Markby, J. (who after shortly stating the plaint and issues continued) — I did not consider that there was any ground shown in the plaint for such relief, and, further, it appeared to me that, if the property were declared subject to the plaintiff's claim for maintenance and marriage expenses, she would obtain thereby all the security she would require.
The defendant Chandra Mohan, before proposing any issues and raising his other objections, objected generally to the form of the suit, first, on the ground that a Hindu widow had no such rights as were claimed in this suit; secondly, on the ground that the plaint only asked for a declaration of right, and not for any relief; and upon these two points after hearing Counsel on both sides, I was asked to express my opinion.
With regard to the first point, I considered that, without expressing any final opinion of my own, and reserving to myself the power of reconsidering the matter in the Court of Appeal.
I ought, for the purpose of this suit, to follow the ruling of Phear, J., in the case of Srimati Bhagabati Dasi v. Kanailal Mitter decided on the 8th instant. The learned Judge (according to a report of his judgment in the Englishman newspaper, which has on this argument been treated as correct) said that he was not prepared to say that the mere fact of the existence of the widow was sufficient notice to give her a lien against the estate in the hands of alienees; that against an heir who has taken the property the widow has a right to have her maintenance treated as a charge an the property; that she may doubtless follow the property in the hands of any one who takes it with notice of her having set up a claim for maintenance against the heir, but that in Bengal, she has not a lion on the property in respect of her maintenance against all the world, irrespective of her notice. I took the ruling of the learned Judge there to be that, in order to establish a lien against property in the hands of an aliene, the widow must show, not only that the alienee had notice of her existence, and therefore notice of the existence of a person who might claim maintenance, but notice that she had actually set up that claim against the heir. I do not understand that any such notice as that was alleged to have taken place in this case, but all that was alleged here as regards the maintenance, was that the mortgagee was aware of the widow's existence, and it was sought to be inferred from that that he was aware of her claim to maintenance, and the third issue was apparently framed with the intention of proving and relying on these facts; and I thought that, according to the ruling of the learned Judge upon which I base my decision, was not sufficient.
I also thought that, without going into the question now (upon which no authority had been cited before me, and upon which I express no opinion) as to whether or not the claim for the expenses of a daughter's marriage is precisely the same in character and extent as the claim for maintenance, it was quite clear that that part of the claim which relates to those expenses stands in the same position: because if it is necessary that notice that a claim has been set up as against the heir should be given in the case of maintenance, it seems to me by parity of reasoning that it must also be given in the case of expenses for the daughter's marriage.
The case was then adjourned until the following morning, in order that the parties might consider the effect of this ruling on the case as it stood. On the case being again called on, permission was asked on the part of the plaintiff to alter the frame of her 3rd issue by substituting an issue in this form:— Whether the defendant Chandra Mohan Sur took the property with notice that the plaintiff had asserted her right to maintenance out of the mortgaged property against the heir? And she also wished to make a similar alteration in the 4th issue. It was stated that the plaintiff was prepared to prove that the defendant Chandra Mohan had had express notice of the plaintiff's assertion of her right to maintenance and marriage expense. This alteration in the issues was opposed by the defendant Chandra Mohan as not being in accordance with the allegation in the plaint, and his Counsel relied on the case of Eshan Chunder Singh v. Sham Churn Bhutto. But I thought that case had really nothing whatever to do with the question, and decided to alter the issues.
It remained, however, to decide the other objection, namely that the suit was only for a declaration of right, and did not ask for any relief; and, upon consideration, I think that that objection is fatal to the suit in its present form. I am inclined to think that the rule which excludes suits for a mere declaration of right is not quite so strict here as in England, and that by the practice of the Courts, at any rate in the Mofussil, suits are admitted in certain exceptional cases for a declaration of right, although no actual relief has been asked for, or could be granted; probably, because in these particular cases, there is manifest convenience in having the right ascertained, and there is no other way of raising the question: but I think there is nothing in the practice of this Court which would justify this suit in its present form. On the contrary, I think, it is the practice here, whenever a widow sues to have her right of ! maintenance declared, for her to ask, not that her right should be declared, generally, but that it should be enquired what is a fing and proper sum for her maintenance, and upon what portion of her deceased husband's property and in what mode it should be secured. Whether or no, such a suit must be preceded by a demand by a mother, and refusal by the son to maintain his mother, I need not now say: but I may observe that there is no allegation in this case that the son is not maintaining his mother, or even that any funds applicable to that purpose have been directed by him to any other purpose. It is not said that she has been turned out of the family dwelling-house, or that there is any prospect of her being ejected. She asks for general lien to be declared over the whole property for her maintenance, without fixing the amount, and that the money expended on her daughter's marriages should be declared a charge on the property, without any inquiry whether those sums were properly expended; and the issues raised are in accordance with this indefinite prayer. In this form I think the suit cannot be maintained; and as no proposal is made for amending the form of the suit or the issues in this respect, the suit must be dismissed as against both defendants with costs on scale No. 2.
Pending the appeal, Mr. Branson, on behalf of the defendant Chandra Mohan, applied that the plaintiff should be ordered to give security for the costs of the appeal under s. 342 of Act VIII of 1859; he referred to the case of Bamasundari Dasi v. Ramnarayan Mitter.
Mr. Lowe, contra.— If the application is granted, the effect will be to prevent the proper rights of the plaintiff from being asserted. In the lower Court no issue as to her rights was allowed to be raised. The case was dismissed on preliminary points: the plaintiff has had no opportunity of going into her case and showing she is entitled to the relief asked for. [Phear, J. — You do not in your plaint ask for any specific sum for maintenance, or that it should be paid out of any particular fund; that is the reason Markby, J., gives for dismissing it. It may be your appeal is merely a vexatious proceeding. Mr. Branson.— Opportunity was given to the plaintiff in the Court below to amend her pleadings, but she elected to stand by them as they were.] She asked in her prayer that an account might be taken for the purpose of ascertaining the proper amount of maintenance. The prayer is specific enough to enable us to obtain a decree, and then the amount can be ascertained. In applications of this kind, diligence should be used; there has here been great delay on the part of the defendants.
Mr. Branson in reply. — Opportunity was given to the plaintiff in the Court below to amend her case, but she refused to do so. It is said the plaint prayed for a specific declaration, but the second ground of appeal is that the learned Judge “erred in holding that the plaintiff's suit would not lie unless the plaint asked for a specific sum to be ascertained as necessary for the maintenance of the plaintiff, and further sought to charge such sum upon a specific portion of the property mentioned in the plaint.”
[Mr. Lowe objected to reference to the grounds of appeal, but the objection was overruled.]
Cur. adv. vult.
Phear, J.:— On consideration of Markby, J's judgment, I find that he dismissed the suit mainly on the ground that the plaint only asked for a vague general declaration of right to maintenance, without further asking that the proper sum for maintenance should be ascertained, and made specific in amount. The last words of his judgment are “she” (the plaintiff) asks for a general lien to be declared over the whole property for her maintenance, without fixing the amount, and that the money expended on her daughter's marriages should be declared a charge on the property, without any enquiry whether those sums were properly expended; and the issues raised are in accordance with this indefinite prayer. In this form I think the suit cannot be maintained; and as no proposal is made for amending the form of the suit or the issues in this respect, the suit must be dismissed with costs.” Markby, J., therefore, was of opinion, not only that the claim of the plaintiff was at the outest to have a general right of this kind declared, bat also that the parties themselves declined to enable him to make a decree, which should be specific in its character, and on this ground he refused to give the plaintiff the relief which she asked. Now whether Markby, J., was right or wrong, as a matter of strict law or procedure, in refusing to make the general declaration of right to maintenance, for which he considered the plaintiff asked, still if I thought the plaint could not be construed otherwise than in the way in which Markby, J., construed it, namely, that it asked for nothing more than a general declaration, I should consider the litigation set on foot by the plaintiff as in a sense vexatious; because it seems to me that, even if she got the general declaration, she could make no use of it, without suing the defendants again de novo. Then, attributing this character to the suit, and coupling it with the apparent want of means of the plaintiff, I should think it was a case in which I ought to direct security for the costs of further litigation to be given. But I am not sure that the plaint must necessarily be construed quite so narrowly as Markby, J., did construe it. I express no opinion upon this point; but if the plaintiff has any ground to ask the Appeal Court, on the footing of her plaint, to make a decree for a specific amount of maintenance, and to charge it on the poverty, which is the subject of the suit, I think that her proverty alone ought not to lead me to grant the present application. It does seem to me on the-whole that the plaintiff may be fairly justified in asking the Appeal Court to put the latter construction on the plaint. Consequently, as Mr. Branson has not given me any other ground than that of poverty in support of his application for security for the costs of the appeal, I think I most dismiss it. The-costs of the application will be costs in the appeal proceedings.
On the appeal comming on to be heard, Mr. Lowe and Mr. Bonnerjee appeared for the appellants.
Mr. Marindin and Mr. Branson appeared for the respondents.
Mr. Lowe. — More is asked for in this case than a mere declaration of right: the plaint asks that a right of maintenance may be declared, and that the amount may be ascertained: that is in accordance with the usual practice in cases of this kind, which is first to get a declaration of the right, and then to make an enquiry as to the value of the property and position of the parties, with a view to ascertain the amount. The plaint asks that an account may be taken. (MAcpherson, J. — The plaint asks for an account “for the purposes aforsaid” i.e, for the purpose of the declaration of the right, not of ascertaining the amount.] A suit is not to be dismissed, merely because it only asks for a declaratory decree; see s. 15, Act VIII of 1859 — Kenaram Chuckerbutty v. Dinonath Panda. The widow has a right to maintenance as long as she continues to live in the family dwelling-house. The maintenance of unmarried daughters was a charge on the estate in the hands of the heir, Makhanlal, Shama Charan's Vyavashta Darpana, 368–370. That the property id small, is all the greater reason for assigning the widow some maintenance, and Mangala Debt v. Dinanath Boss decides that she cannot be ejected from the family dwelling-house as the defendant threatens to do. The case of Ram Chandra Dikshit v. Savitribai decides that the maintenance of a Hindu widow is a charge on the whole estate and on every part of it [Couch C.J — The question there was as to whether one brother could be sued alone, and it was held that he could.] We ask for an injunction, which is more than a mere declaration of right: if we are entitled to an injunction against Makhanlal, that is, more than a declaration of right — Gobindmani Dasi…Plaintiff; v. Shamlal Bysak…Defendant.* Bysak.
The Court called on the respondents.
Mr. Marindin.— It is in the discretion of the Court to give a declaratory decree or not. It would be vexatious and harassing if a plaintiff could come in and ask for an indefinite sum to be charged on the property. There is no prayer that the amount of maintenance should be ascertained, nor is it stated what would be a proper amount, nor on what part of the estate it is to be charged. [Couch, C.J — Ought this suit to be dismissed because the issue was not raised, whether the property in the hands of the mortgagee is chargeable with maintenance, and what is a proper sum f I think we have, if necessary, power to raise the issue now.] If the plaintiff asks for it, I do not think I can oppose it being raised, but the costs of the appeal ought in that case to be paid by the plaintiff — The Government v. Rajah Raj Kishen Singh. As to the claim for the daughter's marriage expenses, that is the right of the daughters, and they ought to have sued.
Mr. Branson on the same side. — Opportunity was given in the Court below to raise the issue, but advantage was not taken of it by the plaintiffs.
Mr. Lowe in reply — As to raising issues, see Arbuthnot v. Betts. [Couch, C.J — That must be understood as applying to special appeals, not to regular appeals.] As to marriage expenses being a charge, see Vyavashta Darpana, 342 & 358.
Couch, C.J:— This is an “appeal from a decree of Markby, J., dismissing the suit with costs. The ground of the dismissal is stated by the learned Judge to be that the suit was only for a declaration of right, and did not ask for any relief, and that it is the practice of the Court, whenever a widow sues to have her right of maintenance declared for her to ask, not that her right should be declared generally, but that it should be inquired what is a fit and proper sum for her maintenance. We agree that this is a proper practice, and that it would be unjust that a burden of an indefinite amount should be imposed upon the property which the defendant Chandra Mohan Sur holds as mortgagee by a general declaration of the plaintiffs right to maintenance, rendering it necessary for him to institute a snit to hare the amonnt determined. The plaint prayed “that the plaintiff's rights over the estate of her late husband by way of maintenance, and for the expenses attended upon the marriages of her said daughters, as well those already incurred as those which may hereafter be incurred in respect of the marriage of her still unmarried daughter, may be ascertained and declared; and that it may be declared that the defendant Chandra Mohan Sur took his said mortgage subject to the plaintiff's right to maintenance, and right to be recouped the expenses necessarily and properly incurred by her in and about the marriage of her said two daughters, as also the right to be provided with the expenses necessary for the due and fitting performance of her said unmarried daughter's marriage, when incurred, or to some one or other of such rights, and that for the purposes aforesaid, all proper accounts may be taken and directions given.” The plaint also prayed “that the defendant Makhanlal Dutt may be restrained by and under the order and injunction of this Honorable Court from alienation, dealing with, or disposing of the said one-third share of and in the said family dwelling-house, No. 2, Beadon Street, until the further order of this Honorable Court, and that the plaintiff may have such further or other relief as the nature of this case may require.”
Now the rule in Courts of Equity is that, if the plaintiff should mistake the relief to which he is entitled in his special prayer, the Court may yet afford him the relief to which he has a right under the prayer for generel relief, provided it is such relief as is agreeable to the case made by the bill. This rule should be acted upon in this Court, and is in accordance with the judgments of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Eshan Chunder Sing v. Shama Churn Bhutto and Mohammed Zahoor Mi Khan v. Mussamat Thakooranee Rutta Koer. Although, as the learned Judge says, no proposal was made for amending the form of the suit, we think he might, upon the plaint as it then was, have framed issues for the purpose of ditermining what should be allowed for the maintenance and expenses, if the plaintiff should be found to be entitled to them, and that this should have been done instead of the suit being dismissed. No leave being reserved to bring a fresh suit, the effect of the dismissal is to bar the right of the plaintiff, which is too great a penalty for a mistake in the form of the suit. We think the suit should be remanded for re-trial, fresh issues being framed in accordance with this judgment; and that the parties should bear their own costs of this appeal.
Case remanded.
Attorney for the plaintiff: Mr. Hart.
Attorneys for the defendant, Chandra Mohan Sur: Messrs. Ghose and Bose.