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  • provisions of Section 151 and Order 18 Rule 17 of the Code.
  • provisions of Section 151, Order 18 Rule 17 of the Code
  • Order 18 Rule 17 read with Section 151 of the Code
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  • section 115 in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
  • section 151 or Order 18 Rule 17 of the Code
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citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
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  • provisions of Section 151 and Order 18 Rule 17 of the Code.
  • provisions of Section 151, Order 18 Rule 17 of the Code
  • Order 18 Rule 17 read with Section 151 of the Code
  • SECTION 29 STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT
  • section 115 in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
  • section 151 or Order 18 Rule 17 of the Code
  • ARTICLE 227 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • provisions of Order 18 Rule 17 of the Code
  • provisions of Section 151 of the Code,
  • section 151 of the Code. Para 12
  • Order 18 Rule 17 of the Code

    Gujarat Industrial Investment Co. Ltd. Petitioner(S) v. Lalitaben Govindbhai Patel & 5 (S)

    ORAL ORDER

    This petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is filed by the petitioner-original plaintiff-Gujarat Industrial Investment Corporation Limited [for short, ‘GIIC’] challenging the order dated 11.01.2001 passed below Exh.114 in Regular Civil Suit No. 3953 of 1988 by which application Exh.114 filed by the petitioner for re-opening the stage of oral examination of witnesses which was closed by order dated 06.04.2000, came to be rejected.

    2. Brief facts of the case relevant for the purpose of deciding this petition, are as under:

    2.1 The petitioner is one of the Government of Gujarat enterprises, which is a company having 100% share holding held by the Government of Gujarat. One Ganpati Pulp and Papers Limited approached the petitioner for grant of financial assistance in the year 1979 and initially the petitioner granted a loan of Rs. 40 lakhs and subsequently Rs. 20 lakhs was granted at the request of the said Ganpati Pulp and Papers Mills Limited. The present respondents/defendants are guarantors for the said financial assistance granted by the petitioner to Ganpati Pulp and Papers Mills Ltd., the principal borrower. As against the above, the principal borrower availed amount of Rs. 54.35 lakhs approximately. The principal borrower executed various legal and security documents, including equitable mortgage by deposit of title deeds in accordance with law. Other banks and financial institutions, including GSFC, had also sanctioned financial assistance to the principal borrower company.

    2.2 It is the case of the petitioner-GIIC that the principal borrower company was closed down and ultimately in association with other financial institutions, whose dues were also outstanding, GSFC took possession on 22.10.1986 of the mortgaged property in question, in exercise of powers under Section 29 of the State financial Corporations Act. A petition being Company Petition No. 139/1985 was also filed by a unsecured creditor before this Court, where order was passed for winding up of the principal borrower company and Official Liquidator was appointed. The petitioner-GIIC filed Regular Civil Suit No. 3953 of 1988 for recovery of dues against the respondents, who were the guarantors and directors of the principal borrower together with interest and costs. During the pendency of the suit, defendant No. 2 expired and his legal heirs were brought on record. At the time of filing suit an amount of Rs. 1,64,03,583/- was outstanding by the respondent company. During the pendency of the suit application Exh.96 was filed declaring that petitioner-GIIC is entitled to recover total amount of Rs. 6,28,90,012/- after deducting Rs. 1,64,60,709/- received pursuant to the measure undertaken by the petitioner-GIIC under section 29 of the SFC Act and the said amount was to be deducted, and therefore, net amount payable was Rs. 4,64,29,303/-. It is not in dispute that in the year 1997 the suit was taken up for trial and the issues were framed on 24.06.1997 after about 9 years. Even application for amendment of written statement was filed and amendment of plaint and production of documents were also filed. The first witness of the petitioner-plaintiff, Shri Virendra H. Pancholi [Exh.34] was examined on 23.07.1998 and was also cross examined by defendants. Thereafter, another witness Shri Anilkumar Tulsidas Shah [Exh.35] was examined on 04.01.2000 and cross-examination started on the same day and was cross-examined. Thereafter, the matter was taken up so as to enable the witnesses to have further details from consortium account and further cross-examination was postponed. The said witness could not make himself available for further cross-examination and remained absent. The trial court closed evidence and treated the deposition of the said witness Anilkumar as cancelled vide order dated 29.06.2000

    3. It is the case of the petitioner that except examination of officer of GSFC, no other witness has been examined by the respondents-defendants and upon knowledge about closure of evidence, the petitioner-GIIC on 27.09.2000 submitted an application Exh.114 requesting the trial Court to re-open the stage of examining the witness and to allow petitioner to examine other witness as number of documents have been produced later on by both the sides and affidavits were filed.

    3.1 The trial Court, by order dated 11.01.2001 rejected the said application on the ground that the petitioner-GIIC and its officers were not vigilant and application Exh.114 was filed almost after 8 months when evidence of the petitioner-GIIC was ordered to be closed, and therefore, there was no question to allow the petitioner-GIIC for re-opening the evidence and it was the duty of the petitioner-GIIC to prove the documents when its witness were present and deposition was recorded. Further, it was not the case of the plaintiff that after their evidence, the defendants have produced any documents and it has become necessary to explain such subsequent evidence of the defendants.

    3.2 That being aggrieved and dissatisfied by the above order dated 11.01.2001, the petitioner-GIIC filed Civil Revision Application No. 188 of 2001 before this Court, wherein, initially interim relief was granted and proceedings of the suit were stayed, which was in force during the pendency of the said Civil Revision Application for about 11 years and finally on 27.03.2012 while discharging the Rule, petitioner-GIIC was permitted to avail other remedies viz. to file writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in view of amendment of section 115 in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Hence, the present petition.

    4. Mr. Rajesh Dave, learned advocate for the petitioner-GIIC, would contend that by rejecting the application Exh.114 for re-opening the evidence, which was ordered to be closed, the trial Court erred in exercising its jurisdiction inasmuch as the petitioner-GIIC is deprived of placing evidence in suit for recovery of an amount of Rs. 4,64,29,303/-, which was due as per the plaint and subsequent application for amendment. It is next contended that in preferring the application Exh.114 for re-opening the evidence, there was no inordinate delay and the trial court erred in recording a finding that there is a delay of about 8 months. In fact, the order to close the evidence was passed on 06.04.2000 and application was preferred on 27.09.2000, and therefore, at the most, the delay was about 5½ months due to compelling circumstances, which prevented the petitioner from examining several witnesses and bringing relevant documents was due to the fact that Voluntary Retirement Scheme [for short, ‘VRS’] was made applicable to the officers, which resulted into internal massive changes at various departments in the entire State. Thus, Anil Kumar Shah, one of the witnesses [Exh.85] was also one of them who could not remain present for further cross-examination and the trial court has not taken into consideration all these important aspects. It is further submitted that by not permitting to reopen the stage for evidence, serious prejudice is caused to the petitioner, and therefore, the court below has committed serious jurisdictional error in denying a reasonable opportunity to the petitioner-GIIC. According to learned advocate for the petitioner-GIIC, it was a bonafide application filed by the petitioner-GIIC to recover dues outstanding to a semi-government corporation, there was no reason for the petitioner-GIIC to prolong or protract litigation, which would not be in the interest of the petitioner-plaintiff.

    4.1 Learned advocate for the petitioner-GIIC placing reliance on the provisions of Section 151, Order 18 Rule 17 of the Code and decisions of the Apex Court in the cases of K.K Velusamy v. N. Palanisamy [(2011) 11 SCC 275] and Salem Advocate Bar Association, Tamil Nadu v. Union of India [AIR 2005 SC 3353], submitted that the civil court is duty bound to ensure that the process of re-opening evidence is not a protractive tactic and if the application is bonafide only consideration to be weighed with the court is to consider whether the evidence sought to be produced would either assist in clarifying evidence led on the issues or lead to a just and effective adjudication. In absence of any malafide or any intention to protract the litigation for arriving just and effective adjudicating, the court ought to have accepted the prayer of the plaintiff to re-open evidence. It is also submitted that even as per the parameters laid down in para 12 of the judgment in the case of K.K Velusamy [supra] for exercising powers under section 151 of the Code, the court below ought to have exercised such inherent power under section 151 Code in favour of the petitioner-GIIC. Thus, it is submitted that the petition be allowed by quashing and setting aside the impugned orders.

    5. Per contra, Mr. Apurva Vakil appearing for the respondents, heavily relied on the provisions of Order 18 Rule 17 of the Code and submitted that when specific provisions are available, the civil court need not take recourse to inherent power under section 151 of the Code. It is further submitted that all throughout the petitioner-GIIC remained negligent and careless in prosecuting his case and in spite of the opportunities given by the trial court to produce the evidence and/or relevant record, no such opportunity was availed and as a last resort the court was left with no option but to close the evidence of the plaintiff-GIIC by discarding the incomplete cross-examination of concerned witness. In addition to the above, it is submitted that even application Exh.114 preferred by the plaintiff-GIIC on 27.09.2000 was as vague as it could be and no reasons were mentioned much less requirement or purpose for which such application Exh.114 was preferred. Therefore, the court rejecting the application by the order impugned has exercised the discretion vested into it and in absence of any illegality in exercise of such discretion, this Court exercising powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India would refuse to entertain this petition. It is also contended that even in filing the application, as above, there was gross delay and in absence of any specific averments in the application and the defendant had not produced any evidence which would have required any counter or cross by the plaintiff-GIIC, there was no justification as rightly observed by the civil court and duty was cast on plaintiff-GIIC to prove the documents when the stage was already reached and exhausted by the plaintiff-GIIC, the trial court was well within its domain while rejecting application for re-opening the evidence. Learned advocate for the respondents-defendants placing reliance on the decision in the case of K.K Velusamy [supra] submits that powers under section 151 or Order 18 Rule 17 of the Code is not intended to be used routinely merely for asking and if so used, it will defeat the very purpose of the various amendments to the Code to expedite the trial. According to learned advocate for the respondents, it is not the case that the civil court had no power to order re-opening the witness. However, sufficient cause and justification was not available as per the application Exh.114 and contents thereof and when discretion so exercised by the civil court, no further opportunity could be given to the party, who remained negligent and careless in pursing the opportunity and/or remedy available. In support of the above submissions reliance is also placed on two decisions in the cases of [i] Macha Gangadhar v. Macha Gangaram [AIR 2005 AP 178] and [ii] Prahlad Das v. Karunaram [AIR 1999 Raj. 108] where the High Courts refused to exercise powers in revision petitions when the court below refused to consider the application under Order 18 Rule 17 of the Code precisely on the grounds similar to the facts of the present case. It is, therefore, submitted that the order impugned does not suffer from vice of any illegality either in exercising jurisdiction nor the order per se can be said to be illegal and no relief is required to be granted in favour of the petitioner in exercise of powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

    6. Before considering rival submissions of learned advocates for the parties, it is worth referring to the decision of K.K Velusamy [supra] in the context of provisions of Section 151 and Order 18 Rule 17 of the Code. In the above case, two applications were filed viz. one under section 151 of the Code with prayer to re-open the evidence for the purpose of further cross-examination of the plaintiff and the contesting witness [PW 1 & PW 2] filed another application under Order 18 Rule 17 of the Code for recalling PW-1 & PW-2 for further cross-examination. The appellant-defendant wanted to cross-examine the witnesses with reference to the admissions made during some conversations, recorded on a compact disc. While examining both the above applications, the Apex Court considered various decisions of the Apex Court and summarized in para 12 of the judgment, to exercise powers of section 151 of the Code. Para 12 of the judgment reads, as under:

    “12. The respondent contended that section 151 cannot beused for re-opening evidence or for recalling witnesses. We are not able to accept the said submission as an absolute proposition. We however agree that section 151 of the Code cannot be routinely invoked for re-opening evidence or recalling witnesses. The scope of section 151 has been explained by this Court in several decisions (See: Padam Sen v. State of UP-AIR 1961 SC8218; Manoharlal Chopra v. Seth Hiralal - AIR 1962 SC 527; Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar - AIR 1964 SC 993; Ram Chand and Sons Sugar Mills (P) Ltd. v. Kanhay Lal - AIR 1966 SC 1899; Nain Singh v. Koonwarjee -1970 (1) SCC 732; The Newabganj Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India - AIR 1976 SC 1152; Jaipur Mineral Development Syndicate v. Commissioner of Income Tax, New Delhi - AIR 1977 SC 1348; National Institute of Mental Health & Neuro Sciences v. C. Parameshwara - 2005 (2) SCC 256; and Vinod Seth v. Devinder Bajaj - 2010 (8) SCC 1). We may summarize them as follows:

    (a) Section 151 is not a substantive provision which creates or confers any power or jurisdiction on courts. It merely recognizes the discretionary power inherent in every court as a necessary corollary for rendering justice in accordance with law, to do what is ‘right’ and undo what is ‘wrong’, thatis, to do all things necessary to secure the ends of justice and prevent abuse of its process.

    (b) As the provisions of the Code are not exhaustive, section 151 recognizes and confirms that if the Code does not expressly or impliedly cover any particular procedural aspect, the inherent power can be used to deal with such situation or aspect, if the ends of justice warrant it. The breadth of such power is co-extensive with the need to exercise such power on the facts and circumstances.

    (c) A Court has no power to do that which is prohibited by law or the Code, by purported exercise of its inherent powers. If the Code contains provisions dealing with a particular topic or aspect, and such provisions either expressly or necessary implication exhaust the scope of the power of the court or the jurisdiction that may exercised in relation to that matter, the inherent power cannot be invoked in order to cut across the powers conferred by the Code or a manner inconsistent with such provisions. In other words the court cannot make use of the special provisions of Section 151 of the Code, where the remedy or procedure is provided in the Code.

    (d) The inherent powers of the court being complementary to the powers specifically conferred, a court is free to exercise them for the purposes mentioned in Section 151 of the Code when the matter is not covered by any specific provision in the Code and the exercise of those powers would not in any way be in conflict with what has been expressly provided in the Code or be against the intention of the Legislature.

    (e) While exercising the inherent power, the court will be doubly cautious, as there is no legislative guidance to deal with the procedural situation and the exercise of power depends upon the discretion and wisdom of the court, and the facts and circumstances of the case. The absence of an express provision in the code and the recognition and saving of the inherent power of a court, should not however be treated as a carte blanche to grant any relief.

    (f) The power under section 151 will have to be used with circumspection and care, only where it is absolutely necessary, when there is no provision in the Code governing the matter, when the bona fides of the applicant cannot be doubted, when such exercise is to meet the ends of justice and to prevent abuse of process of court”.

    7. In addition to the above, the Apex Court also noticed that no application should be entertained once the trial or hearing is concluded and the case is reserved for judgment is a sound rule, but not a straitjacket formula, there can always be exceptions in exceptional or extraordinary circumstances, to meet the ends of justice and to prevent abuse of process of court, subject to the limitation recognized with reference to exercise of power under Section 151 of the Code. In para 15, the Apex Court held as under:

    “15. The learned counsel for respondent contended that once arguments are commenced, there could be no re-opening of evidence or recalling of any witness. This contention is raised by extending the convention that once arguments are concluded and the case is reserved for judgment, the court will not entertain any interlocutory application for any kind of relief. The need for the court to act in a manner to achieve the ends of justice (subject to the need to comply with the law) does not end when arguments are heard and judgment is reserved. If there is abuse of the process of the court, or if interests of justice require the court to do something or take note of something, the discretion to do those things does not disappear merely because the arguments are heard, eitherfully or partly. The convention that no application should be entertained once the trial or hearing isconcluded and the case is reserved for judgment is asound rule, but not a straitjacket formula. There can always be exceptions in exceptional or extra-ordinary circumstances, to meet the ends of justice and to prevent abuse of process of court, subject to the limitation recognized with reference to exercise of power under section 151 of the Code. Be that as itmay. In this case, the applications were made beforethe conclusion of the arguments.

    [emphasis supplied]

    8. That in the above case, neither the trial court nor High Court had examined question about exercise of discretion under Section 151 or under Order 18 Rule 17 of the Code where the evidence sought to be produced would either assist in clarifying evidence led on the issues or lead to a just and effective adjudication and the application was mechanically dismissed by the courts below only on the ground that matter was already at the stage of final arguments and application would have the effect of delaying the proceedings. In paras 19 and 20 of the above judgment, the Apex Court held as under:

    “19. We may add a word of caution. The power under section 151 or Order 18 Rule 17 of the Code is not intended to be used routinely, merely for the asking. If so used, it will defeat the very purpose of various amendments to the Code to expedite trials. But where the application is found to be bona fide and where the additional evidence, oral or documentary, will assist the court to clarify the evidence on the issues and will assist in rendering justice, and the court is satisfied that non-production earlier was for valid and sufficient reasons, the court may exercise its discretion to recall the witnesses or permit the fresh evidence. But if it does so, it should ensure that the process does not become a protracting tactic. The court should firstly award appropriate costs to the other party to compensate for the delay. Secondly the court should take up and complete the case within a fixed time schedule so that the delay is avoided. Thirdly if the application is found to be mischievous, or frivolous, or to cover up negligence or lacunae, it should be rejected with heavy costs.

    [emphasis supplied]

    20. If the application is allowed and the evidence is permitted and ultimately the court finds that evidence was not genuine or relevant and did not warrant the re opening of the case recalling the witnesses, it can be made a ground for awarding exemplary costs apart from ordering prosecution if it involves fabrication of evidence. If the party had an opportunity to produce such evidence earlier but did not do so or if the evidence already led is clear and unambiguous, or if it comes to the conclusion that the object of the application is merely to protract the proceedings, the court should reject the application. If the evidence sought to be produced is an electronic record, the court may also listen to the recording before granting or rejecting the application”.

    Thus, if the judgment is read as a whole, the anxiety on the part of the Apex Court was to see that applications of mischievous, or frivolous, or to cover up negligence or lacunae are to be rejected with heavy costs. But, if the application is bonafide and would assist the court in bringing at a just and effective adjudication by leading the evidence, such application is not to be rejected mechanically.

    9. In view of the above decision, while considering application under Order 18 Rule 17 of the Code, the court has to prima facie look into substance about merit of bonafide action on the part of the person who moves such application and that the additional evidence, oral or documentary will assist the court to clarify the evidence on the issues and will assist in rendering justice, and the court is satisfied that non-production earlier was for valid and sufficient reasons and accordingly discretion be exercised. Even in a given case, the court is empowered to impose costs and the applicant-GIIC, a semi-government corporation filed civil suit for recovery of outstanding dues to the extent of Rs. 4,64,29,303/- as per subsequent application at Exh.96 moved on 21.03.2000 after adjusting recovery under Section 29 of the Act had no earthly reason either for delaying or protracting the suit. The issues were framed on 24.05.1997 i.e after 9 years and evidence had commenced thereafter and even time was granted to defendant to produce relevant record from time to time and the first witness came to be examined on 23.07.1998 Though details and particulars and grounds were not stated in the application dated 27.09.2000 for re-opening the closed evidence, a request was made that plaintiff had deposed orally and certain documents which were produced and to be proved for which re-opening stage of evidence was necessary in the interest of justice. There was only delay of about 5½ months which could not be termed as inordinate. Besides in a government or semi-government institution decision making process is based on involvement of various authorities inter se and in view of non-availability of the witness, who opted voluntary retirement, it was not possible for the plaintiff-corporation to move the court for necessary relief. If the stage of evidence is not opened, the very claim of recovery of dues depending on various documents already produced would remain unproved and even for some negligence of officer of corporation, public fund and money need not go unrecovered. If the parameters for exercising power under Order 18 Rule 17 read with Section 151 of the Code are seen, the decision in the case of K.K Velusamy [supra] would help the cause of the petitioner. The decisions in the cases of Macha Gangadhar [supra] and Prahlad Das [supra] relied on by the learned advocate for the respondents have no application to the facts of the present case. Even the earlier order dated 06.04.2000 of closure of evidence is seen, it was passed on the basis of negligence on the part of the officer of a semi-government institution like the plaintiff, who is the custodian of public money and failed to discharge his duty. The very ground ought to have been considered for re-opening the evidence by the civil court inasmuch as for the negligence, if any, on the part of the officer of semi-government like the petitioner-GIIC, recovery of money dues to the plaintiff-GIIC ought not to have been jeopardized by taking such hyper technical view. Thus, upon consideration of overall facts and circumstances of the case and legal position on re-opening of evidence already closed, there was no justification for disallowing application Exh.114 under Order 18 Rule 17 read with Section 151 of the Code filed by the plaintiff-petitioner. The court below erred in exercising jurisdiction to the extent, as above. Therefore, the order impugned dated 11.01.2001 passed below Exh.114 is hereby quashed and set aside.

    Accordingly, this petition is allowed to the aforesaid extent only.

    10. In view of the above, the evidence which was ordered to be closed on 06.04.2000 and the application Exh. 11 rejected on 11.01.2001 both orders are hereby quashed and set aside. Civil Revision Application No. 188 of 2001 filed by the petitioner remained pending for about 11 years till it was finally disposed of on 27.03.2012 permitting petitioner to file writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The trial Court is directed to proceed with the suit permitting the petitionerplaintiff-GIIC to lead evidence, as prayed for, as if orders impugned were not passed.

    At this stage, Mr. A.S Vakil, learned advocate, prayed to stay this order for a period of three weeks. Considering the facts request is rejected.

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    Gujarat Industrial Investment Co. Ltd. Petitioner(S) v. Lalitaben Govindbhai Patel & 5 (S)
    (Aug 23, 2012)