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citation codes
Case Number
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  • Section 96(1) read with Rule 1A of Order 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure.8.
  • Rule 3 of Order 23 and scope of Rule 1A of Order 43 of the Code
  • Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Indian Contract Act. Even R.1(m) of O.43
  • SECTION 42 SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT
  • Order 23 Rule 3-A of CPC,
  • Order 23 Rule 3-A CPC
  • Rule 3 of Order 23,
  • Order 23 Rule 3-A
  • Order 23 Rule 3,
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 96(1) read with Rule 1A of Order 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure.8.
  • Rule 3 of Order 23 and scope of Rule 1A of Order 43 of the Code
  • Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Indian Contract Act. Even R.1(m) of O.43
  • SECTION 42 SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT
  • Order 23 Rule 3-A of CPC,
  • Order 23 Rule 3-A CPC
  • Rule 3 of Order 23,
  • Order 23 Rule 3-A
  • Order 23 Rule 3,
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This matter arises from competing proceedings about a decree recorded on 05.05.1992 in a suit titled Abdul Gani v. Ali Lone (File No. 146) which was decided on the basis of a compromise deed that purportedly gifted suit land by Ali Lone (defendant in that suit) to Abdul Gani (plaintiff, his sister's son). Thereafter Ali Lone filed a suit titled Ali Lone v. Abdul Gani Lone seeking cancellation of that consent decree, alleging that the compromise was procured by fraud: he claimed his signature was taken on a blank paper by an advocate at his residence under the impression a will would be executed and that he never intended to gift the property during his lifetime.

In opposition, Abdul Gani pleaded that the suit was barred by Order 23 Rule 3-A CPC and claimed possession of the suit property. The trial court framed seven issues (including whether the suit was barred by Order 23 R.3-A and whether the decree was vitiated by fraud) and treated Issue No. 3 (bar under Order 23 R.3-A) as a preliminary issue. Ali Lone filed an application seeking that the suit be treated as an application under Section 151 CPC; hearing on the preliminary issue was deferred and both parties led evidence.

The trial court recorded issue-wise findings: it partially found on possession (Issue 1), accepted the allegation of fraud and cancelled the earlier decree (Issue 2), treated the present suit as an application under Section 151 CPC relying on AIR 1993 SC 1139 (Issue 3) and awarded cancellation of the decree but denied consequential permanent injunction because parts of the land were held by the defendant. An appeal was preferred; Ali Lone died during appeal and his widow Mst. Rehti was arrayed as respondent in the appeal. The learned District Judge (Appellate Court) reviewed Issues No. 3 and 4, set aside the trial court's finding on Issue No. 3 (finding the trial court had converted the suit into an application under Section 151 without giving the defendant an opportunity to be heard), and held that the declaration simplicitor was a nullity under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, remanding the case to trial court to decide the Section 151 application afresh.

The trial court thereafter dismissed the application under Section 151 CPC (impugned order dated 29.12.2008). Aggrieved, Mst. Rehti filed the present revision petition before this Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. What remedy is available for challenging a decree passed on the basis of a compromise that is alleged to have been procured by fraud?
  2. Whether Order 23 Rule 3-A CPC bars all suits to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which the decree was passed was not lawful?
  3. Whether an application under Section 151 CPC (or a petition under the proviso to Rule 3 of Order 23) is maintainable to challenge a compromise decree alleged to be based on fraud?
  4. Whether the trial court erred in dismissing the application under Section 151 CPC and whether the appellate court's remand to decide that application afresh was appropriate in the factual matrix where evidence on fraud had already been led?

Arguments of the Parties

Ali Lone (plaintiff in the cancellation suit; represented in appeal by widow Mst. Rehti)

  • Ali Lone pleaded that he never gifted the property; rather, he was induced to sign a blank paper by an advocate on the representation that a will would be executed in his favour, and that his signature was misused to prepare a compromise deed.
  • On that basis he alleged the consent decree (in Abdul Gani v. Ali Lone) was based on fraud and sought cancellation; he treated the proceeding as an application under Section 151 CPC when the compromise was challenged.

Abdul Gani (opposite party in the cancellation suit)

  • Contended that the suit challenging the compromise decree was barred by Order 23 Rule 3-A CPC.
  • Also claimed to be in possession of the suit property, and relied on that fact in opposing relief for possession or permanent injunction.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court in this Opinion
Banwari Lal v. Smt. Chando Devi, AIR 1993 SC 1139 Explained scope of proviso and explanation to Rule 3 of Order 23; noted deletion of R.1(m) of O.43 and effect of R.1A of O.43; held that a party challenging a compromise can file a petition under proviso to R.3 of O.23 or an appeal under s.96(1) read with R.1A of O.43 to question validity of a compromise; also treated maintainability of application under S.151 in context of amendments. The Court relied on this decision to hold that the bar under Order 23 R.3-A does not preclude challenging a decree on ground of fraud via the proviso to Rule 3 or under Section 151 CPC; applied it to conclude the trial court erred in dismissing the Section 151 application and that the application was not misconceived.
Bahori… Applicant v. Vidya Ram… Opp. Party, AIR 1978 All. 299 Discussed limits on exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Section 151 CPC where there is an express prohibition; quoted by trial court to show that Section 151 cannot be exercised when a specific statutory bar exists. The trial court relied on para 20 of this decision to conclude that there was an express prohibition precluding invocation of Section 151 CPC to challenge the consent decree. This Court reviewed that reliance and found the trial court's conclusion to be incorrect in light of subsequent law (as explained in Banwari Lal).
Tara Bai v. Krishnaswamy Rao, AIR 1985 Kar 270 One of several High Court decisions cited for the proposition that an application under Section 151 of the Code is maintainable to question a compromise. Referenced (via Banwari Lal) to show that High Courts had held S.151 maintainable; the present Court relied on Banwari Lal's treatment of these authorities to reject the trial court's prohibition-based approach.
S.G. Thimmappa v. T. Anantha, AIR 1986 Kar 1 Cited as authority that an application under Section 151 is maintainable after a compromise has been recorded. Used (through Banwari Lal) to support the proposition that S.151 may be invoked to challenge the legality/validity of a compromise where appropriate facts are shown (e.g., fraud).
Bindeshwari Pd. Chaudhary v. Debendra Pd. Singh, AIR 1958 Pat 618 Earlier decision cited as authority endorsing maintainability of S.151 applications in such contexts. Referred to by the Apex Court in Banwari Lal and relied upon in this opinion (through Banwari Lal) to show historical judicial treatment permitting S.151 in appropriate cases.
Mangal Mahton v. Behari Mahton, AIR 1964 Pat 483 Cited as an authority where S.151 was held maintainable post-compromise. Included among precedents in Banwari Lal referenced by this Court to demonstrate that S.151 could be available in cases of alleged invalid compromises.
Sri Sri Iswar Gopal Jew v. Bhagwandas Shaw, AIR 1982 Cal 12 Cited similarly as authority that applications under S.151 are maintainable to question compromises in appropriate circumstances. Referenced (via Banwari Lal) to support the Court's conclusion that the trial court had misappreciated the law by treating Order 23 R.3-A as an absolute bar to invoking Section 151.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in stages, grounded strictly on the record and authorities cited in the opinion.

1. Identification of the central legal question: The Court identified the primary question as what remedy is available to challenge a decree founded on a compromise when fraud is alleged. It recognized that Order 23 Rule 3-A CPC bars a suit seeking to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise was not lawful, but the proviso and explanation to Rule 3 of Order 23 (as explained in Banwari Lal) permit limited recourse where the compromise is void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act (for example, where fraud is shown).

2. Assessment of trial court's approach: The trial court had relied on Bahori (AIR 1978 All. 299) to conclude that an express prohibition prevented exercise of Section 151 CPC. The Court analyzed this in the light of the Supreme Court's decision in Banwari Lal (AIR 1993 SC 1139), which clarified that where a compromise is alleged to be unlawful (including because of fraud), a party can invoke the proviso to Rule 3 of Order 23 to have the court which recorded the compromise re-examine its lawfulness; the same relief could be invoked by way of Section 151 in appropriate circumstances prior to or in addition to the specific remedy created by amendment (and procedural changes like R.1A of O.43).

3. Application of authorities: The Court applied Banwari Lal directly, noting that the Supreme Court held that a petition under the proviso to Rule 3 or an appeal under Section 96(1) read with Rule 1A of Order 43 can be used to question the validity of a compromise. The Court also observed that various High Court decisions had held S.151 maintainable in such cases, and these were cited in Banwari Lal (Tara Bai, S.G. Thimmappa, Bindeshwari, Mangal Mahton, Sri Sri Iswar Gopal Jew). Thus, the absolute bar as perceived by the trial court was incompatible with the law as explained by the Supreme Court.

4. Factual matrix and consequences: Importantly, evidence had already been led by both parties on the question of fraud. The Court reasoned that treating the proceeding as an application maintainable under Section 151 (as the trial court had done earlier) would, given that evidence, effectively lead to adjudication of the main controversy and thus terminate the suit proceedings. Consequently, the bar contemplated by the amendment to Section 115 CPC (which restricts revision against interlocutory orders that would not terminate proceedings) did not preclude the present revision: if the trial court had held the Section 151 application maintainable, it would have decided the substantive controversy and thereby terminated the suit.

5. Conclusion on trial court error and appellate court remand: The Court found that the trial court misapplied the law by treating Order 23 Rule 3-A as an absolute prohibition to invoking Section 151 where fraud was alleged. The Appellate Court had also erred in some findings (Issues No. 3 and 4), but that judgment was not under challenge. Given the overall analysis and because the trial court's order (dismissing the Section 151 application) would produce a miscarriage of justice, the Court set aside the impugned order and directed the trial court to decide the Section 151 application on merits based on the evidence already on record.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: ORDER SET ASIDE — The impugned trial court order dismissing the application under Section 151 CPC is set aside.

Direct consequences and directions flowing from the decision:

  • The trial court is directed to decide the application under Section 151 CPC on merits, on the basis of the evidence already led in the suit.
  • The admission that evidence relevant to the allegation of fraud has already been led means that deciding the Section 151 application may necessarily involve determination of the substantive controversy (i.e., whether the compromise/decree was vitiated by fraud).
  • The Court noted that the bar in Order 23 Rule 3-A does not preclude the remedy of challenging a decree based on fraud via the proviso to Rule 3 of Order 23 or, in appropriate cases, under Section 151 CPC; thus the trial court's categorical refusal to consider Section 151 on that basis was incorrect.
  • Administrative directions: learned counsel for the parties were directed to appear before the trial court on 20-02-2012, and a copy of this order with the trial court record was directed to be sent to the trial court well before that date.

Broader precedent implications: The Court applied existing Supreme Court authority (Banwari Lal) and earlier High Court decisions (as discussed in Banwari Lal) to interpret the interplay between Order 23 R.3-A, the proviso to Rule 3 of Order 23, Rule 1A of Order 43 and Section 151 CPC. The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel principle distinct from those authorities; it applies them to find that the trial court misapplied the law and to order reconsideration on merits.

    Mst. Rehti Petitioner v. Abdul Gani

    :JUDGMENT:

    1. Trial court (Munsiff, Pulwama) in terms of order impugned dated 29.12.2008 has dismissed the application filed under Section 151 CPC. Aggrieved thereof revisional jurisdiction of this Court has been invoked.

    2. Facts and circumstances which have given rise to the impugned order are precisely required to be noticed as same shall be advantageous for proper appreciation of the controversy:

    (I) Suit titled Abdul Gani v. Ali Lone (file No. 146), on the basis of compromise deed, has been decided on 05.05.1992 by the trial court. Ali Lone (defendant therein) was issueless whereas Abdul Gani (plaintiff therein) is his sister's son. In terms of the compromise defendant Ali Lone is shown to have gifted away the suit land in favour of the plaintiff Abdul Gani.

    (II) Ali Lone filed a suit titled Ali Lone v. Abdul Gani Lone for cancellation of the consent decree wherein it is projected that he is in possession of the suit land covered by khewat Nos. 124 and 126 along with one storeyed tin roofed residential house and one granary(kothar). Abdul Gani has obtained a decree on the basis of a compromise which is based on fraud because he was interested in executing a will deed in favour of Abdul Gani, on whose behest he was taken to an Advocate and was asked to sign the will deed but the paper on which his sign was taken was blank, he was under the impression that will deed will be prepared. He in fact wanted Abdul Gani to be the owner of the suit land after his life time but he has been cheated as his signature has been misused. It is also projected that Ali Lone had agreed for execution of a will deed so as to retain the power of revoking the same during his life time on need basis.

    (III) In opposition Abdul Gani filed the written statement wherein he contended that the suit is barred by Order 23 Rule 3-A CPC and has also claimed to be in possession of the suit property.

    (IV) Finally on the basis of respective pleadings, trial court has framed the following issues:

    1) Whether the plaintiff is the khewatdar at Ratnipora and is in possession of the land falling under khewat No. 124 & 126 as a khewatdar?(OPP)

    2) Whether decree impugned passed by ld. Munsiff Pulwama on 5.5.1992 on the basis of compromise deed is ineffective on the rights of the plaintiff and is liable to be cancelled for being based on fraud?(OPP)

    3) Whether the suit aforesaid is barred by order 23 R 3-A CPC?(OPD)

    4) Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form for want of relief for possession?(OPD)

    5) Whether the suit is time barred?(OPD)

    6) Whether the suit of the plaintiff is hit by law of estoppel?(OPP)

    7) Relief? (OP Parties)

    (V) Issue No. 3 was treated as a preliminary issue and was fixed for consideration but in the meantime, on 19.3.1998, Ali Lone filed an application praying therein that the suit may be treated as an application under Section 151 CPC. Objections were filed on 10.5.2000 In view of this position, at the instance of counsel for the parties, hearing on the preliminary issue No. 3 was deferred and the parties were permitted to led evidence, as such, both the parties led evidence.

    (VI) On conclusion of the evidence, counsel for the parties were heard and issue-wise findings have been recorded.

    Issue No. 1. Whether the plaintiff is the khewatdar at Ratnipora and is in possession of the land falling under khewat No. 124 & 126 as a khewatdar?(OPP)

    It is recorded that the defendant Abdul Gani has been paying the usufruct of the suit land to the plaintiff Ali Lone which means that the defendant was in possession of 18 kanals of land and rest of the land under khewat No. 124 and 126 situated at Ratnipora is in possession of plaintiff Ali Lone, so the issue was partly decided in favour of the plaintiff and partly in favour of the defendant.

    Issue No. 2. Whether decree impugned passed by ld. Munsiff Pulwama on 5.5.1992 on the basis of compromise deed is ineffective on the rights of the plaintiff and is liable to be cancelled for being based on fraud?(OPP)

    While dealing with this issue, it is recorded that the witness Mr. J. D. Asgar Advocate has deposed that the plaintiff had approached him at his house for execution of a document which could not be quashed in future. It is the said witness who has deposed that he wrote a suit and the compromise deed and filed the same in the Court but in the Court defendant (plaintiff herein) did not appear and the compromise deed was signed by one advocate on behalf of Ali Lone and it has been concluded that the plaintiff has succeeded in establishing that the defendant played fraud and the said position has remained uncontroverted. Issue has been decided in favour of plaintiff Ali Lone.

    Issue No. 3. Whether the suit aforesaid is barred by order 23 R 3-A CPC?(OPD)

    While dealing with this issue, trial court, while relying on the judgment reported in AIR 1993 SC 1139, has recorded that the present suit of the plaintiff (Ali Lone) is treated as application under Section 151 CPC, accordingly issue has been decided in favour of plaintiff Ali Lone.

    Issue No. 4. Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form for want of relief for possession? (OPD)

    No evidence has been led, therefore, decided in favour of the plaintiff.

    Issue No. 5. Whether the suit is time barred?(OPD)

    Issue No. 6. Whether the suit of the plaintiff is hit by law of estoppel?(OPP)

    In respect of both these issues it is recorded that no evidence has been led by the defendant, therefore, decided in favour of the plaintiff.

    Issue No. 7. Relief.

    It has been concluded that the plaintiff Ali Lone is entitled to the relief of cancellation of decree dated 05.05.1992 passed by Munsiff, Pulwama in case titled Abdul Gani v. Ali Lone as the compromise was proved by the plaintiff as being based on fraud whereas defendant has succeeded in proving that the decreed land is in his possession at present, as such, relief for permanent injunction is not permissible.

    (VII) Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree appeal has been preferred but in the meantime Ali Lone has died, therefore, in appeal his widow Mst. Rehti has been arrayed as party/respondent.

    (VIII) Learned District Judge while deciding the said appeal has dealt with the findings recorded vis-à-vis issue No. 3 and 4 and on the result of such determination has recorded that there is no necessity to go into the correctness of the findings recorded on other issues. Learned Appellate Court has relied on the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case titled Banwari Lal v. Smt. Chando Devi (AIR 1993 SC 1139), wherein it has been held that “a party challenging a compromise can file a petition under proviso to R. 3 of O. 23, or an appeal under S. 96(1) of the Code, in which he can now question the validity of the compromise in view of R.1A of O.43 of the Code”. Finally has concluded that the trial court has converted the suit into an application under Section 151 CPC but has not given an opportunity of being heard to the defendant. On such basis has recorded that the finding recorded vis-à-vis issue No. 3 is illegal, erroneous, therefore, set aside.

    (IX) While dealing with the finding on issue No. 4, the Appellate Court has recorded that the issue No. 4 being purely a legal issue could be decided on the basis of law. Since the trial court has found the plaintiff out of possession so has declined to pass consequential relief of permanent injunction but has passed the decree of declaration simplicitor which is a nullity in terms of Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act. A decree of declaration simplicitor cannot be executed at all because the decree of declaration is passed when a shadow is cast upon the title of a person vis-à-vis some property or some right. Unless there is a consequential relief claimed, a decree of declaration becomes a paper decree, thus has been declared as nullity in law.

    (X) While recording aforesaid findings vis-à-vis issue No. 3 and 4, the learned Appellate Court has recorded that the correctness of the findings vis-à-vis other issues are not required to be looked into. Then has remanded the case back to the trial court with the direction to decide the application under Section 151 CPC after hearing the parties which application appears to have been filed during the trial.

    3. Though judgment of the Appellate Court dated 26.02.2008 is not under challenge but a strange situation arise there from because in terms of modified findings vis-à-vis issue No. 3 and 4, nothing would survive for further consideration before the trial court. What could be the purpose of remanding the case so as to decide the application under Section 151 of CPC afresh is totally astonishing. This position will be dealt with later on.

    4. In view of the direction for hearing the application under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure afresh, as is the mandate of the judgment dated 26.02.2008 passed by the Appellate Court, learned trial court while noticing that he has to decide as to whether suit could be treated as an application under Section 151 of CPC, while referring to the position of Order 23 Rule 3-A of CPC, appear to have concluded that there is a specific bar for challenging the consent decree, therefore, there is no scope for invoking powers under Section 151 of the Code. While quoting para 20 of the judgment rendered in the case Bahori…Applicant; v. Vidya Ram…Opp. Party. (AIR 1978 All. 299), has concluded that the exercise of power under Section 151 CPC is expressly prohibited and it is only when there is no such prohibition, the Court can consider whether power should be exercised under Section 151 CPC or not.

    5. Aggrieved by the said order, instant revision petition has been filed by Mst. Rehti - widow of Ali Lone.

    6. The star question for consideration at the first instance is as to what is the remedy available for challenging the decree which has been passed on the basis of a compromise. Order 23 Rule 3A CPC in specific terms provides that no suit shall lie to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise, on which the decree is passed, was not lawful.

    7. In the case in hand it has been specifically pleaded that Ali Lone, who was defendant in the original suit, never gifted away his property, instead his signature was taken on a blank paper by an Advocate at his residence under the impression that a will deed will be executed but instead a compromise deed has been prepared and presented in the court where, on behalf of Ali Lone, an Advocate has appeared. On the said basis it has been pleaded that the decree is based on a fraudulent compromise. On such ground consent decree is open to be challenged by having recourse to proviso to Order 23 Rule 3A or an appeal under Section 96(1) read with Rule 1A of Order 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

    8. Similar position fell for the consideration of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case Banwari Lal v. Smt. Chando Devi (AIR 1993 SC 1139), wherein it had been pleaded that the order recording compromise be recalled on the ground that the counsel was in collusion with the defendant who had played fraud on him by filing a fabricated petition of compromise although no compromise had been effected between him and the defendant. In the said reported judgment scope of bar as operates under Order 23 Rule 3, scope of proviso to Rule 3 of Order 23 and scope of Rule 1A of Order 43 of the Code has been considered.

    9. In the reported case the trial court had recalled the order passed in the suit on the basis of compromise. Same was set aside by the High Court but restored by the Hon'ble Apex Court. The Hon'ble Apex Court in para 13 of the judgment, while referring to the proviso along with explanation to Rule 3 of Order 23, has held as under:-

    “……..In view of the proviso read with explanation, a Court which had entertained the petition of compromise has to examine whether the compromise was void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act. Even R.1(m) of O.43 has been deleted under which an appeal was maintainable against an order recording a compromise. As such a party challenging a compromise can file a petition under proviso to R.3 of O.23, or an appeal under S.96(1) of the Code, in which he can now question the validity of the compromise in view of R.1A of O.43 of the Code.”

    10. Hon'ble Apex Court in para 14 of the judgment has also noticed the position as was prevalent prior to introduction of the proviso along with explanation to Rule 3 of Order 23. It shall be quite relevant to quote following portion from para 14 of the said judgment:

    “The application for exercise of power under proviso to R.3 of O.23 can be labelled under S.151 of the Code but when by the amending Act specifically such power has been vested in the Court before which the petition of compromise had been filed, the power in appropriate cases has to be exercised under the said proviso to R.3 It has been held by different High Courts that even after a compromise has been recorded, the Court concerned can entertain an application under S. 151 of the Code, questioning the legality or validity of the compromise. Reference in this connection may be made to the cases Tara Bai v. Krishnaswamy Rao*, AIR 1985 Kar 270; S.G Thimmappa v. T. Anantha*, AIR 1986 Kar 1, Bindeshwari Pd. Chaudhary v. Debendra Pd. Singh, AIR 1958 Pat 618; Mangal Mahton v. Behari Mahton, AIR 1964 Pat 483 and Sri Sri Iswar Gopal Jew v. Bhagwandas Shaw, AIR 1982 Cal 12, where it has been held that the application under S. 151 of the Code is maintainable…”

    11. Finally in the said para it has been concluded as under:

    “…….If the agreement or the compromise itself is fraudulent then it shall be deemed to be void within the meaning of the explanation to the proviso to R.3 and as such not lawful. The learned Subordinate Judge was perfectly justified in entertaining the application filed on behalf of the appellant and considering the question as to whether there had been a lawful agreement or compromise on the basis of which the Court could have recorded such agreement or compromise on 27-2-1991. Having come to the conclusion on the material produced that the compromise was not lawful within the meaning of R.3, there was no option left except to recall that order.”

    12. Applying the law as has been laid down in the reported judgment, the application of the petitioner could not be termed to be misconceived. The bar to suit as envisaged by Order 23 Rule 3-A does not prohibit the remedy of challenging the position of the decree being based on fraud, as permissible under explanation to proviso to Rule 3 or even under Section 151 CPC. The trial court has not appreciated the position of law correctly. The Appellate Court too has fallen in error while recording findings on issue No. 3 and issue No. 4 but since that judgment has not been challenged and on over all analysis trial court judgment had been set aside and case remanded to the trial court so as to decide the application.

    13. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent challenged the maintainability of the instant petition. While projecting the same, contends that in view of the amendment to Section 115 CPC revision petition cannot lay against an order which, if would have been in favour of the revisionist, would not terminate the suit proceedings.

    14. Now the question is as to whether by holding the application under Section 151 as maintainable by treating the suit as an application under Section 151 CPC, the suit proceedings would terminate or not. Answer is very simple. Evidence has been led on all issues, though framed in the suit but are directly the issues to be considered for allowing or disallowing the application. So in case trial court would have held the application to be maintainable, the necessary corollary of the same would have been adjudication of the entire dispute because evidence was led by both the parties relatable to the question of fraud. So while recording finding about the maintainability, the main controversy was also to be decided at the same time, so the suit proceedings would terminate. Therefore, bar in the said background for maintaining the revision petition will not operate. It is in view of this position in the beginning of the judgment position of the framing of issues, recording of evidence and the findings recorded thereon stand noticed.

    15. The order impugned if allowed to remain will result in causing miscarriage of justice, as such, is set aside. The trial court is directed now to decide the application on merits on the basis of the evidence as has already been led in the suit.

    16. Learned counsel for the parties shall appear before the trial court on 20-02-2012.

    17. Copy of this order along with trial court record be sent to the trial court well before the date fixed.

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    Comments

    Mst. Rehti Petitioner v. Abdul Gani
    (Feb 13, 2012)