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  • Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code,
  • Section 499.16.1
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  • Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code,
  • Section 499.16.1
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner is the Chairman of Sachin Udyognagar Sahakari Mandali Limited. The complainant, acting as the power of attorney holder of his son (who is a member of the society), alleges that a notice dated 16.5.2007 issued by the petitioner’s advocate contains defamatory statements. The complainant claims that the notice was intended to intimidate, threaten, and blackmail members of a committee called “Sabhasad Hitrakask Samiti,” formed to expose alleged illegal activities of the society's office bearers. The notice contained allegations of serious criminal conduct against the complainant’s son and others. The complainant filed a complaint under Section 500 IPC before the JMFC court, Surat, which sent the complaint for police inquiry. Upon receipt of the police report and subsequent proceedings, the trial court issued an order challenging the petitioner's request to quash the complaint.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the issuance of a legal notice by an advocate on behalf of a client amounts to "making" or "publishing" defamatory imputation under Section 499 of the IPC?
  2. Whether the contents of the notice and its alleged circulation constitute defamation under the law?
  3. What is the degree of freedom an advocate enjoys in issuing a legal notice without attracting liability for defamation?
  4. Whether forwarding copies of the notice to police officials and certain private persons amounts to publication causing defamation?

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner’s Arguments

  • The petitioner’s advocate argued that issuance of a notice by an advocate does not amount to “making” or “publishing” defamatory statements under Section 499 IPC.
  • Reference was made to the decision in Varshaben Devendrabhai Patel v. State of Gujarat and the Supreme Court’s ruling in K. Khushboo v. Kanniammal to support that no prima facie case of defamation exists.
  • It was contended that the notice’s circulation to police officers and private individuals was either non-existent or insufficient to constitute publication, especially since some recipients were those against whom allegations were made.
  • The circulation of a leaflet by the petitioner was argued to be immaterial as it contained no defamatory content.
  • It was submitted that advocates enjoy a considerable degree of freedom in issuing notices, including use of strong or exaggerated language, without attracting defamation liability unless there is malicious intent.

Complainant’s Position

  • The complainant alleged that the notice contained defamatory imputations falsely accusing him of serious criminal offenses and intended to tarnish his reputation.
  • By sending copies of the notice to police officers, the complainant contended that an impression was created that police action might be initiated against him.
  • The complainant produced evidence including a leaflet and witness testimony to show that the notice lowered his prestige and respect in the eyes of others.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Varshaben Devendrabhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, 2007 Cri.L.J 2877 (Guj) Clarification that defamation requires certain elements and that communication limited to the complainant alone may not constitute defamation. Used to demonstrate that mere issuance of notice or communication to the complainant does not prima facie establish defamation.
K. Khushboo v. Kanniammal, 2010 (2) GLH 334 (SC) Requirement of mens rea and actus reus for defamation; absence of intent to harm reputation negates defamation claim. Applied to show that the notice lacked intention to harm reputation and thus did not constitute defamation.
Queen-Empress v. Taki Husain, 1884 All WN 340 Distinction between ‘making’ and ‘publishing’ defamatory imputations; sending a notice to the accused alone does not amount to publication. Relied upon to hold that issuance of notice by an advocate to the concerned party does not amount to defamation by publishing.
B.P Bhaskar v. B.P Shiva, 1993 Cri.L.J 2685 (Madras) Legal notice issued by advocate does not amount to publication of defamatory matter. Supported the principle that reply or notice by an advocate is not publication attracting defamation liability.
P.R Ramakrishnan v. Subbaramma Sastrigal, AIR 1988 Ker. 18 Issuance of legal notice by an advocate does not amount to publication of defamatory matter. Referenced to reinforce the non-publication nature of legal notices issued by advocates.
Om Prakash Chotala, (2014) 5 SCC 417 Recognition of reputation as a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution and the need for careful judicial scrutiny when reputation is at stake. Quoted to emphasize the importance of reputation and the careful balancing required in defamation claims.
Umesh Kumar v. State of A.P, (2013) 10 SCC 591; Kiran Bedi v. Committee of Inquiry, (1989) 1 SCC 494; Vishwanath Agarwal v. Sarla Vishwanath Agarwal, (2012) 7 SCC 288; Mehmood Nayyar Azam v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2012) 8 SCC 1 Various principles relating to reputation and defamation under constitutional and criminal law. Referred to in the context of the Supreme Court’s observations on reputation in Om Prakash Chotala.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the essential ingredients of defamation under Section 499 IPC, which require making or publishing an imputation concerning a person with intent or knowledge that it would harm that person's reputation. The court noted the distinction between ‘making’ and ‘publishing’ and emphasized that communication limited to the concerned party alone generally does not amount to publication.

Relying on precedents including Queen-Empress v. Taki Husain, the court held that issuance of a notice by an advocate to the party concerned is not ‘making’ or ‘publishing’ defamatory imputations within the meaning of Section 499. The court observed that forwarding copies of the notice to police officials, given the nature of legal correspondence, is unlikely to be treated as publication causing defamation, especially in the absence of evidence that the police actually received or acted upon the notice.

The court also analyzed the complainant’s evidence, including a witness statement that the complainant’s reputation was lowered. However, the court found such evidence to be either absurd or insufficient to establish harm to reputation legally. Further, the court noted that the complainant had not effectively disproved the petitioner’s claim that the notice was issued in good faith and without malicious intent.

Additionally, the court underscored the broad freedom enjoyed by advocates in issuing legal notices, including the use of strong or exaggerated language, provided the purpose is to advance the client’s cause rather than to maliciously defame. The court cautioned that misuse of this freedom could attract consequences, but found no such misuse here.

Considering all aspects, the court concluded that the complaint did not disclose a prima facie case of defamation and that continuation of the proceedings amounted to an abuse of the legal process.

Holding and Implications

The petition is allowed and the complaint (Inquiry Case No. 06 of 2007) pending before the 9th Judicial Magistrate, Surat is quashed and set aside.

The direct effect of this decision is the termination of the defamation proceedings against the petitioner in this case. The court reaffirmed the principle that issuance of a legal notice by an advocate, even if containing strong or harsh language, does not amount to defamation unless accompanied by malice or improper intent. No new precedent was created; rather, existing principles regarding defamation and the freedom of advocates in legal correspondence were applied and reiterated.

    Hemantkumar Hasmukhlal Hojiwala v. State Of Gujarat

    ORAL JUDGMENT

    1. What is defamation? Complainant alleges that notice given by petitioner's advocate contains defamatory statement and hence, the complaint. Petitioner prays to quash the complaint.

    2. Few relevant facts are, thus;

    Petitioner is a Chairman of Sachin Udyognagar Sahakari Mandali Limited. Complainant claims to be the power of attorney holder of his son. Complainant's son is a member of said Sachin Udyognagar Sahakari Mandali Limited. Some of the members of the society have formed committee called “Sabhasad Hitrakask Samiti”. It is claimed that to expose illegal activities of the office bearers of the co-operative society, this Samiti is formed. It is the say of the complainant that to intimidate, threaten and blackmail the members of the said committee, a notice in question was given by the petitioner's advocate. It is dated 16.5.2007 Alleged defamatory allegation made in the notice, in substance, are as under:

    (I) That you are the accused in the complaint bearing IC.R No. 87/2003 registered at Gondal Police Station for murder of one Vikramsinh Rana,

    (II) That in murder of one Tulsi Bhagat of Jasdan Taluka, you are also the accused.

    (III) That in your native, you were involved in serious criminal activities and upon police pressure mounting, you have left the native and shifted to Surat. However, it appears that you have not given up your criminal mentality.

    (IV) That you have come at Surat after committing two murders. That you have come to threaten and terrorize the members of the society. That you have formed assembly of anti-social elements, who have criminal background.

    (V) That there is a documentary evidence of cheating and forgery in connection with sale of plot.

    3. It is the say of the complainant that by issuing the notice with above-referred contents and giving a copy of the notice to six police officers - who are referred to at the end of the notice - the impression is created that complainant is an criminal and intention is, police officer may take criminal action against the complainant.

    4. Complainant filed the complaint before the JMFC court, Surat alleging that by issuing notice with above-referred contents, the petitioner has committed an offence under Section 500 of IPC. The learned trial court has sent the complaint for inquiry. Upon receiving of police report, the learned trial court has passed the order under challenge below Exh.1

    5. Heard learned Senior Advocate Mr. R.S Sanjanwala assisted by learned advocate Mr. A.V Thakkar on behalf of petitioner and learned APP Mr. K.P Raval for respondent No. 1 - State of Gujarat. Complaint, though duly served, has not engaged any advocate and has remained absent.

    6. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. R.S Sanjanwala apprises the Court to the facts of the case and has referred to the relevant material on record. It was submitted that there is no case of offence of defamation even prima facie. It was submitted that giving of notice by an advocate on behalf of his client, does not amount to ‘making’ or ‘publishing’. Shri Sanjanwala has drawn attention to a decision of this Court in the case of Varshaben Devendrabhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, reported in 2007 Cri.L.J 2877 (Guj.) and also to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of K. Khushboo v. Kanniammal, reported in 2010 (2) GLH 334.

    7. In Varshaben Devendrabhai Patel's case (supra), the complainant was a teacher. The petitioners before this Court were trustees and office bearers of the school. The complaint of the complainant was two fold; firstly, the defamation is made in oral and secondly, it is in the form of letter of termination of services. As to the former, it was the say of the complainant that petitioners were saying in presence of others that complainant did not know anything and she is very harsh to the young students. It was alleged that such a derogatory statements were made in presence of other teachers and parents of the students. In letter of termination, it was alleged that complainant is not behaving properly with the parents and she is imposing corporal punishment upon the students. Demanding explanation by the complainant about allegations, complainant was said to have told - Is she attending the school for teaching or for flirting, and that she was told that it is not a ‘fashion parade’. It is interesting to note that news of termination of her services was published in dailies. On these allegations, complaint of defamation was filed. Petitioners were praying for quashing of the complaint. In that case also, complainant did not turn up before this Court. Allowing the petition, this Court has held in Para.6 as under:

    “6. It was seen from bare perusal of the complaint that the complaint as well as the statement on oath recorded below were vague and details were left to be filled up. There is no gainsaying the fact that the teacher was discharged from service expressly on the ground of her record of unsatisfactory service. After the allegations of defamation by spoken words in presence of unnamed teachers or parents, it is not even alleged that the words were intended to or did harm her reputation. The complainant appears to be mainly relying upon the words used in the letter terminating her service, and the words used in the letter of termination, even if assumed to be defamatory, were communicated to her only. Therefore, such communication would be covered by Explanation (4) since the imputation could not lower the moral or intellectual character of the complainant, or, by itself, lower the character in the estimation of others. The remaining allegations about asking of questions by the petitioners, who were managing a school, about the behaviour of the complainant could not be termed as defamatory in so far as the petitioners were entitled to question the teacher if her behaviour was found to be questionable. Thus, in short, it clearly appears that the complainant had set the machinery of criminal court into motion only with a view to take revenge against termination of her service and, taking the allegations even at their face value, the complaint did not make out or disclose an offence for which the petitioners could be tried. In this view of the matter, the petition is required to be allowed and accordingly it is allowed with the direction that the proceedings of Criminal Case No. 10322 of 1995 pending in the court of learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Surat are quashed. Rule is made absolute with no order as to costs. (emphasis in original)

    8. In the present case, the court had sent the complaint for police inquiry. Police has filed a report dated 16.8.2007 Police has reported that complainant on being asked by police has not given any statement and has stated that police may proceed accordance with law. On receipt of the report, court has issued notice to the complainant. Complainant had given statement before the court referring the allegation made in the notice and has also produced one leaflet alleging that present petitioner is circulating this leaflet among the public and leaflet contains the defamatory allegation. Complainant has also examined one Mansukh Bavisiya, who had stated before the court that on reading the contents of the notice, prestige of complainant is lowered in his - the witness - eyes and now, he is not giving respect to the complainant. He also says that he has reduced the relationship with the complainant. Considering the record of the case, learned trial court concluded that complainant at this stage is not required to establish his case beyond doubt. The learned trial court was of the view that complainant has brought on record the evidence in support of the say about defamation. Holding so, it ordered to issue the summons.

    9. Essential ingredients of offence of defamation are, thus; (i) Making or publishing any imputation concerning any person; (ii) such imputation must have been made by (a) words, either spoken or intended to be read; or (b) sign etc. and (iii) such imputation must have been made with the intention of harming or with knowledge or reason to believe that it will harm the reputation of the person concerned.

    10. As far as back in 1884, issue as to what constitutes defamation came to be referred to Five Judges Bench in Queen-Empress v. Taki Husain, reported in 1884 All WN 340. This case is referred by this Court in Varshaben Devendrabhai Patel's case (supra). The question referred to the Full Bench of Allahabad High Court was, thus;

    “Assuming for the purpose of argument, that the matter contained in the notice sent by the applicant to Basawan Singh was defamatory in the sense of Explanation (4) to Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code, in that none of the Exceptions provided under that section can be established, then was the action of the applicant in sending the notice in a closed cover by post to Basawan Singh such a making or publishing of the defamatory matters as to constitute an offence within the meaning of Section 499 of the IPC?”

    11. In the present case, defamation is alleged for the act of giving notice by the learned advocate of the petitioner. The contents of the notice found to be objectionable and defamatory by the complainant. At the time of hearing, learned Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjanwala submitted that mere issuance of notice by the advocate to the party does not amount to publishing and therefore, party cannot complain of defamation on account of such legal notice. Essential ingredients of defamation is referred above. On perusal of it, it would appear that even ‘making’ of imputation concerning any person would attract the offence of defamation. The provision gives impression that ‘publishing’ is not necessary in the sense that even making of imputation concerning any person would fall within the mischief of this provision. In other words, ‘making’ itself - as distinct and independent from ‘publishing’ - brings the act within this provision of the Act. This aspect is considered in Queen-Empress's case (supra). It would appear from the question framed for consideration of Full Bench, that in that case, issue arose for consideration on account of issuance of notice by the advocate - as in the present case. Therein, Mahmood, J., in separate concurring opinion, has observed that the imputations communicated to the prosecutor only, could not be treated as defamatory. A man's opinion of himself cannot be called his reputation. Petheram, C.J observed that, if the illustrations to Section 499 were looked at, they all deal with such communications only as are made to third persons. A man has no reputation to himself and therefore, the section does not make an act of this nature a crime. It follows that sending of the letter was not ‘making’ or ‘publishing’ an imputation within the meaning of Section 499.

    12. It may be stated that in the present case, the grievance of the complainant is, notice in question in the end alleges that copy is sent to nine persons named therein. The notice contains designation of six police officials at Surat plus three private persons. They are; (i) Pradip Tamakuwala (ii) Praful Rakholiya and (iii) Mansukhbhai (Manubhai) Chhaganbhai Bavishiya. It was rightly pointed out at the time of hearing that there is nothing on record to suggest that in fact, notice was dispatched to all these persons. Beside that, assuming for the sake of argument that this notice - copy of this notice - is deemed to have sent to those persons including to three private persons, these three private persons are none else but they are the persons against whom allegation made in the notice as to forming unlawful/anti-social assembly. In fact, one of them i.e Mansukhbhai Bavishiya has, at the time of issuance of process, deposed in favour of complainant, to which reference is made hereinabove and thereafter, later on, he has filed an affidavit contrary to the statement given by him before the court. Copy of the affidavit is placed on record by the petitioner along with his affidavit. This apart, forwarding the copy of notice to the persons against whom the allegation is made in the notice in the circumstances of the case cannot be said to be ‘publishing, causing defamation’.

    13. As to the forwarding of the copy to the police officials, it may be stated that had it not been a notice issued by the advocate but, some other mode of written communication then, the matter would have been different. The notice issued by the advocate on behalf of his client makes all the difference. Police Officials are not unaware of degree of freedom enjoyed by the advocate in exchange of notice correspondence. It is natural and obvious that said notice would totally go unnoticed by the police officer in the sense that notice would hardly ‘read’ by police. In any case, there is no material that in fact, this notice was dispatched to any of the parties referred to in the notice.

    14. As to the circulating of leaflet by the petitioner, it was pointed out at the time of hearing that leaflet does not contain any defamatory allegation in the same. Copy of the leaflet is on record. That being so, circulation of leaflet is immaterial. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjanwala has also drawn attention to a decision in the case of B.P Bhaskar… v. B.P Shiva…., reported in 1993 Cri.L.J 2685 (Madras). Therein also, a question arose on account of reply to the notice sent by the party's advocate. The question was, whether it would amount to ‘publication’ or not. Relying on Kerala High Court’ judgment in the case of P.R Ramakrishnan v. Subbaramma Sastrigal, reported in AIR 1988 Ker. 18, it was held that it does not amount to publication.

    15. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjanwala has also drawn attention to S. Khushboo's case (supra). Considering the contents of alleged defamation, it was held that “… there is neither any intent on the part of appellant to cause harm to the reputation of the complainants nor can we discern any actual harm done to their reputation. In short, both the elements i.e mens rea and actus reus are missing. …”

    16. It may also be noted that issuance of legal notice by an advocate on behalf of his client would always be without mens rea - unless the intention is otherwise. The advocate enjoys considerable liberty in this regard. As to the imputation made therein, complainant in his complaint says that two murder cases to which the notice refers, one of the murder case is subjudice and in another case, he is only witness. No clarification or comment offered on other allegations. In the circumstances of the case, strong expression used in the notice cannot be said to be amounting to defamation within the meaning of Section 499.

    16.1 How one reminds quote of Charles Barkley.

    “My initial response was to sue her for defamation of character, but then I realized that I had no character”.

    16.2 Defamation, generally speaking, takes place in either of two ways; one by libel or by slander. If it is defamation by verbal or spoken word then it is slander and if it is by written or printed word then it is known as ‘libel’.

    17. Two incidental points surfaces in the present case; one, degree of advocate's freedom in issuance of notice on behalf of his client and second, is reputation. As to the reputation, recently, the Supreme Court - though in a different context - has held in the case of Om Prakash Chotala [(2014) 5 SCC 417] as under:

    “Reputation is fundamentally a glorious amalgam and unification of virtues which makes a man feel proud of his ancestry and satisfies him to bequeath it as a part of inheritance on posterity. It is a nobility in itself for which a conscientious man would never barter it with all the tea of China or for that matter all the pearls of the sea. The said virtue has both horizontal and vertical qualities. When reputation is hurt, a man is half-dead. It is an honour which deserves to be equally preserved by the down trodden and the privileged. The aroma of reputation is an excellence which cannot be allowed to be sullied with the passage of time. The memory of nobility no one would like to lose; none would conceive of it being atrophied. It is dear to life and on some occasions it is dearer than life. And that is why it has become an inseparable facet of Article 21 of the Constitution. No one would like to have his reputation dented. One would like to perceive it as an honour rather than popularity. When a court deals with a matter that has something likely to affect a person's reputation, the normative principles of law are to be cautiously and carefully adhered to. The advertence has to be sans emotion and sans populist perception, and absolutely in accord with the doctrine of audi alteram partem before anything adverse is said.”

    17.1 In the above-referred case, on reputation the Supreme Court has referred to and relied upon the decisions in case of in Umesh Kumar v. State of A.P,(2013) 10 SCC 591, Kiran Bedi v. Committee of Inquiry, (1989) 1 SCC 494, D.F Marion v. Davis, reported in 217 Ala 16, Vishwanath Agarwal v. Sarla Vishwanath Agarwal, (2012) 7 SCC 288 and Mehmood Nayyar Azam v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2012) 8 SCC 1.

    18. Say of Mansukhbhai Bavishiya that he has reduced the relationship with complainant and now, the complainant's reputation is lowered in his eyes and that now, he is not giving respect to the complainant is such that either it can be said to be comic or absurd but, certainly it is not a legal material on which reliance can be placed. It may be recalled that in the notice in question, it is alleged that this witness also is a member of assembly of anti-social persons formed by the complainant. Further, the very fact that the witness has come forward to support the say of the complainant itself is a gesture of a respect the witness has shown towards the complainant. What is required is ‘evidence’ pointing contrary to that.

    19. As to the degree of advocate's freedom in issuance of notice, as observed above, an advocate enjoys good degree of freedom. He may use the strong expression. In advancing case of his client, advocate may have given coloured version of the case or recipient of the notice may find therein twisted presentation or invented meaning. Notice may contain dangerous half truth or mischievous exaggeration. Aim is more or less served if it irritates the recipient of the notice by crude way of assertion. The advocate may set up false defence in the notice. The contents of the notice may be blunt, arrogant and rough. All such ‘deviations’ - if one put that way - in the notice may stand to the scrutiny against allegationof defamation, if the focus is on the purpose of giving notice i.e reasons for issuance of notice. It is so because intention is the test. If focus is shifted from the ‘purpose’ or ‘cause’ of issuance of notice and purpose is to malign the person to whom the notice is addressed then person concerned may have to face music for abuse and misuse of freedom by the advocate.

    20. It is interesting to refer English instance on freedom of expression. It relates to Lord Denning. Denning is considered as phenomena in the history of common law. He had an occasion to pass an order in Granda's case. It happened, thus; A man presumably in higher up position in British Steel Corporation has leaked out documents of ‘high confidentiality’ to Granda. That man went underground and had never caught. Granda had telecast that information. In the litigation followed by telecasting of information, Corporation had prayed before the Court for disclosure of name of that person - ‘Mole’. Granda refused to disclose the name on the ground of freedom of press. The issue came to be considered by Denning, J. He had held that freedom is available to the press only to the extent that it acts responsibly. That the press should deserve the freedom and it must show itself worthy of it. Freedom of press is recognized to that extent and with that rider. The decision had created quite stir. Michel Foot, politician said that Denning is an ass. The Observer came with headline article ‘Why Denning is an ass’. How Denning, J. reacted to this? He said that had it happened in earlier time, press may have hauled up for contempt of court. Now the press - media - enjoys considerable freedom. Beside that, attack on a Judge in the newspaper - he said - is abuse of power. In the context of discussion in the case on hand, it may be bear in mind that almost abusive and unnecessarily bold expression about none other than person enjoying next to the highest position in the judicial hierarchy in England published in a newspaper. In the facts of the case, say of the petitioner has no substance. The continuation of present proceedings is abuse of process of law.

    21. In view of discussions and observations, present petition deserves to be allowed and same is accordingly allowed. The complaint being Inquiry Case No. 06 of 2007 pending in the Court of learned 9th Judicial Magistrate, Surat is hereby quashed and set aside. Rule is made absolute.

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    Hemantkumar Hasmukhlal Hojiwala v. State Of Gujarat
    (Aug 1, 2014)