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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Proprietary Rights) Act, 1953. Khasra Nos. 918, 1056, 1057, 1799
  • Section 104 of the H.P Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972,
  • section 104 of the H.P Tenancy and Land Reforms Act,
  • H.P Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972.
  • H.P Tenancy and Land Reforms Act.
  • Proprietary Rights), Act, 1952.
  • Proprietary Rights), Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Proprietary Rights) Act, 1953. Khasra Nos. 918, 1056, 1057, 1799
  • Section 104 of the H.P Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972,
  • section 104 of the H.P Tenancy and Land Reforms Act,
  • H.P Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972.
  • H.P Tenancy and Land Reforms Act.
  • Proprietary Rights), Act, 1952.
  • Proprietary Rights), Act
Smart Summary

Summary of Opinion delivered by Kuldip Singh, Judge

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal challenges the judgment dated 21.3.1996 of the learned Additional District Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala (camp at Una) in Civil Appeal No. 79/91 which had set aside the trial court's judgment and decree dated 2.8.1991 (learned Sub Judge Ist Class (I), Una) and directed that the plaint be returned for presentation in a proper court having jurisdiction.

The appellant had originally filed a suit for declaration and consequential reliefs that he, along with proforma respondent No. 2, were owners-in-possession of specified land (7 Kanals 8 Marlas; khewat No.103 min; khatauni No.243; khasra Nos. 192, 918, 1056, 1057, 1799) in village Kotla-Kalan, Tehsil and District Una. The plaint alleged that entries in the revenue record showing a person named Bhajna as tenant were illegal and that Bhajna had no right, title or interest in the suit land. The appellant sought permanent injunction against Bhajna and alternatively a decree for possession.

The defence (filed by Bhajna) alleged that Budhu (a predecessor) had been a tenant (occupancy for khasra No.192 and non-occupancy for other khasras), that Budhu adopted Bhajna (registered adoption deed dated 30.1.1953) and executed a gift deed (dated 15.5.1959) in Bhajna's favour; that mutation(s) in revenue records were attested/sanctioned in Bhajna's favour; and that Bhajna succeeded to tenancy rights and proprietary rights under relevant tenancy/land-reform statutes. Bhajna accordingly prayed for dismissal of the suit.

The trial court framed six issues (listed in the record). The opinion records the following result of trial: "Issues No. 1, 2, 3 and 5 were answered in negative and issue No. 3 in affirmative." (As recorded in the opinion.) The trial court held issue No.4 to be infructuous in view of its finding on issue No.1 and dismissed the suit on 2.8.1991.

On first appeal the learned lower appellate court held that the civil court had no jurisdiction to try the case, set aside the trial court's judgement and decree dated 2.8.1991 and ordered that the plaint be returned for presentation in a proper court having jurisdiction. That order of the lower appellate court (dated 21.3.1996) is the subject of the present second appeal.

Subsequent procedural developments recorded in this appeal: Bhajna (original respondent) died and legal representatives were directed to be brought on record by order dated 3.6.1999; certain legal representatives later died and, as per directions dated 27.8.2008 and subsequent registry report, the appeal against respondents No.1(a), 1(d) and 1(e) stood abated.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the principles of Chuniya Devi v. Jindu are applicable in the present case or not?
  2. Whether the Civil Court's jurisdiction was ousted wrongly?
  3. Whether by way of gift deed tenancy rights can be given to the donee?
  4. Whether oral and documentary evidence was misread and misinterpreted?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The lower appellate court erred in returning the plaint on jurisdictional grounds; the order returning the plaint was wrong.
  • Jurisdiction of the civil court must be determined from averments in the plaint and not from pleas taken in the written statement/defence.
  • The appellant had not admitted in the plaint that Bhajna was a tenant under him on the suit land; therefore the Chuhniya (Chuniya) Devi precedent was wrongly applied by the lower appellate court.

Respondents' Arguments (Respondents No.1(b) and 1(c))

  • Budhu had been shown in possession of khasra No.192 as an occupancy tenant and of the remaining suit land as a non-occupancy tenant paying rent; Budhu became owner of certain land on the coming into force of the Punjab Occupancy Tenant (Vesting of Proprietary Rights) Act.
  • After Budhu's death, Bhajna (as adopted son) succeeded to Budhu's ownership and tenancy land; mutations of ownership in revenue records had been attested in favour of Bhajna.
  • Possession of Bhajna on non-occupancy land had ripened into ownership under the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972.
  • On these bases the learned lower appellate court correctly held that the civil court lacked jurisdiction to try the matter and its judgement and decree should be upheld.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Chuhniya (Chuniya) Devi v. Jindu Ram, 1991 (2) SLJ 1082 (Full Bench) Stated that the civil court has no jurisdiction to go into questions connected with the conferment of proprietary rights under section 104 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972, except where statutory authorities did not act in conformity with fundamental principles of judicial procedure or provisions of the Act were not complied with. The lower appellate court relied on this Full Bench principle to conclude that the civil court had no jurisdiction and to order return of the plaint. The High Court in the present opinion held that the lower appellate court wrongly applied Chuhniya Devi in the facts of this case because jurisdiction must be ascertained from the plaint's averments and the appellant had not pleaded Bhajna to be a tenant nor challenged any statutory conferment of proprietary rights.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The High Court examined the lower appellate court's reliance on the Full Bench decision in Chuhniya Devi. The Full Bench had held that civil courts generally have no jurisdiction to inquire into conferment of proprietary rights under section 104 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972, except in cases of want of compliance with statutory procedure or fundamental principles of judicial procedure.

The court emphasized the settled rule that a civil court's jurisdiction is to be determined from the averments contained in the plaint, not from the defence raised in the written statement. Applying that principle to the present record, the High Court observed that the appellant had not pleaded that Bhajna was a tenant under him nor had the appellant challenged any order that purportedly conferred proprietary rights in favour of Bhajna under the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972.

Because the lower appellate court had allowed the appeal merely on the jurisdictional point—by applying Chuhniya Devi—and had not considered the merits, the High Court concluded that Chuhniya Devi was inapplicable in the particular facts of this case. The High Court therefore answered substantial questions of law No. 1 and 2 in favour of the appellant.

The High Court expressly refrained from deciding substantial questions of law No. 3 and 4 (concerning whether tenancy rights can be conferred by gift deed and whether oral/documentary evidence was misread). The court stated that it did not wish to decide those points so as not to prejudice either party, and instead remanded the matter to the learned District Judge, Una, for fresh consideration of the appeal in accordance with law.

Procedural developments (death of parties and abatement as recorded by the Registry) were noted and reflected in the parties to the remand.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: APPEAL ALLOWED; JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 21.3.1996 SET ASIDE; MATTER REMANDED TO THE DISTRICT JUDGE, UNA FOR FRESH DECISION.

Direct consequences and directions given by the Court:

  • The impugned judgment and decree of 21.3.1996 (learned Additional District Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala camp at Una in Civil Appeal No.79/91) are set aside.
  • The matter is remanded to the learned District Judge, Una to decide the appeal afresh in accordance with law.
  • The High Court directed the learned District Judge to decide the appeal on or before 31.8.2009, noting the age of the first appeal (filed in 1991).
  • The parties through their counsel were directed to appear before the learned District Judge, Una on 31.3.2009; the record was ordered returned forthwith so as to reach the trial court well before the date fixed.
  • No costs were imposed by the High Court.

Implications for parties and precedent:

  • Substantial questions of law No. 1 and 2 were answered in favour of the appellant (i.e., the High Court found the lower appellate court had erred in returning the plaint on jurisdictional grounds).
  • Substantial questions of law No. 3 and 4 were left undecided by the High Court to avoid prejudicing either party; those issues are to be considered afresh on remand.
  • The direct effect is a remand for fresh consideration of the appeal; the opinion does not purport to create or announce a new broad precedent beyond the application of existing principles (the court applied the settled rule that jurisdiction is determined from the plaint's averments and confined the reach of the Chuhniya Devi authority in the present facts). No further broader legal principle was declared in this opinion beyond that application.

    Joginder Singh v. Smt. Dropti Devi & Ors. S

    Kuldip Singh, Judge.

    This appeal has been directed against the judgement dated 21.3.1996 passed by learned Additional District Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala camp at Una in Civil Appeal No. 79/91 setting-aside the judgement, decree dated 2.8.1991 passed by learned Sub Judge Ist Class (I), Una with a direction to return the plaint to be presented in proper court having jurisdiction to decide the case.

    2. The facts, in brief, are that appellant had filed a suit for declaration to the effect that he alongwith proforma respondent No. 2 are owners in possession of the land measuring 7 Kanals 8 Marlas, khewat No. 103 min, khatauni No. 243, khasra Nos. 192, 918, 1056, 1057, 1799 vide jamabandi 1983-84, situate at village Kotla - Kalan, Tehsil and District Una. The entries of possession as tenant in revenue record in the name of Bhajna are illegal and against the rights of the appellant, consequential relief of permanent injunction was also prayed against Bhajna from interfering in the possession of appellant and respondent No. 2. In the alternative, a decree of possession of the suit land was prayed.

    3. The further case of the appellant is that suit land is owned and possessed by appellant and proforma respondent No. 2. The suit land was earlier in possession of Budhu as tenant, who died issueless about twenty years ago and since then the appellant and proforma respondent No. 2 had been coming in actual physical possession of the suit land. Bhajna had no right, title or interest in the suit land. He was never inducted as tenant by the appellant nor he was admitted to be a tenant. The revenue entries showing Bhajna as tenant under appellant and proforma respondent No. 2 are wrong and illegal.

    4. Bhajna contested the suit by filing a written statement. He has submitted that land under reference alongwith other land is now owned and possessed by him. The appellant and proforma respondent No. 2 have no right or interest in the suit land nor they are in possession of the same. Budhu was in possession of khasra No. 192 measuring 2 Kanals 10 Marlas, as occupancy tenant prior to Punjab Occupancy Tenant (Vesting of Proprietary Rights) Act, 1953. Khasra Nos. 918, 1056, 1057, 1799 prior to consolidation were in possession of said Budhu as non-occupancy tenant on payment of rent. Budhu became owner of khasra No. 82/1 after coming into force Punjab Occupancy Tenant (Vesting of Proprietary Rights), Act and continued in possession as non-occupancy tenant of the remaining land. Budhu adopted Bhajna as his own son vide registered adoption deed dated 30.1.1953 and mutation No. 1652 was attested. Budhu had also executed a gift deed dated 15.5.1959 regarding other property in favour of Bhajna and mutation No. 1543 was sanctioned in favour of Bhajna. On the death of Budhu in the year 1965, Bhajna succeeded to his entire tenancy as male lineal descendant and land comprised in khasra No. 82/1 (khasra No. 192 new) as adopted son. Bhajna had become owner in possession of land comprised in khasra No. 918, 1056, 1057 and 1799 by conferment of proprietary rights under the H.P Tenancy and Land Reforms Act. Bhajna prayed for dismissal of the suit. The appellant filed replication and reiterated his stand which was taken in the plaint. The following issues were framed from the pleadings of the parties.

    1. Whether the plaintiff and defendant No. 2, are owners in possession of the suit land as alleged? OPP.

    2. Whether the plaintiff has no locus-standi to file the suit? OPD

    3. Whether defendant No. 1 is the adopted son of Budhu and he is entitled to succeed to the tenancy right of Budhu in respect of suit land as alleged? OPD.

    4. Whether the defendant No. 1 has become owner by adverse possession of khasra No. 82/1, as alleged? OPD.

    5. Whether the plaintiff has no cause of action? OPD.

    6. Relief.

    Issues No. 1, 2, 3 and 5 were answered in negative and issue No. 3 in affirmative. In view of findings on issue No. 1, the trial court has held that issue No. 4 has become infructuous. The suit was dismissed on 2.8.1991 In appeal the learned lower appellate court has held that civil court has no jurisdiction to try the case, hence the judgement and decree dated 2.8.1991 passed by learned Sub Judge Ist Class, Una were set-aside and plaint was ordered to be returned for presentation in a proper court having jurisdiction to try the case, hence this appeal, which has been admitted on the following substantial questions of law:-

    1. Whether the principles of Chuniya Devi v. Jindu's case are applicable in the present case or not?

    2. Whether the Civil Court's jurisdiction was ousted wrongly?

    3. Whether by way of gift deed tenancy rights can be given to the donee?

    4. Whether oral and documentary evidence was misread and misinterpreted?

    5. I have heard Mr. Baldev Singh, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. N.K Thakur, learned counsel for respondents No. 1(b) and (c) and have gone through the record. It has been submitted on behalf of the appellant that learned lower appellate court has erred in returning the findings that civil court has no jurisdiction to try the suit, the order of returning of plaint is wrong. The jurisdiction to try the suit is to be seen on the basis of averments made in the plaint and not on the basis of defence set up in the written statement. The appellant in the plaint has nowhere admitted Bhajna as tenant under him on the suit land. Chuhniya Devi v. Jindu Ram 1991 (2) SLJ 1082, has been wrongly applied by the leanred lower appellate court. The learned counsel for respondents No. 1(b) and (c) has submitted that Budhu had been continuously shown in possession of khasra No. 192 (new) as occupancy tenant and on the remaining suit land as non-occupancy tenant paying rent. Budhu died in the year 1965, he became owner of the land comprised in khasra No. 82/1 (192 new) under the Punjab Occupancy Tenant (Vesting of Proprietary Rights), Act, 1952. After the death of Budhu, he was succeeded by Bhajna being adopted son, who continued in possession of the ownership and tenancy land of Budhu. The possession of Bhajna on non-occupancy land had ripened into ownership under the H.P Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972. The learned counsel for the respondents No. 1(b) and (c) has submitted that trial court has recorded a finding that mutation of ownership has already been attested in favour of Bhajna. In brief, it has been submitted that learned lower appellate court has committed no wrong in holding that civil court has no jurisdiction to try the suit. The learned counsel for respondents No. 1(b) and (c) has supported the impugned judgement and decree.

    6. Before proceeding further, it is necessary to point out some developments which took place after the filing of second appeal. In the appeal, Bhajna was impleaded as respondent No. 1 and Sansar Chand as proforma respondent. Bhajna died and his legal representatives were ordered to be brought on record vide order dated 3.6.1999 to the following effect:-

    1. (a) Smt. Daropati Devi (mother) |

    (b) Smt. Satya Devi (widow) |

    (c) Sh. Rakesh Kumar (son) |

    (d) Smt. Darshana Devi (daughter) |

    (e) Smt. Soma Devi (daughter) |

    of Late Shri Bhajna son of Babu.

    In the meantime, respondent 1(a) Smt. Daropati Devi had also died. On 27.8.2008 this court granted six weeks time to the appellant to take steps for service of respondents 1(a), 1(d) and 1(e) on payment of costs and stop order was passed. It was clarified that in case steps were not taken and cost is not paid, the appeal shall abate with respect to these respondents. As per report of the Registry, no steps have been taken in terms of order dated 27.8.2008 Therefore, the appeal against respondents No. 1(a), 1(d) and 1(e) stands abated in terms of order dated 27.8.2008

    Substantial questions of law No. 1, 2, 3 and 4.

    7. The substantial questions of law No. 1, 2, 3 and 4 are taken up together. The learned lower appellate court has held that civil court has no jurisdiction to try the suit and in taking this view learned Addl. District Judge has taken help from Chuhniya Devi's case. In Chuhniya Devi's, one of the points for consideration before the Full Bench was to the following effect:-

    “(b) Whether the civil court has jurisdiction, in respect of an order, of conferment of proprietary rights under section 104 of the H.P Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972”

    In paragraph 64 of the judgement, the Full Bench has answered the point as follows:-

    “(b) The civil court has no jurisdiction to go into any question connected with the conferment of proprietary rights under section 104 of the H.P Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972, except in a case where it is found that the statutory authorities envisaged by that Act had not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure or where the provisions of the Act had not been complied with.”

    8. It is settled law that jurisdiction of the civil court is to be seen on the basis of averments made in the plaint and not on the basis of defence set up in the case. In the present case, the appellant has nowhere pleaded that Bhajna was the tenant on the suit land under him nor he has challenged any order conferring the proprietary rights in favour of Bhajna of the suit land under the H.P Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972. Bhajna had, however, taken the plea of tenancy on the suit land. On merits, whether the appellant has proved his case or Bhajna succeeded in establishing his case that has not been considered by the learned lower appellate court. The appeal has been allowed simply on the point of jurisdiction. There is no issue of jurisdiction. The learned lower appellate court has wrongly applied Chuhniya Devi's case, which in my opinion, in the facts and circumstances of the case is not applicable in the present case. In these circumstances, substantial questions of law No. 1 and 2 are decided in favour of the appellant. In view of my findings on substantial questions of law No. 1 & 2, I do not think it proper to decide substantial questions of law No. 3 and 4 so that it may not prejudice the case of either side, inasmuch as, I intend to remand the matter to the learned District Judge, Una to decide the appeal afresh in accordance with law. The substantial questions of law No. 3 and 4, are therefore, disposed of accordingly.

    9. No other point was urged.

    10. As a result of above discussion, the appeal is allowed, the judgement and decree dated 21.3.1996 passed by learned Additional District Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala camp at Una in Civil Appeal No. 79/91, are set-aside and the case is remanded to learned District Judge, Una. The first appeal was originally filed in the year 1991 and, therefore, keeping in view the fact that the matter is very old, the learned District Judge is directed to decide the appeal on or before 31.8.2009 The parties through their counsel are directed to appear before the learned District Judge, Una on 31.3.2009 The record be returned forthwith so as to reach the trial court well before the date fixed. No costs.

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    Joginder Singh v. Smt. Dropti Devi & Ors. S
    (Mar 13, 2009)