Asit Kumar Bisi, J.:— The instant appeal preferred by defendant No. 7 Khan Bahadur Sk. Mohammed Jan as appeallant is directed against the judgment and decree passed by the learned Subordinate Judge, 4th Court, Alipore, on 2.9.71 in Title Suit No. 20 of 1969. During pendency of the appeal the sole appellant died and his heirs have been substituted as appellants in his place.
2. The facts leading to this appeal may briefly be narrated thus. The plaintiffs presently respondent Nos. 1 to 4 instituted the representative suit under Order 1 Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the defendants. As per the plaint case by the Wakfnama dated 25 July, 1920 and the supplementary Wakfhama dated 18 March, 1930, one Khan Bahadur Aulad Hossain created a Public Wakf for the maintenance of the public Mosque at premises No. 22, Topsia Road South and for other religious and charitable purpose. The Wakf Estate was enrolled as a Public Wakf under E.C No. 900 in the office of the Commissioner of Wakfs on 4-5-36. Besides the properties at Mouza Topsia measuring about 15 bighas 9 cottahs and 4½ chittaks of land, the said Wakf Estate consisted of very valuable properties in Calcutta viz. premises Nos. 18, 18/1 and 18/2 Ripon Street, and 1 Elliot Road. The income derived from the Wakf properties was to the tune of Rs. 3606/- per annum. The plaintiffs as members of the Mohammedan Community of Topsia and Calcutta are interested in the Mosque. They obtained necessary consent of the Commissioner of Wakfs under section 73(1) of the Bengal Wakf Act, 1934 and of the Collector of 24-Parganas under section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure for institution of this suit against the defendants. Defendant Nos. 1 to 6 claim to be legally constituted present Trustees of the Wakf Estate. They neglected and failed to employ a Muazzim for the Mosque and to pay the expenses for lighting and purchase of mats for prayer. They did not reconstruct the fallen rooms of the Imam and Muazzim. No arrangements for water supply and privy at the Mosque were made. Defendant Nos. 1 to 4 in collusion with one another and defendant No. 7 purported to transfer 9 cottahs 5 chittaks and 30 sq. fit. of land on the eastern side of premises No. 18 Ripon Street, Calcutta by way of sale to defendant No. 7 and defendant No. 7 got a deed of sale illegally executed by defendant No. 2 in his favour. The said transfer was void abinitio and the deed of sale created no title in favour of defendant No. 7. So defendant No. 7 has become a Trustee-de-son-Tort. It has been further alleged by the plaintiffs that defendant Nos. 1 to 6 did not keep proper accounts and whatever accounts they submitted to the Board of Wakfs were not genuine and correct. Defendant Nos. 1 to 4 are Pakistani nationals and the so called Board of Trustees of the aforesaid Wakf Estate alleged to have been constituted by defendant Nos. 1 to 6 is fictitious and bogus. No meeting of the Board had ever been called by the Secretary. Under the above circumstances the plaintiffs have filed the suit for removal of defendant Nos. 1 to 6 from the Board of Trustees, for appointment of New Mutwallis or Trustees in place of the said Trustees, for settling a scheme and for permanent injunction restraining defendant No. 7 from claiming any portion of the said Wakf Estate said to be sold to him.
3. The suit has been contested by defendant No. 7 and by defendant Nos. 5, 6 and 8. Defendant No. 7 has filed the written statement alleging inter alia that the plaintiffs have no cause of action for the suit, that the suit as framed is not maintainable and that the suit is barred by limitation. It has been averred by defendant No. 7 that the suit has been filed against the dead persons namely Ashanuddin Ahmed and Alhaj Dr. Immamuddin impleaded as defendant Nos. 3 and 4 respectively. The plaintiffs have no locus standi to file this suit. The plaintiffs never took any interest in the affairs of the Mosque and the Wakf Estate. Defendant No. 7 has claimed to be a bona fide purchaser for value. The question of sale of the properties came up for hearing before the Deputy Commissioner of Wakfs, West Bengal on 18-11-61 in presence of all the parties concerned and their lawyers. Due advertisement was made in the Statement dated 5-11-61 inviting offer from the intending purchasers. After giving due consideration to the offers received pursuant to the advertisement the offer of this defendant was considered fair and reasonable and the Commissioner took into consideration that the Wakf Estate owned a large sum of money to this defendant to whom the property in question had been leased out prior to the said sale. This defendant agreed to relinquish a sum of Rs. 11,589-7-9 ps out of his legitimate dues amounting to Rs. 38,085-7-9 ps as also to surrender a part-of the leasehold premises. The price of 9 cottahs 5 chittaks 30 sq. ft. of land was fixed at Rs. 51,500/- i.e at the rate of Rs. 5500/- per cottah. This defendant paid the consideration money after due adjustment of his claim for loan advanced for the Wakf Estate. This defendant has been possessing the property openly and peacefully since his purchase. The plaintiffs are inimically disposed towards this defendant. Plaintiff No. 3 who was a former employee of this defendant was dismissed from service. Plaintiff No. 4 is a tenant in respect of a portion of the premises in question and the other two plaintiffs are under the influence of plaintiff No. 3. Out of ill-motive they have managed to institute the present suit.
4. The suit had been contested by defendant Nos. 5, 6 and 8 as well. Defendant Nos. 5 to 8 had adopted the written statement filed by defendant No. 6. Their case in brief is that the suit is barred by limitation and the same is bad for misjoinder of parties and causes of action. Defendant No. 3 Ashanuddin Ahmed and defendant No. 4 Alhaj Dr. Immamuddin died before institution of this suit. It has been averred inter alia that the plaintiffs are not at all interested in the Mosque of Topsia and are not entitled to bring this suit either for themselves or on behalf of all other members of the Mohammedan community. Defendant Nos. 1, 2, 5 and 6 were legally and properly appointed Trustees of the Khan Bahadur Alhaj Aulad Hossain Wakf Estate and defendant No. 6 is the Secretary of Board of Trustees. Defendant No. 7 can never be said to be a Trustee-de-son-Tort in respect of any suit property and has no connection with the management of the Wakf Estate nor he ever meddled with the Wakf Properties. Defendant No. 7 is a bona fide purchaser for value in respect of 9 cottahs 5 chittaks 13 sq. ft. of land at 18, Ripon Street, Calcutta under sanction accorded by the Commissioner of Wakfs on 24-11-61. There was nothing mala fide in the transaction for sale to defendant No. 7. The accounts are submitted to the Board of Wakf regularly. The Mosque is maintained properly. It has been further alleged that the suit is vexatious, frivolous, speculative, motivated and mala fide and has been filed out of malice and grudge and the plaintiffs are not entitled to get any relief as prayed for.
5. The learned Trial Court has found the suit to be maintainable and held that the plaintiffs have locus standi to maintain the suit. On consideration of the materials on record the learned Trial Court has come to a finding that the Board of Trustees has not been legally constituted and as such the present Trustees cannot be allowed to administer the Wakf Estate. He has found that the Trustees are guilty of misfeasance and malfeasance as alleged and they are liable to be removed from the management of the Wakf Estate. It has been held by the learned Trial Court that the sale of the property to defendant No. 7 was not legal and valid and as such defendant No. 7 should be restrained from exercising any act of ownership in respect of the land covered by the indenture (Exhibit ‘A1’) dated 25-4-62. Consequently the learned Trial Court has decreed the suit with costs against the contesting defendants. The present Trustees in respect of the said Wakf Estate has been ordered to be removed and the sale of the property to defendant No. 7 has been declared to be illegal. The learned Trial Court has directed that the property covered by the indenture dated 25-4-62 be deemed to be a part of the Wakf Estate and a scheme for administration of the Wakf Estate has been ordered to be framed in the manner mentioned in the ordering portion of the judgment.
6. Aggrieved, defendant No. 7 who was the original appellant has preferred the instant appeal assailing the findings of the learned Trial Court on the grounds inter alia that the learned Subordinate Judge failed to consider that the suit as framed is not maintainable in law, that the learned Subordinate Judge ought to have considered that the plaintiffs are not at all interested persons in the affairs of the Wakf Estate and the Wakf Estate was indebted to defendant No. 7 to the tune of Rs. 38,000/- and this defendant, in the interest and welfare of the Wakf Estate, voluntarily relinquished his claim to the extent of about Rs. 12,000/- and also surrendered a portion of the leasehold land of the Wakf and purchased 9 cottahs and odd at the rate of 5500/- per cottah, that the learned Subordinate Judge erred in law and fact in not considering that the Wakf Estate was sold to defendant No. 7 after due advertisement in the newspaper and this defendant's offer was the best for the welfare of the Wakf Estate, that the findings of the learned Subordinate Judge that the sale of the Wakf Estate was fraudulent in character and the permission from the Commissioner of Wakfs was obtained by fraud are not based on materials on record, that the learned Court below ought to have held that the appellant is a bona fide purchaser for value and the sale of a portion of premises No. 18 Ripon Street was legal and binding on the Wakf Estate and that the learned Court below failed to appreciate the evidence of D.W 6 and erred in holding that the sale in favour of the appellant was wholly illegal and void and not binding upon the Wakf.
7. The following points arise for decision in the instant appeal:—
1) Whether the judgment under appeal is vitiated by non-framing of an issue regarding the bar of limitation.
2) Whether the learned Trial Court is justified in holding that sale of the land covered by the indenture dated 25-4-62 to defendant No. 7 was not legal and valid and defendant No. 7 did not acquire any title thereby and that the property covered by the indenture dated 25.4.62 is deemed to be a part of the Wakf Estate.
3) Whether the learned Trial Court is justified in granting decree in favour of the plaintiffs-respondents.
Point No. 1:
8. None appears on behalf of the plaintiffs-respondents at the time of hearing of the appeal. The learned Advocate for the appellants has contended at the outset that the learned Trial Court has failed to frame a material issue regarding the bar of limitation and the said issue being a vital issue involved in the suit, it ought to have been framed and considered by the learned Trial Court. It is significant to point out at the outset that during trial of the suit defendant No. 7 did not agitate the matter before the learned Trial Court nor such question on the point of limitation has been raised by defendant No. 7 the original appellant in the memorandum of appeal filed in this Court. Failure on the part of defendant No. 7 appellant to move the learned Trial Court for framing of such issue at the appropriate stage and non-inclusion of such plea of limitation in the memorandum of appeal as well may amount to waiver of such plea. However, we have to decide the question of limitation as urged by the learned Advocate for the appellants before us at the time of hearing of the appeal.
9. The suit out of which the instant appeal has arisen has been instituted by the plaintiffs for removal of defendant Nos. 1 to 6 from their alleged position of Trustees and defendant No. 7 from his position of Trustee-de-son-Tort of Khan Bahadur Syed Aulad Hossain Wakf Estate (hereinafter referred to as the Wakf Estate), appointment of new Trustees or of a Mutwalli in place of the Trustees removed, a decree vesting the property of the Wakf Estate in the new Trustees, permanent injunction restraining defendant No. 7 from claiming the portion of the Wakf Estate said to be sold to him as his own personal and secular property on the basis of the so called deed of sale in his favour and some other incidental reliefs against the defendant. In the instant appeal the present appellants have assailed the part of the decree by which the sale of portion of the Wakf property in favour of defendant No. 7 who was the original appellant has been held to be illegal. It has been argued by the learned Advocate for the appellants that such sale was made on 24th April, 1962 and plaintiff No. 4 examined as P.W 6 has admitted in his evidence that he came to know about the said sale in 1963. The learned Advocate for the appellants has drawn our attention to the relevant parts of the evidence of P.W 2 and P.W 3 and contended that all the said witnesses examined on behalf of the plaintiff complained of mismanagement of the Wakf Estate for the last thirty years. He has further urged that the starting point of limitation is the date on which the right to sue first accrued and the suit should have been filed within 3 years from the date of accrual of such right to sue in terms of Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
10. As mentioned hereinabove, the suit instituted by the plaintiffs is substantially a suit for removal of the present Trustees, appointment of new Trustees, permanent injunction restraining defendant No. 7 from claiming the portion of the Wakf Estate said to be sold to him on the basis of the alleged deed of sale in his favour and some other incidental reliefs. In para 10 of the plaint it has been specifically alleged inter alia by the plaintiffs that the cause of action of the suit arose on or about the 24 November, 1961 when the order of the Deputy Commissioner of Wakf, West Bengal, was made, and then in February and March, 1964, when complaints regarding mismanagement of the said estate were made before the Commissioner of Wakf, West Bengal, and being a continuing one has since then been arising from day to day. The genesis of the litigation is no doubt mismanagement of the Wakf Estate as alleged. A careful perusal of the plaint as a whole leaves no room for scepticism that the plaintiff raised several allegations of mismanagement of the Wakf Estate against the present Trustees and when complaints regarding mismanagement of the Wakf Estate alleged to have been made before the Commissioner of Wakf, West Bengal yielded no result, the instant suit has been brought. In our view mismanagement of the Wakf Estate by the present Trustees as alleged gives rise to continuing cause of action which is pleaded in para 10 of the plaint. The Limitation Act, 1963, as it appears, does not make any specific provision for limitation for institution of the suit for removal of the Trustees and/or appointment of new Trustees. In the instant suit permanent injunction has been prayed for by the plaintiffs in prayer (h) of the plaint restraining defendant No. 7 from claiming the portion of the Wakf Estate alleged to be sold to him as his own personal and secular property on the basis of the so called deed of sale in his favour. Such relief as claimed by the plaintiffs arises out of mismanagement of the Wakf Estate as alleged. We have already indicated that the plaintiffs have alleged that in February and March, 1964 complaints regarding mismanagement of the Wakf Estate were made before the Commissioner of Wakf, West Bengal. Even if it is accepted for the sake of argument that there is no continuing cause of action in such a case and Article 113 which is residuary provision of the Limitation Act applies here as argued by the learned Advocate for the appellants, still we find that the suit was instituted by the plaintiffs in representative capacity after obtaining consent from the Commissioner of Wakf, West Bengal, under section 73(2) of the Bengal Wakf Act, 1934 within the statutory period of limitation as provided under Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
11. For the foregoing reasons we find that the suit brought by the plaintiffs-respondents is not barred by limitation and as such the contentions raised by the learned Advocate for the appellants as to applicability of the barring provisions of the Limitation Act in the instant suit have no force at all.
Point Nos. 2 and 3:
12. The learned Trial Court has decreed the suit against the defendants and passed an order for removal of the present Trustees in respect of the Wakf Estate. The sale of portion of the Wakf property to defendant No. 7 has been declared to be illegal and the property covered by the indenture dated 25-4-62 has been treated to be a part of the Wakf Estate. The learned Trial Court has further framed a scheme for administration of the Wakf Estate.
12A. As indicated hereinbefore, in the instant appeal the appellants have challenged only that part of the decree by which the sale in favour of the defendant No. 7.original appellant has been held to be illegal and his acquisition of title by such sale has also been declared to be illegal. No other part of the decree has been assailed by the appellants in course of hearing of the appeal. None on behalf of the plaintiffs-respondents has come to contest the appeal. The learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the Board of Wakf, West Bengal, being respondent No. 10 supports the contentions raised by the learned Advocate for the present appellants.
13. Prom the materials on record it appears that there was an advertisement in the Sunday's Statesman dated 5-11-1961 inviting offers for the purchase of 9 cottahs 5 chittaks 30 sq. ft. of land of the Wakf Estate at 18, Ripon Street. Copy of the order dated 24-11-1961 passed by the Commissioner of Wakf, West Bengal, marked as Exhibit 4(g) indicates that four persons named therein made offer for purchase of the land with vacant possession and highest offer was Rs. 6,000/- per cottah. It does not appear therefrom that defendant No. 7 made any offer within the time scheduled for the purpose. The said order copy of which is marked as Exhibit 4(g) however reveals that after considering the offers received through the advertisement and that of defendant No. 7 who offered Rs. 5,500/- per cottah it was agreed that the property advertised for sale would be sold to defendant No. 7 or his nominee at Rs. 51,500/- i.e @ 5,500/- per cottah. It further appears that the solicitor of defendant No. 7 submitted a statement of accounts claiming Rs. 38,089/7/9 Ps. on account of the loan stated to have been advanced by defendant No. 7 for the Wakf Estate. It has been argued on behalf of defendant No. 7 in the said proceeding that as a lessee of the premises in question the amount was reasonably spent for the maintenance of the estate and so the entire amount should be adjusted against the consideration money. It, however, appears from Exhibit 4(g) that the Secretary of the Board opposed and raised objection to such adjustment on the ground that the same was unauthorised and frivolous. In spite of that the compromise was brought out and the loan was settled at Rs. 26,500/- to be adjusted against the consideration money in the said land and defendant No. 7 was asked to deposit Rs. 25,000/- for the purchase of the said land. The amount so deposited is stated to be untilised for developing the other portion of the land measuring 3 cottahs 10 chittaks and 15 sq. ft. to be released by defendant No. 7. The Secretary was directed to submit a building plan to the Corporation of Calcutta for making construction on the remaining land. By the order dated 12-12-61 copy of which is marked as Exhibit ‘B-1’ the Commissioner of Wakf, West Bengal, granted permission for sale of the said land measuring 9 cottahs 5 chittaks and 30 sq. ft. to defendant No. 7.
14. The learned Trial Court has pointed out in its judgment that there was no loan and defendant No. 7 had no occasion to advance any loan for the Wakf Estate. It is further pointed out by the learned Trial Court that none on belief of the Wakf Estate asked for such loan and none of the Trustees asked defendant No. 7 to make any construction. On consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case the learned Trial Court has come to the finding that the dealings of defendant No. 7 were of doubtful character from beginning to end and that defendant No. 7 was not a tenant, nor did he spend any money for the improvement of the Wakf Estate. The learned Trial Court has further held that the defendant No. 7 procured the land at a low value of Rs. 25,000/- only and such gross under-valuation leads the learned Trial Court to infer that the dealing was fraudulent and the sale cannot be binding upon the Wakf Estate. In the above premises the learned Trial Court has held that the sale to defendant No. 7 was illegal and void.
15. The learned Advocate for the appellants has contended that the learned Trial Court did not make any attempt to find out any fraud in the process of the grant of permission for sale of the Wakf Property by the Wakf Commissioner. It has been held by the learned Trial Court that the permission from the Wakf Commissioner for transfer of the said land was fraudulently obtained. It has been contended by the learned Advocate for the appellants that the plaintiff does not disclose any allegation of fraud and unless fraud is pleaded specifically in the manner as provided in Order 6 Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure the Court cannot enquire into the alleged fraud. In this context the learned Advocate for the appellants has cited the case of Subhas Chandra Das Mushib v. Ganga Prosad Das Mushib, reported in AIR 1967 Supreme Court 878 (para 10) and the case of Bishundeo Narain v. Seogeni Rai, reported in AIR 1951 Supreme Court 280 (para 25). In the case of Bishundeo Narain (supra) at page 288 (para 25) the Supreme Court has held as follows:—
“It is also to be observed that no proper particulars have been furnished. Now if there is one rule which is better established than any other, it is that in cases of fraud, undue influence and coercion, the parties pleading it must set forth full particulars and the case can only be decided on the particulars as laid. There can be no departure from them in evidence. General allegations are insufficient even to amount to an averment of fraud of which any Court ought to take notice, however strong the language in which they are couched may be, and the same applies to undue influence and coercion. [See Order 6 Rule 4, Civil P.C]”
16. It in no doubt settled law that a party who wants to raise allegations of fraud must set forth specific particulars thereof in the pleading and that is the mandatory requirement of Order 6 Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But in the instant case no such question of setting forth particulars of fraud in the pleading arises. It has been specifically pleaded inter alia in para 5 of the plaint that defendant Nos. 1 to 4 in collusion with one another and defendant No. 7 purported to transfer by way of sale to the latter, through defendant No. 2, a portion of the said Wakf Estate being 9 cottahs 5 chittaks and 30 sq. ft. of land on the eastern side of premises No. 18, Ripon Street, Calcutta, under an alleged order of the same date of the Deputy Commissioner of Wakf, West Bengal. It has further been specifically alleged inter alia by the plaintiffs in para 7 of the plaint that the so-called transfer of the portion of the said Wakf Estate by a deed of sale executed by defendant No. 2, the then so-called Secretary of the fictitious Board of Trustees representing the said Board in favour of defendant No. 7 is void abinitio and such deed of sale has created no personal or secular title in favour of defendant No. 7 and the portion of the said Wakf Estate so sold still remains and continues to be a part of the said Wakf Estate. So the crucial question cropping up for consideration in the instant appeal is whether the deed of sale executed in favour of defendant No. 7 in respect of portion of the Wakf property as stated above is dubious in origin and suspicious circumstances surround such transaction of sale in favour of defendant No. 7. Coupled with that another question of considerable importance arising for decision is whether such sale to defendant No. 7 was illegal and void and the property covered by the indenture dated 25-4-62 can be treated to be a part of the Wakf Estate. In our view the material facts need to be pleaded in this context have been pleaded in the plaint.
17. Let us now advert to the evidence on record. As indicated hereinbefore, pursuant to the advertisement in the Sunday's Statesman dated 5-11-61 inviting offers for purchase of 9 cottahs 5 chittaks and 30 sq. ft. of land at 18, Ripon Street, Calcutta, four persons made offer for purchase of the land with vacant possession. The copy of the order dated 24-11-61 passed by the Commissioner of Wakfs marked as Exhibit 4(g) reveals that the Commissioner of Wakfs accorded sanction for sale of the land measuring 9 cottahs 5 chittaks and 30 sq. ft. on the eastern side of the said premises to defendant No. 7 at a price of Rs. 51,500/- and to adjust Rs. 26,500/- in full settlement of his dues. Consequently defendant No. 7 deposited an amount of Rs. 25,000/- and the Board of Trustees executed a conveyance in favour of defendant No. 7. The learned Trial Court has analysed the evidence and arrived at the finding that the sale transaction was a mere show for giving the land to defendant No. 7 at a nominal price of Rs. 25,000/- only. The certified copy of formal order dated 12-12-61 of the Commissioner of Wakf, West Bengal, which is marked as Exhibit B-1 shows that in exercise of the powers conferred on him by sections 53 and 54 of the Bengal Wakf Act, 1934, the Commissioner accorded sanction for such sale. But it is curious to note that there is nothing credible on record to indicate that any loan was advanced by defendant No. 7 for the Wakf Estate nor anyone on behalf of the Wakf Estate ever asked for such loan from defendant No. 7.
18. Defendant No. 7 who has been examined as D.W 7 has stated that he was a tenant in respect of premises No. 18, Ripon Street, at a rental of Rs. 100/- which was subsequently enhanced to Rs. 160/- per month and the said premises comprised an area of about 13 cottahs of land. The materials on record indicate in unambiguous terms that defendant No. 7 had no valid lease in respect of the disputed land nor any scrap of paper is produced to show any payment of rent by him. As per version of defendant No. 7 (D.W 7) he purchased 9½ cottahs of land and gave up his tenancy right in respect of the rest and such purchase was made for a consideration of Rs. 51,500/- under a conveyance. As stated by him, total dues were Rs. 38,000/- out of which he gave up claim for Rs. 11,500/-. In cross-examination D.W 7 has stated that he did not take permission from the Commissioner of Wakf for advancing money nor he has any paper to show when and on what occasion he advanced money. In fact no paper is forthcoming to indicate that any loan was ever advanced by defendant No. 7 for benefit of the Wakf Estate. The learned Trial Court has pointed out the relevant part of evidence of defendant No. 7 wherefrom it appears that in Title Suit Nos. 663 of 1967 and 619 of 1969 of the City Civil Court he deposed that a 3½ cottahs of land had been let out to Howrah Timber Works owned by Wahab and his son Manna. Defendant No. 7 has of course stated that his deposition was not correctly recorded. Such explanation has not been accepted by the learned Trial Court. On consideration of the evidence on record the learned Trial Court has rightly found that the land in possession of Wahab and his son Manna was alleged to have been surrendered by defendant No. 7 taking it to be vacant and that the story of loan to the extent of Rs. 38,000/- was invented in order to create burden on the Wakf Estate and to procure the land at an abnormally low value. Such findings of the learned Trial Court are supported by the circumstances emerging on the factual matrix.
19. It has been contended by the learned Advocate for the appellants that the learned Trial Court has failed to assess the evidence of the respective parties in its totality. He has drawn our attention to the testimony of plaintiff No. 3 (P.W.I) wherein he has admitted that defendant No. 7 constructed four incomplete rooms for the Wakf Estate and also constructed privy, bath and took water connection. He has further pointed out that plaintiff No. 3 (P.W.I) has admitted that defendant No. 7 raised boundary walls after purchase. The learned Advocate for the appellants has also drawn our attention to the evidence of P.W 5, an Inspector under the Board of Wakf, West Bengal, whose evidence reveals that there is a mention of loans in accounts of 1949-1950, 1951 and 1952 etc. However P.W 5 has testified that the names of lenders have not been mentioned nor accounts were audited. It has been urged by the learned Advocate for the appellants that there is admission from the said witnesses of the plaintiffs that defendant No. 7 invested money for improvement of the Wakf Estate and also lent some money for maintenance of the said Estate. He has contended that the learned Trial Court has erred in drawing adverse presumption against defendant No. 7.original appellant for non-production of documentary evidence by overlooking the admission made by the said witnesses of the plaintiffs in their evidence in this regard. He has argued that the Court ought not to draw adverse inference for failure to produce documentary evidence by the original appellant where the issue has already been admitted by the plaintiffs-respondents and the fact admitted must be taken to be established. He has cited the case of Mahendra Manilal Nanavati v. . Sushila Mahendra Nanavati, reported in AIR 1965 Supreme Court 364 and the case of Thiru John v. Returning Officer, reported in AIR 1977 Supreme Court 1724, in this regard. But on scrutinising the evidence of the said witnesses examined on behalf of the plaintiffs we fail to find out any such admission in their evidence which can prevent us from making any adverse presumption because of non-production of the documentary evidence on behalf of the appellants. Rather we find that the learned Trial Court has analysed the evidence in proper perspective and correctly found that defendant No. 7 spent money, if at all, for the improvement of the portion alleged to have been sold to him. The evidence of the material witnesses examined on behalf of the plaintiffs does not contain any admission which can support the case of defendant No. 7. In this view of the matter the above noted two decisions cited by the learned Advocate for the appellants do not apply to the facts and circumstances of the instant case.
20. It has been contended on behalf of the appellants that the original appellant was a bona fide purchaser for value and the sale made in his favour cannot be assailed for inadequacy of consideration and as such the interest of defendant No. 7 in the purchased land cannot be challenged. The materials on record clearly indicate that defendant No. 7 was not a bona fide purchaser for value. The circumstances gleaned from the materials on record do not reveal that defendant No. 7 was a purchaser in good faith for consideration without notice. He was all along aware that the properties were Wakf. The plea of loan to the extent of Rs. 38,000/- has not been substantiated by any convincing evidence on record. The story of loan to the extent of Rs. 38,000/- was invented in order to procure the portion of the Wakf property at an abnormally low price. The sale in favour of defendant No. 7 is thus found to be illegal, void and inoperative and the same cannot be binding upon the Wakf Estate.
21. It has been next urged by the learned Advocate for the appellants that even if the sale is found to be illegal, long possession of the original appellant in the suit property on the basis of an invalid deed can ripen into a valid legal title by way of adverse possession. He has cited the case of State Of West Bengal v. Dalhousie Institute Society, reported in AIR 1970 Supreme Court 1778, in support of his contention and argued that if the sale in favour of the original appellant is held to be invalid, even then by operation of law he acquired valid title by way of adverse possession, notwithstanding such sale. In the case of State Of West Bengal v. Dalhousie Institute Society (supra) cited by the learned Advocate for the appellants grant of land in favour of the institute was not made in the manner required by law but the evidence showed that the grantee was in open, continuous and uninterrupted possession and enjoyment of the site for over 60 years and the institute was treated as owner not only by the Municipal Corporation but also by the Government. It is in such context the Supreme Court has held that though possession of the institute was on the basis of invalid grant, person in such possession acquires title by adverse possession and is entitled to compensation money for acquisition of such land. The facts and circumstances of the said case cited by the learned Advocate for the appellants are inapplicable to the case we are seized of. In the case at hand no plea of adverse possession was ever taken by defendant No. 7 who was the original appellant, far less the same is proved. That apart, sale of the property was made in favour of defendant No. 7 on 25-4-62 and the suit originally being Trust Suit No. 3 of 1967 was filed by the plaintiffs in the court of the learned District Judge, Alipore on 4-2-67 which was within the period of less than five years from the date of the conveyance. Occupation of the property by defendant No. 7 as tenant prior to the date of the said conveyance, even if there be any, cannot come within the ambit of adverse possession by which one can acquire title to the land. So the contention raised by the learned Advocate for the appellants with regard to acquisition of title by adverse possession by the original appellant in respect of the land in question cannot be upheld.
22. It has lastly been contended by the learned Advocate for the appellants that the acts which were done by the Board of Trustees during the tenure till their removal cannot be made invalid on the ground of mere irregularities in the process of appointment particularly when the Board of Trustees was recognised by the Wakf Commissioner and was enrolled as such in the official records. It has been argued by the learned Advocate for the appellants that removal of the Trustees which cannot take effect retrospectively cannot in either way vitiate the sale when the sale was made with the permission of the Commissioner as per the provision of section 53 of the Bengal Wakf Act, 1934. Admittedly Khan Bahadur Aulad Hossain created the public Wakf and as a matter of fact he reserved practically no income for benefit of himself and his family. The public character of the said Wakf Estate is an undeniable fact. The learned Trial Court has elaborately dealt with the matter relating to mismanagement of the Wakf Estate by the Trustees who have subsequently been ordered to be removed. No argument has been advanced on behalf of the appellants to challenge such findings of the learned Trial Court so far as removal of the Trustees is concerned. As mentioned hereinabove, the appellants have only challenged that part of the decree by which sale of portion of the Wakf property in favour of the defendant No. 7 being the original appellant has been declared to be illegal and invalid. For the reasons already set forth it can well be held that the transaction evidenced by the indenture dated 25-4-62 (Exhibit ‘A-1’) relating to sale of portion of the Wakf Property in favour of defendant No. 7 is dubious in origin and the suspicious circumstances surrounding the same which are proved in evidence lead us to irresistible conclusion that such sale was effected for personal gain of defendant No. 7 which is detrimental to interest of the Wakf Estate. It is needless to point out on our part that the said transaction is a glaring example of utter mismanagement of the Wakf Estate and the sale in favour of defendant No. 7 was made for personal gain of an individual causing wrongful loss to the public Wakf.
23. From that all has been stated above we are of the view that the learned Trial Judge has held in justifiable manner that the sale to defendant No. 7 was illegal and invalid and he did not acquire any title thereby and the property covered by the indenture dated 25-4-62 is deemed to be a part of the Wakf Estate. The learned Trial Court has rightly decreed the suit and removed the Trustees in respect of the Wakf Estate and framed the scheme for administration of the Wakf Estate for welfare of the said Wakf. There is no merit in the instant appeal. The same is bound to fail.
24. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. The judgment and decree passed by the learned Subordinate Judge, Fourth Court, Alipore, on 2-9-71 in Title Suit No. 20 of 1969 are affirmed. No order as to costs.
25. Let a copy of this judgment along with L.C.R to be sent down to the learned Court below forthwith.
Appeal dismissed.
Samaresh Banerjea, J.:— 26. Although I fully agree on all points with my learned Brother but I would like to add few words.
27. One of the contentions of the appellant before us was that the trial court could not have held that the Board of Trustees was not validly constituted as the Trustees were appointed changing the line of succession as provided for in the deed of Wakf.
28. The learned Counsel appearing for the appellant addressed us on such question and has tried to contend that the finding of the learned Judge to that respect is wrong as no illegality was committed in appointment of Trustees. It has been further submitted that even if there is any illegality or infirmity in the formation of the Trust Board, the appellant being a bona fide purchaser of value without notice cannot be blamed for the same and the sale cannot be held to be vitiated for the aforesaid reasons.
29. The Trustees having accepted such finding and not having challenged the same by preferring appeal, it is not for the present appellant to assail such finding. We, however, agree the same may not vitiate the impugned sale of the Wakf property to the appellant. But the same does not help the appellant in any manner whatsoever in view of the fact that the entire transaction relating to sale of the Trust properties in question was shrouded with suspicion, as discussed in detail by my learned Brother. There is not even any clear evidence how at the first instance the appellant came into possession of the land in question which is admittedly a Wakf property. No documentary evidence could be produced by the appellant that he was a tenant of the suit property, that he gave loan to the Board of Trustees for benefit of the Wakf property, that he expended money for benefit of the Wakf property, that any permission was obtained from the Commissioner of Wakf for granting loan to the Trust Board. He claims himself to be bona fide purchaser of value. But although he is an educated man and had full notice that he was dealing with Wakf property, it is inconceivable that he would not maintain the rent receipts and other documents relating to transaction with Board of Trustees.
30. Much has been argued by the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant on the alleged admission of the witness of the plaintiff as regards alleged tenancy.
31. It has been submitted that admission being a substantive piece of evidence it was not necessary for the Court to go into any other evidence for the purpose of ascertaining whether such tenancy was created as alleged. We are unable to agree. AS pointed out by my learned Brother in detail, the appellant miserably failed to produce a single scrap of document in respect of his claim that he was tenant in respect of such premises and that he actually expended money for the benefit of the Trust. Even from the order passed by the Commissioner upon which much reliance has been placed by the appellant will indicate that the order was passed by the Commissioner by approving the sale under the circumstances when it was fait accompli and not on the basis of material evidence, documentary or otherwise that he was a tenant of the premises in question. Even the way the price offered by him was accepted by the Commissioner although he did not even respond to the advertisement published in the Statesman is also shrouded with suspicion which was further deepened because of contention raised by one of the Trustees in the said hearing that the sale was not a bona fide one.
32. It is obvious that the original appellant, who admittedly was a rich man, a Presidency Magistrate and a member of the Legislative Council of the West Bengal Assembly untilised his high position in the society get an order in his favour.
33. On the face of such situation it is immaterial that one of the witnesses for the plaintiff might have said that the appellant was a tenant. The witness of the plaintiff was an outsider and obviously his aforesaid oral evidence is not based on any materials on record but on information which he received from other as it was being declared by the appellant at that point of time he was a tenant in respect of the property.
34. In the self-same decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Mahendra v. Sushila, reported in AIR 1965 SC page 364, it was held by the Supreme Court that section 58 of the Evidence Act and Order 8 Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure vests discretion in the Court to require any fact so admitted to be proved otherwise than by admission and it is fit case where such discretion is to be exercised as it is sale of Wakf property which is permitted only under special circumstances for the benefit of the Wakf.
35. The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Thiru John v. Returning Officer, reported in AIR 1977 SC page 1724, also will not help the appellant. It is held in the said case admission shifts the onus to the maker of admission to prove to the contrary. The alleged admission of the witness of the plaintiff as pointed out hereinbefore can hardly be said to be admission of tenancy as he cannot be competent person to say about the existence of the tenancy.
36. Agreeing with my learned Brother, therefore, I do not find any reason to interfere with the impugned judgement and decree of the Trial Court.
37. The appeal is accordingly dismissed without any order of costs.
Appeal dismissed.
Later:
38. The learned Counsel appearing for the appellant prays for stay of operation of the judgement and order. Such prayer is considered and rejected.
39. As prayed for by the learned Advocate appearing for the appellant urgent xerox certified copy of this judgement and order, if applied for, shall be given to the parties expeditiously.
Samaresh Banerjea and Asit Kumar Bisi, JJ.:
Prayer for stay rejected.
S.K.P