AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Judges
Acts
  • SECTION 29 LIMITATION ACT 1963
  • LIMITATION ACT 1908
  • LIMITATION ACT 1963
  • U/s 32(1) of A.P (T.A) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act,
  • provisions of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2),
  • Control Act, 1947
  • Section 40 of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 (for short the Act)
  • Rules 14, 15 and 16 of The Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Land Rules, 1950,
  • S.28(2) of the new Act or S.29(2) of the old Act)
  • Limitation Act, 1908 or the new Limitation Act, 1963
  • U/s 35 & 37 of the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950.
  • provisions of S.5 and Ss.12 to 24 of the Limitation Act, 1963,
  • TheAP (TA) Tenancy Act, 1950
  • provision making Article 65 and Section 27
  • S.29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963
  • Section 40 of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy & Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 (the Act,
  • (iv) Section 38(D)
  • subsection (1) or sub-section (2)
  • provisions of the Limitation Act, 1903
  • Tenants, U/s 32(i) of A.P (T.A) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950
  • S.28(2) of the new Limitation Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Judges
Acts
  • SECTION 29 LIMITATION ACT 1963
  • LIMITATION ACT 1908
  • LIMITATION ACT 1963
  • U/s 32(1) of A.P (T.A) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act,
  • provisions of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2),
  • Control Act, 1947
  • Section 40 of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 (for short the Act)
  • Rules 14, 15 and 16 of The Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Land Rules, 1950,
  • S.28(2) of the new Act or S.29(2) of the old Act)
  • Limitation Act, 1908 or the new Limitation Act, 1963
  • U/s 35 & 37 of the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950.
  • provisions of S.5 and Ss.12 to 24 of the Limitation Act, 1963,
  • TheAP (TA) Tenancy Act, 1950
  • provision making Article 65 and Section 27
  • S.29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963
  • Section 40 of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy & Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 (the Act,
  • (iv) Section 38(D)
  • subsection (1) or sub-section (2)
  • provisions of the Limitation Act, 1903
  • Tenants, U/s 32(i) of A.P (T.A) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950
  • S.28(2) of the new Limitation Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioners claim to be the legal heirs of the late Teegala Shivaiah @ Shiva Reddy, who was a protected tenant of agricultural land in Koheda Village, Hayathnagar Mandal, Rangareddy District. After Shiva Reddy's death, the petitioners sought succession to the protected tenancy rights and restoration of possession of the land under Sections 40 and 32(1) of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 ("the Act"). The Deputy Collector and Mandal Revenue Officer initially granted succession and restoration of possession to the petitioners in 2004. Respondents, claiming to be third-party purchasers from the original landholders, appealed these orders to the Joint Collector-II, who set aside the orders in 2006. The petitioners challenged the appellate authority's order, particularly regarding restoration of possession, leading to the present revision petition. The court had earlier dismissed a connected revision concerning succession jurisdiction.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the application filed for restoration of possession by the alleged legal heirs of protected tenant Shiva Reddy is barred by the long lapse of time?
  2. Whether the authority below was justified in questioning whether the protected tenancy subsists after such a long period, absent evidence of tenancy termination under Section 19 of the Act?
  3. Whether the petitioners, claiming to be legal heirs of the protected tenant Shiva Reddy, can seek restoration of possession?
  4. Whether the present Civil Revision Petition (C.R.P) for possession is maintainable in view of the dismissal of the connected C.R.P concerning succession on jurisdictional grounds?

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The petitioners are the sons and legal heirs of late Teegala Shiva Reddy, the protected tenant of the subject land as per tenancy records.
  • Succession and restoration petitions under Sections 40 and 32 of the Act were initially allowed by the Mandal Revenue Officer, and possession was delivered accordingly.
  • The appellate authority's finding that the respondent purchaser has no locus standi is well-founded, as sales by landholders to third parties violate Section 38-D of the Act and relevant Supreme Court precedent (KOTAIAH v. THE PROPERTY ASSOCIATION OF THE BAPTIST CHURCHES (Pvt.) Ltd.).
  • The petitioners, as deemed protected tenants under Section 40, are entitled to restoration of possession under Section 32, regardless of the validity of succession orders.
  • The law of limitation or adverse possession does not apply to claims by protected tenants under the Act, supported by Full Bench and Supreme Court decisions.
  • Proceedings under Sections 32 and 40 of the Act are distinct; thus, dismissal of the connected revision on succession jurisdiction does not bar the present revision on restoration.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The respondents are purchasers from the original landholders who sold the land through registered deeds starting in 1971, with subsequent transfers and approved layouts, and are in peaceful possession.
  • The petitioners have no proven title or right over the land and failed to establish their status as legal heirs or protected tenants.
  • The appellate authority's order setting aside succession granted by the Mandal Revenue Officer is final, as upheld in the connected revision dismissed by this court.
  • The petitioners cannot seek possession without a succession certificate issued by a competent civil court, as held in SYED ABDUL MAJEED v. JOINT COLLECTOR.
  • The petition for restoration was filed after a very long period, during which third parties acquired rights and equities arose in their favor, making restoration impermissible.
  • The absence of a Protected Tenancy Register and relevant tenancy entries in official records undermines the petitioners' claim.
  • The Mandal Revenue Officer's order restoring possession violated procedural rules (Rules 14, 15, and 16 of The Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Land Rules, 1950) due to lack of notice to interested parties.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
KOTAIAH v. THE PROPERTY ASSOCIATION OF THE BAPTIST CHURCHES (Pvt.) Ltd., AIR 1989 SC 1753 Sales by landholders of protected tenancy land to third parties without offering to protected tenant violate Section 38-D of the Act. The court held respondents had no locus standi as their purchase was contrary to Section 38-D; such alienations have no legal effect.
Sada v. Tahsildar, Utnoor, Adilabad District, AIR 1988 AP 77 (Full Bench) Law of limitation and adverse possession do not apply against protected tenants under the Act. The court relied on this to reject limitation and adverse possession defenses against petitioners’ claims.
BODDAM NARSIMHA v. HASAN ALI KHAN (2007) 11 SCC 410 & MAN MOHAN v. MOHD. MOHINUDDIN ALIKHAN (DEAD) BY L.Rs AIR 2008 SC 2273 Confirmed that protected tenancy rights are not extinguished by limitation or adverse possession principles. Supported the court’s conclusion that petitioners’ rights as protected tenants survive despite delay.
PONNAL NARSING RAO v. NALLOLLA PENTAIAH (1998) 9 SCC 183 Applications for restoration under Section 32 must be filed within reasonable time; delay may raise equities favoring third parties. The court noted that although limitation does not apply, delay may affect equities, which must be pleaded and proved; no such proof was found here.
MATHURA PRASAD v. DOSSIBAI AIR 1971 SC 2355 Dismissal of revision on jurisdictional grounds does not operate as res judicata on substantive issues. Used to hold that dismissal of connected revision on succession jurisdiction does not bar present revision on restoration.
SYED ABDUL MAJEED v. JOINT COLLECTOR - II RANGA REDDY DISTRICT 2006 (5) ALD 6348 Succession certificates must be issued by competent civil courts, not revenue authorities. Respondents relied on this to argue that petitioners’ succession claim was invalid; court distinguished this from restoration under Section 32.
Smt. Shakuntala S. Tiwari v. H.C.M Singhania AIR 1987 SC 1823 Limitation Act applies only to suits in courts, not to proceedings before quasi-judicial tribunals or executive authorities. Supported the principle that limitation law does not apply to tenancy restoration proceedings before revenue authorities.
DHARVATHKOTIA (DIED) PER L.RS v. JOINT COLLECTOR AND ADDITIONAL DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, KHAMMAM DIST 2006 (2) ALT 486 Protected tenant’s right to recover possession is uninhibited by adverse possession principles. Reinforced that limitation or adverse possession cannot extinguish protected tenancy rights.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the factual and legal matrix surrounding the protected tenancy of late Teegala Shivaiah and the petitioners’ claim as his legal heirs. It accepted the appellate authority’s unchallenged finding that Shivaiah was the protected tenant, which had become final due to no revision being filed by respondents. The court noted that the respondents, as third-party purchasers, had no locus standi since the sales by the original landholders violated Section 38-D of the Act by failing to offer the land to the protected tenant first, rendering those sales ineffective.

Addressing the limitation and adverse possession arguments, the court relied on authoritative Full Bench and Supreme Court decisions holding that such principles do not apply to rights of protected tenants under the Act. Although the Apex Court in Ponnala Narsing Rao recognized that applications for restoration under Section 32 must be filed within reasonable time to avoid prejudice to third parties, the court found no evidence of pleaded or proved equities favoring respondents due to delay. The appellate authority’s provisional finding that restoration after long lapse is impermissible was thus rejected.

The court distinguished the jurisdictional dismissal of the connected revision on succession certificate issuance, holding that jurisdictional rulings do not operate as res judicata on substantive rights to restoration of possession. It further held that restoration proceedings under Section 32 can be initiated by a tenant or deemed tenant (including legal heirs), independent of succession certificates under Section 40.

Regarding procedural objections about notice, the court found the Mandal Revenue Officer had issued notices and conducted hearings in accordance with the Rules, and the respondents failed to file objections. The delivery of possession by panchanama was also noted.

Ultimately, the court concluded that the petitioners, as legal heirs and deemed protected tenants, are entitled to restoration of possession under Section 32 of the Act, and the appellate authority’s order setting aside the restoration was erroneous and liable to be set aside.

Holding and Implications

The revision petition is allowed. The impugned order of the appellate authority rejecting restoration of possession is set aside, and the order of the Mandal Revenue Officer dated 13.7.2004 granting possession to the petitioners is restored.

The direct effect of this decision is to affirm the rights of the petitioners as legal heirs and deemed protected tenants to restoration of possession, notwithstanding the lapse of time and intervening sales by original landholders that violated statutory pre-emptive rights. No new precedent is set, but the ruling reinforces the protective regime of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950, particularly the inapplicability of limitation and adverse possession principles to protected tenancy rights and the invalidity of alienations contrary to Section 38-D of the Act.

    Teegala Narayana Reddy And Four Others Petitioners v. B. Bal Reddy

    G. Chandraiah, J.:— Heard the respective counsels appearing for the parties.

    2. This revision is filed against the order dated 22.7.2006 passed by the court of Joint Collector - II Rangareddy District in Case No. F2/3785/2005.

    3. The petitioners claim to be the legal heirs of one late Teegala Shivaiah @ Shiva Reddy. The case of the petitioners is that Shiva Reddy is the protected tenant of agricultural land bearing Sy. No. 359(old), corresponding to 121(new) in an extent of Acs.23-10 gts situate at Koheda Village, Hayathnagar Mandal, Rangareddy District. Their case is that after the death of Shiva Reddy, they being the lineal descendents, succeeded to the protected tenancy rights. Hence, they filed two petitions before the Deputy Collector and Mandal Revenue Officer, Hayathnagar, RR District, for grant of succession under Section 40 of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 (for short ‘the Act’) and for restoration of possession under Section 32(1) of the said Act.

    4. By order dated 27.4.2004 in Proc. No. B/5085/2001, the Deputy Collector and Mandal Revenue Officer, granted succession to Teegala Narayana Reddy and Teegala Rangareddy. And by order dated 13.7.2004 in Proc. No. B/5085/2001 the Deputy Collector and Mandal Revenue Officer, ordered to restore the land to the petitioners i.e, protected tenants under Section 32(1) of the Act and the Mandal Revenue Inspector and Mandal Surveyor, were directed to handover the physical possession to the petitioners/protected tenants in the above survey numbers to an extent of Acs.17-10 gts., by conducting panchanama by following the due procedure and report compliance.

    5. Aggrieved by the above orders of the Deputy Collector and Mandal Revenue Office, the respondents in the said petitions who claim to be the third party purchasers from the original landholders, filed two appeal before the Joint Collector-II Rangareddy District. The appeal filed against the grant of succession is in case No. F2/3785/2005 and the appeal filed against the grant of restoration of possession is in Case No. F2/3785/2005. The appellate authority heard both the appeals analogously and by common order dated 22.7.2006, set aside both the impugned orders dated 27.4.2004 and 13.7.2004 passed by the Deputy Collector and Mandal Revenue Officer.

    6. Challenging the order passed by the appellate authority in case No. F2/3784/2005 dated 22.7.2006 in setting aside the succession granted by the Deputy Collector and Mandal Revenue Officer, the respondents before the appellate authority, who claim to be legal heirs of late Shiva Reddy, filed C.R.P No. 4910/2006 and this court by order 8.12.2006 dismissed the revision. The order is extracted as under:

    “There is no dispute or denial that under Section 40 of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy & Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 (the Act, for brevity), the jurisdictional Mandal Revenue Officer cannot grant succession to the persons claiming to be the lineal descendants to a protected tenant. In that view of the matter, order of the Joint Collector dated 22/07/2006 impugned in this Civil Revision Petition in so far it relates to setting aside the order of the Mandal Revenue Officer 27/04/2004 passed under Section 40 of the Act does not warrant any interference.

    The Civil Revision Petition is accordingly dismissed. No costs.”

    7. Now challenging the order of the appellate authority in Case No. F2/3785/2005 dated 22.7.2006 in setting aside the order of the Mandal Revenue Officer, in granting restoration of possession, the present revision is filed.

    8. The operative portion of the impugned order is extracted as under for better appreciation:

    “In the instant case, the application for restoration is filed after long distance of time from the date of dispossession. The date of dispossession is lost in antiquity. Owing to such extraordinary length of time, third parties have emerged on the scene. The position of adversary might have changed. And the character and nature of the land too might have been fundamentally altered. Claim U/s 32 of the Act after long lapse of time is impermissible.”

    9. The case of the petitioners as stated in the grounds of the revision and as contended by their senior counsel is that the 1 petitioner is the son of late T. Shiva Reddy and the other petitioners are the wife and sons of late T. Rangareddy, who is the other son of Shiva Reddy. Shiva Reddy is the protected tenant of the subject land as per the final record of tenancy. The original landholders of the subject land are K. Pulla Reddy, Laxmamma and Bhoodevamma. The protected tenant Shiva Reddy died sometime in the year 1964 and due to legal unawareness, his sons i.e, Teegala Narayana Reddy and Teegala Ranga Reddy, did not take legal steps for getting into the possession of the subject land. They filed petitions for succession and restoration of possession under Sections 40 and 32 of the Act before the Mandal Revenue Officer and both were allowed by orders dated 27.4.2004 and 13.7.2004 and under panchanama dated 30.8.2004, the petitioners were delivered the possession of the subject land. The respondent herein i.e, B. Bal Reddy is the purchasers from one Bennuri Ramesh, who in turn purchased from the prospective purchaser of the original landholders. He filed the appeals before the authority and the appellate authority by common order dated 22.7.2006 allowed the appeals and set aside the orders of the Mandal Revenue Officer.

    10. The learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the appellate authority had recorded a categorical finding that the respondent being a purchaser from the landholder, is not having locus standi to file the appeal since the said sale transaction by landholder in favour of the third parties in respect of the protected tenant land, is contrary to provision in Section 38-D of the Act and also the law laid down by the Apex court in KOTAIAH v. THE PROPERTY ASSOCIATION OF THE BAPTIST CHURCHES (Pvt.) Ltd. AIR 1989 SC 1753. He stated that this finding of the appellate authority is well founded. He contended that when the respondent is found to have no locus standi, the appellate authority ought not have proceeded further and reversed the order of the lower authority ie., the Mandal Revenue Officer. He stated that challenging the finding of the appellate authority that the respondent has no locus standi, since his sale is hit by Section 38-D of the Act and contrary to the law laid down by the Apex court, the respondent has not preferred any revision before this court and hence the said finding has become final. He further submitted that the appellate authority further recorded a categorical finding that Teegala Shiva Reddy is the protected tenant of the subject land. He contended that this finding of fact recorded by the lower appellate authority, has also become final, since no revision is filed and hence sought this court to proceed on the basis that as per the tenancy records, Teegala Shiva Reddy was the protected tenant of the subject land. He submitted that there is no evidence on record to show that the protected tenant has ever surrendered his protected tenancy or that he was evicted by the land holders under Section 19 of the Act and hence it has to be construed that the protected tenancy shall continue despite the death of protected tenant. He contended that under Section 40 of the Act, protected tenancy is heritable to the lineal blood descendants. He stated that there is no dispute that the petitioners are the sons of late T. Shiva Reddy, since there are no rival claims by others and, therefore, they become protected tenants by operation of law. He submitted that Section 2(v) of the Act defines ‘tenant’ which includes a person who is deemed as a tenant under the Act. By virtue of Section 40 of the Act, the petitioners are the deemed protected tenants and hence their claim for restoration of possession under Section 32 of the Act, is valid in law. Therefore his contention is that when there is no dispute that the petitioners are the legal heirs of the protected tenant and they are eligible for inheriting the tenancy under Section 40 of the Act and as there is no determination of tenancy under Section 19, the finding of the appellate authority that “t is not known as to when the original protected tenant died, it is not possible to decide as to whether the protected tenancy has subsisted or not”; is erroneous. He stated that the protected tenancy will continue till the tenancy is surrendered or the tenancy is determined or tenant is evicted. Therefore, he submitted that the restoration of possession ordered by the Mandal Revenue Officer, to the sons of the protected tenant, is perfectly valid. He further submitted that the appellate authority held that the succession of protected tenancy and the restoration of possession should be claimed within reasonable time, since long lapse of time would create equities and introduce third party rights. He submitted that a Full Bench of this court in Sada v. Tahsildar, Utnoor, Adilabad District AIR 1988 AP 77 held that there is no limitation or adverse possession against protected tenant. This view was approved by the Apex court in BODDAM NARSIMHA v. HASAN ALI KHAN (2007) 11 SCC 410 and MAN MOHAN v. MOHD. MOHINUDDIN ALIKHAN (DEAD) BY L.Rs AIR 2008 SC 2273. He contended that the purchasers from the landholders, have no legitimate right and hence no equity in their favour, can be considered.

    11. He contended that the proceedings under Section 32 of the Act for restoration of possession are different from the proceedings under Section 40 of the Act and a son of a protected tenant can directly apply for restoration of possession without seeking any succession from the Mandal Revenue Officer, because a petition under Section 32 can be filed either by the tenant or a deemed and as the sons of the protected tenant can be construed as deemed protected tenants, irrespective of the validity of the order of succession, they can seek for restoration of possession and the order of the lower authority in ordering restoration, ought not to have been interfered with by the appellate authority.

    12. He further contended that since the reliefs under Sections 32 and 40 are distinct, the order of this court in CRP. No. 4910/2006 dated 8.12.2006 does not come in the way of adjudicating the present revision, since in the said revision, only the aspect of jurisdiction of Mandal Revenue Officer to issue succession certificate was dealt with and hence the said judgment on the aspect of jurisdiction, will not operate as res judiata. In support of this contention, he relied on the judgment of the of the Apex court in MATHURA PRASAD v. DOSSIBAI AIR 1971 SC 2355.

    13. With these contentions, the impugned order was sought to be set aside.

    14. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the original landholders of the subject land are K. Pulla Reddy, Smt. Laxmamma and Smt. Bhudevamma. The said persons sold part of the subject land to one Smt. Sarada Devi through registered sale deed on 19.8.1971 and thereafter she sold the land to different persona and one of such purchaser is Bennuri Ramesh and he in turn sold the land to the respondent in an extent of Acs.8-14 guts and after purchase, the respondent got the land plotted and sold to various purchasers after obtaining approved layout from the Government and the said purchasers are in peaceful possession and enjoyment of the said land. While, the petitioners who are having no title or right over the subject land, claiming to be legal heirs of late Shiva Reddy, filed applications for succession and for restoration of possession, without impleading the purchasers. He stated that the order of the appellate authority in setting aside the order of the lower authority in granting succession has become final, since the revision filed by the petitioners in CRP. No. 4910/2006 was dismissed by this court on 8.12.2006 Therefore, he contended that when the petitioners have not established that they are the successors of late Shiva Reddy, they cannot seek for possession. He submitted that this court in SYED ABDUL MAJEED v. JOINT COLLECTOR - II RANGA REDDY DISTRICT 2006 (5) ALD 6348 held that the competent civil court has to issue succession certificate and not the revenue authorities. Therefore, in the absence of any succession from the competent civil court, the petitioners cannot seek for possession.

    15. He further contended that there are series of transactions starting from the year 1971 to 2003 and there is change of ownership of the property and from the material on record, it is not clear when Shivaiah is alleged to have been dispossessed as protected tenant and it is also not clear when he died and at this length of time, it is difficult to determine whether the protected tenancy subsisted. He stated that after a lapse of 30 years the revision petitioners approached the MRO for grant of succession and possession. Due to inordinate delay and lapse of time, there is change of ownership and third parties have emerged on the scene. Hence, owing to lapse of time, the restoration of possession to the revision petitioners under Section 32 of the Act, is not permissible and equities have arisen in favour of third parties. He submitted that the Apex Court in PONNAL NARSING RAO v. NALLOLLA PENTAIAH (1998) 9 SCC 183 held that though no express period of limitation is provided for filing application under Section 32 of the Act, such applications have to be moved within reasonable time; that due to belated applications, the other side may stand adversely affected and it may have changed its position in the meantime, that equities have arisen in his favour and he may have spent large amounts on land by improving it. He stated that following the above judgment of the Apex Court (7 supra), this court in the judgments reported in DEVAVATHI NAMYA v. GURUKUL TRUST, GHATKESAR 2004 (5) ALT 418, BHEEMATI DAWOOD v. MADICHETTY RACHAIAH 2004 (4) ALT 402 and NOMULA RACHAIAH v. GOLLA NARASIMHULU 2009 (3) ALD 774, held that the restoration of possession under Section 32 is an extra ordinary remedy available to the alleged protected tenants alone. Having regard to the typical nature of rights conferred upon an alleged protected tenant, through series of judgments, this court held that relief under Section 32 of the Act can be sought by the tenants and extended by the competent authority uninhibited by the ordinary law of limitation also. He stated when such is the status accorded to the right under Section 32 of the Act, it is the fundamental duty of the person claiming possession, that they should establish beyond any doubt that he is the alleged protected tenant. In the present case, there is no such proof filed by the petitioners herein and they failed to prove that when the protected tenant was dispossessed. He submitted that Hon'ble Court further held that as no express provision of limitation is prescribed under the Act, any application for restoration of possession must be made within a reasonable time. It is further held that the alleged protected tenant having been silent for a period of more than two decades during his lifetime, the alleged legal heirs of the alleged protected tenant cannot now claim possession, when there are series of events. He stated that there is no Protected Tenancy Register available with the office of the Mandal Revenue Officer and even in the pahanies, the name of late Shiviah does not appear anywhere. In order to substantiate this, they filed papers as additional documents in the revision petition. At this juncture it is to be noticed that when the said material is not placed before the lower appellate authority, the same cannot be considered in this revision. The learned counsel further submitted that in the absence of any documents, the applications cannot be maintained and the Joint Collector rightly rejected the contentions and set aside the orders of the Mandal Revenue Officer. He submitted that the appellate court having found that the alleged legal heirs of Shivaiah have slept over the matter for three decades and having regard to the factual matrix, the appellate authority rightly set aside the orders of the M.R.O and the same does no call for any interference. With these averments, the revision was sought to be dismissed.

    16. In view of the above rival contentions the following points would arise for consideration:

    1. Whether the application filed for restoration of possession by the alleged legal heirs of protected tenant Shiva Reddy is bad, in view of long distance of time?

    2. Whether the authority below is justified in observing that whether the protected tenancy subsists at this length of time, in the absence of any evidence to show that there was recovery of possession by determination of tenancy under Section 19 of the Act?

    3. Whether the petitioners who are claiming to be the legal heirs of protected tenant Shiva Reddy can seek for restoration of possession?

    4. Whether the present C.R.P No. 4904 of 2006 for possession, is maintainable in view of the dismissal of the C.R.P No. 4910/2006 dated 8.12.2006 with regard to succession?

    17. The case of the petitioners is that they are the legal heirs of late Shiva Reddy, who is the protected tenant of the subject land and the said Shiva Reddy died some time in the year 1964 and they did not take legal steps for getting into the possession of the said land and hence filed the petition under Section 32 of the Act for restoration of the possession and the Mandal Revenue Officer by the proceedings dated 13.7.2004 rightly granted restoration of possession and the said order was executed under a panchanam dated 30.8.2004 and the possession was delivered to them. Their further case is that there is no dispute that the petitioners are the legal heirs of protected tenant and there is also no rival claim. The law of limitation is not applicable for filing application under Section 32 of the Act for restoration of possession. Therefore, they sought to set aside the impugned order.

    18. On the other hand the vehement contention of the respondents is that there is no material on record to show that the petitioners are the legal heirs of protected tenant Shiva Reddy and when they failed to establish that the petitioners are the protected tenant, they cannot seek restoration of possession under Section 32 of the Act. Their further case is that there is no P.T register and the finding of the court below that Shiva Reddy is the protected tenant, is without any evidence and further there is also no material to show that when the alleged protected tenant was dispossessed and the lower authority without issuing any notice to the respondents or their lessees or their family members or the persons interested, by following the procedure as contemplated under Rules 14, 15 and 16 of The Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Land Rules, 1950, proceeded to pass the order restoring the possession in violation of the Rules. Further the petition for restoration is filed after a long distance of time, whereby third party interests have emerged and equities have also emerged in their favour and, therefore, the order of the lower authority is null and avoid and the appellate authority has set aside the same and the same does not warrant any inference.

    19. With regard to the 1 issue i.e, applicability of law of limitation, a Full Bench of this court in Sada's case (2 supra) while considering the issue no. 8 therein that whether the landholder can plead and prove adverse possession, before the Revenue Tribunals and authority, as against a protected tenant, held as under:

    “68. There is no provision in the Act dealing with adverse possession. The only provision dealing with ‘limitation’ is the one contained in S.93 of the Act which initially stated (before the Amendment by Act 2 of 1979) that every appeal or application for revision should be filed within 60 days of the order against which the appeal or revision is filed and that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1903 applied only for the purpose of computation of the said period. After the amendment by Act 2 of 1979, it is now stated that the provisions of S.5 and Ss.12 to 24 of the Limitation Act, 1963, shall apply for the purposes of extension and computation. Again under S.29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 also, if the period prescribed by any special or local law for any suit, appeal or application, is, different from the one prescribed under the Limitation Act, 1963, the periods prescribed in those laws apply as if prescribed in the Schedule to the Limitation Act and, for determining any such period, the provisions of Ss.4 to 24 shall apply except to the extent included by the special or local law. Under S.28(2) of the new Limitation Act there is no provision making Art.65 and S.27 thereof applicable to special laws. Similarly, even under S.29(2) of the old Limitation Act, 1908, there is no provision making Art. 144 and S.28 thereof applicable to special laws. Thus, either under the new Limitation Act, 1963 or under the old Limitation Act, 1908, there is no possibility for the landholders to invoke either the plea of adverse possession (under old Art. 144 or new Art. 65) or the plea of extinguishment of any right (under old S.28 or new S.27) inclusive of the right of protected tenancy under the Act. The right of protected tenants to recover possession is uninhibited by any principle of adverse possession.

    69. There is another strong objection to the plea of adverse possession set up by the landholders. It is to be noticed that the provisions of the Limitation Act (except those applied to special laws by force of S.28(2) of the new Act or S.29(2) of the old Act) are not attracted for enforcing rights before the revenue authorities or tribunals under the special laws. The provisions of the Limitation Act are applicable only to proceedings before Civil Courts. In a case arising under this very Act, the Supreme Court has recently restated this proposition. In Sakuru v. Tanaji, AIR 1985 SC 1279 Balakrishna Eradi J. stated:

    “……. the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 apply only to proceedings in ‘Courts’ and not to appeals or applications before bodies other than ‘Courts’, such a quasi judicial Tribunals to executive authorities.” And their Lordships approved the judgment of M. Ramchandra Raju and B.P Jeevan Reddi, JJ in K. Venkaiah v. IK. Venkateswara Rao, AIR 1978 Andh. Pra 166 where, in a case arising under this very Act, it was stated that the Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to Tribunals and revenue authorities except to the extent permitted by S.28(2) of the Act.

    “70. The decision of the Supreme Court in Smt. Shakuntala S. Tiwari v. H.C.M Singhania, (1987) 2 SCJ 481: (AIR 1987 SC 1823) that provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 applied to suits under the Bombay rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 is clearly distinguishable because the case clearly related to suits. In fact, Ramaswamy, J. has recently held and, in our view, rightly, Ushanna v. Sambu Goud, (1985) 3 APLJ (HC) 32 that the plea of adverse possession cannot be raised under this Act against a protected tenant. We overrule the view expressed by the Division Bench in Narsaiah's case (1979 (1) Andh WR 9HC) 23) that pleas of adverse possession are admissible against protected tenants. We do not also approve of the observations in Chennaiah's case (AIR 1983 AndhPra 34) that the plea of adverse possession could be raised by the landholders before the revenue authorities or tribunals under the Act. Thus, there is no question of applying the principle of adverse possession either under the old Limitation Act, 1908 or the new Limitation Act, 1963 for contending that the protected tenancy rights are lost or extinguished on that count (see S.A.547/81 and C.R.P NO. 3313/92 below).

    20. The above Full Bench of this court has categorically held that plea of adverse possession is not available for landholders to contend that the protected tenancy rights are lost or extinguish on that count. The said view was noted with approval in the judgments of the Apex Court cited 3 and 4 supra.

    21. A Division Bench of this court in DHARVATHKOTIA (DIED) PER L.RS v. JOINT COLLECTOR AND ADDITIONAL DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, KHAMMAM DIST 2006 (2) ALT 486 following the above Full Bench of this court, held as under:

    “14. From a bare reading of the above, it is obvious that two aspects are relevant for the purpose of answering the present reference. Firstly; under Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 there is no provision making Article 65 and Section 27 thereof, applicable to special laws, - in the instant case, the special law is the Act. Secondly, the right of protected tenant to recover possession of land is uninhibited by any principle of adverse possession. ‘Adverse possession’ is a concept, which otherwise deals with the aspect of limitation.”

    22. Therefore from the above judgments of this court it is clear that law of limitation cannot be made applicable to recover possession of protected tenant under Section 32 of the Act.

    23. The next contention of the respondents is that since the petition is filed after a long distance of time, third party interests have emerged and equities have also emerged and since the petition for restoration of possession is not filed within reasonable time, the restoration of possession to the petitioners cannot be ordered.

    24. As already noted above, the law of limitation cannot be made applicable to the present Act and with regard to equities of the third parties, they have to plead and prove. In this connection it is necessary to look into the law laid down by the Apex Court in PONNALA NARSING RAO v. NALLOLLA PENTAIAH (7 supra) as under:

    “3. So far as the second contention is concerned, it is true that through no express period of limitation is provided for filing application under Section 32 of the Act, such applications have to be moved within reasonable time. It may be cause of such belated applications, the other side may stand adversely affected. It may have changed its position in the meantime. Equities may have arisen in his favour, he may have spent large amounts on land by improving it. But all these questions have to be pleaded and proved. Surprisingly, no such contention was ever canvassed much less tried to be proved on any equitable ground by the petitioner.”

    25. From the above judgment of the Apex court it is clear that though no express limitation is provided for filing application under Section 32 of the Act, such applications for recovery of possession, have to be moved within reasonable time, because in the mean time equities may arise. It is further clear that such questions of equities have to be pleaded and proved by the party raising the ground of delay.

    26. In the present case, from a reading of the impugned order of the appellate authority, it does not disclose any specific finding that because of delay in filing the application under Section 32 of the Act for restoration of possession, equities have arise and there is also no material placed on record. The appellate authority recorded a provisional finding that “In the instant case, the application for restoration is filed after long distance of time from the date of dispossession. The date of dispossession is lost in antiquity. Owing to such extraordinary length of time, third parties have emerged on the scheme. The position of adversary might have changed. And the character and nature of the land too might have been fundamentally altered. Claim U/s 32 of the Act after long lapse of time is impermissible.” Thus it is clear that the finding of the lower appellate authority is not certain and the further finding that restoration of possession under Section 32 after long lapse of time is impermissible; is contrary to the law laid down in the above extracted judgments of this court and the apex Court and hence such a finding cannot be sustained and the issue framed is answered in the negative.

    27. Coming to the 2 issue, certain facts are required to be noticed. The claim of the petitioners is that their father Shiviah is the protected over the subject land. The Appellate authority has categorically recorded a finding that “It is not in disputed that one Teegala Shivaiah is Protected Tenant in respect of the subject land in Sy. No. 359 (old) corresponding to Sy. No. 121 (new) as per the copy of Wasool Baqui and certificate U/s 35 & 37 of the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950. It is conclusive proof of that the fact that the subject lands were under the protected tenancy.”

    28. From the above finding recorded by the lower appellate authority it is clear that Teegala Shivaiah is the protected tenant of the subject land. Challenging the said finding, the respondents did not prefer any revision. Therefore, this finding has become final and it is to be proceeded on the fact that the Shiviaha is the protected tenant of the subject land.

    29. The respondents herein are the third party purchases of the tenancy land from the original owners. This issue has rightly been considered by the lower appellate authority. The said portion is worth extracting:

    “The appellant herein is neither the original landholder nor the protected tenant. The appellant herein claim to have interest in the appeal schedule property, having acquired title thereto by way of purchase through registered sale deeds during 1997 executed by the prospective purchasers from the pattedars in 1971 through Registered sale deed no. 13771/71 dated 19.8.1971 executed by 1. M/s. K. Pulla Rddy, 2. Smt. Laxmamma S/o late K. Rama Krishna Reddy and 3. Smt. Bhudevamma w/o late Narahar Reddy. It is not clear how the original pattdar could effect sale in favour of a third party when a protected tenancy subsisted in respect of the subject land. TheAP (TA) Tenancy Act, 1950 substantially circumscribes the alienation of lands by landholders to third parties where protected tenancy subsists. It is clearly laid down in Sec.38 of the Act that the protected tenancy has pre-emptive right to purchase the landholder's interest in the land. In case a landholder intends to sell his rights in the land, he is required to first offer the same to the protected tenant. Only upon refusal by the protected tenant, the landholder is at liberty to alienate the same to third parties. In this case the appellants have not shown that these conditions were fulfilled at the time of alienation in their favour in 1971. If the conditions stipulated in the Act for alienation by landholder to third parties are not fulfilled, then the sale falls foul of the Act and the rights of parties who claim to have acquired rights under such sales would be of dubious validity. The persons who have acquired rights under such transaction would be treated as strangers to tenancy proceedings and will have no locus standi before revenue authorities in tenancy proceedings.”

    30. The respondents herein are the third party purchasers from the prospective purchases from the original owners and there is no martial on record that the landholders offered the land to the protected tenant to exercise his pre-emptive right and hence the lower appellate authority rightly held that the respondents have no locus standi. Further, it is to be noticed that the law is a beneficial legislation, which has to be interpreted in favour of the beneficiaries and in the present case, the respondents, who are the third party purchasers, cannot also claim equity, since their sale is in violation of the provisions of the Act.

    31. The Apex Court in the decision reported in KOTAIAH v. THE PROPERTY ASSOCIATION OF THE BAPTIST CHURCHES (Pvt.) LTD., (1 supra), considering the sale of landholders in violation of Section 38(D) of the Act, held as under:

    “18. In sum …

    (iv) Section 38(D) prohibits the landholder from alienating the tenanted land to third parties. If the landholder intends to sell the land, he must give notice in writing of his intention to the protected tenant. The first offer must be given to the protected tenant. It is only when the protected tenant does not exercise the right to purchase, the landholder could sell the land to third parties. The alienation made in contravention of these provisions had no legal effect.

    32. From the above judgment of the Apex Court it is clear that alienations made by the landholders in contravention of Section 38(D) of the Act has no legal effect. In the present case, there is no material on record to show that the landholders before alienation had given any notice to the protected tenant to exercise his pre-emptive right. Therefore, as per the law laid down by the Apex Court, the sale made by the landholders in favour of the prospective purchasers and from whom the respondent had purchased, has no legal effect and the lower appellate authority, as noted above, has rightly considered this aspect and held that the respondent has no locus standi.

    33. It is to be noticed that when the respondents have no locus standi, the lower appellate authority ought not have proceeded further and ought to have relegated the parties to the civil court. But instead of doing so, it proceeded further. The said findings, which are recorded by the lower appellate authority, will be examined in the course of judgment.

    34. As already noted above, the lower appellate authority has recorded a finding of fact that Shiviah is the protected tenant and this finding has become final, since the respondents, who are the third party purchases, did not file any revision challenging the said finding and they are seeking to challenge the same, in this revision, which is filed by the legal heirs of the protected tenant, and the same cannot be permitted.

    35. The lower appellate authority held that there is no material on record to show whether the protected tenancy subsisted at the time of demise of the original protected tenant. This finding of the lower appellate authority is based on no evidence and without considering the relevant provision of the Act. Section 19 of the Act deals with termination of tenancy. Under Section 19, for termination of the tenancy, provisional and final notices are required and there is no material on record to show that proceedings under Section 19 have been initiated for termination of tenancy. When there is no material on record to show that tenancy has been terminated under Section 19, it has to be deemed that tenancy continued. Moreover, there is also no material on record to show that the protected tenancy had ever surrendered the tenancy. Therefore, the finding of the lower appellate authority that whether the tenancy subsisted or not as on the date of demise of the protected tenant, is without any basis.

    36. The petitioners are the lineal descendents of the protected tenant and as per Section 2(v) of the Act, which defines ‘Tenant”, includes a person who is a deemed as a tenant under the Act and by virtue of the Section 40 of the Act, the petitioners are the deemed protected tenants and hence they are entitled under law, to seek for restoration of possession.

    37. In view of the above and as the admitted fact is that Shiviah is the protected tenant and as there is no material on record show that the original protected tenant ever surrendered the land or that the proceedings under Section 19 of the Act have been initiated terminating the tenancy, it has to be held that the tenancy continued even after the death of protected tenant and the finding of the lower appellate authority in this regard, is without any basis and the same is liable to be set aside and the issue is accordingly answered in favour of the petitioners.

    38. The next issue is whether the petitioners can seek for restoration of possession. The case of the petitioners is that they are the legal heirs and lineal blood descendents of protected tenant and hence as per law they are entitled to seek for restoration of possession.

    39. On the other hand, the vehement contention of the respondents is that the succession certificate given by the M.R.O has been set aside by the lower appellate authority and same has been confirmed by this court in the connected revision in C.R.P No. 4910/2006 and hence in the absence of any material to show that they are the legal heirs of protected tenant, they cannot seek for restoration of possession and in this regard, they relied on the judgment of a learned single Judge of this court reported in DEVAVATHI NAMYA v. GURUKUL TUST, GHATKESAR (8 supra).

    40. In this regard certain facts need to be noted. The lower appellate authority has categorically recorded finding of fact that Shiviah is the protected tenant and the respondents herein are the third party purchases of the tenancy land from the land holders and hence they have no locus standi. This finding is being concurred by this court and challenging the finding of the lower appellate authority, the third parties did not choose to prefer any revision and in the revision filed by the petitioners against the order of the lower appellate authority, where under certain adverse findings are recorded, the respondents are seeking to contend that the petitioners are not the lineal descendents.

    41. In fact, when the respondents have no locus standi to contest the appeals before the lower appellate authority, their dispute with regard to the legal heir ship of the present petitioners, is of no consequence. Disputing for the sake of dispute is of no use. The party disputing the fact, should have locus standi and in the present case, the respondents have no locus standi. Moreover, there are no rival claims from within or out side with regard to claim for tenancy and from the order passed by the Mandal Revenue Officer while granting restoration of possession, though notices have been issued calling for objections, no objections were received.

    42. It is to be noticed that when there are no rival claims and all through their claim is that they are the legal heirs of the protected tenant and in the absence of any rival claims and in the absence of any rebuttal evidence and as the respondents have no locus standi, it has to be presumed that the petitioners are the legal heirs of the protected tenant and as already noted above, as per the provisions of Section 40 of the Act, the petitioners are the deemed protected tenants and entitled for restoration of possession under Section 32 of the Act, as laid down by the Apex Court in the above cited decisions relied on during the discussion on the issue no. 1 that the law of limitation will not apply for filing applications for restoration of possession.

    43. If there are disputes or rival claims, the matter has to be dealt with by the civil court and when there is no dispute and in the light of the admitted facts, the claim of the petitioners cannot be negatived on this count.

    44. Under the Statement of the Objects and Reasons, published in Andhra Gaz., PartIV-A, Extraordinary, page 179 dated 14.8.1956, protections given to the tenants is stated. The relevant clauses are extracted as under for better appreciation:

    “1. In July, 1956, the Andhra Cultivating Tenants Protection Ordinance, 1956 was promulgated with a view to protecting the tenants who were then in possession from unjust eviction. The Ordinance will cease to operate at the expiration of six weeks from the commencement of the present session of the legislative Assembly. The Government have therefore decided to undertake legislation for replacing the Ordinance by an Act of the Legislature providing for more permanent measures of tenancy reforms.

    4. In accordance with the recommendations of the Andhra Land Reforms Committee, the bill provides that the minimum period of all future agricultural leases shall be 6 years. All tenancies subsisting on the date of promulgation of the Ordinance and protected by such Ordinances, and all tenancies subsequently entered into upto the date on which the provisions of this bill come into force will, however, continue for a period of three years only from the commencement of the current agricultural year, or until their expiry in the normal course, whichever is later. The bill also provides that in the event of a change in the ownership of the land during the currency of a lease, the tenant shall be entitled to continue the tenancy on the same terms and conditions for the unexpired portion of the lease, and that, if a cultivating tenant dies, his widow and his lineal heirs shall have the option to continue the tenancy for the unexpired portion of the lease on the same terms and conditions on which the deceased tenant was holding. Provision is also made for the termination of the tenancy and eviction of tenants during the currency of a lease in case where, among others, the tenant has failed to pay the rent due, or has misused the land.

    45. Therefore, from a reading of the above objects and reasons, it is clear that the Act has been promulgated in order to protect the tenants who are in possession from unjust eviction and under the Act procedure has been prescribed for taking possession.

    46. At this juncture it is necessary to note Sections 32 and 40 of the Act and the same are extracted as under:

    32. Procedure of taking possession (1) A tenant or an agricultural labourer or artisan entitled to possession of any land or dwelling house under any of the provisions of this Act may apply to the Tahsildar in writing in the prescribed form for such possession.

    (2) No landholder shall obtain possession of any land or dwelling house held by a tenant except under an order of the Tahsildar, for which he shall apply in the prescribed form.

    (3) On receipt of of an application under subsection (1) or sub-section (2) the Tahsildar shall, after holding an enquiry pass such order thereon as he deems fit.

    (4) Any person taking possession of any land or dwelling house otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), as the case may be, shall, without prejudice to is liability to the penalty provided in Section 96, be liable to forfeiture of the crops, if any, grown on the land to the payment of such costs as may be awarded by the Tahsildar or by the Collector on appeal from the Tahsildar.

    40. Rights of protected tenant heritable:- (1) All rights of a protected tenant shall be heritable.

    (2) If a protected tenant dies, his heir or heirs shall be entitled to hold the tenancy on the same terms and conditions on which such protected tenant was holding the land at the time of his death and such heirs may notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, sub-divide inter se according to their shares the land comprised in the tenancy to which they have succeeded.

    (3) If a protected tenant dies without leaving any heirs, all his rights shall be extinguished.

    Explanation:--The following persons only shall be deemed to be the heirs of a protected tenant for the purposes of this section:--

    (a) his legitimate lineal descendants by blood or adoption;

    (b) in the absence of any such descendants, his widow for so long as she does not remarry”

    (4) The interest of a protected tenant in the land held by him as a protected tenant shall form sixty per cent.

    47. From a close reading of the above provisions, it is to be further noticed, as contended by the counsel for the petitioners that the proceedings under Section 32 of the Act for restoration of possession are different from the proceedings under Section 40 of the Act. A son of a protected tenant can directly apply for restoration of possession without seeking any succession from the Mandal Revenue Officer because a petition under Section 32 can be filed either by the tenant or a deemed tenant. The son of a protected tenant is to be constructed as a deemed protected. Hence, irrespective of the validity of the order of the succession, the order restoring possession to the petitioners has to be held to be valid. Further from a perusal of the order of the lower authority i.e, the Mandal Revenue Officer dated 13.7.2004 it could be seen that notices have been ordered. The relevant portion is extracted as under for better appreciation:

    “After succeeding the above rights, the petitioners have filed a separate petition for restoration of possession U/s 32(1) of A.P (T.A) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950.

    Accordingly, the petitioner is allowed and notices have been issued to all the concerned on 11.06.2004, while intimating the date of hearing on 19-06-2004, for filing objections, if any, in this matter.

    In response to the above notices, the case has been called again on 19-06-2004, the Counsel for the petitioner present and the respondents called absent and the case was posted for next hearing on 03.07.2004

    On 03.07.2004, the case called for, but either the respondent or their counsel called absent, even after giving both opportunities, the respondents not filled any objections and no response from the respondents side for the notice issued on 11-06-2004, and it is observed that, there is no any interest of the respondents or any others in the matter. Hence, the case is reserved for orders on 03.07.2004

    In view of the above, it is hereby ordered to restore the land to the petitioners i.e, Protected Tenants, U/s 32(i) of A.P (T.A) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 for the land bearing Sy. No. 359 (Old), corresponding to Sy. No. 121(new), total extent Acs.17-10 gts., situated at Koheda Revenue Village. Further the Mandal Revenue Inspector and Mandal Surveyor of this Office are hereby directed to handover the physical possession to the petitioners Protected Tenants in the above survey number to an extent of Acs.17-10 gts, while conducting Panchanama by following the due procedure and report compliance.”

    48. From the above order of the lower authority it is clear that every care has been taken with regard to service of notice before ordering restoration of possession and hence the contention of the counsel for the respondent that no notice has been served, merits for rejection.

    49. It is also brought to the notice of this court that pursuant to the order of the Mandal Revenue Officer granting possession, panchanama has been conduced and the land was delivered to the protected tenants.

    50. For the foregoing reasons, it is held that the petitioners are entitled for restoration of possession under Section 32 of the Act.

    51. The next contention of the respondents is that since the connected revision in C.R.P No. 4910/2006 is dismissed by order dated 8.12.2006, the present revision is not maintainable.

    52. As already noted above, the two reliefs under Section 40 and under Section 32 of the Act are distinct. Further this court dismissed the revision on the ground that Mandal Revenue Officer has no jurisdiction to grant succession certificate. The well settled proposition of law is that the judgment between the same parties on the point of jurisdiction, will not operate as res judiata. The Apex court in the decision reported in MATHURA PRASAD v. DOSSIBAI (5 supra) held as under:

    “9. A question of jurisdiction of the Court, or of procedure, or a pure question of law unrelated to the right of the parties to a previous suit, is not res judicata in the subsequent suit.”

    53. In view of the above, it cannot be said that the dismissal of the C.R.P No. 4910/2006 on the ground of jurisdiction, will operate as res judiata for the present revision. Accordingly the issue is answered in favour of the petitioners.

    54. For the foregoing reasons, the impugned order to the extent of rejecting possession to the petitioners is set aside and the order of the Mandal Revenue Officer dated 13.7.2002 grating possession to the petitioners, is restored.

    55. The revision is accordingly allowed. No costs.

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