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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • URBAN LAND CEILING AND REGULATION ACT 1976
  • hereunders29. Sec. 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963
  • sub-Section (2) of Sec.20 of the Specific Relief Act,
  • provisions of Secs.20.21 of Specific Relief Act
  • provisions of Sac. 20 (2)(b) of specific Relief Act
  • provision Sec.20 of the Specific Relief Act,
  • sec.20(2) of the Specific Relief Act
  • TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • sub-section (2) of Sec.20
  • Order 41 Rule 25.
  • Relief Act, 1963
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • URBAN LAND CEILING AND REGULATION ACT 1976
  • hereunders29. Sec. 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963
  • sub-Section (2) of Sec.20 of the Specific Relief Act,
  • provisions of Secs.20.21 of Specific Relief Act
  • provisions of Sac. 20 (2)(b) of specific Relief Act
  • provision Sec.20 of the Specific Relief Act,
  • sec.20(2) of the Specific Relief Act
  • TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • sub-section (2) of Sec.20
  • Order 41 Rule 25.
  • Relief Act, 1963
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — Regular First Appeal (V. Gopala Gowda, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The appeal arises from Original Suit No. 30/81 decided by the I Additional Civil Judge, Bangalore on 3.11.1998. The plaintiff sued for specific performance of a registered agreement dated 25.6.1979 for the sale of a 1/3 undivided share in property No. 43 Mission Road, Bangalore, claiming payment of consideration (Rs.40,000) and part payment (advance Rs.5,000). The second defendant (the eldest brother and power of attorney holder for the first defendant) executed the agreement in 1979 and allegedly received consideration on behalf of the first defendant; the plaintiff claimed readiness and willingness to perform and possession by part performance and issued notices when the sale deed was not executed. The defendants denied the validity of the agreement, contending the power of attorney was limited, the agreement was bogus, denial of receipt of advance and asserted that plaintiff occupied as a tenant and had sub-let portions without paying rent. At trial, issues were framed (three main issues and two additional issues). The Trial Court answered the core issues in favour of the plaintiff and decreed specific performance, directing the first defendant to execute a sale deed for his 1/3 share. The first defendant filed this Regular First Appeal challenging the Trial Court's judgment and decree and advanced contentions including failure to frame/answer an issue on the trial court's discretionary power under Section 20(2) of the Specific Relief Act.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Trial Court's findings on Issue Nos. 1 and 2 and Additional Issue Nos. 1 & 2 — i.e., that the defendants failed to prove the agreement was not executed or was procured by fraud/misrepresentation — warranted interference by the appellate court.
  2. Whether the Trial Court erred by not framing and considering an issue on whether it should exercise its discretionary power under Section 20(2) of the Specific Relief Act when granting specific performance, and if so whether this Court should remand the matter to the Trial Court for consideration of that discretionary aspect.

Arguments of the Parties

First Defendant's Arguments (Appellant)

  • The Trial Court erred in its appreciation of facts and evidence and the findings on issues are legally erroneous.
  • The Trial Court improperly framed an issue that effectively shifted burden to the defendants; it failed to frame and answer an essential issue as to whether the plaintiff proved execution of the agreement dated 25.6.1979.
  • The power of attorney to the second defendant was limited to management; the agreement was "bogus" and procured by misuse of the power of attorney and collusion.
  • The plaintiff occupied as a tenant (allotment under HRC), sub-let portions and appropriated rents; he did not pay rent to the first defendant and thus was not entitled to specific performance or to claim part performance.
  • Relying on Supreme Court authorities, the first defendant argued the Trial Court should have considered whether, in the exercise of its discretion under Section 20(2) of the Specific Relief Act, specific performance was appropriate — including consideration of comparative hardship and escalation of property value; alternatively, the Court should award compensation or money instead of specific performance.

Plaintiff's Arguments (Respondent)

  • The Trial Court correctly appreciated facts and evidence and correctly answered the issues in favour of the plaintiff, entitling him to specific performance.
  • The defendants did not plead or prove hardship under Section 20(2) of the Specific Relief Act before the Trial Court; therefore the Trial Court had no duty to frame an issue or examine Section 20(2)(b).
  • The plaintiff relied upon Section 10 of the Specific Relief Act (statutory right) and authorities supporting the grant of specific performance in similar circumstances.
  • The plaintiff asserted he was in possession pursuant to part performance; the agreement and delivery/possession aspects justified specific performance.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For (as stated in the opinion) Application by the Court
(2002) 5 SCC 383 The opinion records reliance on this Supreme Court citation by the appellant; no specific rule from this citation is set out in the text. The citation was relied on by the appellant; the Court does not set out or expressly rely upon a distinct rule from this citation in its reasoning as recorded in the text.
(2001) 7 SCC 617 : AIR 2001 SC 2446 Referenced by the appellant; the opinion does not extract a specific rule textually from this citation. Relied upon by the appellant in urging discretionary considerations; the Court's reasoning does not identify a distinct application of this specific citation beyond general reliance on Apex Court authority.
AIR 1988 SC 2116 Cited by the appellant; no rule or principle from this report is expressly quoted in the opinion. Listed among authorities relied upon by appellant; the Court does not separately analyze or extract a particular principle from it in the written reasoning.
(1997) 3 SCC 1 : AIR 1997 SC 1751 — K.S. Vidyanadam v. Vairavan Discussed in the opinion: affirms that courts have discretion under Section 20 and that time may not be the essence; courts should not automatically grant specific performance merely because it is lawful to do so. It is referred to for interpretation of Section 20(2) and the need to consider surrounding circumstances. The Court relied upon K.S. Vidyanadam to hold that the Trial Court should have considered the discretionary power under Section 20(2) and that such discretion requires consideration of hardship and price escalation; this precedent supported answering the discretionary point in favour of the first defendant.
AIR 1963 PUNJAB 100 Cited by appellant; the opinion does not state the principle taken from this report. Included among authorities cited by appellant; no separate application or textual principle is set out by the Court in its reasoning.
(1999) 5 SCC 77 : AIR 1999 SC 77 — K. Narendra v. Riviera Apartments (P) Ltd. Interprets Sections 20 and 21 of the Specific Relief Act; emphasises that jurisdiction to decree specific performance is discretionary, guided by judicial principles and capable of appellate correction; acknowledges the doctrine of comparative hardship and that severe hardship may justify refusal of specific performance or substitution by compensation. The Court relied on Narendra to support the proposition that discretionary considerations (comparative hardship, price rise, etc.) ought to have been considered by the Trial Court and to justify altering the relief from specific performance to monetary compensation/adjustment in this appeal.
(1993) 1 SCC 519 : AIR 1993 SC 1742 — Chand Rani v. Kamal Rahi The Constitution Bench held that courts must consider time, nature of property and surrounding circumstances; it suggested relaxation/modification of the traditional rule that time is not the essence in sale of immovable property, particularly urban properties, and that price-rise and inaction are relevant considerations under Section 20(2). The Court treated Chand Rani as a controlling constitutional authority establishing the duty of courts to consider price-rise and hardship when deciding Section 20(2) questions; this precedent was a primary basis for finding the Trial Court's omission material and for answering the discretionary point in favour of the first defendant.
(1996) 5 SCC 589 : AIR 1995 SC 2814 — Lourdu Mari David v. Louis Chinnaya Arogiaswamy Stated that decree for specific performance is discretionary; discretion should be exercised on sound principles and be correctable on appeal. Recognised doctrine of comparative hardship as a consideration. The Court used this authority to emphasise that discretionary power under Section 20 must be exercised on sound principles and that comparative hardship can justify refusing specific performance; it informed the appellate conclusion to modify the remedy.
AIR 1965 SC 1405 Quoted in the opinion (Subba Rao J.) distinguishing Indian and English law on delay: mere delay in India without prejudice to the defendant does not empower refusal of specific performance; delay must have caused prejudice to defendant or made relief inequitable. The opinion cites this extract to explain limitations on refusing specific performance for delay and to show how discretion under Section 20 should be exercised; it is part of the appellate Court's analysis of whether delay/price-rise made specific performance inequitable here.
(1979) 4 SCC 393 : AIR 1979 SC 1241 Cited by the plaintiff; the opinion does not reproduce a specific rule from this citation. One of the authorities relied upon by the respondent to justify the Trial Court; the appellate Court does not specifically single out its rule in the reasoning recorded.
(1999) 7 SCC 703 : AIR 2000 SC 191 Cited by the plaintiff; the text does not extract an explicit principle from this citation. Listed among authorities supporting the Trial Court's decision; the appellate Court does not separately apply its content in the written analysis.
AIR 1990 DELHI 42 Cited by the plaintiff; no specific principle is quoted in the opinion. Included among respondent's authorities; not separately applied in the Court's reasoning as set out in the text.
(1995) 4 SCC 15 Cited by the plaintiff; the opinion does not state a principle attributed to this citation. Relied upon by the respondent but not separately analyzed or applied in the opinion's reasoning as recorded.
2001 (4) SUPREME TODAY 510 Cited by the plaintiff; no principle is extracted in the opinion text. Part of the respondent's list of authorities; not separately applied in the appellate reasoning set out in this text.
ILR 2003 KAR 3443 — B.R. Mulani v. A.B. Aswathanarayana (DB) Applied to hold that it may be inappropriate to grant specific performance if it would be contrary to terms of the agreement and would prejudice the vendor's contractual option to pay and thereby preserve the property; indicates situations where specific performance should not be compelled. The Court relied on this Division Bench decision to support the conclusion that granting specific performance in the present facts was not appropriate and that monetary relief could be substituted; it guided the Court against enforcing specific performance where resulting consequences would be inequitable.
(1973) 2 SCC 515 : AIR 1973 SC 2457 — M.L. Devender Singh v. Syed Khaja Quoted in the opinion to explain when a court will enforce a contract that contains an alternative (e.g., option to pay): where payment is one of the modes, the contract may be enforced in keeping with its terms; if the contract is satisfied by payment of money, specific performance of the other alternative may not be appropriate. The Court used this principle to underscore that where the contract allows satisfaction by payment the Court may not compel an alternative performance which would defeat the vendor's contractual opportunities; it influenced the decision to direct payment rather than enforce a sale deed.
(1968) 1 SCC 143 Cited in plaintiff's submissions on escalation not being a ground to deny relief; the opinion does not recite a rule from this report. Referenced by the plaintiff; the appellate Court did not treat this citation as outweighing constitutional authority requiring consideration of price-rise/hardship.
AIR 1968 MADRAS 84 Cited by plaintiff; the opinion does not set out a particular rule from it. Part of plaintiff's supporting authorities; not separately relied on by the appellate Court in its reasoning as recorded.
AIR 1991 MAD. 137 Cited by plaintiff; no explicit rule quoted in the opinion text. Included among respondent's citations; not individually applied in the appellate reasoning presented.
AIR SCW 2001 PAGE 2361 Cited by plaintiff in support of non-application of price escalation as a bar; no rule is quoted in the opinion. Included in the respondent's list of authorities but not separately analyzed or applied by the appellate Court in the extract provided.
(2002) 2 SCC 686 — P. Purusrottam Reddy v. Pratap Steels Ltd. Cited by the Court in relation to the exercise of appellate power and the circumstances in which remand is not required under Order 41 Rule 25. The Court relied on this authority to justify that remand to the Trial Court was not necessary and that the appellate Court could exercise its power in the appeal to modify the relief rather than remitting the matter.
Chitty on Contracts (27th Edn. 1994, Vol. 1 at p.1296) Text authority: severe hardship may be a ground for refusing specific performance, even if hardship arises after the contract and is not the plaintiff's responsibility. The Court quoted Chitty to illustrate the accepted doctrine that severe hardship to the defendant may justify refusal of specific performance; it informed the Court's discretionary analysis under Section 20.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by (i) reviewing pleadings and trial record, (ii) assessing the Trial Court's factual findings on the core issues, and (iii) examining whether the Trial Court failed to consider its statutory discretion under Section 20(2) of the Specific Relief Act.

  1. Findings on agreement and evidence: The appellate Court examined the Trial Court's findings on Issue Nos. 1 and 2 and Additional Issues Nos. 1 & 2 — relating to the existence of the registered agreement, receipt of consideration through the power of attorney holder, and pleas of fraud/misrepresentation — and concluded those findings were based on proper appreciation of facts and evidence. Consequently, these findings did not warrant interference.
  2. Omission to frame/consider Section 20(2): The Court identified a lapse — the Trial Court did not frame and decide an issue on whether it should exercise its discretionary power under Section 20(2) while granting specific performance. The appellate Court regarded that omission as material because Section 20 confers discretion and precedent (including the Constitution Bench in Chand Rani) requires consideration of comparative hardship, delay and escalation of urban property values.
  3. Application of precedent: The Court relied on a body of Supreme Court authority (including K.S. Vidyanadam, Chand Rani, K. Narendra, Lourdu Mari David, and related decisions) to articulate that:
    • Jurisdiction to decree specific performance is discretionary; a court is not bound to grant specific performance merely because it is lawful to do so.
    • The doctrine of comparative hardship is statutorily and judicially recognized — severe unforeseen hardship to a defendant may justify refusal of specific performance or substitution of compensation.
    • In urban property cases, the rule that "time is not of the essence" requires relaxation in light of price escalation and other circumstances; courts must consider delay, value escalation, and who bears prejudice.
  4. Application to facts: The opinion found relevant facts favouring the first defendant: (i) the agreed consideration was inadequate compared to market value escalation, and (ii) the plaintiff, though found to be in possession, arguably enjoyed the property and had not paid rent for the defendant's share (pleaded though not evidenced). In light of the authorities, the Court concluded these circumstances required that discretionary considerations be applied and that specific performance was not the appropriate remedy in this case.
  5. Power to decide on appeal without remand: The appellate Court considered whether remand was necessary for the Trial Court to decide the discretionary issue afresh. Citing P. Purusrottam Reddy and other authority, the Court held remand was not required and that it could exercise appellate power to modify the decree in accordance with law and justice.
  6. Relief formulation: Balancing the Trial Court's factual findings (which the appellate Court upheld) and the discretionary considerations arising from authority and the facts (price escalation, inadequate consideration, plaintiff's possession), the appellate Court determined that substituting a monetary remedy — payment of consideration with interest after deducting rent payable by the plaintiff — was the appropriate modification rather than enforcement of specific performance by decree for conveyance of the share.

Holding and Implications

The Court's final decision and its consequences are:

Core Holding: Appeal is partly allowed. The impugned Judgment and Decree directing the first defendant to execute a sale deed for the 1/3 share of the suit property is modified.

The modification directs the first defendant to pay the agreed consideration with interest at 12% per annum from the date of the agreement until the date of payment, after deducting the rent payable to him by the plaintiff in respect of the 1/3 share.

Direct effect on the parties: The plaintiff will not obtain an order compelling execution of the sale deed; instead the plaintiff is entitled to monetary recovery (consideration plus interest, less rent). The first defendant is obligated to pay that monetary amount.

Broader implications: The opinion does not announce a new legal doctrine; it applies and reconciles existing Supreme Court authorities (including Chand Rani, K.S. Vidyanadam, K. Narendra and related decisions) to hold that tribunals must consider the discretionary power under Section 20(2) of the Specific Relief Act, especially in urban property cases with significant price escalation. The Court also held that an appellate court may, in appropriate circumstances, modify relief without remand (citing P. Purusrottam Reddy and Order 41 Rule 25).

Availability of Information

This summary is prepared exclusively from the opinion text provided. Where the provided text listed citations without setting out the rule extracted from them, the summary notes that the opinion either listed the citation among authorities relied upon or that the opinion did not reproduce a distinct principle from that citation in the material passages quoted.

    A. Ramalingam v. H. Siddiqui

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    V. Gopala Gowda, J.:— This Regular First Appeal is filed by the first defendant questioning the judgment and Decree passed in original suit No. 30/81 by the I Addl. civil Judge, Bangalore dated 3.11.1998 in granting Judgment and Decree in favour of the plaintiff directing the first defendant to execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff in respect of his l/3rd share in property bearing NO. 43 Mission Road, Bangalore, which is mora fully described in the plaint schedule and sought for setting aside the said Judgment and Decree by allowing this appeal in dismissing the original suit, urging various legal contentions.

    2. The rank of the parties in this Judgment is referred to as has been assigned in the original suit for the sake of convenience.

    3. The brief facts are stated for the purpose of considering the rival legal contentions urged by the learned counsel on behalf of the parties and also to answer as to whether the impugned Judgment and Decree warrants interference by this Court.

    4. The original suit was filed by the plaintiff against defendants for specific performance of the schedule property of l/3 share of first defendnat and execute sale deed in his favour. It is the case of the plaintiff that first defendant is the absolute owner of l/3 undivided share in the property No. 43 of Mission Road, Bangalore which is morefully described in the suit schedule (hereinafter called as ‘suit property’).

    5. The second defendant is eldest brother of first defendant and he is also his power of attorney holder. second defendant who is power of attorney holder of first defendant entered into agreement on 25.6.1979 to sell his l/3 share of suit property to the plaintiff for consideration of Rs. 40,000/- by receiving an advance of Rs. 5,000/-. The said agreement was registered as per the terms and conditions enumerated therein and the sale suit property was required to be completed by paying the balance of sale consideration amount on or before 30.12.1980 by the plaintiff. Further, the case of the plaintiff is that, the parties to the agreement have to take necessary steps for obtaining permission from the competent authority under the provisions of urban Land ceiling Regulation Act, 1976 (now repealed).

    6. It is the case of the plaintiff that entire consideration amount was paid to the second defendant who is the power of attorney holder of first defendant and he received the same on behalf of first defendant and further case is that he was ready and willing to perform his part of contract and he has been requesting the defendants to take necessary steps to obtain permission from the urban Land ceiling Authority. since they failed to take necessary steps, he got issued legal notice to the defendants on 5.3.1980 and on 25.5.1980 through his counsel calling upon them to complete the sale transaction in his favour and by performing their part of contract. Despite the said demand, they did not perform their part of contract as they failed to execute the registered sale deed in favour the plaintiff, the defendants sent reply notice dated 4.10.1980 repudiating the agreement in question and it is the case of the plaintiff that he has been in possession of undivided share of the defendants of the property in pursuant to agraement for sale. Defendants have failed to execute the sale deed in favour of plaintiff and therefore, he has filed suit before the Trial Court seeking the relief as stated supra.

    7. Defendants 1 and 2 have filed written statement. First defendant admitted his l/3 share of suit property and further admitted that second defendant is his brother and power of attorney holder. However, first defendant has contended that power of attorney was given in favour of second defendant only for the limited purpose of looking after and managing the suit property. Further, denied that there was agreement of sale of the suit property and denied having received advance amount of Rs. 5,000/- from him. He has also further stated that agreement is a ‘Bogus’ agreement. The said agreement is prepared by his alder brother by misusing the power of attorney on the ill advice of the plaintiff to play fraud on him and he further pleaded that the property worth is nore than Rs. 3,00,000/- on the date of suit agreement. Further pleaded that he has sent registered notice to the plaintiff on 4.10.1980 denying execution of agreement. Further pleaded that one Mr. D. Narada filed OS 767/78 re-numbered as OS No. 2762/80 seeking partition of l/34d share in the suit schedule property, in the said suit, plaintiff was the 4th defendant and he had filed his written statement on 27.2.1979 by urging a plea stating that he did not agree to purchase the suit property that would goes to show that plaintiff with a view to snatch away the property, the agreement of sale in question in respect of that property had come into existence in collusion with second defendant.

    8. It is the further case of the first defendant that plaintiff occupied suit property as tenant by virtue of allotment order in HRC (ACC) 306/70 and thereafter he has sub-let a portion of suit property to various persons. Further pleaded that plaintiff has not been paying rent to the first defendant, he has appropriated the income that he derived from the property which was. sub-let by him. He further denied that he has received any part of consideration amount from the plaintiff. There is no breach of contract between them. Therefore, there is no question of he being ready and willing to perform his part of contract on the basis of the agreemant in question in favour of plaintiff, Further he has stated that he had no intention to sall the suit property much less to the plaintiff but, he wanted to retain the suit property. Further stated that he is not bound by the agreement in question. Further denied the possession of the plaintiff pursuant to agreement of sale. Therefore, defendant pleaded that plaintiff is not entitled for the decree for specific performance as prayed by him and therefore he has prayed for dismissal of the suit with costs.

    9. On the basis of said pleadings, three issues and two additional issues as at Para-14 are framed by the trial court. The case want for trial, on behalf of plaintiff he himself was examined as PW-1 and produced and narked as Ex.P1 to P22 and on behalf of first defendant he was examined and DW1 and produced and marked Ex.D1 the certified copy of written statement filed by the plaintiff in OS 2762/80 by the plaintiff.

    10. The Trial Court on appreciation of facts and legal evidence on record has answered Issue No. 1 and additional Issue Nos. 1 and 2 are answered in the negative and issue No. 2 is answered in the affirmative. Issue No. 3 is answered holding that plaintiff is entitled for - Judgment and Decree of specific performance in respect of the suit property and accordingly decreed the suit directing the first defendant to execute the sale deed to an extent of l/3 extent of suit property by referring to the facts and legal evidence at Para-18 to 22 on Issue Nos. 1 and Addl. Issue Nos. 1 at Para-23, Addl. Issue No. 2 at Para-24, and Issue No. 3 at para-25.

    11. The correctness of the findings and reasons recorded on the above contentious issues in the impugned Judgment are questioned in this appeal by the first defendant urging various legal contentions.

    12. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of first defendant Mr. sreanidhi, has sought to anul the findings and reasons recorded on the contentious issues contending that the Trial Court has not appreciated the facts and legal evidence on record. Therefore, he has urged that the findings recorded on the issues are erroneous and suffer from error in law. Further contended that the framing of issue regarding throwing burden upon the defendants is not based on the pleadings and in accordance with law. Therefore, the learned Trial Judge has committed an error in framing the first issue throwing burden upon the defendants and answering the said issue in the impugned Judgment against the defendants without framing an issue as to whether the plaintiff has proved execution of agreement of sale dated 25.6.1979 Further placing reliance upon the following Judgments of the Supreme Court in support of the proposition that the Trial Court was required to answer the question as to whether the discretion has to be exercised by it in favour of plaintiff for grant of a decree for specific performance against first defendant as it is a discretionary relief and whether such relief can be granted because it is lawful to do so:

    1. (2002) 5 SCC 383

    2. (2001) 7 SCC 617 : AIR 2001 SC 2446

    3. AIR 1988 SC 2116

    4. (1997) 3 SCC 1 : AIR 1997 SC 1751

    5. AIR 1963 PUNJAB 100

    13. This issue is neither framed nor answered though it is mandatory on the part of the trial as held by the Apex court in catena of cases. Therefore, the learned counsel for the first defendant has prayed this Court to consider this important aspect of matter and pass appropriate judgment in this regard. Further, the learned counsel for the first defendant placing strong reliance upon the Judgment of the Apex Court reported in (1999) 5 SCC 77 : AIR 1999 SC 77 in the case of K. Narendra v. Riviera Apartments (P) Ltd.., wherein the Apex Court has interpreted provisions of Secs.20.21 of Specific Relief Act with reference to the Constitutional Bench Judgment reported in (1993) 1 SCC 519 : AIR 1993 SC 1742 in the case of CHAHD RANI v. KAMAL RAHI, (1996) 5 SCC 589 : AIR 1995 SC 2814 in the Casa of LOURDU MARI DAVID v. LOUIS CHINHAYA AROGIASWAHY Judgment reported in (1997) 3 SCC 1 in the case of K.S VIDYANADAM v. VAIRAVAN and at paragraphs 29 and 30 has laid down the law as follows:

    “Sec.20 of the specific Relief Act, 1963 provides that the jurisdiction to dacres specific performance is discretionary and the court is not bound to grant such relief merely becansa it is lawful to do so; the discretion of the Court is not arbitrary but sound and reasonable, guided by judicial principles and capable of correction by a court of appeal, Performance of the contract involving some hardship on the defendant which ha did not foresee while non-performanca involving no such hardship on the plaintiff, is one of the circumstances in which the court may properly exercise discretion not to decree specific performance. The doctrine of comparative hardship has been thus statutorily recognized in India. However, mere inadequacy of consideration of the mere fact that the contract is onerous to the defendant or improvident in its nature, shall not constitute an unfair advantage to the plaintiff over the defendant or unforeseable hardship on the defendant The principle underlying Section 20 has been summed up by this court Lourdu Mari David v. Louis Chinnsya Arogiaswamy by stating that the decree for specific performance is in the discretion of the Court but the discretion should not be used arbitrarily; the discretion should be exercised on sound principlas of law capable of correction by an appellate court.

    30. Chitty on Contracts (27 Edn. 1994, Vol.1 at p.1296) states, “Severe hardship may be a ground for refusing specific performance even though it results from circumstances which arise after the conclusion of the contract, which affect the person of the defendant rather then the subject matter of the contract, and for which the plaintiff is in no way responsible”

    14. Again at paragraph-31, after referring to k.S vidyanandam's case and constitutional Judgment, the court has held with reference to Sees.20 and 22 of “Doctrine of Comparative hardship and equity” shall be applied to a case and substitute in the place of decree for specific performance by awarding compensation in favour of plaintiff instead granting a decraa for specific performance in respect of the suit property. The learned counsel submitted that the constitution Bench Judgment in CHAND RANI's case stated supra and other decisions referred to in the preceding paragraph of this judgment with all fours applicable to the facts of this case. Therefore, he has requested this Court to set aside the impugned Judgment and passed for passing the Judgmant and Decree by awarding either award of amount without interest or compensation in the place of specific performance of the suit property as awarded by it, having regard to the astronomical rise of price of suit property after 1979 as he has stated in the pleadings as on the date of agreement the property was worth about Rs. 50,000/- but as on the date of evidence Rs. 40,000/-, therefore, it is urged that the consideration amount mentioned in the agreement of sale is inadequate than the market value of the property and therefore the learned counsel for first defendant has prayed for grant of the reliefs.

    15. Sri Y.K Narayana Sharma, learned counsel appearing on behalf of plaintiff sought to justify the impugned Judgment and Decree passed by the Trial court in answer to contentious points and additional issue by placing reliance upon the following Judgments:

    1. AIR 1965 SC 1405

    2. (1979) 4 SCC 393 : AIR 1979 SC 1241

    3. (1999) 7 SCC 703 : AIR 2000 SC 191

    4. AIR 1990 DELHI 42

    5. (1995) 4 SCC 15

    6. 2001 (4) SUPREME TODAY 510

    7. ILR 2003 KAR 3443 (1.9.2003 Issue)

    16. He further contended that, in so far as the legal contentions urged by the learned counsel on behalf of first defendant that Trial Court has not framed the issue regarding exercise of its discretionary power under sub-section (2) of Sec.20 of the Specific Relief Act, for the reason that first defendant neither pleaded the hardship nor proved befora the trial court by adducing legal evidence on record. Therefore, he has vehemently contended that there is no duty caste upon the Trial Court to frame such an issue and answer the same. He has placed reliance upon the above said Judgments in support of the proposition that when no plea of hardship in specific performance suit was raised by defendant vendor, examination of the provisions of Sac. 20 (2)(b) of specific Relief Act by the Trial court would not arise. Further in support of the proposition that the escalation of the suit property during pendency of the proceedings cannot be a ground for the trial court in view of the provisions under sec.10 of the specific Relief Act to deny the relief, the learned counsel for plaintiff in support of this contention has placed reliance upon the following decisions:

    1. (1968) 1 SCC 143

    2. AIR 1968 MADRAS 84

    3. AIR 1991 MAD. 137

    4. AIR SCW 2001 PAGE 2361

    17. He also further submitted that the plaintiff was not at all at fault in approaching the Court as he approached the Trial Court immediately and the defendants have dragged on the proceedings before the trial court, notwithstanding the fact that there is escalation in price of the suit property, he is entitled for the relief granted in the suit by the trial court. Hence he has submitted that this Court need not interfere with the judgment having regard to the statutory right conferred upon the plaintiff under Sec,10 of the specific Relief Act. Therefore, he has urged that there was no duty cast upon the Trial court to frame an issue regarding as to whether the discretionary power can be exercised by the trial court as required in law. Therefore, the Trial court has rightly not framed that issue and did not consider the same and answered in the impugned judgment. Therefore the ground regarding failure to exercise discretionary power at the time of passing judgment is not a ground available for the first defendant to examine this contention and answer the same by this court to accept the alternative submission made by the learned counsel for the defendant in this Appeal.

    18. The learned counsel for the plaintiff has submitted that the plaintiff has been in possession as tenant pursuant to part performance of the contract and it is also an undisputed fact that the property in question was allotted by the House Rent Controller in the allotment proceedings referred to supra. On the basis of agreement of sale by incorporating the clause regarding delivery of possession of the suit property, he was in possession as tenant and the sale deed was not executed for which he has filed suit for specific performance.

    19. The Division bench of this Court in the case of B.R MULANI v. A.B ASWATHANARAYANA reported in ILR 1992 (3) Kar.L.J 207 (DB) referring to the Judgment of Apex court reported in (1973) 2 SCC 515 : AIR 1973 SC 2457 in the case of M.L DEVENDER SINGH v. SYED KHAJA has held that it would not be proper and appropriate to grant a decree for specific performance as it would be contrary to the terms of agreement and it would take sway the right of the prospective vendor to exercise his option and pay off the amount and thereby save the property, the relevant portion of which reads thus:

    “Where the stipulated payment comes under either of the two first mentioned heads, the court will enforce the contract, if in other respects it can and ought to be enforced, just in the same way as a contract not to do a particular act, with a penalty added to. secure its performance or a sum named as liquidated damages, may be specifically enforced fey means of an injunction against breaking it. On the other hand, where the contract comes under the third head, it is satisfied by the payment of the money, and there is no ground for the court to compel the spacific performance of the other alternative of the contract.”

    20. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and perusing the pleadings, the following points would arise for consideration:

    (a) whether the findings and reasons recorded on issue Nos. 1 and 2 and Addl. Issue Nos. 1 & 2 by the Trial court in holding that defendants have not proved that they have not executed agreement of sale in favour of plaintiff and the same has been obtained by the plaintiff by making use of power of attorney holder of second defendant which amounts to fraud and misrepresentation warrant interference with the same by this court in exercise of its Appellate power and Jurisdiction?

    (b) Whether the Trial Court was right in not exercising its discretionary power under subsection (2) of Sec. 20 while granting judgment and decree for Specific Performance in favour of plaintiff if it has not exercised its power undar the above provisions of the Act, whether, this Court has to remand the case to the trial court after setting aside the judgment and Decree for its consideration regarding this aspect of the case?

    21. After hekring the learned counsel for the parties, perusing the pleadings and the documentary evidenca produced by the plaintiff. In my view, the trial court while recording findings and reasons on the contentious issues, there is lapse on the part of the Trial Court in not framing the relevant issue regarding as to whether the trial court was required to exercise its discretionary power under Section 20(2) of the Act for grant of the relief of specific performance in favour of the plaintiff, even though it has answered the contentious issues regarding agreement of sale executed by defendants in respect of the suit property in favour of plaintiff. The findings and reasons recorded by the Trial on the contentious issues No. 1, 2 and Additional Issue Nos. 1 and 2 do not call for interference by this court as this Court after going through the reasons recorded in the impugned judgment, the same is based on proper appreciation of facts and legal evidence on record. Therefore, first point has to he answered by this court against the first defendant as I have fully concurred with the findings and reasons on the above contentious issues.

    22. In so far as 2nd point framed by this court is cuncarnad it is answered in favour of the first defendant for the following reasons, it is an undisputed fact that the Trial court has not framed an issue as to whether it would be proper and appropriate for it to exercise its discretionary power to grant the relief of specific performance in his favour for executing the sale deed in respect of the suit property merely because it is lawful to do so as it has answered the contentious issues regarding the agreement of sale in favour of plaintiff. There is voluminous case-law on this point in favour of first respondent. By bare reading of the provision Sec.20 of the Specific Relief Act, this court is of the view that, the Trial court should have examined the case of the parties keeping in view the legal evidence on record and the law-laid down by the Apex Court on the point as to whether the jurisdiction to pass a decree for specific performance of executing the sale deed by first defendant in favour of plaintiff cannot be exercised in his favor by executing discretionary power and whether it was bound to grant such relief in favour of plaintiff merely because it is lawful to do so.

    23. In this regard, reliance placed upon the decision of Supreme court reported in (1997) 3 SCC 1 : AIR 1997 SC 1751 in the case of K.S VIDYANADAM stated supra is required to be considered by this Court. In the said Judgment, the Supreme Court has referred to the constitutional Bench Judgment reported in (1993) 1 SCC 519 : AIR 1993 SC 1742 at Paragraphs 10 and 14. In the said Judgment, at paragraph-12, the decision of the Apex Court reported in AIR 1965 SC 1405 upon which the reliance is placed upon by the plaintiff's counsel is referred with reference to interpretation of sub-section (2) of Sec.20 the relevant portion of which paragraph is extracted as hereunder:

    “Subba Rao, J., speaking for the Bench pointed out the distinction between Indian Lav and the English Law on the subject and stated the conclusion in the following words: “While in England, mera delay or laches may be a ground for refusing to give a relief of specific performance, in India mere delay without such conduct on the part of the plaintiff as would cause prejudice to the defendant does not empower a court to refuse such a relief. It is not possible on desirable to lay down the circumstances under which a Court can exercisa its discretion against the plaintiff. But they must be such that the repiasantation by or the conduct or neglect of the plaintiff is directly responsible in including the defendants to change his position to his prejudice or such as to bring about a situation when it would be inequitable to give him such a relief.”

    24. Further, with reference to the fact situation of that case at Paragraph-13, the Apex Court has held as follows:

    “The delay has brought about a situation where it would be inequitable to give the relief of specific performance to the plaintiff.”

    25. Further, the learned counsel for the first defendant has rightly placed reliance upon the decision of Supreme Court in Narendra's case stated supra wherein the Apex Court has referred to its earlier decisions as noted in the earlier paragraphs, at pargaraphs-29 and 30, the law has been laid down which are extracted, hereunders

    29. “Sec. 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 provides that the jurisdiction to decree specific performance is discretionary and the Court is not bound to grant such relief merely because it is lawful to do not the discretion of the Court is not arbitrary but sound and reasonable, guided by judicial principles and capable of correction by a court of appeal. Performance of the contract involving some hardship on the defendant which he did not foresee while non-performance involving no such hardship on the plaintiff, is one of the eircumstances in which the court may properly exercise discretion not to decree specific performance. The doctrine of comparative hardship has been thus statutorily recognized in India. However, mere inadequacy of consideration of the mere fact that the contract is onerous to the defendant or improvident in its nature, shall not constitute an unfair advantage to the plaintiff over the defendant or unforeseable hardship on the defendant. The principle underlying Section 20 has been gummed up by this Court Lourdu Mari David v. Louis Chinnaya Arogiaswamy by stating that the decree for specific performance is in the discretion of the Court but the discretion should not be used arbitrarily; the discretion should be exercised on sound principles of law capable of correction by an appellate court.

    30. Chitty on Contracts (27 Edn. 1994, vol.1 at p.1296) states;

    “Severe hardship may be a ground for refusing specific performance even though it results from circumstances which arise after the conclusion of the contract, which affect the person of the defendant rather than the subject matter of the contract, and for which the plaintiff is in no way responsible”

    26. Further at paragraph-31 in the above case after referring to the constitution Bench Judgment of the supreme court in K.S vidyanadam v. Vairavan, the Apex Court has laid down the law after referring to SCC P7.para 10 of the said Judgment which reads as follows:

    “31. Vary recently in K.S Vidyanadam v. Vairavan this Court has held: (SCC p.7.para 10)

    “10. It has been consistently held by the Courts in India, following certain early English decisions, that in the case of agreement of sale relating to immovable property, time is not of the essence of the contract unless specifically provided to that affect. The period of limitation prescribed by the Limitation Act for filing a suit is three years. From these two circumstances, it does not follow that any and every suit for specific performance of the agreement (which does not provide specifically that time is of the essence of contract) should be decreed provided it is filed within the period of limitation notwithstanding the time limits stipulated in the agreement for doing one or the other thing by one or the other party. That would amount to saying that the time limits prescribed by the parties in the agreement have no significance or value and that they mean nothing. Would it be reasonable to say that because time is not made the essence of the contract, the time limit(s) specific in the ageement have no relevance and can be ignored with impunity? It would also mean denying the discretion vested in the court by both sections 10 and 20. As held by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Chand Rani v. Kamal Rani (SCC p.528, para 25).

    27. In the said paragraph of the constitution Bench Judgment of supreme court the case of Chand Rani v. Kamal Rani (See 328) is referred and relevant portion is extracted hereunder:

    “…it is clear that in the case of sale of immovable property there is no presumption as to time being the essence of the contract. Even if it is not of the essence of the contract, the court may infer that it is to be performed in a reasonable time if the conditions are (evident): (l) from the express terms of the contract; (2) from the nature of the property; and (3) from the surrounding circumstances, for example, the object of making the contract.”

    28. Further at para-32 of the aforesaid Judgment is relevant wherein para.11 of the constitution Bench Judgment is referred which is extracted hereunder:

    “Indeed, we are inclined to think that the rigor of the rule evolved by courts that time is not of the essence of the contract in the case of immovable properties - evolved in times when prices and values were stable and inflation was unknown - requires to be relaxed, if not modified particularly in the case of urban immovable properites. It is high time, we do so.

    29. From the aforesaid constitution Bench Judgment of Supreme court viz: Chand Rani v. Kamal Rani, the Apex Court is of the view that it is the duty of the Court to consider the relevant facts having regard to the time taken by the parties may not ba at their instance but time has been taken to pass decree and also taking into consideration the value of the property for grant of the relief in favour of the plaintiff. Therefore, the said approach has to be relaxed and if the same is not modified in respect of case of Immovable properties. The Apex Court has clearly held that, inaction and price rise of immovable property is the relevant consideration for the court for the purpose of either exsrcising or not exercising its discretionary power to grant the relief to the plaintiff as provided under sec.20(2) of the Specific Relief Act is required to be carefully considered. The principle of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in the case referred to supra is in favour of defendants. Therefore, reliance placed upon by the learned counsel for the plaintiff cannot bo accepted as the Apex Court has clearly answered the point stating that it is the statutory duty of the court to consider the Hardship and the price rise of the immovable property of the urban area. Undisputedly, the property in question is situated in Bangalore. Therefore, this important aspect of the matter should have been considered by the Trial Court but that has not been done. Hence, the same is required to be answered in favour of first defendant having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case namely (i) The amount of sale consideration agreed to sell the property to the plaintiff is inadequate (ii) Due to lapse of time on account of pending of the case before the courts for no fault of parties, there is considerable escalation of market value of the suit property.

    30. Further, one more important aspect of the matter which is in favour of first defendant is, plaintiff has been in possession by way of part performance of contract and therefore, he was not required to pay the rent as he has paid full consideration amount towards the suit property as per the document produced by which case is accepted by the Trial Court without execution of sale deed he has enjoyed the property as owner not as a tenant. This position of law is answered in B.R Mulani's case referred, to supra. As the matter has been pending before the Court and the sale deed is not executed but the explanation offered by the plaintiff stating that sale deed in respect of the suit property is required to be executed as required under Transfer of Property Act by the first defendant, till then the plaintiff will not become the absolute owner of the property in question. Therefore, he was required to pay the rent in favour of first defendant in respect of his share of the suit property. Undisputedly, this aspect of the matter is in the pleading but there is no evidence in this regard nonetheless it is the duty of the Court to find out as to whether the trial court could exercise its discretionary power for grant of decree in favour of the plaintiff having regard to the above undisputed facts and circumstances of the case. Non-exercise of its discretionary power by assigning irrelevant reasons has made this Court to exercise its power in this Appeal without remanding the case to the trial court for the aforesaid purpose though the learned counsel for plaintiff has made submission in this regard. In view of the ciear pronouncement of law laid down by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court and other cases referred to supra and also law laid down by the Apex Court at paras 8, 9, 10 and 11 in the case of P. PURUSROTTAM REDDY v. PRATAP STEELS LTD. reported in (2002) 2 SCC 686 the remand order of the case is not required as provided under Order 41 Rule 25. The contention that the plaintiff has paid full consideration by way of rent and is enjoying the property as owner cannot be accepted by this Court.

    31. Further, grant of relief of specific performance is also not in accordance with law in view of Division Bench Judgment of this Court in MULANI's case referred to supra which is applicable to the facts of the present case.

    32. For the reasons stated supra, the poinds formulated by this Court are answered in favour of first defendant. This Court delivers the following Judgment:

    33. Appeal is partly allowed. Impugned Judgment and Decree directing the first defendant to execute sale deed in respect of ⅓ share of suit property is modified by directing the first defendant to pay the consideration amount with interest at 12% from the date of agreement till the date of payment after deducting rent payable to him by the plaintiff in respect of ⅓ share.

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