or at the direction of respondents 1 and 2, the State represented by the Secretary, Home and the Director General of Police.

    7. Number of Press cuttings, which contain the reports of some of the speeches made in other meetings organised by the petitioner along with the reports of the police intelligence have been annexed to the counter affidavit.

    8. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner submitted that the impugned order is violative of the petitioner's fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution, and is beyond the protective ambit of Section 41 of the Madras City Police Act, 1888. Counsel submitted that the reasons given are wholly untenable, and they do not constitute sufficient justification for denying the fundamental right of the petitioner to exercise his right of freedom of expression, and also the right to organise and hold assemblies. It was submitted that the respondents have acted with mala fide intention merely to avoid embarrassment to the Chief Minister and such action would be subversive of the democratice norms and clearly beyond the legitimate exercise of power permitted under Section 41 of the City Policy Act.

    9. Section 41 of the Madras City Police Act confers power on the police to regulate assemblies, meetings and processions in public places. The power is conferred by sub-section (1) on police officers above the rank of Head Constable to direct the conduct of all assemblies, meetings and processions in public places, prescribe routes by which, and the times at which such processions may pass, keep order in these places and prevent obstructions on the occasion of such assemblies, meetings and processions, sub-sections (2) thereof empowers the Commissioner by order in writing, subject to Sub-sections (3) and (4) to prohibit any assembly, meeting or procession, if he considers such prohibition to be necessary for the preservation of the public peace or public safety, such order is not to be made without the sanction of the State Government, and is to remain in force for a period not exceeding fifteen days from the date of the order. Sub-section (3) empowers the Commissioner to permit assemblies, or meetings, if an application for such permission is made five days before the date of meeting. The Commissioner is empowered to grant permission or refuse permission, and the permission if granted, can be subject to such conditions as he may choose to impose. An order refusing permission is not to be made before giving an opportunity to applicant to appear before the Commissioner and showing cause against the proposed refusal. Sub-section (5) of Section 41 of the Act empowers the Commissioners by order in writing depute one or more police officers to be present in any assembly, meeting or procession for the purpose of causing a report to be taken of the proceedings.

    10. Counsel for petitioners relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Himat Lal v. Police Commissioner, Ahmedabad (1973 Crl. L.J 204) rendered by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court, wherein the Court struck down Rule 7 of the Rules framed under the Bombay Police Act on the ground that Rule, which empowered the Commissioner of Police to refuse permission to hold meetings without giving any guidance under the Rule, and thereby conferring any arbitrary discretion, was an unreasonable restriction on the freedom of association and freedom of assembly guaranteed under Article 19 of the Constitution. The Court also held that the word “regulating” in Section 33 (1) (o) of the Bombay Police Act would include the power to prohibit and impose the condition that permission should be taken a few days before the holding of the meeting on a public street. Mathew, J. dissented from the view of the majority and held that the power to regulate did not include the right to prohibit and the permission sought for holding a meeting ought not to be refused. The majority opinion was that regulation is necessary to enable citizens to enjoy the various rights in crowded Public Streets, and that the State can made regulation in aid of the right of the assembly of each citizen and can impose reasonable restrictions in the interest of public order.

    11. Reliance was also placed on the decision rendered by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in the case of Superintendent, Central Prison v. Dr. Lohia (AIR 1960 S.C 633), wherein the concept of public order was considered. It was held that the public order is synonymous with public peace, safety and tranquility, that it is the absence of disorder involving breaches of local significance in contradistinction to national grievance, such as revolution, civil strife and war, affecting the security of the State. The Court held that in order that limitation on the right conferred by Article 19 to be reasonable, limitation must have a proximate connection to “public order” and not one farfetched, hypothetical, problematical or too remote.

    12. Counsel also referred to a decision rendered by a Bench of this Court in the case of S. Ramakrishna v. The President, District Board, Nellore (I.L.R 1953 Madras 57) wherein it was held that the exercise of any of the fundamental rights, like freedom of association or union, which are guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be made subject to the discretionary control of an administrative or executive authority, which can grant or withhold permission to exercise such right, at its discretion, and that there cannot also be any restriction on the exercise of such rights, which consist of a previous restraint and such is in the nature of administrative censorships. The issue in that case was the right of the teachers to form a union, and the validity of Circular which prohibited the formation of such union. The right to hold public meetings or the extent of reasonableness of the restrictions therein was not in issue.

    13. The decision of the Apex Court in the case of S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram (1989) 2 S.C.C 574) was also referred to and relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner. It was held therein that freedom of speech under Article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution of India means the right to express one's opinion by word of mouth, printing, picture or in any one manner of ideas made through any and the communication of ideas made through any medium. Such right, however, was held to be subject to reasonable restrictions in the larger interest of the community and the country as set out in Article 19 (2) of the Constitution. Those restrictions are intended to strike a proper balance between the liberty guaranteed, and the social interest specified under Article 19 (2). The Court emphasised that the interest of freedom of expression and social interest cannot be regarded as of equal weight and the Court's commitment to freedom of expression demands that it cannot be suppressed unless the situations created by allowing the freedom are pressing and the community interest is endangered. The anticipated danger should not be remote, conjectual or farfetched, but should have proximate and direct nexus with the expression. The expression of thought should be intrinsically dangerous to the public interests. It should be inseparably locked up with the action contemplated like the equivalent of a “spark in a powder keg.”

    14. Learned counsel for the State contended that applying the very test formulated by the Apex Court in the decisions relied upon by the counsel for the petitioner, no fault can be found with the action taken by the respondents, as the petitioner has been persistently extending support for an unlawful Association, viz., LTTE, which has been declared to be an unlawful association under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, and under Section 13 (2) of the said Act, whoever, in any way, assists any unlawful activity of any association, declared unlawful under Section 3, after the notification by which it has been so declared has become effective under sub-section (3) of that section, is liable for punishment with imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years, or with fine, or both. It was also submitted by counsel that the intelligence reports clearly show that the primary object of the meeting was to rouse the feelings of the persons who were likely to take part in that meeting to voice support for this banned organisation, and having regard to the fact that there were many factors even amongst those who were supporting the banned organisation, there was likelihood of breach of public tranquility and public safety, and that the apprehension of such breach was neither remote nor farfetched, but was very real and direct. The permission earlier granted had been withdrawn in the light of those reports and such withdrawal was effected after giving notice to the petitioner, and, therefore, there has been full and complete compliance with the requirements of Section 41 of the Act. Counsel also stressed the fact that the Constitutional validity of Section 41 of the Act was not in issue in this case, but only validity of the exercise of the power conferred by that Section.

    15. The rights conferred on the citizens by Article 19 of the Constitution are precious rights and are not to be lightly breached or restricted by the State or any functionary of the State. Any regulation of exercise of those rights must be for the purposes specified in Article 19 of the Constitution itself, and that power must be so exercised as to sub serve the larger public good. The power to impose restrictions is not the power which is available for exercise in an arbitrary manner or for the purpose of promoting the interest of those in power, or for suppressing dissent. Democracy can be made dynamic and truly alive only when there is free market for ideas and discussion and debate is not only permitted but is encouraged. All expression of opposing view point cannot be regarded as dangerous to the safety or security of the country and all expressions which do not find the approval of those exercising the power of the State cannot be regarded as harmful to the State and to the public order.

    16. The power conferred on the Commissioner under Section 41 of the Madras City Police Act is sweeping, that power is meant to be exercised with great care and caution. The Madras City Police Act is a pre-Constitution enactment, and the powers conferred on the authorities at a time when the country was under the colonial regime, and during the period when suppression of dissent was considered to be a legitimate policy of the State, cannot be exercised after the enactment of the Constitution in the same manner, as it was exercised earlier. The Intelligence Report placed before the Court shows that the police still have the attitude which does not seem to recognise that the country is a democratic nation, where every citizen has a right to full and equal participation in the process of Government. No citizen can be regarded as an enemy of the State merely because he has voiced a view which is not the one favoured by those in authority.

    17. The fact that the police are vested with power should not make them assume that power is available for exercise in any manner that they consider fit. That power is to be exercised strictly within the ambit of the provisions of the Constitution, more particularly, the requirement that any restriction placed on the exercise of fundamental rights should be a reasonable restriction, and the restrictions so placed should be shown to be essential, having regard to the permissible purpose for which restrictions may be imposed.

    18. The fact that the petitioner Association is voicing a view point which may not be popular cannot be a justification for preventing that point of view being projected. The petitioner-Association has not been declared as unlawful Association. If the petitioner-Association does anything which constitutes an offence under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, it is always open to the authorities to initiate prosecution under that Act.

    19. The meeting which the petitioner had wanted to hold was to have been held on the 19th January, 1997, well over a year ago. If the petitioner were to make a fresh application for holding a meeting, the authorities ought not to refuse permission mechanically. They should be in a position to satisfy the Court that such refusal falls strictly within the ambit of the permissible grounds for restricting the exercise of fundamental rights under Article 19 of the Constitution. A mere apprehension that some disturbance may be caused in the meeting place would not be sufficient. Under Section 41 of the Madras City Police Act, the police have the power to depute one or more police officers to be present at the meeting. If, at the meeting, such police officers were to find that anything illegal was being done, it would be open to them to take such further action as may be considered necessary in the circumstances. A blanket order refusing to permit the meeting to be held is not the method of regulating the exercise of fundamental rights of free speech, expression and assembly.

    20. It is necessary to observe that the presence of some persons who may not be regarded as supporters of the banned organisation at the meeting by itself cannot be taken as proof of that meeting not being one which was meant to express support for a banned organisation.

    21. The prayer in the petition that the respondents be directed to permit the future meeting cannot, however, be granted as the circumstances that may exist on the date of the proposed meeting cannot be visualised in vacuum. As and when an application is made, the respondents will consider the same in accordance with law, and in the light of what has been observed in the course of this order.

    22. The Writ Petition is disposed of accordingly. No costs. Consequently, W.M.P 3389/97 is dismissed.

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    Nedumaran v. State Of Tamil Nadu And Others
    (Apr 30, 1998)