This Writ Petition is filed by the President of Tamizhar Desiya Iyakkam. It is stated in his affidavit that he is the President of a political party viz., Tamizhar Desiya Iyakkam, which party is said to be registered with the Election Commission of India. The petitioner's grievance is that the 3rd respondent Commissioner of Police, Madurai has unlawfully withdrawn or cancelled the permission which had been given for holding a public meeting on 19.1.1997 at Madurai.
2. In the affidavit, it is averred that the petitioner's forum is vitally interested in the happenings of Sri Lanka, and the Conference that had been organised at Madurai on 19.1.1997 was intended to make known what this organisation regarded as atrocities in Sri Lanka, to the larger public. The Conference had been christened by it as “Tamils Warning Conference”. Persons of repute like a religious leader, a former Judge and a Member of Parliament were said to have agreed to participate in that Conference.
3. Initially permission sought was granted by the Commissioner to hold the Conference on 19.1.1997 at Tamukkam grounds at Madurai. That ground is under the control of the Madurai Corporation. An application was also made by the petitioner to the Corporation. That application was refused by the Corporation on 17.1.1997 on the ground that the Commissioner of Police had objected to the holding of the Conference. The District President of the Petitioner's Association, it is stated, was served with notice dt. 15.1.1997 issued by the Commissioner of Police requiring him to take part in an enquiry to be held on 15.1.1997 It is averred that the petitioner changed the venue to a Hotel, but the owner of the hotel also refused to permit the meeting to be held. The petitioner, thereafter, called upon the Commissioner to state his reasons as to why the permission granted earlier was being withdrawn and, on 25.1.1997, the Commissioner stated his reasons. The petitioner has produced the letter dated 25.1.1997, and sought for the quashing of the same.
4. In that letter, it is stated, that though initially permission had been granted under Section 41 (3) (b) of the Tamil Nadu City Police Act, subsequently, discreet enquiries made by the Intelligence Agencies and interaction with the cross-section of the Madurai public revealed that if this Conference was to be allowed, there was a likelihood of some untoward incident happening affecting the law and order and maintenance of peace in Madurai City, since the Conference was likely to voice its support to LTTE, an organisation banned by the Government of India. Reference was made by the Commissioner to number of Press cuttings reporting the speeches made at a Conference held by the petitioner's organisation in Bangalore on 5.12.1996, wherein, slogans supporting LTTE were stated to have been raised. It is also noted in that letter that on 17.1.1997, the petitioner had issued a press statement that the proposed Conference had been postponed, and in the light of that announcement, the Commissioner dropped further proceedings in the matter.
5. The petitioner has in his affidavit alleged that the refusal to permit the Conference was really on account of an anxiety on the part of the respondents to avoid any embarrassment to the Chief Minister who was to have deposed before the Jain Commission on 17.1.1997 and 18.1.1997 and to enable him to claim that he had prevented the holding of a Pro-L.T.T.E Conference in Tamil Nadu.
6. An elaborate counter-affidavit has been filed by the Commissioner of Police, Madurai City, wherein, he has stated that the petitioner association is always supporting L.T.T.E which was banned by the Government of India by issue of a Notification under Section 3 (1) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 as the object of L.T.T.E is for a homeland for all Tamils by creating a broadened Tamil land annexing Tamil Nadu with northern Sri Lanka which disrupts the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India and thus falls within the ambit of an unlawful activity. The declaration banning the L.T.T.E in India first made in the year 1992 had been continued in the years 1994 and 1996, and was in force at the time the Conference was proposed to be held at Madurai by the petitioner. The acts of the petitioner in the earlier meetings conducted by him and his agents showed, according to the Commissioner, total disrespect to the law of the land, and had the effect of adversely affecting the diplomatic relationship between India and Srilanka. The open praise, glorification and support of a banned organisation which is accused of having indulged in activities prejudicial to the security of the nation could not be allowed and go unchecked. The Commissioner has averred that in the light of reliable information received by him that if the conference is allowed, public peace and public safety will be affected, the permission granted earlier was cancelled. It is averred that the internecine clashes between Srilankan Tamil groups due to their ideological differences was not uncommon, and that the sympathy or support shown to one group always attracted ill will of a rival group. It is also averred that the order made was in the public interest and safety. He has further averred that the permission granted earlier which was subsequently revoked, was in the nature of Executive direction. He has denied that the order was made at the instigation of the Chief Minister or at the direction of respondents 1 and 2, the State represented by the Secretary, Home and the Director General of Police.
7. Number of Press cuttings, which contain the reports of some of the speeches made in other meetings organised by the petitioner along with the reports of the police intelligence have been annexed to the counter affidavit.
8. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner submitted that the impugned order is violative of the petitioner's fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution, and is beyond the protective ambit of Section 41 of the Madras City Police Act, 1888. Counsel submitted that the reasons given are wholly untenable, and they do not constitute sufficient justification for denying the fundamental right of the petitioner to exercise his right of freedom of expression, and also the right to organise and hold assemblies. It was submitted that the respondents have acted with mala fide intention merely to avoid embarrassment to the Chief Minister and such action would be subversive of the democratice norms and clearly beyond the legitimate exercise of power permitted under Section 41 of the City Policy Act.
9. Section 41 of the Madras City Police Act confers power on the police to regulate assemblies, meetings and processions in public places. The power is conferred by sub-section (1) on police officers above the rank of Head Constable to direct the conduct of all assemblies, meetings and processions in public places, prescribe routes by which, and the times at which such processions may pass, keep order in these places and prevent obstructions on the occasion of such assemblies, meetings and processions, sub-sections (2) thereof empowers the Commissioner by order in writing, subject to Sub-sections (3) and (4) to prohibit any assembly, meeting or procession, if he considers such prohibition to be necessary for the preservation of the public peace or public safety, such order is not to be made without the sanction of the State Government, and is to remain in force for a period not exceeding fifteen days from the date of the order. Sub-section (3) empowers the Commissioner to permit assemblies, or meetings, if an application for such permission is made five days before the date of meeting. The Commissioner is empowered to grant permission or refuse permission, and the permission if granted, can be subject to such conditions as he may choose to impose. An order refusing permission is not to be made before giving an opportunity to applicant to appear before the Commissioner and showing cause against the proposed refusal. Sub-section (5) of Section 41 of the Act empowers the Commissioners by order in writing depute one or more police officers to be present in any assembly, meeting or procession for the purpose of causing a report to be taken of the proceedings.
10. Counsel for petitioners relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Himat Lal v. Police Commissioner, Ahmedabad (1973 Crl. L.J 204) rendered by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court, wherein the Court struck down Rule 7 of the Rules framed under the Bombay Police Act on the ground that Rule, which empowered the Commissioner of Police to refuse permission to hold meetings without giving any guidance under the Rule, and thereby conferring any arbitrary discretion, was an unreasonable restriction on the freedom of association and freedom of assembly guaranteed under Article 19 of the Constitution. The Court also held that the word “regulating” in Section 33 (1) (o) of the Bombay Police Act would include the power to prohibit and impose the condition that permission should be taken a few days before the holding of the meeting on a public street. Mathew, J. dissented from the view of the majority and held that the power to regulate did not include the right to prohibit and the permission sought for holding a meeting ought not to be refused. The majority opinion was that regulation is necessary to enable citizens to enjoy the various rights in crowded Public Streets, and that the State can made regulation in aid of the right of the assembly of each citizen and can impose reasonable restrictions in the interest of public order.
11. Reliance was also placed on the decision rendered by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in the case of Superintendent, Central Prison v. Dr. Lohia (AIR 1960 S.C 633), wherein the concept of public order was considered. It was held that the public order is synonymous with public peace, safety and tranquility, that it is the absence of disorder involving breaches of local significance in contradistinction to national grievance, such as revolution, civil strife and war, affecting the security of the State. The Court held that in order that limitation on the right conferred by Article 19 to be reasonable, limitation must have a proximate connection to “public order” and not one farfetched, hypothetical, problematical or too remote.
12. Counsel also referred to a decision rendered by a Bench of this Court in the case of S. Ramakrishna v. The President, District Board, Nellore (I.L.R 1953 Madras 57) wherein it was held that the exercise of any of the fundamental rights, like freedom of association or union, which are guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be made subject to the discretionary control of an administrative or executive authority, which can grant or withhold permission to exercise such right, at its discretion, and that there cannot also be any restriction on the exercise of such rights, which consist of a previous restraint and such is in the nature of administrative censorships. The issue in that case was the right of the teachers to form a union, and the validity of Circular which prohibited the formation of such union. The right to hold public meetings or the extent of reasonableness of the restrictions therein was not in issue.
13. The decision of the Apex Court in the case of S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram (1989) 2 S.C.C 574) was also referred to and relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner. It was held therein that freedom of speech under Article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution of India means the right to express one's opinion by word of mouth, printing, picture or in any one manner of ideas made through any and the communication of ideas made through any medium. Such right, however, was held to be subject to reasonable restrictions in the larger interest of the community and the country as set out in Article 19 (2) of the Constitution. Those restrictions are intended to strike a proper balance between the liberty guaranteed, and the social interest specified under Article 19 (2). The Court emphasised that the interest of freedom of expression and social interest cannot be regarded as of equal weight and the Court's commitment to freedom of expression demands that it cannot be suppressed unless the situations created by allowing the freedom are pressing and the community interest is endangered. The anticipated danger should not be remote, conjectual or farfetched, but should have proximate and direct nexus with the expression. The expression of thought should be intrinsically dangerous to the public interests. It should be inseparably locked up with the action contemplated like the equivalent of a “spark in a powder keg.”
14. Learned counsel for the State contended that applying the very test formulated by the Apex Court in the decisions relied upon by the counsel for the petitioner, no fault can be found with the action taken by the respondents, as the petitioner has been persistently extending support for an unlawful Association, viz., LTTE, which has been declared to be an unlawful association under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, and under Section 13 (2) of the said Act, whoever, in any way, assists any unlawful activity of any association, declared unlawful under Section 3, after the notification by which it has been so declared has become effective under sub-section (3) of that section, is liable for punishment with imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years, or with fine, or both. It was also submitted by counsel that the intelligence reports clearly show that the primary object of the meeting was to rouse the feelings of the persons who were likely to take part in that meeting to voice support for this banned organisation, and having regard to the fact that there were many factors even amongst those who were supporting the banned organisation, there was likelihood of breach of public tranquility and public safety, and that the apprehension of such breach was neither remote nor farfetched, but was very real and direct. The permission earlier granted had been withdrawn in the light of those reports and such withdrawal was effected after giving notice to the petitioner, and, therefore, there has been full and complete compliance with the requirements of Section 41 of the Act. Counsel also stressed the fact that the Constitutional validity of Section 41 of the Act was not in issue in this case, but only validity of the exercise of the power conferred by that Section.
15. The rights conferred on the citizens by Article 19 of the Constitution are precious rights and are not to be lightly breached or restricted by the State or any functionary of the State. Any regulation of exercise of those rights must be for the purposes specified in Article 19 of the Constitution itself, and that power must be so exercised as to sub serve the larger public good. The power to impose restrictions is not the power which is available for exercise in an arbitrary manner or for the purpose of promoting the interest of those in power, or for suppressing dissent. Democracy can be made dynamic and truly alive only when there is free market for ideas and discussion and debate is not only permitted but is encouraged. All expression of opposing view point cannot be regarded as dangerous to the safety or security of the country and all expressions which do not find the approval of those exercising the power of the State cannot be regarded as harmful to the State and to the public order.
16. The power conferred on the Commissioner under Section 41 of the Madras City Police Act is sweeping, that power is meant to be exercised with great care and caution. The Madras City Police Act is a pre-Constitution enactment, and the powers conferred on the authorities at a time when the country was under the colonial regime, and during the period when suppression of dissent was considered to be a legitimate policy of the State, cannot be exercised after the enactment of the Constitution in the same manner, as it was exercised earlier. The Intelligence Report placed before the Court shows that the police still have the attitude which does not seem to recognise that the country is a democratic nation, where every citizen has a right to full and equal participation in the process of Government. No citizen can be regarded as an enemy of the State merely because he has voiced a view which is not the one favoured by those in authority.
17. The fact that the police are vested with power should not make them assume that power is available for exercise in any manner that they consider fit. That power is to be exercised strictly within the ambit of the provisions of the Constitution, more particularly, the requirement that any restriction placed on the exercise of fundamental rights should be a reasonable restriction, and the restrictions so placed should be shown to be essential, having regard to the permissible purpose for which restrictions may be imposed.
18. The fact that the petitioner Association is voicing a view point which may not be popular cannot be a justification for preventing that point of view being projected. The petitioner-Association has not been declared as unlawful Association. If the petitioner-Association does anything which constitutes an offence under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, it is always open to the authorities to initiate prosecution under that Act.
19. The meeting which the petitioner had wanted to hold was to have been held on the 19th January, 1997, well over a year ago. If the petitioner were to make a fresh application for holding a meeting, the authorities ought not to refuse permission mechanically. They should be in a position to satisfy the Court that such refusal falls strictly within the ambit of the permissible grounds for restricting the exercise of fundamental rights under Article 19 of the Constitution. A mere apprehension that some disturbance may be caused in the meeting place would not be sufficient. Under Section 41 of the Madras City Police Act, the police have the power to depute one or more police officers to be present at the meeting. If, at the meeting, such police officers were to find that anything illegal was being done, it would be open to them to take such further action as may be considered necessary in the circumstances. A blanket order refusing to permit the meeting to be held is not the method of regulating the exercise of fundamental rights of free speech, expression and assembly.
20. It is necessary to observe that the presence of some persons who may not be regarded as supporters of the banned organisation at the meeting by itself cannot be taken as proof of that meeting not being one which was meant to express support for a banned organisation.
21. The prayer in the petition that the respondents be directed to permit the future meeting cannot, however, be granted as the circumstances that may exist on the date of the proposed meeting cannot be visualised in vacuum. As and when an application is made, the respondents will consider the same in accordance with law, and in the light of what has been observed in the course of this order.
22. The Writ Petition is disposed of accordingly. No costs. Consequently, W.M.P 3389/97 is dismissed.