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AMICUS AI
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citation codes
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  • sub-section (1) of section 86 of the Himachal Pradesh Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972 (Act No. 8 of 1974)
  • Article 144 of the Limitation Act, 1908. Article 144 of the Limitation Act, 1908
  • Section 104 of the H.P Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred
  • Himachal Pradesh Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972 (Act No. 8 of 1974).
  • Himachal Pradesh Land Revenue Act, 1953 (Act No. 6 of 1954)
  • Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963
  • HP Tenancy and Land Reforms Act,
  • sub-section (8)(a) of Section 104
  • Rule 29 of the Rules,
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • sub-section (1) of section 86 of the Himachal Pradesh Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972 (Act No. 8 of 1974)
  • Article 144 of the Limitation Act, 1908. Article 144 of the Limitation Act, 1908
  • Section 104 of the H.P Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred
  • Himachal Pradesh Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972 (Act No. 8 of 1974).
  • Himachal Pradesh Land Revenue Act, 1953 (Act No. 6 of 1954)
  • Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963
  • HP Tenancy and Land Reforms Act,
  • sub-section (8)(a) of Section 104
  • Rule 29 of the Rules,
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Judgment — Dev Darshan Sud, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs, suing in a representative capacity on behalf of village residents, sought a permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the plaintiffs' possession of a specified parcel of land (25 Bighas 11 Biswas in Khasra No. 503; Jamabandi 1974-75) in Mauja Tood, Tehsil & District Shimla (the "suit land").

Plaintiffs alleged that in July 1980 mutation No. 348 (Ex.DX-1 to Ex.DX-3) attested on 21.6.1980 by the Assistant Collector 2nd Grade conferred proprietary rights on the defendants by deleting plaintiffs' names; they alleged manipulation and that the statutory procedure under the Himachal Pradesh Land Revenue Act, 1953 had not been followed. A specific allegation was made that defendant Kishan Chand (a peon in the Tehsil Office) connived with revenue staff to get his name entered in possession and that the Khasra Girdawari entries were improperly altered.

Defendants denied manipulation and pleaded they were tenants and had become owners by operation of law under the Himachal Pradesh Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972, alternatively asserting they had acquired tenancy/ownership by adverse possession (continuous, open and hostile possession for over 40 years).

The trial Court framed 15 issues, held issues Nos. 1, 2 and 14-A in favour of the plaintiffs and decided multiple issues against the defendants (including issues 11 and 13 concerning induction as tenant and acquisition of tenancy by adverse possession). The suit was decreed as prayed. The appellate Court, on reappraisal, affirmed the findings against the defendants. The defendants filed a second appeal which was admitted on substantial questions of law nos. 1, 3, 4 and 5.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the suit of the plaintiff was within limitation and the defendants-appellants had matured their title through adverse possession?
  2. Whether the oral and documentary evidence have not been considered in its proper prospective especially the statements of DW-2, Smt. Aruna Kapoor, DW-3, Sh. Krishan Chand, DW-4, H.C Shiv Singh, documents Ex.P-3 Jamabandi for the year 1969-70, P-4 Khasra Girdawari, P-5 Khasra Girdawari 1970-75, DW-2.A statements, Ex.DW-4/1 to DW-4/4?
  3. Whether on the basis of Ex.DX-1 to Ex.DX-3, mutation No. 348, the defendants' title stood established thereby debarring the suit seeking relief of injunction?
  4. Whether the civil court had jurisdiction in view of Chunia Devi's case 1991 (1) S.L.C 223?

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' Arguments

  • The plaintiffs and other village residents are recorded as owners in possession of the suit land (Jamabandi entry for 1974-75).
  • The mutations (Ex.DX-1 to Ex.DX-3) attesting proprietary rights to the defendants were obtained without following statutory procedure and/or were the result of suppression and manipulation by the defendants and revenue staff.
  • The mutation was attested by an officer not empowered to confer proprietary rights (Assistant Collector 2nd Grade), rendering the mutation void ab initio.

Defendants' Arguments

  • The defendants were in possession as tenants and, by operation of law under the Himachal Pradesh Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972, became owners.
  • The defendants alternatively claimed title by adverse possession, being in continuous, open and hostile possession for over 40 years.
  • The revenue record and mutation entries reflected the true factual position and the allegations of manipulation were denied as false.
  • On appeal, counsel for the defendants emphasised documentary and oral evidence (Jamabandi Ex.P-3; Khasra Girdawari Ex.P-4 & Ex.P-5; statements Ex.DW-4/1 to Ex.DW-4/4; criminal proceeding statements Ex.DW-2.A; witness evidence of DW-2, DW-3, DW-4) and relied on Supreme Court authorities (e.g., P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy v. Revamma; Des Raj v. Bhagat Ram) to argue that the defendants' possession satisfied the elements of adverse possession.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Besru v. Shibu, 1999 (1) Shim.L.C 343 Mutation passed by an officer without jurisdiction (and where parties were not served) is void ab initio; only Assistant Collector of 1st Grade is competent under Rule 29 to hold inquiry under Section 104. Applied to hold mutation Ex.DX-1 to Ex.DX-3 void because it was attested by Assistant Collector 2nd Grade who did not have competent authority to confer proprietary rights under Section 104; this undermined the defendants' foundational title claim.
Notification No. 1-8/68-Rev.1 (under Section 86(1) of the Act) Confers on Tehsildars the powers exercisable by Assistant Collector of First Grade for purposes of Chapter IX (as per the text of the Notification). The opinion notes the Notification text but treats competence to confer proprietary rights as a jurisdictional matter; notwithstanding the Notification, the Court concluded the impugned proceedings were conducted by an officer not empowered to grant proprietary rights in the particular instance and therefore void.
Pritam Singh v. Krishan Kumar, 1997 (1) Sim.L.C 255; Birbal v. Udhami 1992 (1) Sim.L.C; Shankar v. Rukmani, 2003 (1) Sim.L.C 300 Where proceedings under the Tenancy Act have been conducted without jurisdiction or statutory provisions not complied with, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not ousted. Relied on to answer question No. 5: because the conferment of proprietary rights was challenged as lacking jurisdiction or compliance, the civil court's jurisdiction was not barred.
Chuhniya Devi v. Jindu Ram (Chunia Devi) (citation in text) Discussed in relation to ouster of civil court jurisdiction by the Act; if authorities act in conformity with procedures, the civil court may be barred, subject to exceptions. Used via Rukmani's analysis: civil court is barred only where statutory authorities have complied with Act and procedures; otherwise civil jurisdiction survives. Applied to hold jurisdiction not ousted where statutory procedure was not followed.
P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy v. Revamma, (2007) 6 SCC 59 Elaboration of the concept of adverse possession: open, continuous, hostile possession; importance of limitation statutes; necessity of intent to dispossess (animus possidendi). Cited by defendants' counsel and treated by the Court in its detailed analysis of adverse possession; the Court used the principles to assess whether defendants established adverse possession and concluded they had not.
Des Raj v. Bhagat Ram (Dead) by LRs, (2007) 9 SCC 641 (also cited as 2007 (3) SCALE 371) Cited on points relating to adverse possession and the burden of proof required to establish it. Referred to in the discussion on adverse possession principles; the Court considered such authorities in concluding the defendants failed to prove adverse possession.
Fairweather v. St Marylebone Property Co., 1963 AC 510 Characterisation of adverse possession as a negative/right consequent on the operation of limitation — distinguishing it from a positive right. Quoted in the exposition of adverse possession doctrine to underline that adverse possession operates by barring the paper-owner's right, not by creation of a positive original title.
Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Government of India, (2004) 10 SCC Notion that possession must be peaceful, open and continuous — nec vi, nec clam, nec precario — and the factors to be shown by a claimant of adverse possession. Used to articulate the factual elements required of a claimant of adverse possession; informed the Court's evaluation of the defendants' evidence.
S.M. Karim Alias Tamanna Sabeb v. Mst Bibi Sakina, AIR 1964 SC 1245 Ingredients of adverse possession: adequacy in continuity, publicity and extent; need to show when possession became adverse for limitation. Applied as an authoritative statement of the elements that must be pleaded and proved; the Court found the defendants' pleadings and proof inadequate in this regard.
M. Durai v. Muthu, (2007) 3 SCC 114 Reiterated standards in adverse possession cases (cited alongside S.M. Karim). Referenced to reinforce the settled position on what must be established for adverse possession; formed part of the Court's reasoning that the defendants failed to meet that standard.
Saroop Singh v. Banto, (2005) 8 SCC 330 Starting point of limitation runs from date defendant's possession becomes adverse; animus possidendi is essential. Relied upon to emphasize that unless defendants prove animus possidendi, limitation does not commence; applied to reject defendants' adverse possession plea.
Vasantiben Prahladji Nayak v. Somnath Muljibhai Nayak, (2004) 3 SCC 376 Clarifies that limitation against a paper-owner commences when the defendant's possession becomes adverse. Referenced to support the Court's application of Article 65 of the Limitation Act in assessing defendants' adverse possession claim.
Mohd. Mohd. Ali v. Jagadish Kalita, (2004) 1 SCC 271 On importance of animus possidendi in adverse possession claims. Used to underscore that absence of requisite animus defeats an adverse possession plea; relied upon in concluding against the appellants.
Mohammadbhai Kasambhai Sheikh v. Abdulla Kasambhai Sheikh, (2004) 13 SCC 385 Explains Article 65 of the Limitation Act (re-enactment of Article 144 of Limitation Act, 1908) for suits by heirs in immovable property cases. Referred to in the discussion of limitation and adverse possession; formed part of the background on how limitation runs in property suits.
Mahomedally Tyebally v. Safiabai (1939-40) 67 IA 406 (AIR 1940 PC 215) On succession of heirs and applicability of Article 144 (historical reference to limitation provisions for heir suits). Quoted to provide historical legal context on limitation provisions applicable to suits for possession by heirs and to anchor discussion of Article 65.
T. Anjanappa v. Somalingappa, (2006) 7 SCC 570 Requires adverse possessor to prove who the true owner is; if defendants are unsure who the true owner is, hostile possession and denial of true owner's title cannot arise. Applied to reject adverse possession where defendants had not established the identity of the true owner or requisite hostility/animus.
Govindammal v. R. Perumal Chettiar, (2006) 11 SCC 600 Further authority cited concerning adverse possession principles. Referred to as part of the body of authorities underscoring the standard required to prove adverse possession; relied upon in the Court's adverse possession analysis.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded methodically, addressing the questions admitted for consideration in the following sequence: first question No. 4 (validity/effect of mutation Ex.DX-1 to Ex.DX-3), then question No. 5 (jurisdiction of civil courts), and finally questions No. 1 and 2 (limitation and adverse possession).

On Question No. 4 (Validity of Mutation Ex.DX-1 to Ex.DX-3):

  • The defendants relied on Ex.DX-1 to Ex.DX-3 and Section 104 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act for conferment of proprietary rights.
  • The Court invoked Besru v. Shibu to highlight that only an Assistant Collector of the 1st Grade was competent to hold inquiry under Section 104, and that a mutation attested by an Assistant Collector 2nd Grade is void if the authority lacked jurisdiction or parties were not served in accordance with law.
  • Although a Notification (No. 1-8/68-Rev.1) confers on Tehsildars certain powers of an Assistant Collector of the 1st Grade for Chapter IX purposes, the Court found — on the facts as pleaded and proved — that the impugned proceedings were conducted by an officer not empowered to grant proprietary rights (Assistant Collector 2nd Grade), rendering those proceedings void ab initio.
  • Accordingly, the Court concluded the very foundation of the defendants' ownership claim (the mutation) lacked basis.

On Question No. 5 (Civil Court Jurisdiction):

  • The Court referenced authorities (Pritam Singh v. Krishan Kumar; Birbal v. Udhami; Shankar v. Rukmani) to restate that where proceedings under the Tenancy Act are conducted without jurisdiction or statutory authorities do not comply with procedural requirements, civil courts retain jurisdiction.
  • Rukmani's case was cited for the principle that civil court jurisdiction is ousted only where disputes about landlord-tenant relationship arise during properly conducted proceedings under the Act; where statutory authorities have not complied with fundamental judicial procedure, civil courts are not barred.
  • Because the plaintiffs challenged the validity of the conferment (suppression of facts, incompetent officer, etc.), the Court answered this question against the appellants and held the civil court's jurisdiction was not ousted.

On Questions No. 1 and 2 (Limitation and Adverse Possession):

  • The defendants' counsel urged that documentary and oral evidence (Jamabandi, Khasra Girdawari entries, witness statements) established open, continuous and hostile possession and animus possidendi sufficient to mature title by adverse possession; reliance was placed on Supreme Court authorities (e.g., P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy; Des Raj) explaining adverse possession.
  • The Court undertook a detailed exposition of the legal principles governing adverse possession, drawing on the cited precedents: adverse possession requires proof of continuity, publicity, extent, and crucially animus possidendi (intention to dispossess). It reiterated that adverse possession is a mixed question of fact and law and that limitation begins when possession becomes adverse (Article 65 of the Limitation Act).
  • Turning to the record, the Court found the defendants' pleadings to be insufficiently precise: paragraph 5 of the written statement contained only general and contradictory assertions (claiming both tenancy and adverse possession), which the Court held did not constitute adequate pleadings to establish adverse possession.
  • Materially, DW-3 (Kishan Chand) admitted in evidence that he had no documentary proof (no rent receipts or tenancy instruments) to show a landlord-tenant relationship. Given this admission and the inadequacy of pleadings and proof, the Court concluded the ingredients of adverse possession were not established.
  • The Court also observed the legal point that possession by consent as a tenant is not adverse; the defendants' pleadings themselves were contradictory in attempting to treat consensual tenancy as adverse possession.

On the cumulative assessment of law and fact, the Court found no merit in the appellants' contentions on limitation or adverse possession and upheld the findings of the Courts below that the plaintiffs were entitled to injunctive relief and possession.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal was dismissed. The Court concluded and ordered that the judgment and decree of the Courts below in favour of the plaintiffs be maintained. In the words of the Court: THIS APPEAL IS ACCORDINGLY DISMISSED.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The plaintiffs' decree for a permanent prohibitory injunction and their possession over the suit land, as found by the Courts below, stands affirmed. The defendants' foundational claim to ownership based on mutation Ex.DX-1 to Ex.DX-3 was rejected as void in the circumstances, and their plea of adverse possession and tenancy was found not proved.
  • Jurisdictional consequence: The civil court's jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute was affirmed on the basis that the statutory proceedings conferring proprietary rights were challenged as tainted by lack of jurisdiction and non-compliance with procedural requirements.
  • Precedential scope: The judgment applied and relied upon established precedents concerning (a) competence to confer proprietary rights under Section 104 of the HP Tenancy Act, (b) when civil court jurisdiction is ousted, and (c) the stringent requirements for proving adverse possession. The opinion does not purport to create a new legal principle beyond the application of these authorities to the facts of the case.

Disposition on costs: There shall be no order as to costs.

    Krishan Chand & Others v. Jeet Ram & Another S

    Dev Darshan Sud, J.

    This is the defendants' appeal against the concurrent findings of the two Courts below decreeing the suit of the plaintiffs-respondents granting a decree for permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the appellants-defendants from interfering with the possession of the plaintiffs on land measuring 25 Bighas 11 Biswas in Khasra No. 503, entered in Khewat No. 65 min, Khatauni No. 126 as per Jamabandi for the year 1974-75, situated in Mauja Tood, Pargana Kaimli-Kalan, Tehsil and District Shimla, (hereinafter referred to as the “suit land”).

    The plaintiffs instituted the suit in a representative capacity pleading that they and the other residents of the village are recorded as owners in possession of the suit land. In July, 1980, the plaintiffs were surprised to learn that the Assistant Collector 2nd Grade, Shimla, had attested mutation No. 348 Ex.DX-1 to DX-3 on 21.6.1980 in favour of the defendants by deleting the names of the plaintiffs and others by recording that proprietary rights had been conferred on the defendants. The specific allegation made against the defendants was that Kishan Chand appellant was employed as peon in the Tehsil Office, Shimla and he, in connivance with the Revenue Staff, had got his name entered in possession of about 3 Bighas of land and thereafter the entries in the Khasra Girdavari were changed recording him as non-occupancy tenant although there was no rent being paid by him etc. The plaintiff pleaded that these entries were recorded without authority as there was nothing on the record to show that the procedure prescribed by Himachal Pradesh Land Revenue Act, 1953 (Act No. 6 of 1954) had been followed authorizing such change/alteration.

    The defendants resisted the suit by pleading that they were in possession as tenants of the suit land and are now owners by operation of law i.e The Himachal Pradesh Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972 (Act No. 8 of 1974). A specific plea was raised that they had acquired the right of tenancy and ownership by adverse possession being in continuous, open and hostile possession for the last more than 40 years and that the revenue record only reflected the true and factual position. The allegations of manipulation were denied as false.

    The learned trial Court settled 15 issues. The burden of proof of issues No. 1 and 2 i.e the ownership and possession of the plaintiffs and their entitlement to the injunction was on the plaintiffs and these issues were held in their favour. Issue No. 14-A, as to whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief of possession, was also held in their favour. The onus of the other 12 issues was on the defendants which have been held against them. Two issues, namely, issue Nos. 11 and 13, as to whether the predecessor-in-interest of the defendants was inducted as tenant on the suit land and whether they have acquired tenancy rights by way of adverse possession were decided against them. The suit of the plaintiffs was accordingly decreed as prayed for.

    The defendants-appellants herein, reiterated their defence before the learned appellate Court which negatived the contentions raised after a reappraisal of the evidence and pleadings.

    The defendants are now in second appeal before this Court. This appeal was admitted on substantial questions of law No. 1, 3, 4 and 5 which are:-

    “1. Whether the suit of the plaintiff was within limitation and the defendants-appellants had matured their title through adverse possession?

    3. Whether the oral and documentary evidence have not been considered in its proper prospective especially the statements of DW-2, Smt. Aruna Kapoor, DW-3, Sh. Krishan Chand, DW-4, H.C Shiv Singh, documents Ex.P-3 Jamabandi for the year 1969-70, P-4 Khasra Girdawari, P-5 Khasra Girdawari 1970-75, DW-2.A statements, Ex.DW-4/1 to DW-4/4?

    4. Whether on the basis of Ex.DX-1 to Ex.DX-3, mutation No. 348, the defendants' title stood established thereby debarring the suit seeking relief of injunction?

    5. Whether the civil court had jurisdiction in view of Chunia Devi's case 1991 (1) S.L.C 223?

    Before taking up these questions, question No. 4 may be considered as the first question to be decided.

    Question No. 4:

    Learned counsel has urged that proprietary rights were conferred on the appellants herein in accordance with law and has emphasized that Ex.DX-1 to DX-3 which are the basis and foundation for claiming ownership under Section 104 of the H.P Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’).

    In Besru v. Shibu, 1999 (1) Shim.L.C 343, this Court has held:-

    “10. Admittedly, in the present case no attempt was made by the Assistant Collector 2 Grade to serve the plaintiff in accordance with law. As such, the mutation is void ab initio being violative of the principles of natural justice. It can be held so far another reason that it was not passed by the competent authority. From Rule 29 of the Rules, it is clear that only Assistant Collector of the Ist Grade was the competent Land Reforms Officer to hold inquiry under Section 104 of the Act. It is further fortified by the Notifications dated 27th/29 September, 1995 whereby all the Tehsildars in Himachal Pradesh were conferred with powers of Assistant Collector of Ist Grade for purposes of Chapter X of the Act under which Section 104, pertaining to acquisition of proprietary rights by the tenants, fails. By another Notification of the same date, Tehsildars conferred with the powers of Assistant Collector Ist Grade were appointed Land Reforms Officers for carrying out the purposes of Chapter X of the Act within their respective jurisdiction with immediate effect. So far the present case is concerned, from the perusal of mutation, it is clear that it was attested by the Assistant Collector 2 Grade who had no jurisdiction to do so. Had the plaintiff been served in accordance with law and the competent authority held proper inquiry, the mutation conferring proprietary rights on the defendants would not have been passed in view of the Bar under sub-section (8)(a) of Section 104 of the Act.”

    By Notification No. 1-8/68-Rev.1 issued by the competent Authority under Section 86 of the Act, it is only the Assistant Collector Ist Grade, who is empowered to take-up proceedings of conferment of proprietary rights. Notification reads:-

    “No. 1-8/68-Rev.1- In exercise of the powers vested in him under sub-section (1) of section 86 of the Himachal Pradesh Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972 (Act No. 8 of 1974) and all other powers enabling him in this behalf, the Governor, Himachal Pradesh, is pleased to confer on all the Tehsildars in Himachal Pradesh, all the powers exercisable by an Assistant Collector of First Grade, for the purposes of Chapter IX of the aforesaid Act, within their respective jurisdiction, with immediate effect.”

    It is undisputed that the provision of conferment of proprietary rights by tenants is contained in Chapter-IX of the Act as aforesaid.

    These proceedings are, therefore, void ab initio, having been conducted by an officer who is not empowered to exercise power to grant proprietary rights or to perform any other ancialling act. The very basis set up by the defendants for claiming ownership is, therefore, without any basis. This question would have concluded the entire controversy, however, since the appeal has been admitted on other questions, I am taking them up for consideration.

    Question No. 5:

    This question is answered against the appellants. The jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not ousted as pleaded. The decisions in Pritam Singh v. Krishan Kumar, 1997 (1) Sim.L.C 255, Birbal v. Udhami 1992 (1) Sim.L.C and Shankar v. Rukmani, 2003 (1) Sim.L.C 300 are clear and unequivocal that where the proceedings have been conducted without jurisdiction, where the question of tenancy is disputed, independent of the proceedings under the HP Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, there is no finality to the adjudication of the revenue officials and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not barred.

    In Rukmani's case supra this Court held:-

    “After analyzing the judgment in Chuhniya Devi v. Jindu Ram's case (supra), we have no doubt that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred under the Act if the dispute pertaining to the relationship of landlord and tenant arises during the proceedings of conferment of proprietary rights upon the tenant and resumption of land by the land owner and the order in respect thereof has been passed by the authorities under the Act except in a case where it is found that the statutory authorities envisaged by that Act had not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure or where the provisions of the Act had not been complied with. But if the dispute of landlord and tenant arises independent of the proceedings under the Act, the Civil Court has the jurisdiction.”

    In the present case the very basis and foundation of conferment of proprietary rights has been questioned. The case pleaded by the plaintiffs is one of suppression of facts, exercise of powers by an officer not competent to do so and the very basis of tenancy has been challenged. This question is, therefore, answered against the appellants.

    Questions No. 1 and 2:

    Both these questions are taken up together for consideration. Learned counsel has submitted with ability that the possession of the plaintiffs is established by the record produced in the case. He has drawn my attention to the statements of DW-2, Smt. Aruna Kapoor, who had recorded the evidence of the parties in Criminal Proceedings, DW-3, Shri Kishan Chand and DW-4, HC Shri Shiv Singh. According to him, these statements established the uninterrupted possession of the appellants openly, without any hindrance and as of right. Learned counsel urges that the ingredients of adverse possession i.e nec vi, nec clam, nec precario have been established. He places reliance upon Ex.P-3, Jamabandi for the year 1969-70, Ex.P-4, Khasra Girdawari, Ex.P-5 Khasra Girdawari for the year 1970-75 and statements Ex.DW-4/1 to Ex.DW-4/4, statements in criminal proceedings Ex.DW-2.A and Ex.DW-4/1 to Ex.DW-4/4. In support of his contention he referred to the judgments of the Supreme Court in P.T Munichikkanna Reddy v. Revamma, (2007) 6 SCC 59 and Des Raj v. Bhagat Ram (Dead) by LRs., (2007) 9 SCC 641 in extensor to urge that the title of the plaintiffs-respondents was extinguished.

    In P.T Munichikkanna Reddy's case, the Supreme Court elaborating on the concept of adverse possession held:-

    “CHARACTERIZING ADVERSE POSSESSION -

    5. Adverse possession in one sense is based on the theory or presumption that the owner has abandoned the property to the adverse possessor on the acquiescence of the owner to the hostile acts and claims of the person in possession. It follows that sound qualities of a typical adverse possession lie in it being open, continuous and hostile. [see Downing v. Bird 100 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 1958), Arkansas Commemorative Commission v. City of Little Rock 227 Ark. 1085: 303 S.W 2d 569 (1957); Monnot v. Murphy 207 N.Y 240, 100 N.E 742 (1913); City of Rock Springs v. Sturm 39 Wyo. 494, 273 P. 908, 97 A.L.R 1(1929).]

    6. Efficacy of adverse possession law in most jurisdictions depend on strong limitation statutes by operation of which right to access the court expires through efflux of time. As against rights of the paper-owner, in the context of adverse possession, there evolves a set of competing rights in favour of the adverse possessor who has, for a long period of time, cared for the land, developed it, as against the owner of the property who has ignored the property. Modern statutes of limitation operate, as a rule, not only to cut off one's right to bring an action for the recovery of property that has been in the adverse possession of another for a specified time, but also to vest the possessor with title. The intention of such statutes is not to punish one who neglects to assert rights, but to protect those who have maintained the possession of property for the time specified by the statute under claim of right or colour of title. (See American Jurisprudence, Vol. 3, 2d, p. 81). It is important to keep in mind while studying the American notion of Adverse Possession, especially in the backdrop of limitation statutes, that the intention to dispossess can not be given a complete go by. Simple application of limitation shall not be enough by itself for the success of an adverse possession claim.

    7. To understand the true nature of adverse possession, Fairweather v. St Marylebone Property Co. 1963 AC 510, [1962] 2 WLR 1020: [1962] 2 All ER 288 can be considered where House of Lords referring to Taylor v. Twinberrow [1930] 2 K.B 16 termed adverse possession as a negative and consequential right effected only because somebody else's positive right to access the court is barred by operation of law: (Fairweather case 1963 AC 510, (1962) WLR 1020, (1962)2 ALL ER 288, ALL ER pp. 291 G-292 C) … … … … … … … … … …”

    8. Therefore, to assess a claim of adverse possession, two-pronged enquiry is required:

    1. Application of limitation provision thereby jurisprudentially “willful neglect” element on part of the owner established. Successful application in this regard distances the title of the land from the paper-owner.

    2. Specific Positive intention to dispossess on the part of the adverse possessor effectively shifts the title already distanced from the paper owner, to the adverse possessor. Right thereby accrues in favour of adverse possessor as intent to dispossess is an express statement of urgency and intention in the upkeep of the property.

    11. This brings us to the issue of mental element in adverse possession cases-intention. 1. Positive Intention

    13. At this juncture, it would be in the fitness of circumstances to discuss intention to dispossess vis-a-vis intention to possess. This distinction can be marked very distinctively in the present circumstances.

    14. Importantly, intention to possess can not be substituted for intention to dispossess which is essential to prove adverse possession. The factum of possession in the instant case only goes on to objectively indicate intention to possess the land. As also has been noted by the High Court, if the appellant has purchased the land without the knowledge of earlier sale, then in that case the intention element is not of the variety and degree which is required for adverse possession to materialize.

    22.A peaceful, open and continuous possession as engraved in the maxim nec vi, nec clam, nec precario has been noticed by this Court in Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Government of India (2004) 10 SCC in the following terms: (SCC p. 785 para 779).

    “Physical fact of exclusive possession and the animus possidendi to hold as owner in exclusion to the actual owner are the most important factors that are to be accounted in cases of this nature. Plea of adverse possession is not a pure question of law but a blended one of fact and law. Therefore, a person who claims adverse possession should show: (a) on what date he came into possession, (b) what was the nature of his possession, (c) whether the factum of possession was known to the other party, (d) how long his possession has continued, and (e) his possession was open and undisturbed. A person pleading adverse possession has no equities in his favour. Since he is trying to defeat the rights of the true owner, it is for him to clearly plead and establish all facts necessary to establish his adverse possession”.

    34. … … … … … The ingredients of adverse possession have succinctly been stated by this Court in S.M Karim Alias Tamanna Sabeb v. Mst Bibi Sakina . (AIR 64 SC 1245) in the following terms: (AIR p. 1256, para 5).

    “Adverse possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and extent and a plea is required at the least to show when possession becomes adverse so that the starting point of limitation against the party affected can be found. [See also M. Durai v. Muthu (2007) 3 SCC 114].

    35. The aforementioned principle has been reiterated by this Court in Saroop Singh v. Banto (2005) 8 SCC 330, stating: (SCC p. 340, paras 29-30).

    “29. In terms of Article 65 the starting point of limitation does not commence from the date when the right of ownership arises to the plaintiff but commences from the date the defendants possession becomes adverse. (See Vasantiben Prahladji Nayak v. Somnath Muljibhai Nayak, (2004) 3 SCC 376).

    30. Animus possidendi is one of the ingredients of adverse possession. Unless the person possessing the land has a requisite animus the period for prescription does not commence. As in the instant case, the appellant categorically states that his possession is not adverse as that of true owner, the logical corollary is that he did not have the requisite animus. (See Mohd. Mohd. Ali v. Jagadish Kalita, (2004) 1 SCC 271)(SCC para 21.)”

    36. In Mohammadbhai Kasambhai Sheikh v. Abdulla Kasambhai Sheikh (2004) 13 SCC 385, this Court held: (SCC p. 386, para 4)

    “But as has been held in Mahomedally Tyebally v. Safiabai, (1939-40)67 IA 406, AIR 1940 PC 215 the heirs of Mohammedans (which the parties before us are) succeed to the estate in specific shares as tenants-in-common and a suit by an heir for his/her share was governed, as regards immovable property, by Article 144 of the Limitation Act, 1908. Article 144 of the Limitation Act, 1908 has been materially re-enacted as Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and provides that the suit for possession of immovable property or any interest therein based on title must be filed within a period of 12 years from the date when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff. Therefore, unless the defendant raises the defence of adverse possession to a claim for a share by an heir to ancestral property, he cannot also raise an issue relating to the limitation of the plaintiffs claim.”

    37. The question has been considered at some length recently in T. Anjanappa v. Somalingappa (2006) 7 SCC 570, wherein it was opined:(SCC p. 577, para 21).

    “21. The High Court has erred in holding that even if the defendants claim adverse possession, they do not have to prove who is the true owner and even if they had believed that the Government was the true owner and not the plaintiffs, the same was inconsequential. Obviously, the requirements of proving adverse possession have not been established. If the defendants are not sure who is the true owner the question of their being in hostile possession and the question of denying title of the true owner do not arise. Above being the position the High Court's judgment is clearly unsustainable.”

    [see also Des Raj v. Bhagat Ram (Dead) By LRs. 2007 (3) SCALE 371; Govindammal v. R. Perumal Chettiar (2006) 11 SCC 600]”

    Learned counsel has emphasized in detail that the evidence on record, more especially of the witnesses as noticed above, coupled with the statement of the defendants and the revenue record, clearly establishes the animus possidendi and the intention to oust the plaintiff from possession. He submits that this possession was adequate in time, open, and peaceful to the knowledge of the plaintiff and without any hindrance and therefore the defendants were entitled to ownership rights,

    I cannot persuade myself to hold that the ingredients of adverse possession are established. From the evidence on record and after detailed consideration of these documents, the learned Courts below have negatived the contentions of the defendants. Even otherwise from the pleadings I find that the pleadings are not precise and the only allegations made for establishing adverse possession are in paragraph-5 of the written statement which reads:-

    “5. Paras 4 to 7 of the plaint as stated are absolutely wrong and are emphatically denied. It is denied that the defendants were not in possession of the property as tenants. In facts the defendants have been in possession of the property since the time of their father of the entire land. Previously they were in possession of the property as tenants and now as owners. The defendants had, in any event, acquired the right of tenancy or in any event, ownership, by adverse possession being in continuous, open and hostile possession as tenants or in the alternative as owners for the last 40 years. It is denied that the entries were fraudulently obtained or factually wrong. It is further denied that the order of the Asstt. Collector Similar Land Reforms Officer are void and without jurisdiction. It is further denied that the defendants have threatened to interfere with the possession of the property. So the question of extending threats to the plaintiffs does not arise. The plaintiffs have made false and incorrect statements and are not entitled to the relief claimed.”

    These are no pleadings in the eyes of law to establish adverse possession. The case can be looked at from another perspective. DW-3 Kishan Chand, who appeared in the witness box, has categorically admitted in evidence that he has no proof with him to show the relationship between landlord and tenant that is to say he could not produce any document or receipt to show that he was either paying rent or that any tenancy was created. In this view of the admission, I do not find any merit in the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for the appellants. Both these questions are, therefore, decided against the appellants. I hold that there is no evidence to show that the possessory rights of the appellants or their predecessor-in-interest over the suit land was by way of tenancy or that their possession has actually matured into adverse possession, as pleaded which pleadings in any event are contradictory because possession of tenancy is not adverse but consensual. These questions are answered against the plaintiff.

    This appeal is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.

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