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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 184 of the Indian Evidence Act,
  • Section 302 read with Section 34 I.P.C
  • sections 143, 144, 148 & 302 r/w 149 IPC.
  • EVIDENCE ACT 1872
  • section 302 r/w 34 IPC
  • section 161 Cr.P.C,
  • section 428 Cr.P.C
  • Section 302 I.P.C
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 184 of the Indian Evidence Act,
  • Section 302 read with Section 34 I.P.C
  • sections 143, 144, 148 & 302 r/w 149 IPC.
  • EVIDENCE ACT 1872
  • section 302 r/w 34 IPC
  • section 161 Cr.P.C,
  • section 428 Cr.P.C
  • Section 302 I.P.C

    Narayana Reddy v. State Of Karnataka

    1. Appellant No. 1 - Narayana Ready @ Babu arrayed as accused No, 1 along with accused No. 2 Muniswamy Reddy, accused No. 3-Ananda, accused No. 4-K.M. Govindareddy, accused No. 5-Papaiah Reddy and accused No. 6-Srinivasa Reddy were tried for offences punishable under sections 143, 144, 148 & 302 r/w 149 IPC. Accused No. 4 died during pendency of trial, the ease against him abated. The learned trial Judge by judgment dated 27.03.2007, convicted accused Nos. 1 & 2 for an offence punishable under section 302 r/w 34 IPC and acquitted accused 3, 5 & 6 for offences punishable under sections 143, 144, 148, 302 r/w 149 IPC. Accused Nos. 1 & 2 preferred the instant appeal (Criminal Appeal No. 578/2007). The State had not challenged acquittal of accused 3, 5 & 6.

    2. This court by judgment dated 25.03.2010 while acquitting accused No. 2 for an offence punishable under section 302 r/w 34 IPC confirmed conviction of accused No, 1. However, the State has not challenged acquittal of accused No. 2 in terms of the judgment dated 25.03.2010 Thus, acquittal of accused No. 2, 3, 5 and 6 attained finality. Thereafter accused No. 1 was before the Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal No. 2235/2010. The Supreme Court by judgment dated 29.11.2010, set aside conviction of accused No. 1 for an offence punishable under section 302 IPC and remitted the matter for fresh consideration by this court.

    3. The order made by the Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal No. 2235/2010 reads thus:—

    “This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 25th March, 2010 passed by the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in Criminal Appeal No. 578 of 2007.

    The appellant is convicted for the offence punishable under Section 302 I.P.C and sentenced to suffer life imprisonment. There are altogether six accused charged for the offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 I.P.C ‘The trial court, on appreciation of the evidence available on record, acquitted A-3, A-5 and A-6. A-4 died during the pendency of the trial. The High Court, upon consideration of the evidence, acquitted A-2 of the charge. Ultimately, the appellant (A-1) alone stands convicted for the offence under Section 302 I.P.C

    The entire prosecution case rests upon the evidence of P.W.1 who is stated to be an eye-witness to the incident. The appellate court did not consider the evidence of P.W 1 in proper perspective. There is no discussion and any analysis of the evidence of P.W.1 Needless to state that the High Court, being the first appellate court, ought to have considered and assessed the evidence of P.W 1. In such view of the matter, we find it difficult to sustain the judgment of the High Court convicting the appellant herein for the offence punishable under Section 302 I.P.C

    We, accordingly, remit the matter for fresh consideration by the High Court. We request the High Court to dispose of the matter as expeditiously as possible, preferably within six months from today.

    It is brought to our notice by the learned senior counsel that the appellant was on bail during the trial of the sessions case. In the circumstances, we direct release of the appellant on bail subject to the satisfaction of the trial court during the pendency of the appeal.

    4. We have heard Sri. M.S Rajendra Prasad, learned senior counsel for accused No. 1 and Sri. N.S Sampangiramaiah. learned HCGP for State. We have been taken through evidence and the impugned judgment.

    5. In brief, the case of prosecution is as follows:—

    Accused 1 to 6 are the residents of Koramangala Village situate within Bangalore city limits. Deceased Govinda Reddy was also a resident of Koramangala Village. Accused 1 to 3 are the sons of accused No. 4, Accused 4 & 5 are the brothers. Accused No. 6 is the son of accused No. 5. PW1-K. Srinivasa @ Raja is the nephew of deceased Govinda Reddy. At this juncture, it is relevant to state that Koramangala Village is situate in a developed area of Bangalore City and the agricultural lands of Koramangala Village were acquired by BDA for formation of sites. The land bearing survey No. 116/6, which belonged to accused No. 4 was acquired by BDA and there was a road towards northern side of acquired laud. Accused No. 4 had erected stone slabs around his land, including the road. Therefore, deceased Govinda Reddy and others had made a petition to the revenue Assistant Commissioner, who on enquiry got removed stone slabs erected by accused No. 4. In addition to this dispute, several civil disputes were pending between the accused and deceased Govinda Reddy. Accused No. 4-Govinda Reddy was not allowing the deceased and his family members to use the road located in front of the house of deceased. There was a drain between road and the house of deceased.

    On 12.04.1999 between 8.30 p.m and 9 p.m, the deceased requested PW1-Srinivasa to go over to his house to lay a stone slab on drain so that he could take his scooter over the drain to his house. Accordingly, PW1 and the deceased together laid a stone slab on the drain existing between road and the house of deceased. In the meanwhile, accused 1 to 6 armed with deadly weapons came near the drain and held out threats to the life of deceased and also told the deceased to remove stone slab. PW1 and the deceased decided to lodge a complaint with jurisdictional police (Koramangala Police). When the deceased and PW1 were going towards police station near the house of Papaiah Reddy, PW1 thought of informing the matter to his junior uncle namely Surendra Reddy. When PW1 was going back and had covered a distance of 20 feet, he heard the noise of deceased crying “Raja, Raja”. At this juncture, it is necessary to state that at the relevant time, PW1 was called by both names “Srinivas and Raja”. Immediately, PW1 returned back and found that accused 1 to 6 assaulting the deceased with deadly weapons. Accused No. 1 stabbed on the stomach of deceased with a long knife colloquially called as “long”. The deceased fell down and accused No. 1 stabbed on the stomach of deceased nearly by 7-8 times. PW1 ran towards place of occurrence and shouted at the accused not to assault the deceased. The deceased had fallen on middle of the road in front of the house of one James Nirmala Raj. PW1 cried for help, but no body came there. Immediately, PW1 came to the house of deceased and informed the matter to the wife of deceased namely PW6-Ningamma. Thereafter, PW1 came to Koramangala Police Station and lodged first information and set the law into motion. On completion of investigation, charge sheet was filed against accused 1 to 6 for aforestated offences.

    6. As already stated accused No. 4 died during pendency of proceedings and case against accused No. 4 abated.

    7. On behalf of the prosecution, PW1 to PW8 were examined, documents as per Ex.P.1 to Ex.P.7 were marked and material objects as per M.O.1 to M.O.10 were marked. On behalf of the defence, the contradictory portions in the first information and the statements of witnesses recorded under section 161 Cr.P.C, were marked as Ex.D.1 to Ex.D.17 The certified copy of written statement in O.S No. 3792/1990 was marked as Ex. D.18 The certified copy of written statement in O.S No. 5863/1996 was marked as Ex. D. 19. The copy of statement of CW4 was marked as Ex.D.20 The photographs of scene of occurrence and the houses situate near the scene of occurrence were marked as Ex.D.21 to Ex.D.24 The certified copy of objection in O.S No. 5863/1996 was marked as Ex.D.25 The signature of Gopalareddy was marked as Ex.D 25(a). The crime diary report was marked as Ex.D.26 The certified copy of first information in Crime No. 605/99 was marked as Ex.D.27

    8. The learned trial Judge convicted accused 1 & 2 for an offence punishable under section 302 r/w 34 IPC and acquitted accused 3, 5 & 6 of all the offences with which they were charged. The State did not prefer an appeal against the judgment of acquittal of accused 3, 5 & 6. Accused 1 & 2 filed the Instant appeal against the judgment of conviction.

    9. In the earlier paragraphs of this judgment, we have referred to the judgment made by this court on 25.03.2010 and also Criminal Appeal No. 2235/2010 filed by accused No. 1 before the Supreme Court and the order made by the Supreme Court. In view of the above proceedings and judgments, we are required to consider afresh the impugned judgment as it relates to conviction of accused No. 1 (appellant No. 1) for an offence punishable under section 302 IPC.

    10. Before adverting to appreciation of evidence, we deem it proper to state certain facts, which have not been controverted by the defence and also evidence in proof of facts, which has not been controverted.

    11. There was enmity between the deceased and accused. The dispute related to a road in front of the house of deceased. Accused were claiming the road as part of their land and had caused obstruction by erecting stone slabs. On a representation made by the deceased to the revenue Assistant Commissioner, stone slabs were removed, however, drain located between house of deceased and road had not been covered with stone slabs, in this connection, there were several civil litigations pending between parties.

    12. The homicidal death of deceased Govinda Reddy at 9 or 9.30 p.m on 12.04.1999 in front of the house of one James Nirmala Raj cannot be disputed and has not been, disputed. The first information registered by Koramangala police on the basis of first information registered by PW1-Srinivas reached jurisdictional Magistrate at 11.30 p.m on 12.04.1999

    13. The medical evidence given by PW7-Dr. B.R.S Kashyap and the contents of post-mortem examination report would reveal on 13.04.1999, PW7-Dr. B.R.S Kashyap (the then Head of Department of Forensic Medicine at Victoria Hospital at Bangalore), conducted post-mortem examination on the dead body of deceased Govinda Reddy and found following injuries:—

    (i) Incised wound present over left side underneath the Jaw measuring 4 cms × 1 cms × bone deep.

    (ii) Stabbed wound present over front of abdomen epigastric region in the middle line, vertically placed measuring 3 cms × 1 cms × abdominal cavity deep, lower end is sharp and upper end is blunt.

    (iii) Obliquely placed stab wound present over the left side front of the chest, 7 cms below the left nipple and 9 cms left to the midline. The lower outer end is blunt and upper inner end is pointed measuring 3 cms × 1 cm × chest cavity deep.

    (iv) Two incised wounds present over right side front of chest measuring 3 cms × .5 cms, situated 1 cm apart and 2 cms above and medial to right nipple.

    (v) Obliquely placed stab wound present over lower part of right side of the chest, situated 10 cms below the right nipple, and 6 cms from the midline, measuring 4 cms × 1.5 cms × muscle deep. Outer lower end is blunt, upper inner end is pointed, directed backwards and upwards for a depth of 2 cms.

    (vi) Vertically placed stab wound present over left side front of abdomen situated 8 cms above the level of umbilicus and 2 cms from the midline measuring 4 cms × 1.5 cms × abdominal cavity deep from which portion of omentus is protruding out. Upper end is blunt and lower end is pointed,

    (vii) Obliquely placed stab wound present over front of left side abdomen, 5 cms below the left costal Margin and 10 cms from middle line, measuring 4 cms × 2 cms × muscle deep. Upper inner end blunt. Lower outer end is pointed, directed upwards, backwards and inwards for a depth of 5 cms.

    (viii) Obliquely placed stab incised wound present over left side front of abdomen situated 2 cms the midline and 16 cms below the left costal margin, measuring 6 cms × 1.5 cms × abdominal cavity deep. Upper inner end is blunt, lower outer end is pointed. Coils of small intestine protruding out.

    (ix) Vertically placed stab incised wound present over lower part of abdomen on right side, 3 cms lateral to the midline, and 8 cms medial to the anterior superior iliac spine measuring 3 cms × 1.5 cms × abdominal cavity deep. Upper outer end is pointed and lower end is blunt.

    (x) Vertically placed stab wound present over front of lower part of abdomen, 2 cms above the pubic synphysis in the midline measuring 3.5 cms × 1.5 cms × abdominal cavity deep. Upper end pointed and lower end is blunt.

    (xi) Obliquely placed perforating stab wound present over left forearm situated 8 cms below the elbow joint on the inner aspect measuring 3 × 1.5 cms × 7 cms through and through, all the underlying muscles, vessels and nerves are clean cut. The track measures 7 cms.

    (xii) Horizontally placed incised wound present over left forearm situated 3 cms below the elbow joint on outer aspect measuring 6 cms × 1.5 cms × bone deep, On dissection of injury no. (ii) it is observed that, the weapon after piercing the muscles of the abdominal wall entered the peritoneal cavity and has pierced the front of liver substance on which it measures 2 cms × 1 cm × 1 cm in deep. Blood extravasated around. The injury is directed backwards, downwards and to the right for a depth of 7 cms.

    On dissection of injury no. (iii) it is observed that the weapon after cutting the muscles of the chest wall has entered the chest cavity and has pierced the dome of diaphragm on which it measures 3 cms × 1 cm × 0.5 cm. The injury is directed backwards, downwards and inwards for a depth of 4 cms.

    On dissection of injury no. (vi), it is observed that the weapon has pierced the muscles of the abdominal wall entered the peritoneal cavity and has pierced the mesentery of small intestine and the mesenteric vessels severed, blood extravasated all over. The injury is directed backwards for a depth of 4 cms.

    On dissection of injury no. (vii) the wound is in muscle plane directed backwards and inwards for a depth of 2 cms.

    On dissection of injury no. (viii), it is observed that the weapon after piercing the muscles of abdominal wall has entered the peritoneal cavity and has pierced the mesentery of small intestine and severed the mesenteric vessels. Blood extravasated around. The injury directed downwards and backwards for a depth of 4 cms.

    On dissection of injury no. (x), it is observed that the weapon after piercing the muscles of abdominal wall has pierced the front wall of urinary bladder on which it measures 2.5 cms × 1 cm × cavity deep. The injury is directed backwards for a depth of 3 cms.

    On dissection of injury no.(ix), it is observed that the weapon after piercing muscles of abdominal wall has entered the peritoneal cavity and pierced the small intestine measuring 3 cms × 0.5 cm fecal matter is visible in the peritoneal cavity mixed with blood, the injur, is directed downwards and backwards for a depth of 5 cms.”

    14. PW7 has opined that death was due to shock and haemorrhage due to multiple injuries sustained and death was instantaneous.

    15. There is serious controversy as to whether multiple stab/incised injuries found on the deceased could have been caused by M.O.7-long knife will be discussed in the latter part of the judgment. The evidence adduced by the prosecution to prove that death of deceased Govinda Reddy was homicidal and death was due to shock and hemorrhage as a result of multiple stab and incised wounds caused to him and the death was instantaneous has not been controverted.

    16. We see from the evidence adduced by prosecution that PW1 & PW2 are stated to have witnessed the occurrence. PW6 was an immediate post occurrence witness.

    17. After going through the contents of first information, which was lodged by PW1, we find that in the first information. PW1 has narrated the incident which had taken place when PW1 and the deceased had laid stone slab on the drain in front of the house of deceased. PW1 has also stated that himself and the deceased were going to Koramangala Police Station to lodge a complaint against accused. PW1 has narrated the incident of assault on the deceased by accused No. 1 with a long knife (long). PW1 has also stated that immediately after the incident, he cried for help, but none from the neighbourhood came to his rescue. PW1 informed the wife of deceased (PW6) and thereafter he lodged first information, in the first information, there is no reference to presence of PW2 or other eye-witnesses. Therefore, a reasonable doubt would arise as to the presence of PW2 near the place of incident. The case of prosecution that PW2 had also witnessed the incident of assault is rendered doubtful. PW1 had given a detailed first information narrating the incident of assault, immediate motive for the incident of assault and also previous enmity and the events after the incident. In the first information, it has been categorically stated that PW1 and the deceased were the only two persons who were going to police station to lodge a complaint about the incident that had taken place near the drain infront of house of deceased. Therefore, case of the prosecution was PW2 was also one of the eye-witnesses and he had witnessed the incident of assault on the deceased cannot be accepted. In the circumstances, we are left with the evidence of solitary eye-witness account of PW1, medical evidence and motive for occurrence.

    18. Before appreciating evidence of PW1, we deem it useful to refer to the following judgments of the Supreme Court:—

    In a decision reported in AIR 1957 SC 814 [in the case of Vadivelu Thevar v. The State of Madras), the Supreme Court has held:—

    “(11) In view of these considerations, we have no hesitation in holding that the contention that in a murder case, the court should insist upon plurality of witnesses, is much too broadly stated. Section 184 of the Indian Evidence Act, has categorically laid it down that “no particular number of witnesses shall, in any case, be required for the proof of any fact.” The legislature determined, as long ago as 1872, presumably after due consideration of the pros and cons, that it shall not be necessary for proof or disproof of a fact, to call any particular number of witnesses. In England, both before and after the passing of the Indian Evidence Act. 1872, there have been a number of statutes as set out in Sarkar's law of Evidence'- 9 Edition, at pages 1100 and 1101, forbidding convictions on the testimony of a single witness. The Indian Legislature has not insisted on laying down any such exceptions to the general rule recognised in S.134 quoted above, the section enshrines the well recognized maxim that ‘Evidence has to be weighed and not counted.” Our Legislature has given statutory” recognition to the fact that administration of justice may be hampered if a particular number of witnesses were to be insisted upon. It is not seldom that a crime has been committed in the presence of only one witness, leaving aside those cases which are not of uncommon occurrence where determination of guilt depends entirely on circumstantial evidence. If the Legislature were to insist upon plurality of witnesses, cases where the testimony of a single witness only could be available in proof of the crime, would go unpunished. It is here that the discretion of the presiding judge comes into play. The matter thus must depend upon the circumstances of each case and the quality of the evidence of the single witness whose testimony has to be either accepted or rejected. If such a testimony is found by the court to be entirely reliable, there is no legal impediment to the conviction of the accused person on such proof. Even as the guilt of an accused person may be proved by the testimony of a single witness, the innocence of an accused person may be established on the testimony of a single witness, even though a considerable number of witnesses may be forthcoming to testify to the truth of the case for the prosecution. Hence, in our opinion, it is a sound and well-established rule of law that the court is concerned with the quality and not with the quantity of the evidence necessary for proving or disproving a fact. Generally speaking. oral testimony in this context may be classified into three categories, namely:

    (1) Wholly reliable.

    (2) Wholly unreliable.

    (3) Neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable,

    (12) In the first category of proof, the court should have no difficulty in coming to its conclusion either way - it may convict or may acquit on the testimony of a single witness, if it is found to be above reproach or suspicion of interestedness, incompetence or subornation. In the second category, the court equally has no difficulty in coming to its conclusion. It is in the third category of cases, that the court has to be circumspect and has to look for corroboration in material particulars by reliable testimony, direct or circumstantial. There is another danger in insisting on plurality of witnesses. Irrespective of the quality of the oral evidence of a single witness, if courts were to insist on plurality of witnesses in proof of any fact, they will be indirectly encouraging subornation of witnesses. Situations may arise and do arise where only a single person is available to give evidence in support of a disputed fact. The court naturally has to weigh carefully such a testimony and if it is satisfied that the evidence is reliable and free from all taints which tend to render oral testimony open to suspicion, it becomes its duty to act upon such testimony. The law reports contain many precedents where the court had to depend and act upon the testimony of a single witness in support of the prosecution. There are exceptions to this rule, for example, in cases of sexual offences or of the testimony of an approver; both these are cases in which the oral testimony is, by its very nature, suspect, being that of a participator in crime. But, where there are no such exceptional reasons operating, it becomes the duty of the court to convict, if it is satisfied that the testimony of a single witness is entirely reliable. We have therefore, no reasons to refuse to act upon the testimony of the first witness, which is the only reliable evidence in support of the prosecution.”

    In a decision reported in (1988) 4 SCC 302 (in the case of State of U.P v. Krishna Gopal), the Supreme Court has held:—

    “25. A person has, no doubt, a profound right not to be convicted of an offence which is not established by the evidential standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Though this standard is a higher standard, there is, however, no absolute standard, What degree of probability amounts to ‘proof’ is an exercise particular to each case. Referring to the interdependence of evidence and the confirmation of one piece of evidence by another a learned author says”:

    The simple multiplication rule does not apply if the separate pieces of evidence are dependent. Two events are dependent when they tend to occur together, and the evidence of such events may also be said to be dependent. In a criminal case, different pieces of evidence directed to establishing that the defendant did the prohibited act with the specified state of mind are generally dependent, A juror may feel doubt whether to credit an alleged confession, and doubt whether to infer guilt from the fact that the defendant fled from justice But since it is generally guilty rather than innocent people who make confessions, and guilty rather than innocent people who run away, the two doubts are not to be multiplied together. The one piece of evidence may confirm the other.

    Doubts would he called reasonable if they are free from a zest for abstract speculation. Law cannot afford any favourite other than truth. To constitute reasonable doubt, it must be free from an over-emotional response. Doubts must be actual and substantial doubts as to the guilt of the accused person arising from the evidence, or from the lack of it, as opposed to mere vague apprehensions. A reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or a merely possible doubt: but a fair doubt based upon reason and common sense. It must grow out of the evidence in the case.

    26. The concepts of probability, and the degrees of it, cannot obviously be expressed in terms of units to be mathematically enumerated as to how many of such units constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. There is an unmistakable subjective element In ‘he evaluation of the degrees of probability and the quantum of proof. Forensic probability must in the last analysis, rest on a robust common sense and. ultimately, on the trained intuitions of the judge. While the protection given by the criminal process to the accused persons is not to be eroded, at the same time, uninformed legitimisation of trivialities would make a mockery of administration of criminal justice.”

    19. From the above decisions, we find that the settled principles of criminal law that no particular number of witnesses shall, in any case, be required for the proof of any fact. The evidence has to be weighed and not counted. ‘The concepts of probability and the degrees of it, cannot obviously be expressed in terms of units to be mathematically enumerated as to how many of such units constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt.

    20. As already stated, PW1 is the nephew of deceased Govinda Reddy. PW1 has deposed about the incident of quarrel that occurred around 8.30 p.m, on 12.04.1999 when the deceased and PW1 were laying stone slab on the drain in front of the house of deceased. PW1 has deposed that accused 1 & 2 armed with deadly weapons came there and threatened them; therefore, the deceased and PW1 decided to lodge a complaint with jurisdictional police. PW1 has deposed that PW2, Prakash and CW7-Nanjappa (cited as witnesses and not examined before court) went to police station to lodge complaint. PW1 and the deceased were following them. When PW1 and the deceased had covered a distance of 150 feet, PW1 told the deceased that he would inform the matter to his another uncle and asked him to proceed. When PW1 had retreated for a distance of 20 feet, he heard cries of deceased saying “Raja. Raja”. PW1 has deposed; at the relevant PW1 was called by both the names i.e, “Srinivas and Raju”; immediately PW1 returned back and saw accused No. 3 holding the deceased from back side; accused No. 4 & 6 were holding clubs in their hands; found accused 5 & 6 assaulted the deceased with clubs; accused No. 1 stabbed on stomach of deceased with a long knife (long); at that time, deceased fell down; accused No. 1 stabbed on the stomach of deceased about 7-8 times, PW1 has deposed that he had seen occurrence from a distance of 25 feet; PW1 shouted that deceased shall not be assaulted: accused ran away from the place along with weapons; PW1 got frightened and came to the house of deceased and brought PW6 (wife of deceased), by then the deceased had succumbed to injuries; PW1 took PW8 to Koramangala Police Station; PW1 narrated the incident to police, who reduced the same into writing and took the signature of PW1 police visited the place of occurrence around 10 p.m and found dead body of deceased with bleeding injuries and blood had fallen on the ground, clothes of deceased were stained with blood; police after taking sample mud and blood stained mud seized the same as per spot mahazar marked as Ex. P.2, PW1 has identified the blood stained long knife marked as M.O.7

    21. During cross-examination, PW1 has admitted that PW1, his younger brother (PW2) and his father were residing together in house bearing No. 319/3 situate on 80 feet Road, Peripheral road opposite Indoor Stadium in Koramangala at Bangalore. The said house is at a distance of 600 feet from the place of incident. There was a civil dispute between deceased and accused, PW1 has admitted that there were civil disputes between the brothers of PW1 and the accused. PW1 has admitted that place ot incident is at a distance of two minutes walk from Koramangala Police Station. PW1 has admitted that none of the inmates of house of James Nirmala Raj had come near the place of incident. PW1 has deposed that he saw the incident in the light shed by the electric lights burning near two houses and also from the light shed by two streetlights.

    22. We see from cross-examination of PW1, he was subjected to extensive cross-examination spread over for several days. At the first instance, PW1 was cross-examined on 02.01.2003 and thereafter on 27.06.2003, 28.06.2003, 10.07.2003, 28.07.2003 and 30.07.2003 From the tenor of cross-examination of PW1, we find that his presence near the place of incident is disputed. The defence had sought to establish:- that deceased had several potential enemies and some of them had assaulted the deceased: PW1 was residing in his house at. a distance of 600 feet from the place of incident; PW1 after coming to know of the incident, lodged first information, falsely implicating the accused; the conduct of PW1 at the time of incident was not natural; the conduct of PW1 would belie his evidence; PW1 had implicated accused 1, 2, 3, 5 & 6 though he had not named them in the first information. PW1 had falsely deposed about presence of PW2 though he had omitted to mention his name in the first information and there was inordinate delay in lodging first information.

    23. The learned senior counsel for accused referring to the evidence of PW1 and the contents of first information report and medical evidence has made the following primary submissions:—

    I. As per the first information report, place of incident is at a distance of 200 metres from Koramangala Police Station (jurisdictional police station). There was inordinate delay in lodging first information. The first information was lodged after due deliberations.

    II. PW1 on oath had implicated accused 2 to 6 though he dose not refer to them in the first information. PW1 was a highly interested witness; he had ill-will against accused No. 1.

    III. The evidence of PW1 regarding immediate motive for the incident is inconsistent. There is total inconsistency between the evidence of PW1 and medical evidence given by PW7.

    IV. The testimony of solitary eye-witness/PW1 is wholly unreliable. The testimony of PW1 is also contradicted by medical evidence. The prosecution has not examined independent witnesses.

    V. PW7-Dr B.R.S Kashyap has deposed that injuries found on deceased cannot be caused by long (weapon of assault) marked as M.O.7

    VI. The sketch of scene of occurrence and evidence of PW5-T.H. Javaraiah (the then Junior Engineer of No. 8, Building Division] would establish there was no street lamppost near the place of incident.

    24. The learned senior counsel for accused No. 1 has relied on following decisions:—

    I. AIR 2004 SC 2943 (in the case of Ram Swaroop v. State of Rajasthan)

    II. AIR 1994 SC 1539 (in she case of Sri Niwas v. Ram Bharosey. 1992 Supp (2) SCC 247 (in the case of Madhumoy Madhusudam Boul v. State Of West Bengal)

    IV. (2007) 1 SCC (cri) 431 (in the case of Khambam Raja Ready v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh)

    V. AIR 2004 SC 1053 (in the case of Ramanand Yadav v. Prabhu Nath Jha)

    VI. AIR 2001 SC 164 (in the case of Surendra Pratap Chauhan v. Ram Naik)

    VII. 1993 SCC (cri) 1053 (in the case of Bhimappa Jinnappa Naganur v. State of Karnataka)

    VIII. (1991) 2 SCC 432 Paras (23 & 24) (in the case of Main Singh v. State of U.P)

    IX. 1981 Supp SCC 20 (in the case of Dharam Pal… v. State Of U.P….. 1977 SCC (cri) 640 (in the case of Bir Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh)

    XI. 1994 Supp (2) SCC 289 (in the case of Maniram v. State of U.P)

    XII. 1993 Crl. L.J 3909 (SC) (in the case of State of Haryana v. Inderaj)

    XIII. 2008 Crl. L.J 730 (SC) (in the case of Kapildeo Mandal v. State of Bihar)

    XIV. AIR 1971 SC Page 1554 (in the case of Chanan Singh v. State of Haryana)

    XV. (2007) 2 SCC (cri) 105 (in the case of Avtar Singh v. State of Punjab)

    XVI. 1994 Crl. L.J 1843 (Delhi High Court) (in the case of Rishi Pal v. The State)

    25. On careful consideration of facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that there was no inordinate delay in lodging first information, which was recorded at 10 p.m on 12.04.1999 The point of time at which first information was recorded by the jurisdictional police is ensured by the receipt of first information report by the jurisdictional Magistrate at 11 p.m on the same day i.e, on 12.04.1999 PW1 having seen brutal attack on the deceased (his uncle) must have been shocked and stunned. PW1 has deposed that he cried for help but no body came to his rescue. PW1 after witnessing the incident of assault had gone to the house of deceased to inform the incident to PW6 (wife of deceased). In the circumstances, we cannot expect that PW1 was in cool and composed state of mind to immediately rush to the police station to lodge the first information. The incident occurred between 9 p.m or 9.30 p.m and first information was recorded at 10 p.m on 12.04.1999 Therefore, submission of learned senior counsel for accused that there was inordinate delay in lodging first information cannot be accepted.

    26. The learned senior counsel for accused No. 1 has contended that PW1 was highly interested witness; his evidence is inconsistent with the contents of first information; his presence near the place of incident at the time of incident is highly doubtful; there was no source of light for PW1 to identify the assailant.

    27. It is true that PW1 is a close relative of deceased. It is true that there were certain cases pending between family members of accused No. 1 and the deceased. PW1 being a close relative of deceased would be least disposed to implicate accused No. 1, leaving aside the real culprit. The evidence on record does not indicate that PW1 had enmity against accused No. 1 and PW1 had gone to the extent of falsely implicating accused No. 1 in a murder case. The contention of defence that PW1 was in his house; alter coming to know that his uncle, Govinda Reddy was done to death by some unknown assailants, came to the place of incident and foisted first information, implicating the accused cannot be accepted. If PW1 was elsewhere, he could not have concocted the contents of first information within a short period. We see from the contents of first information that PW1 apart from naming accused No. 1 and giving details of assault on the deceased by accused No. 1 with a long had not implicated the other accused. Thus, the substratum of evidence of PW1 that accused No. 1 repeatedly stabbed on the stomach of deceased with a long knife (long) finds corroboration from the contents of first information.

    28. We see from the evidence of PW1, contents of spot inspection mahazar and photographs marked as Ex.D.21 to Ex.D.24, the incident of assault had taken place on the road in front of the house of one James Nirmal Raj and that the area had electric facility. In the photographs marked as Ex.D.21 to Ex.D.24, we also see electric poles near the place of incident. At this juncture, we deem it necessary to state that the incident had taken place in Koramangala Village. Though the place where the incident of assault had occurred is called as Koramangala village, the said area is a developed area and it is in the midst of Koramangala layout. Therefore, submission of learned senior counsel for accused that there was no source of light for PW1 to identify accused No. 1 cannot be accepted. Even otherwise, accused No. 1 was known to PW 1 since long period before the date of incident. Therefore, evidence of identification of accused No. 1 by PW1 before the court cannot be suspected.

    29. The learned senior counsel appearing for accused no. 1 has strenuously contended that oral evidence of PW1 is contradicted by medical evidence given by PW7. PW1 has deposed that accused No. 1 stabbed on the stomach of deceased for 7 or 8 times. PW7-Dr. B.R.S Kashyap had conducted post-mortem examination on the dead body of Govinda Reddy. During examination-in-chief, PW7 has deposed that stab and incised wounds shown in the post-mortem examination report cannot be caused by M.O.7-long knife, PW7 has stated that M.O.7 has no pointed tip. In further examination-in-chief by the learned Public Prosecutor, PW7 has deposed that injuries mentioned in post-mortem examination report could be caused by a sharp edged weapon with a pointed tip.

    30. During cross-examination, PW7 has deposed that M.O.7 (weapon of offence) has got flat tip and cutting edge of M.O.7 is not sharp. PW7 has stated that width of the blade is about 4 cms.

    31. The learned senior counsel for accused relying on the above opinion evidence given by PW7 and also by referring to the evidence of PW2 would submit that blade of M.O.7 was very thin and it could be bent. The learned senior counsel submits that evidence of PW7 contradicts oral evidence of PW1 - the solitary witness.

    32. In order to find out whether the medical evidence (opinion evidence) given by PW7 completely rules out possibility of injuries taking place in the manner deposed by PW1, we deem it proper to refer to the nature/description of injuries, description of weapon and settled principles of law on appreciation of medical evidence vis-a-vis direct evidence. As could be seen from medical evidence of PW7 and the contents of post-mortem examination report the deceased had suffered as many as 12 injuries, winch have been described supra (in paragraph 12 of this judgment). Out of the twelve injuries, injury No. (i) has been described as an incised wound measuring 4 cms × 1 cm × bone deep. Injury No.(ii) has been described as stab wound on front of abdomen epigastric region in middle line, vertically placed measuring 3 cms × 1 cm × abdominal cavity deep, lower end is sharp and upper end is blunt. Injury No. (iii) has been described as obliquely placed stab wound on left side front of chest, 7 cms below left nipple and 9 cms left to the midline. The lower outer end is blunt and upper inner end is pointed, measuring 3 cms × 1 cm × chest cavity deep. As per description of injury at Sl. No. (iv), there were two incised wounds on right side front of chest each measuring 3 cms × 0.5 cm situate 1 cm apart and 2 cms above and medial to right nipple. Injury No. (v) has been described as a stab injury on lower part of right side of chest, situate 10 cms below right nipple and 6 cms from midline, measuring 4 cms × 1.5 cms × muscle deep. Injury No. (vi) has been described as vertically placed stab injury on left side front of abdomen, situate 8 cms above the level of umbilicus and 2 cms from midline, measuring 4 cms × 1.5 cm x abdominal cavity deep. Injury No. (vii) has been described as obliquely placed stab injury on front of left side abdomen, 5 cms below left costal margin and 10 cms from middle line, measuring 4 cms × 2 cms × musele deep, upper inner end blunt, lower outer end is pointed directed upwards, backwards and inwards for a depth measuring 5 cms muscle deep. Injury No.(viii) has been described as stab incise injury on left side front of abdomen situate 2 cms lateral to midline and 16 cms below left costal margin, measuring 6 cms × 1.5 cm × abdominal cavity deep; upper inner end was blunt, lower outer end was pointed: coils of small intestine protruding out. Injury No. (ix) has been described as vertically placed stab incise wound on lower part of abdomen on right side, 3 cms lateral to midline and 8 cms medial to anterior superior iliac spine measuring 3 cms × 1.5 cm × abdominal cavity deep: upper outer end is pointed and lower end is blunt, injury No. (x) has been described as vertically placed stab injury on front of lower part of abdomen measuring 2 cms above pubic synphysis in midline measuring 3.5 cms × 1.5 cm × abdominal cavity deep: upper end pointed and lower end is blunt. Injury No. (xi) has been described as obliquely placed perforating stab injury over left forearm situate 8 cms below elbow joint on inner aspect measuring 3 cms × 1.5 cms × 7 cms. Injury No. (xii) has been described as horizontally placed incise wound over left forearm situate 3 cms below elbow joint on outer aspect measuring 6 cms × 1.5 cms × bone deep.

    33. From the description of injuries, we find that there are incised wounds of considerable depth. The injuries are not punctured wounds. From the evidence of PW7, we do not find thickness of blade of long knife (M.O.7), however width of blade is shown as 4 cms. M.O.7 has a flat tip and not a pointed tip, PW.1 has deposed that accused No. 1 assaulted on the stomach of deceased with a long (long knife).

    34. We find from evidence of PW2 that PW2 has deposed that long knife (M.O.7) resembles a sword. The blade of M.O.7 could be bent, PW7 has deposed that long knife (M.O.7) is a single edged weapon and cutting edge of M.O.7 (when shown to PW7 before Court) was not sharp.

    35. At this juncture, it is necessary to state that the incident had taken place on 12.04.1999 M.O.7 was shown to PW7 when he was examined before the trial court on 22.07.2005 i.e, after a period of 6 years and 3 months. It is probable that blade of M.O.7 must have gathered some rust. Therefore, ocular evidence of PW1 that accused No. 1 stabbed on stomach of deceased with M.O.7 is consistent with the injuries found on the deceased, which have been described in the post-mortem examination report. The injuries are described as incised and stab injuries. that M.O.7 (long knife) has got a flat tip. However, from the evidence of PW7. it is not possible to hold that stab/incised injuries cannot be caused by assaulting with M.O.7 PW7 has not deposed that deceased had suffered punctured wounds, which could be caused by a piercing weapon like a sphere or a dagger. Therefore, contention of defence that there is inconsistency between medical evidence and direct evidence cannot be accepted,

    36. In a decision reported in AIR 1983 SC 484 [in the case of Solanki Chimanbhai Ukabhai v. State Of Gujarat), the Supreme Court has held:—

    “12. Ordinarily, the value of medical evidence is only corroborative. It proves that the injuries could have been caused in the manner alleged and nothing more. The use which the defence can make of the medical evidence is to prove that the injuries could not possibly have been caused in the manner alleged and thereby discredit the eye witnesses. Unless, however the medical evidence in its turn goes so far that it completely rules out all possibilities whatsoever of injuries taking place in the manner alleged by eye witnesses, the testimony of the eye witnesses cannot be thrown out on the ground of alleged inconsistency between it and the medical evidence.”

    37. In a decision, reported in (2003) 12 SCC 155 (In the case of Kamaljit Singh v. State Of Punjab.), the Supreme Court has held:—

    “8. It is trite law that minor variations between medical evidence and ocular evidence do not take away the primacy of the latter. Unless medical evidence in its temas goes so far as to completely rule out all possibilities whatsoever of injuries taking place in the manner stated by the eyewitnesses, the testimony of the eyewitnesses cannot be thrown out. (See Solanki Chimanbhai Ukabhai v. State Of Gujarat), The position was illuminatingly and exhaustively reiterated in State of U.P v. Krishna Gopal. when the acquittal by the trial court was found to be on the basis of unwarranted assumptions and manifestly erroneous appreciation of evidence by ignoring valuable and credible evidence resisting in serious and substantial miscarriage of justice, the High Court cannot in this case be found fault with for its well-merited interference.”

    38. In a decision reported in 2008 Crl.L.J 730 (in the case of Kapildeo Mandal v. State of Bihar), the Supreme Court has held:—

    “11. It is now well settled by series of decision of this Court that while appreciating variance between medical evidence and ocular evidence, oral evidence of eye-witness has to get primacy as medical evidence is basically opinionatlve. [See Mange v. State Of Haryana (1979) 4 SCC 349 (conviction based on sole testimony of eye-witness); State of U.P v. Krishna Gopal, (1988) 4 SCC 302 (in para 24); and Ramanand Yadav v. Prabhu Nath Jha, (2003) 12 SCC 606 (in para 17). But when the court finds inconsistency In the evidence given by the eye-witnesses which is totally inconsistent to that given by the medical experts, then evidence is appreciated in different perspective by the courts.”

    39. In the ease on hand, the injuries suffered by the deceased were either incised wounds or stab/incised wounds. M.O.7 is a long single edged cutting weapon. Though it has a flat tip, stab injuries could be caused by the flat tip of weapon, Above all, it is not possible to conceive that deceased was static when he was receiving injuries at the hands of accused No. 1. The nature of injuries may slightly vary depending upon the manner and the force with which the weapon is wielded. Therefore, this is not a case-where medical evidence had completely ruled out possibility of whatsoever injuries taken place in a manner deposed by PW1. Therefore, testimony of FW1 cannot be discarded on the ground of alleged inconsistency between oral evidence and medical evidence.

    40. The learned senior counsel for accused no. 1 has submitted that incident of assault had taken place on the road in front of house of one James Nirmal Raj. The prosecution has not examined any of the independent witnesses. If the incident had taken place in the manner deposed by PW1, it would not have lost sight of the inmates of house of James Nirmal Raj and adjacent houses.

    41. PW1 in the first information has not stated about presence of independent eye-witnesses. PW1 has not deposed about presence of independent witnesses or presence of inmates of the house of James Nirmal Raj or adjacent houses. If inmates of house of James Nirmal Raj and adjacent houses were not hold enough to come to the place of incident and had shut the doors of their houses, we cannot find fault with the prosecution for non-examination of independent witnesses.

    42. The learned senior counsel for accused no. 1 has contended that there was no sufficient source of light. In the discussion made supra, we have referred to location of place of incident and existence of houses and the source of light. It is not in dispute and cannot be disputed that accused No. 1 was known to PW1 since long before the date of incident. Therefore there was no difficulty for PW1 to identify accused no. 1.

    43. In a decision reported in AIR 1981 SC 2073 (in the case of Anwar Hussain v. The State of U.P), the Supreme Court has held:—

    “…even if there is insufficient light, a witness can identify a person, with whom he is fairly acquainted or is in intimate terms, from his voice, gaits, features etc.”

    44. Therefore, contention of defence as to the non-existence of light and doubts raised about identification of accused No. 1 by PW1 are untenable,

    45. The learned senior counsel for accused no. 1 has contended that PW1 on oath had falsely implicated accused no. 2, 3, 5 and 6. Therefore, his evidence as it relates to implication of accused no. 1 cannot be accepted.

    46. It is true that PW1 in the course of evidence has implicated accused 2 to 6 as other assailants along with accused No. 1. Therefore, the crucial point for determination is:—

    “Whether evidence of PW1 has to be rejected on this ground?”

    47. In a decision reported in AIR 1973 SC 1409 (in the case of Ranbir v. State of Punjab), the Supreme Court has held;-

    “7. No doubt, in cases of party factions, there is generally speaking, a tendency on the part of the prosecution witnesses to implicate some innocent persons also along with the guilty ones, but normally where the general substratum of the occurrence cannot be held to arouse any reasonable doubt or suspicion about its having taken place, then the prosecution witnesses, provided they are held to have witnessed the occurrence and to be in a position to identify the assailants, are ordinarily not to be assumed to have left out the actual offenders or the guilty persons. Although the witnesses for the prosecution are in such circumstances prone to exaggerate the culpability of the actual assailants as also to extend the participation in the occurrence to some possible innocent members of the opposite party as well, the court has to sift the evidence and after a close scrutiny with anxious care and caution to try to come to a judicial conclusion as to who out of the accused persons can be safely considered to have taken part in the assault. As pointed out in Deep Chand v. State of Haryana, (1969) 3 SCC 890 the maxim falsus in uno falsus in omnibus is not a sound rule to apply in the conditions in this country and, therefore, it is the duty of the Court in cases where a witness has been found to have given unreliable evidence in regard to certain particulars, to scrutinise the rest of his evidence with care and trustworthy and the substratum of the prosecution case remains intact, then the court should uphold the prosecution case to the extent it is considered safe and trustworthy.”

    48. In the case on hand, the contents of first information promptly lodged by PW1 would lend assurance to his evidence before the court. In the first information, PW1 has stated that accused No. 1 assaulted on stomach of the deceased with a long knife. However, during evidence, PW1 has implicated accused 2 to 6. As already stated accused No. 4 died during pendency of proceedings. Accused Nos. 3, 5 & 6 were acquitted by the trial court and accused No. 2 was acquitted by this court by judgment dated 25.03.2010 Therefore, the evidence of PW1 that accused No. 1 assaulted on stomach of deceased with a long knife, which is found consistent with medical evidence and the conduct of PW1 promptly lodging the first information, naming accused No. 1 the lone assailant has to be accepted notwithstanding the fact that PW1 has proned to exaggerate his evidence by implicating the other accused in addition to accused no. 1. The court has a duty to sift the evidence and closely scrutinise the evidence to arrive at a conclusion as to who out of the accused persons can be safely considered to hove taken part in the assault.

    49. At this juncture, it is necessary to state that during course of investigation, there was interference of one Surendra Reddy, who was inimical to accused. It is probable that at the instance of said Surendra Reddy, the Investigating Officer had implicated the other accused. Therefore, exaggerated evidence given by PW1, implicating accused 2, 3, 5 & 6 cannot be a ground to discard his evidence regarding culpability of accused No. 1. As already stated, it is the duty of the court in cases where witness has been found to have given unreliable evidence in regard to certain particulars, to scrutinise the rest of his evidence with care and caution. If the remaining evidence is trustworthy and the substratum of prosecution case remains in tact, then the court should uphold the prosecution case to the extent it is considered sale and trustworthy (vide Deep Chand v. State of Haryana, (1969) 3 SCC 890). in the discussion made supra, we have held that there are no reasons to doubt presence of PW1 at the time of incident of assault on deceased by accused no. 1, so also at the time of incident of quarrel that had taken place near the drain in front of the house of deceased when deceased and PW1 had laid a stone slab on the drain, which according to the case of prosecution was the immediate motive for accused No. 1 to assault the deceased. The evidence of PW1 finds substantial corroboration from medical evidence given by PW7. The conduct of PW1 promptly lodging first information giving narration of incident of assault would not only lend corroboration to his evidence before Court but also ensures his presence near the place of incident. We do not find any thing unnatural in the conduct of PW1 before the time of incident of assault, at the time of incident of assault and after the incident of assault. PW1 has deposed that he shouted at accused not to assault the deceased. PW1 also cried for help, but none from neighbourhood came to their rescue. PW1 immediately after the incident of assault had gone to the house of deceased and informed the matter to the wife of deceased namely PW6-Ningamma.

    50. PW6-Ningamma has deposed about ill-will that existed between deceased and accused and obstructions caused by accused No. 1 for the movement of deceased on the road in front of the house of deceased and the acts of accused to prevent the deceased from laying stone slab on the drain in front of their house. PW6 has deposed about the incident that took place near the drain, presence of accused when the deceased and PW1 had laid a stone slab on the drain. PW6 has deposed that her husband (deceased) and PW1 went to lodge the complaint within half-an-hour. PW1 came back and informed PW6 that accused had killed the deceased in front of the house of James Nirmal Raj, PW6 has deposed that she came to the place of incident along with PW1 and found that deceased had suffered multiple injuries and he had succumbed to injuries, Therefore, it is not possible to hold that the conduct of PW1 after the incident was unnatural or inconsistent with his evidence before court. Thus, on re-appreciation of evidence, we hold that evidence of PW1 is reliable and free from suspicion,

    51. Now adverting to decisions relied upon by the learned senior counsel for accused, we finds-

    I. In a decision reported in AIR 2004 SC 2943 (in the case of Ram Swaroop v. State of Rajasthan), the Supreme Court has rejected the case of prosecution by holding that ocular evidence is inconsistent with the medical evidence.

    II. In a decision reported in AIR 1994 SC 1589 (in the case of Niwas v. Ram Bharosey), the Supreme Court has extended the benefit of doubt to accused as oral evidence of witnesses was irreconcilably in conflict with medical evidence.

    III. In a decision reported in 1992 Supp (2) SCC 247 (in the ease of Madhumoy Madhusudam Boul v. State Of West Bengal), the Supreme Court has rejected the case of prosecution as the testimony of sole eye witnesses was found wholly unreliable and his conduct was highly unnatural and suspicious. Apart from that, his testimony was contradicted by medical evidence,

    IV. In a decision reported in (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 431 (in the case of Khambam Raja Reddy v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh), the Supreme court has found that there was contradiction between direct evidence and medical evidence.

    V. In a decision reported in AIR 2004 SC 1053 (in the case of Ramanand Yadav v. Prabhu Nath Jha), the Supreme Court has held that oral evidence has to get primacy and medical evidence is basically opinionative. The Supreme Court has further held that adverse inference can he drawn only when medical evidence specifically rules out injury as claimed to have been inflicted as per oral testimony.

    VI. In a decision reported in AIR 2001 SC 164 (in the case of Surendra Pratap Chauhan v. Ram Naik), the Supreme Court has held that there was total contradiction between oral evidence and medical evidence.

    VII. In a decision reported in 1993 SCC (Cri) 1053 (in the case of Bhimappa Jinnappa Naganur v. State Of Karnataka), the Supreme Court has disbelieved presence of eye-witness on the ground that their names did not find place in the first information.

    VIII. In a decision reported in 1981 Supp SCC 20 (in the case of Dharam Pal v. State of Uttar Pradesh), the Supreme Court has rejected solitary eye-witness account on the ground that eye-witness account was totally inconsistent with medical evidence. The medical evidence did not show any gun shot injury any where as deposed by solitary eye-witness.

    IX. In a decision reported in 1993 Crl.L.J 3909 (in the case of State of Haryana v. Inderaj), the Supreme Court has held that presence of eye-witness to scene of occurrence is highly doubtful and improvements regarding nature of weapon used made by eye-witnesses and their evidence is not corroborated by medical or circumstantial evidence. In the circumstances, the Supreme Court was not convinced to convict accused on the basis of such evidence in an appeal against acquittal.

    X. In a decision reported in AIR 1971 SC 1554 (in the case of Chanan Singh v. State of Haryana), the Supreme Court has disbelieved the evidence of solitary eye-witness on the ground of his abnormal conduct after the occurrence.

    XI. In a decision reported in (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 105 (in the case of Avtar Singh v. State of Punjab), the Supreme Court disbelieved the evidence of eye-witness; soon after the incident eye-witness did not inform the occurrence either to the family members or to the police, the incident which had occurred on 19.11.1989 the incident was reported by presenting a letter to the President on 22.11.1989

    52. Thus on re-appreciation of evidence, we hold that:—

    I. the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that accused No. 1 stubbed on stomach of deceased with a long (long knife) and caused multiple incise and stab injuries, as a result the deceased succumbed at the spot;

    II. There was immediate motive for accused No. 1 to commit the murder of deceased;

    III. PW1 had witnessed the occurrence. The conduct of PW1 in promptly lodging first information giving true version of Incident of assault lends corroboration to his evidence before court. The benefit of doubt extended to accused 2, 3, 5 & 6 by the judgments narrated supra cannot, be a ground to discard the evidence of PW1. There was sufficient light for PW1 to identify accused No. 1. Even otherwise, accused No. 1 was known to PW1 long before the date of incident. Therefore. PW1 had ample opportunity to identify accused No. 1. There were no independent witnesses much less any witnesses, except PW1 near the place of incident. Therefore, we cannot find fault with the prosecution for non-examination of independent witnesses. PW1 being nephew of the deceased would not be least disposed to spare the real assailants to falsely implicate accused No. 1. There was neither delay nor inordinate delay in lodging first information, so also in the dispatch of first information to the jurisdictional Magistrate.

    IV. The manner in which accused No. 1 repeatedly stabbed on stomach of deceased with a long (long knife) and caused his instantaneous death would squarely attract an offence punishable under section 302 IPC.

    53. Therefore, we do not find any grounds to interfere with the impugned judgment as it relates to conviction of accused No. 1.

    54. In the result, we pass the following:—

    55. The appeal as it relates accused no. 1 is dismissed. The impugned judgment as it relates to conviction and sentence of accused No. 1 for an offence punishable under section 802 IPC is confirmed. In view of the fact that the State has not preferred any appeal against acquittal of accused No. 2 by the judgment of this court in Crl.A No. 578/2007 dated 25.03.2010, the acquittal of accused no. 2 has attained finality.

    56. The trial Court shall secure appellant no. 1.accused no. 1 to implement the sentence. The period of detention if any undergone by accused No. 1 is given set off as provided under section 428 Cr.P.C Office is directed to send back records along with a copy of this judgment to the trial court, immediately.

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