Jayant Patel, A.C.J:— The present appeal is directed against order dated 29th September, 2015 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Special Civil Application No. 9618 of 2015, whereby the learned Single Judge for the reasons recorded in the order, has not interfered with the order for removal as Chairman under Section 76-B(1) of the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) and has quashed the order for further disqualification under Section 76-B(2) of the Act.
2. We have heard Mr. Thakore, learned senior counsel appearing with Mr. Champaneri for the appellant and Mr. Prakash Jani, learned Additional Advocate General with Mr. Niraj Ashar, learned Assistant Government Pleader, appearing upon advance copy on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 and 2.
3. Mr. Thakore, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant, during the course of the hearing has taken us to the impugned order passed by the authority for removal, which was subject matter of the petition before the learned Single Judge. There are findings recorded by the authority pertaining to persistent default in performance of the duty by the appellant. Those findings have been examined by the learned Single Judge to the extent of scope of judicial review in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is hardly required to be stated that while undertaking the exercise of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution in a matter of removal of an office bearer of the society under the Act, the Court would examine as to whether the opinion arrived at for removal is supported by objective material or not. Sufficiency of the material may not be re-assessed by the Court nor this Court would re-appreciate the material and record a different finding as that of the appellate court. After having expressed the view for the scope of judicial review, when we have considered the contents of the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge, it appears that no error has been committed by the learned Single Judge in affirming or not interfering with the order passed by the authority under Section 76-B(1) of the Act for removal of the appellant as Chairman of the Milk Producers Union.
4. However Mr. Thakore learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant, voiced grievance that inspite of the order quashed by the learned Single Judge under Section 76-B(2) of the Act, separate notice has been issued by the authority for further disqualification under Section 76-B(2) of the Act and therefore, even if the appellant has to defend the proceedings under Section 76-B(2) or has to challenge the said action under Section 76-B(2) of the Act, findings recorded by the authority in the impugned order before the learned Single Judge or noninterference thereof by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order or non-interference by Division Bench of this Court in the present appeal or such part of the order of the learned Single Judge may come in way of the appellant and therefore, he submitted that this Court may consider the said aspect so far as proceedings under Section 76-B(2) of the Act are concerned.
5. Whereas, learned Additional Advocate General submitted that the order under Section 76-B is not the subject matter of the appeal since the learned Single Judge has already quashed the proceedings under Section 76-B(2) of the Act and he submitted that no observations may be made by this Court since it goes beyond the scope of appeal, nor any interference may be made by the Division Bench of this Court in the present appeal on such ground as sought to be canvassed on behalf of the appellant.
6. We may record that it is undisputed position and apparent from the order of the learned Single Judge that the learned Single Judge has quashed the proceedings for further disqualification under Section 76-B(2) of the Act against the appellant. Further, it is also apparent and there is no dispute on the aspect that observations, if any, made in the impugned order before the learned Single Judge as well as in the order of the learned Single Judge are, and restricted to the order under Section 76-B(1) only. When the learned Single Judge has quashed the order under Section 76-B(2), apprehension voiced on behalf of the appellant that such findings may also be applied against him in the proceedings under Section 76-B(2) is ill-founded. Further, if on account of quashing of the proceedings by the learned Single Judge under Section 76-B(2) of the Act, any notice has been issued for proceedings under Section 76-B(2) after the order passed by the learned Single Judge, it would be for the appellant to ventilate the grievance before the appropriate forum. In any case, as the same is not the subject matter in the present appeal, we leave at that.
7. No case is made out for interference to the order passed by the learned Single Judge for not interfering to the order passed by the authority so far as it relates to the removal under Section 76-B(1) of the Act. So far as quashing of the order for further disqualification under Section 76-B(2) of the Act is concerned, as the same is not the subject matter, we do not find it proper to express any view, but suffice it to observe that if such subsequent proceedings are brought under challenge, rights and contentions of both the sides in accordance with law shall remain open.
8. Appeal is disposed of accordingly.