The following opinions were delivered by the Full Bench:—
Peacock, C.J (after stating the facts, continued). — The question of law which is raised for our opinion is, whether, if a person dies leaving a female as his heir-at-law, the reversionary heirs have a fresh cause of action in regard to the estate of the ancestor at the time of the death of the female heir, or whether they are barred by limitation if the female heir would have been barred. The question is a very important one, and depends upon the proper construction of the Statute of Limitation, having regard to the nature of the respective estates under the Hindu law of a female heir and of the reversionary heirs.
There are several conflicting decisions upon the point in this Court and it is upon the ground of those decisions that we have to determine the question.
The arguments adduced by the Judges in support of their several views are of considerable weight, and they have been substantially incorporated in the argument of the vakeels before us.
A case was cited — Doe d. Colly Doss Bose v. Debnarain Koberauj — for the purpose of showing the opinion of the late Supreme Court upon the subject; but it is not very clear what are the grounds upon which that case turned. The female heir in that case had entered into possession. Sir John Grant, who delivered the judgment, did not state whether his opinion was founded upon the point of limitation simply, or upon the ground that a grant by the female heir might be presumed, and, if so, that it would not be binding beyond her own life. He says:— I think that, if we were to presume a grant, it would not be binding beyond the widow's life.
It is unnecessary for us to determine in this case when the cause of action of the reversionary heirs would accrue if the female heir were to sell the estate without lawful cause. In that case, the purchaser entering into possession would not be a wrong-doer during the life of the female heir. No cause of action would accrue to the female heir against him for entering under her grant, although it would not be binding as against the reversionary heirs, and possibly might not be so against creditors of the ancestor.
In this case, a cause of action did accrue to the female heir, and the question is, whether the reversionary heirs upon her death acquired a new and independent cause of action within the meaning of the Statute of Limitation, or merely succeeded to the same cause of action which was vested in the female heir in her lifetime.
Whatever may have been the date of the decision in the case cited from Fulton's reports, it must have been before the decision of the late Supreme Court in Goluckmoney Dabee v. Diggumber Day, which is set out in Mr. Justice Macpherson's book on Mortgages, 2nd edition, p. 20. Sir Lawrence Peel in that case says:— “It has been invariably considered for many years that the widow” (speaking of the widow succeeding as heir) “fully represents the estate; and it is also the settled law that adverse possession which bars her, bars the heir also after her, which would not be the case if she were a mere tenant for life as known to the English law.”
It was also held by the Privy Council in the Shivagunga case, that in the absence of fraud or collusion, a decision against a widow, with regard to her deceased husband's estate, would be binding upon the reversionary heirs.
In The Collector of Masulipatam v. Cavaly Vencata Narrainapah, it was said that comparing a Hindu widow to n tenant for life was calculated to mislead. In the Shivagunga case (L), the widow was compared to a tennant-in-tuil; but the heirs in that case were not likened to remaindermen, and must, therefore, have been in the position of tenants-in-tail. Such heirs would be bound if the tenant-in-tail was barred, though the remainderman might not be.
If, then, in the Shivagunga case, the widow was like a tenant-in-tuil, and the reversionary heirs were like the issue-in-tail, and the same likeness exists in the present case, the reversionary heirs would be barred by limitation which ran against the female heir. If the female heir in the present case had sued the wrong-doer, and, without fraud or collusion, had failed to make out her case to turn him out of possession, the reversionary heirs would have been bound by the decision. I am assuming that they are not claiming through the female heir. For instance, if the female heir had sued the wrong-doer, and he had set up a purchase from the ancestor, and had succeeded in that defence at the suit of the female heir, the reversionary heirs would be barred by the decision in the absence of fraud or collusion.
The law of limitation is passed for the benefit of defendants, partly upon the ground that after length of time they may have lost the evidence in support of their right; and it would be anomalous to hold that a female heir was barred by limitation, lest the defendant should have lost his evidence to prove his right against her, and to hold that the reversionary heirs, who would have been barred by a decision against the widow if she had brought her suit in time, are not barred by limitation against her.
Possibly, if we could trace the Hindu law to its origin, we should find that a widow did not succeed to her husband's estate as his heir. It was doubtful at one time whether she did so. It was supposed that she took, because she was part of the husband. In the Dayabhaga, Ch. xi, s. 1, vv. 1 and 2, it is said:— “In regard to the wealth of a deceased person who leaves no male issue, authors disagree in consequence of finding contradictory passages of law. Thus Vrihaspati says:— ‘In scripture and in the code of law, as well as in popular practice, a wife is declared by the wise to be half the body of her husband, equally sharing the fruit of pure and impure acts. Of him whose wife is not deceased, half the body survives. How, then, should another take his property while half his person is alive.? Let the wife of a deceased man who left no issue take a share, notwithstanding kinsmen, a father, a mother, or uterine brother be present.’ This would account for the rule which says that the reversionary heirs of the husband are those who would have been his heirs if he had lived up to the time of the death of his wife.
It is difficult to reconcile the above principle with the fact of sons and grandsons taking during the life of the widow. I have never been able to find the principle accurately defined by which sons take in preference to a widow. The Dayabhaga rests the right of the sons upon the doctrine that succession is grounded solely upon the benefits conferred — Dayabhaga, Ch. xi, s. 1, vv. 32, 33, and 34; but, probably, the right of the sons in preference to that of the widow depends upon the doctrine, that a son or other descendant is consubstantial with the father or other ancestor. Menu says:— “The husband, after conception by his wife, becomes himself an embryo, and is born a second time here below”. See also 3 Colebrooke's Hindu Law, p. 459 : 1 Vyavastha Darpana, 1st Edition, p. 33, note.
However this may be, it is settled that the wife does take as heir to her husband in default of issue, and, that upon her death, those persons succeed as reversionary heirs who would have been the heirs of the husband if he had died at that time. It is a very anomalous position that a person should take as heir, and that his right to take as heir should be determined according to a state of facts not existing at the time of the death of the ancestor, but caused by events which may have occurred many years after his death.
These considerations lead me to the conclusion that a reversionary heir, who is bound by a decision against a widow respecting the subject-matter of inheritance, is also barred by limitation, if without fraud or collusion, the widow is barred by limitation.
It has been contended that as the widow cannot absolutely convey away her husband's estate without sufficient cause, so as to be binding upon the reversionary heirs, they ought not to be barred by limitation against the widow, otherwise she will be able, if she lived a sufficient time, to do indirectly, by allowing adverse possession to be held against her, that which she could not do directly, by a sale without sufficient cause. But reversionary heirs presumptive have a right, although they may never succeed to the estate, to prevent the widow from committing waste; and I have no doubt that if a proper case were made out, reversionary heirs would have a sufficient interest, as well as creditors of the ancestor, by suit against the widow and the adverse holder, to have the estate reduced into possession, so as to prevent their rights from becoming barred by limitation.
In the ease of moveable property, such as Government paper, a Hindu, although he is not bound to do so, may obtain probate or letters of administration. Adverse possession or wrongful detention of Government paper, or the like, would give a cause of action to the heirs, or in the case of probate or letters of administration, to the executor or administrator. If an executor or administrator should fail to sue to recover the Government paper within the time limited by law, he would be barred by limitation, but I have no doubt that a suit could be maintained against him and the wrong-doer by legatees or creditors of the deceased owner, or by the heirs who are in the same position as the next-of-kin would be in England, to compel the recovery of the Government paper, and the application of it in due course of law.
The cause of action of the executor or administrator would arise from the time of the wrongful detention of the paper from him. But suppose he should die after the paper had been detained against him for five years, and the next person in succession should take out letters of administration with the will annexed, or if there were no will, simple letters of administration of the property not administered by the deceased executor or administrator, the cause of action of the administrator de bonis non would not accrue at the time of the death of the former executor or administrator, but he would merely succeed to the cause of action which was vested in the former executor, and limitation would date as against him from the same period as it would have dated if the former executor or administrator had lived.
It has been held in England that an executor of an executor, or an administrator de bonis non, has a right to sue if he commences his suit within one year after the death of the preceding executor or administrator, notwithstanding that period may exceed the period of limitation which the former executor or administrator had.
It is unnecessary to say whether a similar law would apply here. I mention it merely because I think it is an argument to show that in the case of representatives, where one is substituted for another in consequence of death or other cause, the substituted representative has only the same cause of action as the representative for whom he is substituted.
Now, according to the Hindu law, it appears to me that the widow although she has a beneficial interest in the property, is still only to some extent a representative, and holds the property, not merely for her own benefit, but for the benefit of the deceased.
It is said that the reversionary heirs could not sue during the lifetime of the widow, and that, therefore, they ought not to be barred by any adverse holding against the widow at a time when they could not sue. But when we look at the widow as a representative, and see that the reversionary heirs are bound by decrees relating to her husband's estate which are obtained against her without fraud or collusion, we are of opinion that they are also bound by limitation, by which she, without fraud or collusion, is barred. When, therefore, we construe the words “cause of action” in the Statute of Limitation, we must consider them as referring, not to a now cause of action accruing to the reversionary heirs personally and individually, but to the cause of action which accrued to the heir or representative, for the time being, of the deceased.
This is not the only instance in which a person may be barred by time which has elapsed before he has a right to sue. If an ancestor is dispossessed, the cause of action of his heir accrues, not at the time when the ancestor dies, and when he could sue, but at the time when the ancestor was dispossessed, and ought himself to have sued; and there is no more reason why a reversionary heir should have a fresh cause of action from the death of the widow, because he could not sue during her lifetime, than that an immediate heir should have a fresh cause of action commencing at the date of the ancestor's death because he could not sue during the lifetime of the ancestor.
A reversionary heir cannot sue during the lifetime of the widow, because during her life the estate of the deceased is represented by her as the heir-at-law. I have spoken of a widow in many parts of this judgment, but the remarks which I have made apply equally to other female heirs, such as mothers, daughters, and the like.
It appears to me that this case ought to go back to the Division Bench which referred it, with the expression of our opinion that the period of limitation against a reversionary heir is not to be reckoned from the time at which he succeeded, viz., from the date of the death of the female heir, but from the date at which it would have been reckoned if the female heir had lived and brought the suit.
L.S Jackson, J.:— I entirely concur in the opinion of the Chief Justice, that the plaintiff was barred in the present case. We sit here unquestionably to administer the Hindu law in those cases to which that law applies, and on all points not decided we are clearly bound to refer to the original sources of that law, and to interpret them to the best of our ability; but where any point having already arisen has been decided by the authority of the highest Court which takes cognizance of questions of Hindu law, we are, I think, as clearly bound implicitly to guide ourselves by the decisions of that tribunal. It has been distinctly held by the Privy Council in the Shivagunga case that a decision fairly arrived at without fraud or collusion in the presence of a Hindu widow in possession of the estate will bind reversionary heirs. That being so decided, it appears to me impossible to escape the conclusion that an adverse possession which barred the widow will also bar the heirs, and in that opinion we are fully and strongly supported by the decisions of the late Supreme Court in the case to which His Lordship the Chief Justice has referred.
It was an argument of the pleader for the plaintiff in this case that a widow who is incompetent, except in certain cases, to alienate the estate left by her husband, ought not to be allowed indirectly to do that which she cannot do directly. It appears to me incorrect to say that in such a case as this, the widow has done anything in the nature of an alienation indirectly or directly. If, indeed, it could be shown that she had colluded with the persons holding adverse possession, so that in fact a case of fraud could be made out, then no doubt she might be held to have done indirectly that which the Hindu law forbids her doing directly. But in such a case as this, undoubtedly, a reversioner aggrieved by such frauds would be entitled to bring his action.
I state very shortly the principal reasons upon which my own conclusions are founded, because, although, I am very far from dissenting from any observations contained in the elaborate judgment which we have just heard, I am not at this moment prepared unreservedly to assent to the whole of them.
Phear, J.:— I too desire to avoid pledging myself to all the illustrations which have fallen from the Chief Justice; but with this exception, I concur entirely in the reasoning which he has given in support of his conclusions, and I concur also in the remarks which have been made by Jackson, J.
I will add that it seems to me that when a reversionary heir succeeds to the property of his ancestor on the death of an intervening female, heir, he takes substantially the same proprietary right as she enjoyed, and no more, though doubtless, she was fettered in a way that he is not, with regard to the dealings with the property, viz., her alienations are often liable to be avoided by him when he succeeds to the right of succession. If, the D, that proprietary right was invaded while in her hands, the cause of action accruing from the act of invasion can be none other when it conies to be pursued by the reversionary heir than it was when the female heir herself was the person to do so. Both the right which is infringed, and the act complained of as the infringement, are the same, whether it is he or she who sues. It follows that if the reversionary heir brings a suit founded upon that act of invasion of the proprietary right, the time prescribed in the Statute of Limitation runs against him from the date of the act. Of course, it may be that the possession of a third party, which is no trespass on the proprietary right when in the hands of the female heir, may, if persisted in, become so when that proprietary right passes to the reversionary heir. In such a case, the infringement of the proprietary right first commences on the death of the female heir, and with it the cause of action arises. This is so when the female heir conveys under such circumstances that her alienation can be questioned by the reversionary heir.
With these views, I entirely agree in the answer which the Chief Justice proposes to send to the Division Bench.
Macpherson, J.:— I also concur in the proposed answer. But a very great difference exists between the case immediately before us, and the case in which a mother (or other Hindu female having an estate similar to that of a childless widow) has herself alienated property belonging to the estate which she has taken as heiress, without sufficient reason for making such alienation. In the latter case, the alienation is good as against her, and so far as her own life-interest is concerned; therefore, in fact, no cause of action necessarily arises at all with respect to her alienation so long as she lives. The cause of action does not arise until her death, when the reversioner's cause of action for the first time accrues. In the case before us, the property having never reached the hands of the mother at all, having been through out held adversely to her, the cause of action accrued in the mother's lifetime; and therefore, a suit to recover possession, by whomsoever it may be brought, is barred, unless instituted within twelve years from the commencement of the adverse possession.