AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 read with Section 151 C.P.C
  • H.P Tenancy and Land Reforms Act.
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 read with Section 151 C.P.C
  • H.P Tenancy and Land Reforms Act.
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary: Kuldip Singh, Judge — 5 April 2010

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner (plaintiff) filed a suit seeking permanent prohibitory and mandatory injunction concerning a parcel of land described in the plaint, alleging the land was un-partitioned between the parties and located on the right side of National Highway (NH) 21. The petitioner stated that his father, Devi Ram, was recorded as a non-occupancy tenant along with the respondents; Devi Ram died on 23.10.2005 and the petitioner asserted he is the sole legal heir by a Will dated 23.12.2000. Devi Ram and the respondents were said to have become owners under the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act. The petitioner had constructed his house on the suit land and used adjacent areas as courtyard and passage. The respondents allegedly started digging on the suit land on 11.11.2008 without permission, whereupon the suit was instituted.

The respondents contested the suit by filing a written statement raising, inter alia, a preliminary objection that the petitioner was not entitled to the equitable relief of injunction because the petitioner himself had raised construction on a valuable roadside portion of the suit land, allegedly in violation of a prior decree in Civil Suit No. 205/83 (Narain Dass & others v. Devi Ram & others). They pleaded that the parties occupied separate parcels under a family arrangement, asserted the petitioner already occupied the best portion (including khasra No. 376), and contended the respondents' construction was on a parcel away from NH-21, leaving two karm spaces between the houses; they further said construction began with the petitioner's consent and the plinth was completed before the suit, alleging the suit was filed to harass them.

The petitioner applied for interim relief under Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 read with Section 151 C.P.C. The Civil Judge (Junior Division) ordered status quo on 25.11.2008 and repeated that order on 17.1.2009, and on 4.3.2009 restrained the respondents from raising any further construction until adjudication on merits. The respondents appealed; the District Judge, Mandi allowed the appeal on 29.5.2009, holding the petitioner had not shown all ingredients for temporary injunction. The petitioner filed the present revision against the District Judge's judgment dated 29.5.2009.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, as a matter of interim relief law, a co-owner can be restrained from raising construction on joint land until partition — i.e., whether one co-owner may raise construction on joint land without consent of other co-owners pending partition or adjudication.
  2. Whether the petitioner had established the necessary ingredients for interim injunction under Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 C.P.C. — namely prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable loss — to restrain the respondents from further construction.
  3. Whether the District Judge's allowance of the respondents' appeal (thereby vacating the temporary restraint) involved any jurisdictional error or misappreciation of material warranting interference in revision.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The parties are joint owners of the suit land and it is a settled principle that a co-owner cannot raise construction on joint land without consent of other co-owners until the land is partitioned.
  • The learned Civil Judge correctly appreciated the record and was justified in granting interim relief under Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 read with Section 151 C.P.C.; the District Judge erred in allowing the appeal.
  • The petitioner sought reinstatement of the Civil Judge's interim order to restrain the respondents from further construction in the interest of justice.
  • Relied on precedents (as cited in the record) to support the proposition that construction on joint land may be restrained pending suit disposal (notably Nagesh Kumar v. Kewal Krishan; Harish Chander Verma; Parduman Singh).

Respondents' Arguments

  • The absolute proposition that a co-owner can never raise construction on joint land is not correct; in this case the parties are in separate possession under a family arrangement.
  • The petitioner had already constructed his house and therefore equitable interim relief restraining the respondents from building is not appropriate.
  • The respondents had already raised construction to an advanced stage (plinth and slab in place) and only finishing works remained; they also intended minor protective works for rain prevention.
  • The District Judge, after due appreciation of the material, rightly allowed the appeal; the petitioner failed to demonstrate any jurisdictional error to justify interference in revision. Prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable loss lay in respondents' favour.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Nagesh Kumar v. Kewal Krishan — AIR 2000 H.P. 116 Supported the proposition that where land is found to be joint, a defendant may be restrained from raising construction on the suit land until disposal of the suit. The petitioner relied on this decision to argue restraint should issue; the court noted this authority as supporting the petitioner's position but resolved the revision on the record facts (separate possession/arrangement) rather than adopting an absolute rule.
Harish Chander Verma v. Kayastha Pathshala Trust & Ors — JT 1988 (1) S.C. 625 Holds that on the face of a decree for permanent prohibitory injunction, it is not appropriate for an appellate court to permit acts which would nullify the decree before disposal of the appeal. The petitioner invoked this Supreme Court authority to argue against permitting construction that could nullify injunctive rights; the court observed that in the present case there was no decree of permanent prohibitory injunction, distinguishing the factual matrix of Harish Chander Verma.
Parduman Singh & another v. Narain Singh & another — 1991 (2) S.L.C. 215 Emphasized the importance of a prima facie case that the land is joint and that defendants have no right to construct to the plaintiff's disadvantage; noted appellate considerations where undertakings were given about demolition if construction was beyond share. The petitioner relied on this case; the court recorded the decision but noted that Parduman Singh did not decide whether a co-sharer in exclusive possession by consent may raise construction on that portion, and therefore that question remained open.
Sant Ram Nagina Ram v. Daya Ram Nagina Ram — AIR 1961 Punjab 528 Where a co-owner is in possession of separate parcels under an arrangement consented to by other co-owners, the arrangement cannot be disturbed by others except by a suit for partition. The court relied on this principle to support the proposition (advanced by respondents) that possession under family arrangement limits interference absent partition, and treated the pleaded family arrangement as material in assessing interim relief.
Managing Director (MIG) Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. v. Ajit Prasad Tarway — AIR 1973 SC 76 Affirms that the scope of revision is limited; guides appellate/revisional interference standards. The court cited this authority to reiterate the limited scope of revision proceedings and to support the view that interference was not warranted because the District Judge's view emerged from the material on record.
Narain Dass and others v. Devi Ram and others — (Civil Suit No. 205/83, decided 27.8.1988) Referenced as a prior decree relevant to respondents' contention that the petitioner had violated an earlier order by constructing towards the roadside. The respondents relied on this earlier decree to allege that the petitioner was estopped from seeking relief; the court noted the respondents' reliance but did not base its final decision solely on that decree in the revision.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court reviewed the record and the oral submissions. Key steps in the reasoning were:

  1. Examination of pleadings and material: The respondents had specifically pleaded that the parties occupied separate parcels under a family arrangement and that the petitioner had already constructed his house on the joint land. The respondents placed photographs on the revision file showing the respondents' under-construction house and a gap between the two houses; the respondents' construction had progressed to the stage where the slab had been placed.
  2. Assessment of pleadings and replication: The court noted that the respondents' assertion of separate possession under family arrangement was not denied by the petitioner by way of replication on the file.
  3. Evaluation of the legal propositions relied upon: While acknowledging the petitioner's submission of settled law that a co-owner cannot raise construction on joint land without consent until partition, the court recognized that this proposition is not absolute and must be applied in light of factual circumstances such as separate possession by family arrangement.
  4. Application of interim injunction principles: The court applied the classic triad for interim relief — prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable loss — and concluded that, on the material presented, the respondents had established these factors in their favour at the interim stage.
  5. Scope of revision: Relying on the authority cited (Managing Director HAL v. Ajit Prasad Tarway), the court emphasized the limited scope of revision and found no jurisdictional error or misappreciation of material warranting interference with the District Judge's conclusion.
  6. Conclusion from facts: Given the respondents' plea of family arrangement, the petitioner's construction of a better portion, the photographs showing distance between constructions, the absence of a replication denying separate possession, and the fact that respondents had progressed construction, the court held that the District Judge's allowance of appeal (setting aside the interim restraint) was supportable on the record.

Holding and Implications

Revision dismissed.

Consequences and immediate effects:

  • The revision petition was dismissed and the impugned judgment of the District Judge dated 29.5.2009 was upheld for the purposes of this interim stage challenge.
  • The court clarified that the observations in the judgment were limited to disposal of the revision at the interim relief stage and shall not be treated as an expression of opinion on the merits of the underlying suit. The trial court (court below) is directed to decide the suit on merits strictly in accordance with law.
  • The record of the court below was ordered to be sent back immediately; the parties (through counsel) were directed to appear before the trial court on 26.4.2010.
  • Interim order dated 26.6.2009 was vacated. The court awarded no costs.
  • No new precedent was laid down; the decision resolves only the revision on the basis of the material available at the interim stage and preserves the parties' rights to litigate the substantive issues in the trial court.

Judge: Kuldip Singh — Judgment dated 5 April 2010. The summary above is drawn exclusively from the provided opinion and does not add facts or inferences beyond the text of that opinion.

    Payar Singh Petitioner v. Narayan Dass And Others S

    Kuldip Singh, Judge

    The plaintiff has come in revision against judgment dated 29.5.2009 passed by the learned District Judge, Mandi in Civil Misc. Application No. 11 of 2009 allowing the appeal against the order dated 4.3.2009 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) Court No. II, Sundernagar in CMA No. 169 of 2008.

    2. The facts, in brief, are that the petitioner has filed a suit for permanent prohibitory and mandatory injunction against the respondents regarding the land more specifically described in the plaint. It is the case of the petitioner that suit land is un-partitioned between the parties and the same is situated on the right side of the National Highway (NH) 21.

    3. The further case of the petitioner is that his father Devi Ram was entered as a non occupancy tenant alongwith the respondents of the suit land, Devi Ram had died on 23.10.2005 and petitioner is the only legal heir of late Devi Ram on the basis of Will dated 23.12.2000 of Devi Ram. Devi Ram and respondents became owners under the H.P Tenancy and Land Reforms Act. The suit land is a valuable piece of land, a co-owner should not be allowed to raise construction till the suit land is partitioned. The petitioner has constructed his house over suit land and vacant portion is being used as courtyard and for other functions such as marriage ceremonies etc. The petitioner is also using the suit land as a passage. The respondents started digging on the suit land on 11.11.2008 without the permission of the petitioner and other persons and in these circumstances, the suit was filed.

    4. The suit was contested by the respondents by filing a written statement in which preliminary objection has been taken that the petitioner is not entitled to discretionary and equitable relief of injunction as he himself has raised construction on a valuable portion of the suit land towards the road side front in gross violation of the decree passed in Civil Suit No. 205/83 decided on 27.8.1988 titled as Narain Dass and others v. Devi Ram and others. The petitioner is thus estopped from his own acts and conduct to file the suit. On merits, it has been submitted that parties are in separate possession under family arrangement. The petitioner has already occupied the best and valuable portion of the suit land including land comprised in khasra No. 376. The respondents are raising construction on a parcel of the suit land which is away from N.H.21 after leaving two karm space between the house of the petitioner. The petitioner can be adequately compensated at the time of the partition. The courtyard of the petitioner is towards the front and no construction is being raised on the front side of the house of the petitioner. The house of the petitioner is on khasra No. 374/1 and the proposed construction of the respondents is on Khasra No. 374/3. The construction was started by the respondents with the consent of the petitioner and prior to the institution of the suit they had completed the plinth level. The suit has been filed to harass the respondents.

    5. The petitioner has filed an application under Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 read with Section 151 C.P.C On 25.11.2008, the learned Civil Judge ordered status quo as to the nature and possession of the suit land. The same order was repeated on 17.1.2009 On 4.3.2009, the learned Civil Judge allowed the application and restrained the respondents from raising any further construction over the suit land till the conflicting interests of the parties are not adjudicated by the Court on merit. The decision dated 4.3.2009 was assailed in appeal which was accepted by the learned District Judge on 29.5.2009 and held that the petitioner has not been able to make out all ingredients to grant temporary injunction. The petitioner has thus filed the present revision against the judgment dated 29.5.2009

    6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the record. Mr. Ashok Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that it has been established on record that parties are joint and it is settled proposition of law that one co-owner cannot raise construction on the joint land without the consent of other co-owners till the land is partitioned. The learned Civil Judge has rightly appreciated the material on record and allowed the application under Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 read with Section 151 C.P.C filed by the petitioner. But the learned District Judge, has not properly appreciated the legal position with respect to joint land and has erred in allowing the appeal of the respondents vide impugned judgment dated 29.5.2009 He has submitted that it is in the interest of justice that the respondents may be restrained from raising further construction on the suit land.

    7. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents has supported the impugned judgment. He has submitted that proposition that under no circumstance, a co-owner can raise construction on the joint land is not absolute. In the present case, the parties are in separate possession under family arrangement. The petitioner has already constructed his house. The equitable relief of injunction is not available to petitioner in interim form so as to restrain the respondents to raise construction on the suit land. It has been submitted that respondents have already raised the construction and even the slab has been put on the under construction house. He has submitted that only finishing by way of plastering inside and outside the walls, putting fixtures in the already constructed house are left. The respondents also intend to raise suitable protection over the stairs opening on the roof of the already constructed house so as to prevent flow of rain water inside the house. The learned counsel for the respondents has also submitted that the learned District Judge after due appreciation of material on record has allowed the appeal. The petitioner has failed to make out a case of jurisdictional error committed by the learned District Judge, therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to interim relief in revision. He has ultimately submitted that prima-facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss are in favour of the respondents.

    8. The learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently stressed that since the suit land is joint, therefore, the petitioner is entitled to interim injunction. He has relied Nagesh Kumar… v. Kewal Krishan…. AIR 2000 H.P 116. In that case, the High Court did not accept the contention of the defendant that he has purchased a specific portion of the suit land. The suit land was otherwise found joint land and, therefore, restrained the defendant from raising construction over the suit land till the disposal of the suit.

    9. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied Harish Chander Verma v. Kayastha Pathshala Trust and Ors. JT 1988 (1) S.C 625. In that case, a decree of permanent prohibitory injunction was passed and in appeal against the decree, the High Court had permitted the defendant/respondent to raise construction subject to condition that in the event of the decree being affirmed the construction shall be pulled down. The Supreme Court has held that on the face of a decree for permanent injunction, it is not appropriate for the appellate court to allow it to be nullified before the appeal is disposed of. In the present case, there is no decree of permanent prohibitory injunction against respondents.

    10. Parduman Singh and another v. Narain Singh and another 1991 (2) S.L.C 215 has also been relied by the learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his contention. In that case the District Judge has disposed of the appeal on the concession of the learned counsel for the parties. The learned counsel for the respondent/defendant had undertaken that in case it was ultimately found that the suit on which the defendant/appellant were raising construction was in excess of their share in the land along National Highway, they would demolish the structure in excess of their share. It was held the most important factor is prima-facie case that the land in dispute is joint between the parties and the defendants have no right to make construction over it to the disadvantage of the plaintiff. The High Court has held that it is not proper for the court to confirm the judgment in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Harish Chander Verma (Supra). In Parduman Singh (supra) the question whether a co-sharer who is in exclusive possession on joint land to the extent of his share with the consent of other co-sharers is entitled to raise construction or not on that portion of the land was not decided by the Court.

    11. In Sant Ram Nagina Ram v. Daya Ram Nagina Ram AIR 1961 Punjab 528, it has been held that where a co-owner is in possession of separate parcels under an arrangement consented to by the other co-owners, it is not open to anyone to disturb the arrangement without the consent of others except by filing of a suit for partition.

    12. The respondents in the written statement have specifically pleaded that parties are in separate possession under family arrangement. The petitioner has also constructed his house on the joint land. It is not the stand of the petitioner that respondents are raising construction on an area which is more than their share. The case of the respondents is that petitioner has constructed his house on a better portion of the land. The under construction house of the respondents is away from the National Highway 21 whereas the house of the petitioner abuts N.H 21. The respondents have placed on record on the file of revision photographs of under construction house of the respondents. The photographs indicate sufficient gap between the already constructed house of petitioner and under construction house of the respondents over which even slab has been placed. It is the case of the respondents in written statement that they are in separate possession of the land in family arrangement. This fact has not been denied by filing replication. The respondents are claiming possession over the suit land under family arrangement i.e with the consent of the petitioner over which they are raising construction. The respondents have thus established prima facie case, balance of convenience, irreparable loss in their favour. In these circumstances, no fault can be found with the impugned judgment. In revision the scope is limited as held in The Managing Director (MIG) Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. Balanagar, Hyderabad and another v. Ajit Prasad Tarway, Manager (Purchase and Stores) Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. Balanagar, Hyderabad, AIR 1973 SC 76. The suit is for permanent prohibitory and mandatory injunction. The rights of the parties will be decided in the suit. It has not been established that the view taken by the learned District Judge does not emerge from the material on record.

    13. No other point was urged.

    14. The result of the above discussion, revision fails and is accordingly dismissed. The observations made in the judgment are for the disposal of the revision petition only at the interim relief stage and shall not be construed as expression of opinion on the merits of the case and the court below shall decide the suit on merits strictly in accordance with law. The record of the court below be sent back immediately. The parties through their counsel are directed to appear in the trial Court on 26.4.2010. Interim order dated 26.6.2009 stands vacated. No costs.

    April 5, 2010. (Kuldip Singh)

    (GR) Judge.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Payar Singh Petitioner v. Narayan Dass And Others S
    (Apr 5, 2010)