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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The Jharkhand State Electricity Board (JSEB or "the Board") is the licensee responsible for electricity supply in Jharkhand. The respondent consumer established an induction furnace unit at Kumardhubi, Dhanbad with a sanctioned load of 2400 KVA and power supply was energized on 03.02.2004 under an executed agreement.

The consumer challenged energy bills for February 2004 to January 2005, contending that Clause 4(c) of the supply agreement required demand charges for the first twelve months to be based on actual consumption recorded in the meter, whereas the Board billed at 100% of the contract demand. The consumer filed a complaint before the Vidyut Upbhokta Shikayat Niwaran Forum (Forum).

The Forum, by order dated 22.11.2006, set aside the impugned bills and directed the Board to serve revised bills for Feb 2004–Jan 2005 based on actual KVA recorded, with adjustments and interest. The Board appealed to the Electricity Ombudsman under Section 42(6) of the Electricity Act, 2003. The Ombudsman dismissed the appeal by order dated 06.06.2007, directing compliance with the Forum's order.

The Board then filed the present writ petition under Article 226 challenging both the Forum and the Ombudsman's orders, seeking quashing of those orders and declaratory reliefs regarding the applicable tariff regime and the proper basis for levying demand charges for induction furnace (HTSS) consumers.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the orders of the Vidyut Upbhokta Shikayat Niwaran Forum dated 22.11.2006 and the Electricity Ombudsman dated 06.06.2007 directing revision of bills for Feb 2004–Jan 2005 on the basis of actual consumption should be quashed.
  2. Whether induction furnace consumers (covered under HTSS tariff) of JSEB are governed by the Induction Furnace Tariff Notification dated 06.04.2000 (published by Bihar Electricity Board and adopted by JSEB), or by the Jharkhand State Electricity Regulatory Commission's Tariff Order effective 01.01.2004, given the contention that the latter does not contain the relevant terms and conditions.
  3. Whether demand charges for induction furnace consumers must be levied from the first day of supply on the basis of actual maximum demand recorded in the meter or 100% of the contract demand, whichever is higher, or whether the first twelve months must be billed on actual monthly maximum demand as per contractual provisions.
  4. Whether the writ petition is maintainable in view of the statutory appellate remedy under Section 111 of the Electricity Act, 2003 (i.e., whether the Board should have pursued the appeal route rather than writ relief).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner (Jharkhand State Electricity Board) — Main Arguments

  • The Ombudsman and the Forum erred in holding that the Induction Furnace Tariff Notification dated 06.04.2000 does not survive the Tariff Order by the Jharkhand State Electricity Regulatory Commission (JSERC) effective 01.01.2004.
  • The Tariff Order 2003-04 contains a saving clause preserving existing terms and conditions of supply (including Induction Furnace provisions), so those terms apply to HTSS consumers.
  • Demand charges for induction furnace consumers are governed by the Special Induction Furnace Tariff (clause cited by petitioner), which provides that demand charges are to be levied on the basis of actual maximum demand recorded in the meter or 100% of contract demand whichever is higher.
  • The Secretary's letter dated 19.12.2005 was written in his individual capacity and is not an order of the Commission under Section 86 of the Electricity Act, 2003; the Secretary is not an adjudicating officer under Section 111.
  • The earlier tariff schedules were before the Commission when framing the 2003-04 tariff, and some terms and conditions were left to be decided later; thus reliance on earlier schedules cannot be disallowed outright.

Respondent (Consumer) — Main Arguments

  • The consumer was billed for Feb 2004–Jan 2005 at 100% of contract demand rather than on actual maximum demand recorded in the meter for the first 12 months, contrary to Clause 4(c) of the Agreement and Clause 15.1(B) of Tariff, 1993, which require first-year billing to be based on actual monthly maximum demand.
  • The Electricity Act, 2003 (effective 10.6.2003) repealed earlier enactments and the Commission's tariff framed thereafter is applicable w.e.f. 01.01.2004; the consumer's connection (03.02.2004) was taken after the JSERC tariff became effective.
  • The Commission's Secretary's letter dated 19.12.2005 (responding to Board's 05.12.2005 letter) clarified that earlier tariff schedules (24.09.1999 and 07.05.2001) were not valid after notification of the Tariff Order 2003-04, and the Board did not challenge that clarification — giving it finality.
  • The Board itself executed HT agreements (29.12.2003 and October 2004) containing Clause 4(b) and 4(c), which expressly provided that maximum demand charges for the first twelve months will be based on actual monthly maximum demand.
  • The Board attempted to get the Commission's approval to change its billing practice, but the Commission rejected the proposal; the Board did not challenge the Commission's position under Section 111 and thus the Commission's stance stands.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
(2006) 9 SCC 233 — H.P. Electricity Regulatory Commission v. H.P. State Electricity Board Where an efficacious statutory remedy (appeal under Section 111) becomes available, parties must approach the Appellate Tribunal; the Tribunal should be invoked when it is functional. The Court relied on this authority to emphasize that when the Appellate Tribunal was functional at the time of filing the writ, the statutory remedy under Section 111 was available and should have been pursued instead of a writ petition.
(2007) 8 SCC 208 An appeal under Section 111 to the Appellate Tribunal is in the nature of a first appeal; the Tribunal must examine all grounds and record reasons on each ground. The Court applied this principle to underline that the Appellate Tribunal is the proper forum to examine and record reasons on the grounds which the Board could have raised, reinforcing that the statutory appellate route was available.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first set out the competing contentions and noted the affidavits and supplementary pleadings filed by both parties, including correspondence between the Board and the Commission (letters dated 05.12.2005, 19.12.2005, 15.07.2008, 20.03.2009 and the Commission's replies).

The Court observed that the Commission, exercising powers under Section 181 of the Electricity Act, 2003, framed the Jharkhand tariff regulations and determined a new tariff by order dated 27.12.2003 effective from 01.01.2004, which bound the Board. The Court emphasized that the Commission alone has the power to determine tariff and that once the tariff order under Section 64 has been passed, the Commission becomes functus officio for that exercise.

The Court analysed the appropriate forums for dispute resolution: Section 86(1)(f) permits the State Commission to adjudicate certain disputes (primarily between licensees and generating companies) but does not encompass individual consumer complaints. For consumer disputes, the forum under Section 42(5) and the Ombudsman under Section 42(6), read with the 2003 Regulations, are proper.

The Court then considered the statutory appellate remedy under Section 111 of the Electricity Act, 2003, describing it as an appeal in the nature of a first appeal. The Court relied on the cited Supreme Court authorities to hold that where the Appellate Tribunal was functional at the time the writ petition was filed, the Board had an efficacious statutory remedy which it ought to have availed itself of instead of approaching the High Court by way of writ.

Despite this, the Court examined the conduct and admitted facts: the Secretary's letter of 19.12.2005 clarified that earlier tariff schedules (24.09.1999 and 07.05.2001) were not applicable after 01.01.2004; the Board did not challenge that letter or the Tariff Order 2003-04 or the Electricity Supply Code Regulations within the available remedies. The Board later sought clarifications in 2008 and 2009, and the Commission reiterated its earlier stand in March 2009.

The Court found that the Board's failure to challenge the Commission's tariff order or the Secretary's clarifying letters over several years meant those positions had attained finality. The Court also noted that a similar order in favour of another induction furnace consumer (Sourya Metals v. JSEB) had been accepted by the Board and not challenged, indicating inconsistent conduct.

Taking these circumstances together — the availability of the appellate remedy, the Board's omission to invoke it, the Commission's clarified and reiterative stance, and the Board's conduct in similar cases — the Court concluded that it would not be appropriate to remit the matter to the Appellate Tribunal at that stage and that the writ petition was devoid of merit and not maintainable.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED — The writ petition under Article 226 was dismissed as being devoid of merit and not maintainable. The dismissal was ordered without any costs.

Implications:

  • The Board is bound by the Tariff Order 2003-04 (effective 01.01.2004) and the relevant schedule thereto as determined by the Commission, and the Board's remedies lay under the statutory appellate regime (Section 111) which it did not pursue.
  • The Secretary's letters clarifying non-applicability of earlier tariff schedules (specifically the letters of 19.12.2005 and reiterations thereafter) were treated as having attained finality because the Board did not challenge them in the appropriate forum.
  • The direct effect on the parties is that the orders of the Forum and the Electricity Ombudsman directing revision of billing for Feb 2004–Jan 2005 on the basis of actual consumption remain effective, and the Board's challenge to those orders in this writ has failed.
  • The opinion did not purport to lay down a novel legal precedent beyond applying existing statutory provisions and Supreme Court authorities regarding the availability of the statutory appellate remedy; no separate, new precedent was announced by this decision.

    The Jharkhand State Electricity Board Petitioner v. M/S Kumardhubi Steels Pvt. Ltd.

    ORDER

    The present writ petition has been preferred for following reliefs:

    a) For quashing/setting aside the order/judgment dated 06.06.2007 passed by the Electricity Ombudsman, Jharkhand in case no. EOJ/02/2007 and the order/Judgment dated 22.11.2006 passed in case no. 43/2006 by Vidyut Upbhokta Shikayat Niwaran Forum (in short VUSN), Jharkhand State Electricity Board (JSEB), Ranchi whereby the petitioner JSEB has been directed to revise the bills of the consumer respondent in relation to demand charges for the first 12 months i.e from February, 2004 to January, 2005 on the basis of the actual consumption recorded in the meter.

    b) For a declaration from this Hon'ble Court that the induction furnace consumers (covered under HTSS Tariff) of JSEB including the respondent are to be governed by the tariff notification dated 6.4.2000 published by Bihar Electricity Board and duly adopted by Jharkhand State Electricity Board, which comprehensively contains the terms and conditions of supply to the Induction Furnace Consumers and the new tariff order published by Jharkhand State Electricity Regulatory Commission (in short to be referred as JSERC) w.e.f 01.1.2004 does not contain the said terms and conditions of supply to the said categories of consumers.

    c) For a further declaration that the demand charges in relation to induction furnace consumers including the respondent are to be levied by the petitioner on the basis of actual maximum demand recorded in the meter or 100% of the contract demand whichever is higher, from the very first day of commencement of supply.

    2. The facts in brief are set out as under:

    The petitioner Jharkhand State Electricity Board (hereinafter referred to as Board) is a deemed licensee cum transmission utility which is engaged in the business of generation, transmission and distribution of electricity to its consumers within the territorial jurisdiction of the State of Jharkhand. The respondent set up its factory at Kumardhubi, Dhanbad for sanctioned load of 2400 KVA and executed agreement with the Board and the power supply was energized on 03.02.2004 as mentioned in the agreement. The respondent consumer filed an application before the Court of Vidyut Upbhokta Shikayat Niwaran Forum (hereinafter referred to as Forum) for quashing the energy bills issued by Board for the period February, 2004 to January, 2005 on the ground that as per the terms of Clause 4(c) of the agreement for supply of electricity, the Board cannot charge more than the actual consumption recorded in the meter whereas the Board raised the energy bill at the rate of 100% of the contract demand which is illegal. It is also prayed to revise the bills from January, 2004 to January, 2005 on the actual KVA recorded for the first 12 months from the date of energisation from February, 2004 till January, 2005.

    3. The learned Forum vide its order dated 22.11.2006 while setting aside the impugned bills directed the Board to serve the revised bill to the petitioner for the aforesaid period on the basis of actual KVA recorded in the meter from February, 2004 to January, 2005 within a period of one month and adjust the excess payment made along with interest. Being dissatisfied with the aforesaid order of the Forum the petitioner Board filed an appeal before the Electricity Ombudsman, Ranchi, Jharkhand under Section 42(6) of the Electricity Act, 2003 challenging the aforesaid order dated 22.11.06 passed by the Forum. The learned Electricity Ombudsman after hearing the parties vide its impugned order dated 6.6.2007 held that there was no merit in the appeal and accordingly dismissed it and directed JSEB to comply with the order of the learned Forum. The present writ petition has been preferred challenging the aforesaid order passed by the learned Forum as well as Electricity Ombudsman, Jharkhand.

    4. The main contention raised by the learned Sr. Counsel Sri V.P Singh, appearing for the petitioner Board is that the learned Ombudsman as well as the learned Forum have committed serious error in holding that the Induction Furnace Tariff Notification dated 6.4.2000 does not survive in view of the Tariff Order issued by Jharkhand State Electricity Regulatory Commission (hereinafter referred to as Commission) w.e.f 1.1.2004 The learned Sr. Counsel further submits that the learned Ombudsman and the Forum failed to appreciate that the Tariff Order 2003-04 published by the Commission contained a saving clause with respect to the terms and conditions of the supply including the Induction Furnace Consumer. He also submits that the consumer being Induction Furnace Unit has to be built as per the provision of Clause (5) of the Special Induction Furnace Tariff dated 6.4.2004 which clearly provide that the demand charges are to be levied on the basis of the actual maximum demand recorded in the meter or 100% of the contract demand whichever is higher. It is also submitted that in the Tariff Order, 2003-04 there are provision for charging demand charges on the basis of minimum of 75% of the contract demand for general HT consumers and 100% of the contract demand for consumers having Induction Furnace. It has further been submitted that the letter by the Secretary to the Commission bearing no. 3.BNP/617 JSERC, dated 19.12.2005 is a letter written by him in his individual capacity and the said letter cannot be termed as an order of the Commission. The said letter of the Secretary to the Commission cannot be said to be an order under Section 86 of the Electricity Act 2003. Moreover, the Secretary to the Commission is not an adjudicating officer within the meaning of Section 111 of the Act. The letter dated 19.12.2005 is in direct conflict and contrary to the Tariff Order 2003-04 published by the Commission as it has been written in the said letter that the Board did not submit its tariff schedule dated 24.9.1999 and 7.5.2001 It is further submitted that paragraphs 3.6, 3.6.1 3.6.2 (Page 117-118) clearly reveals that the said Tariff schedule were before the Commission while considering the Tariff order 2003-04. It is further submitted that the rate/schedule of charges of H.T and Induction furnace Consumers were left out to be decided in future, saying that those terms and conditions needed in-depth for study and analysis.

    5. Sri Ajit Kumar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent consumer in reply submits that the consumer has been billed for the period February, 2004 to January, 2005 against maximum demand KVA as 100% of the contract demand and not on the actual maximum demand recorded in the meter for the first 12 months of power supply energisation. He further submits that as per Clause (4)(c) of the Agreement as well as Clause 15.1(B) of Tariff, 1993 the maximum demand charges for the first 12 months of energisation of power supply for a new connection has to be based on the actual monthly maximum demand recorded in the meter for those months. According to the learned counsel for the respondent the Electricity Act, 2003 has been enacted w.e.f 10.6.2003 which repealed Electricity Act, 1910 and Electricity Supply Act, 1948 and the Commission so constituted was only empowered to frame tariff/conditions of supply with respect to the Board which is now functioning merely as a licensee and once the electricity tariff has been framed by the commission it becomes applicable w.e.f 1.1.2004 He also submits that the electric connection was taken by the respondent consumer on 3.2.2004 i.e much after of the declaration of the electricity tariff by the Commission for the JSEB.

    According to the learned counsel for the respondent there are specific provision in the tariff wherein it is provided that the Board is bound to charge the bills @ Rs. 2.50 per KWH on actual consumption of unit and Rs. 300/- per KVA on actual consumption of maximum demand both subject to a monthly maximum charge of Rs. 400/- per KVA for the full contract demand.

    6. In the aforesaid background, according to the learned counsel for the respondent the reliance upon earlier tariffs dated 24.9.99 or 7.5.2001 cannot be legally permitted and the same is no more valid. He also submits that in this regard an attempt was made by the Board to get the approval to correct their wrong from the Commission and a letter was written on 5.12.05 to which the Commission replied on 19.12.2005 rejecting the proposal of the petitioner. This letter was issued by the Secretary on behalf of the Commission which pointed out that the tariff schedule dated 24.9.99 and 7.5.2001 of BSEB was not valid and cannot be taken cognizance of after the notification of the new Tariff Order, 2003-04. It is further submitted that the petitioners themselves executed a HT agreement with the respondent consumer first on 29.12.2003 and thereafter in October, 2004 and Clause 4(b) & (c) categorically prescribed as under:

    “4(b) For the purpose of this agreement the minimum demand of the consumer for each month shall be largest total amount of Kilovolt amperes (KVA) delivered to the consumer as the point of supply during any consecutive 30 minutes in the month.

    4(c) Maximum demand charges for supply in any month will be based on the maximum KVA demand for the month or 75 percent of the contract demand whichever is higher subject to provision of Clause 13. For the first twelve months' service the maximum demand charges for any month will however, be based on the actual monthly maximum demand for that month.”

    7. It has also been contended that in an another identical order issued by the Commission on 7.2.2006 it has been categorically held that no conditions of the old tariff may apply after the notification of the Tariff Order, 2003-04 and Electricity supply (Code) Regulations. The learned counsel further submits that the Board has adopted double standard and it has not chosen to challenge the aforesaid order of Commission dated 19.12.2005 and 7.2.2006 even though they could have challenged the same under Section 111 of the Electricity Act, 2003 and thus, the view expressed by the two authorities below has attained finality.

    8. I have considered the rival submissions, pleadings and the relevant statutory provisions under the Electricity Act, 2003 and the case laws. It will be relevant to bring on record the submissions made in Rejoinder filed on behalf of the petitioner Board as well as the supplementary counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent consumer during the course of hearing.

    9. In the aforesaid affidavits filed on behalf of the Board and the respondent consumer it has been pointed out that a letter No. 846 dated 5.12.05 was written by the Board to the Secretary of the Commission with regard to the terms and conditions of supply to be applied upon induction (HTSS) furnace consumer, wherein, it has intended to explain its claim for applying the condition of whole tariff upon the HTSS consumers on the basis of Clause 1.4 of the Tariff. The Commission through its Secretary gave a reply on 19.12.2005 clarifying the entire position and specifically pointed out that the earlier tariff schedules cannot be taken cognizance of at this stage after promulgation of tariff order 2003-04 which has become effective and binding. It has also stated in its reply letter that the documents pertaining to tariff schedule of 24th September, 1999 and 7.5.01 were not applicable with effect from 01.01.2004 The Board through its Secretary again wrote a letter after a lapse of 3 years on 15.7.2008 seeking clarification once again regarding the applicability of all the terms and conditions, specially minimum billing on account of the demand charges. When the present matter was part heard another letter dated 20.3.2009 has been written by the Secretary to the Board to the Chairman, of the Commission seeking clarification once again with regard to the terms and conditions of supply of electricity and charging of the demand charges by the licensee to the H.T consumer including HTS and HTSS and in reply the Secretary to the Commission vide its letter dated 21st March, 2009 as directed by the commission reiterated its earlier stand. It further pointed out that its stand was clear and the commission has already filed a counter affidavit in this behalf specifying and clarifying the whole issue.

    10. In exercise of powers conferred by Section 181 of the Electricity Act, 2003, the Commission framed tariff regulations, namely, ‘Jharkhand State Electricity Regulatory Commission (Tariff) Regulations, 2003’. The Commission in its power determined the new tariff to be applicable to the Board by its order dated 27 December, 2003, which was made effective from January 1, 2004 and thus the Board was bound by it. The power is vested with the Commission alone to determine the tariff and once they have clarified it and held that the new tariff schedule of 2003-04 was applicable and if there was any grievance or the Board was aggrieved by the order of Commission the remedy available to the licensee Board was to invoke Section 111 of the Electricity Act, 2003. Even otherwise after passing of the tariff order under Section 64 of the Electricity Act, 2003 the Commission becomes functus officio.

    11. Besides, Section 86(1)(f) of the Electricity Act, 2003 lays down the adjudicatory function of the State Commission which does not encompass within its domain complaints of individual consumers. It only provides that the Commission can adjudicate upon the disputes between the licensees and generating companies and to refer any such dispute for arbitration. This does not include in it an individual consumer. The proper forum provided for resolving consumer dispute is under Section 42(5) and thereafter the ombudsman under Section 42(6) read with the aforesaid 2003 Regulations which has been invoked and complied with in the instant case.

    12. Under Section 111 of the Electricity Act 2003 a statutory appeal is provided and the said appeal is in the nature of 1 appeal and the appellate tribunal is required to examine the entire grounds of appeal and record its reasons on each ground while disposing of the appeal. In (2006) 9 SCC 233 (H.P Electricity Regulatory Commission v. H.P State Electricity Board.) an appeal was preferred by the Commission before the Hon'ble Supreme Court against an interim order passed by the High Court in a Writ Petition rejecting the objection of the appellant to avail of the alternative efficacious remedy of approaching the Appellate Tribunal in terms of Section 111 of the Electricity Act. In that case the High Court had observed that at the time when the writ petition was filed by the respondent, the Tribunal was not constituted and in any case it was not functional. The Hon'ble Supreme Court allowed the appeal and also dismissed the pending Writ Petition before the High Court and directed the respondent to approach the Appellate Tribunal under Section 111 of the Electricity Act, 2003 since by that time the Appellate Tribunal had been constituted and was functional. Again in (2007) 8 SCC 208 the Hon'ble Supreme Court at paragraph 12 held that the appeal under Section 111 before the Appellate Tribunal is in the nature of 1 Appeal. The Tribunal therefore must examine the entire grounds of appeal and record its reasons on each ground while disposing of the appeal.

    13. In the instant case at the time of filing of the writ petition by the Board the Appellate Tribunal was very much functional and the efficacious statutory remedy available was to file an appeal u/s 111 of Electricity Act instead of filing the present writ petition. However, considering the following admitted facts it will not be in the interest of justice at this stage to remit the dispute to the Appellate Tribunal.

    14. The letter by the Secretary to the Commission dated 19.12.2005 was in reply to letter of Board dated 5.12.2005 wherein it was specifically clarified that the documents relating to earlier tariff schedule dated 24.09.1999 and 07.05.2001 were neither valid nor applicable after notification of new Tariff order 2003-04. The Board has till date neither assailed it nor challenged it and the same has thus attained finality. The Board after a lapse of 3 years on 15.07.2008 has again sought the same clarification followed by another letter dated 20.03.2009 which was duly replied by the Secretary to the Commission on 21.03.2009 reiterating its earlier stand as replied on 19.12.2005 Thus, till date the petitioner Board has neither challenged the Tariff order 2003-04 or even the Electricity Supply Code Regulation nor has it challenged the order of the Commission dated 19.12.2005 or 21.03.2009

    15. Be that as it may, even otherwise the Board is bound by the Agreement and the Tariff of 2003-04 and its schedule thereto and in case of any grievance or dispute it could have approached the Appellate Tribunal under Section 111 of the Electricity Act, 2003. The same has not been challenged by the Board even after a lapse of five years.

    16. There is another factor which needs consideration with regard to the double standard and discrimination meted out to the respondent by the petitioner Board. A similar order has been passed in favour of the consumer in Sourya Metals v. JSEB and the Board has accepted the order given by the Court/Forum and has admittedly chosen not to challenge it.

    17. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, the concurrent finding, the stand of the Commission which has not been challenged and the admitted fact that the Board has implemented the order of Forum in identical case of HTSS Induction furnace consumer Sourya Metal, this Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is devoid of any merit and is even otherwise not maintainable and the same is accordingly dismissed without any order as to cost.

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    The Jharkhand State Electricity Board Petitioner v. M/S Kumardhubi Steels Pvt. Ltd.
    (Apr 17, 2009)