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  • clause of Act VIII of the Code of Procedure of 1859
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  • clause of Act VIII of the Code of Procedure of 1859
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Summary of the Opinion (Privy Council)

Factual and Procedural Background

Chuckurdhur Mohapatter, a Hindu subject to Mitakshara law, first adopted Suddanund (the respondent) and later adopted Bonomalee. On 5 April 1849 Chuckurdhur executed and registered a will giving nine annas of his real estate to Suddanund and seven annas to Bonomalee, dividing his personalty equally; the will contained a forfeiture clause providing that any son who contested the will would forfeit his rights under it. Disputes arose: the respondent initially objected to registration and later in 1859 sued his father and others seeking to set aside certain deeds, the will, and the second adoption, and claiming maintenance and a declaration that repudiation was illegal. The Principal Sudder Ameen dismissed that suit on 6 March 1860. On appeal the High Court (Campbell and Pundit, JJ.) on 28 February 1863 reversed the Principal Sudder Ameen in part, holding that ancestral immovable property is only that actually inherited (not purchases made from the income of ancestral property), and that Chuckurdhur could dispose of other property. Subsequent proceedings followed after deaths of Chuckurdhur and Bonomalee. A later Division Bench and Trevor, J., and finally a Division Bench (Loch, Hobhouse, and E. Jackson, JJ.) of the High Court concluded (by 5 May 1869) that property acquired from the income of ancestral property followed the character of the ancestral fund and awarded possession to the respondent of all immoveable estates he sued for. Soorjomonee Dayee (widow of Bonomalee) appealed to Her Majesty in Council.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether real property acquired by Chuckurdhur out of the income (profits) of ancestral property is to be regarded as ancestral (inalienable and not devisable) under the Mitakshara law, or as self-acquired and devisable by will.
  2. Whether the earlier decision of the High Court dated 28 February 1863 (and the findings and judgments in the earlier proceedings) constituted a binding adjudication (res judicata) on the question of the testator's power to devise property acquired from ancestral income.
  3. Whether the courts below had jurisdiction to decide the question as raised by the pleadings despite an issue not having been framed in the narrowest possible terms embracing the whole question.
  4. Whether the forfeiture clause in the will (depriving any son who disputes it of benefits) was valid and operative so as to support Chuckurdhur's acts and petitions of 1857.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Soorjomonee Dayee)

  • The decree of 28 February 1863 was a valid and subsisting decree that finally settled the rights of the parties; the point decided thereby should be treated as res judicata.
  • The lower court should not have called for further evidence on the point of source of purchase; the prior decision was final.
  • Dispositions made by Chuckurdhur in his lifetime were authorized by Mitakshara law; a son's interest under Mitakshara is inchoate until the ancestor's death and does not render profits an increment to ancestral estate.
  • Counsel relied on authority (Gregory v. Molesworth) to support the res judicata contention that what is directed by a decree is res judicata even if obiter remarks appear in reasons for judgment.

Respondent's Arguments (Suddanund)

  • The earlier litigation did not produce a binding adjudication as to the properties now in suit; Act VIII of 1859, s. 2 (bar on suits on a cause of action already heard and determined) prevents such res judicata only where properly applicable.
  • No issue was raised in the former suit specifically with Bonomalee in his present character; therefore the particular question before the later court was not previously decided.
  • Nothing in the prior judgment had been acted upon by interference with possession, and so res judicata should not be treated as extinguishing the present claim.
  • The respondents accepted that the clause in the will providing forfeiture for contesting the will could not be challenged (they acknowledged Cooke v. Turner on that point), but maintained that the main question of character of the property had not been finally determined against them.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Gregory v. Molesworth Where a question has been necessarily decided between parties it is res judicata and cannot be raised again in another suit; a decision upon the substance is binding even if not expressed in the precise terms. The Court invoked this authority to support the general principle of res judicata and to conclude that the prior proceedings had, in substance, decided the testator's power to devise property purchased from ancestral income.
Mussamut Mitna v. Syad Fuzl Bub (also cited as Syud Fuzl Rub) Where no formal issues have been framed, but it plainly appears from pleadings that a question was raised and actually submitted to the Court, the judgment on that question is valid. The Court relied on this case to hold that absence of a precisely framed issue did not render the prior judgment ultra vires where the pleadings and appeals demonstrated that the question was raised and decided.
Cooke v. Turner Supports the validity and operability of a forfeiture clause in a will which disinherits a son who disputes the will. The Court treated Chuckurdhur's 1857 petitions as declarations of intention to act upon the forfeiture clause and regarded that clause as valid and operative in assessing the effect of earlier acts and filings.
Kanth Narain Singh v. Prem Lall Paurey It is competent for a son to bring a suit in his father's lifetime seeking relief (as framed in the plaint in the earlier suit). The Court cited this case to show that the plaintiff could properly bring the 1859 suit against his father while the father was still alive, validating the procedural posture of the earlier proceedings.
Notes to the Duchess of Kingston (Mr. Smith's notes, cited in argument) Historical compilation and discussion of authorities on res judicata and related doctrines. The Court referenced the accumulation of decisions and notes (including Mr. Smith's) as background to the settled law on res judicata which they applied to the facts.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Privy Council proceeded by examining (1) what questions had been actually raised and decided in the earlier litigation between the same parties and (2) whether the earlier judgments were binding on the later controversy under the Code of Procedure (Act VIII of 1859, s. 2) and the general doctrine of res judicata.

Step-by-step analysis as set out in the opinion:

  1. The Council reviewed the pleadings and procedural history of the 1859 suit (plaint, answer, replication and grounds of appeal) to determine whether the question of the testator's power to devise property acquired from the income of ancestral estate was actually raised and argued. They found that although the issues were not framed in the narrowest possible terms, the pleadings and appeals plainly put the question before the court.
  2. The Court considered precedent (notably Mussamut Mitna v. Syad Fuzl Bub) establishing that a judgment may be valid on a question plainly raised and submitted to the Court even if formal issues are lacking. Applying that principle, the Council concluded that the earlier courts had jurisdiction and had decided the question.
  3. They then applied the statutory bar (Act VIII of 1859, s. 2) together with the general law of res judicata (illustrated by Gregory v. Molesworth and authorities discussed in Smith's notes) — construing "cause of action" by substance rather than form — and held that the prior decision operated as a binding decision between the parties on whether Chuckurdhur could devise property purchased from ancestral income.
  4. The Council accepted the High Court's factual finding (as to the earlier decision) that Chuckurdhur had in fact devised the property over which he had the power of disposition to Bonomalee, and treated the 1857 petitions as declarations of intent to act on the forfeiture clause in the will (Cooke v. Turner supporting the operability of such a clause).
  5. On the basis that the earlier litigation had, in substance, decided the point against the respondent, the Council concluded that the High Court's later decision (awarding possession of the immoveable estates acquired from ancestral income to the respondent) conflicted with the prior binding determination. Consequently they reversed the High Court and affirmed the Principal Sudder Ameen.
  6. The Council expressly refrained from expressing opinions on other important points of Hindu law that would have arisen had they decided otherwise; they limited their decision to the res judicata effect and the validity of the forfeiture-related acts.

Holding and Implications

Holding: APPEAL ALLOWED — The decree of the High Court (5 May 1869) is reversed, and the decree of the Principal Sudder Ameen (which had been earlier given) is affirmed.

Immediate consequences for the parties:

  • Soorjomonee Dayee (appellant) succeeds on appeal to Her Majesty in Council; the High Court judgment awarding possession to the respondent of immoveable estates (including acquisitions made from ancestral income) is set aside.
  • The earlier decision of the Principal Sudder Ameen is restored; the Privy Council treated the prior adjudication as binding on the disputed question concerning the devisability of property acquired from ancestral income.
  • The Privy Council ordered that each party should bear their own costs in this appeal and in the proceedings before the High Court, noting the complications were partly due to the way Chuckurdhur dealt with his property.

Broader legal implications:

The Court based its ruling principally on the application of res judicata and on established precedents about when a question is to be treated as decided even if not framed by a precise issue. The Council expressly forborne from deciding other contested legal points of Hindu law on which the earlier High Court decision and the decision under appeal were in conflict. Therefore, beyond the application of res judicata to the facts of these proceedings and the confirmation of the operability of the forfeiture clause as applied, no broad new principle of Hindu law was authoritatively declared by this opinion.


Disposition: Appeal allowed; decree of the High Court reversed; decree of the Principal Sudder Ameen affirmed. Costs: each party to bear their own costs in this appeal and before the High Court.

    Soorjomonee Dayee v. Suddanund Mohapatter

    Appeal from a decision of the High Court at Calcutta (Loch and Hobhouse, JJ.), dated the 5th May 1869, modifying a decree of the Principal Sudder Ameen of Cuttack, dated the 27th April 1864.

    The facts of the case were as follows:—

    Chuckurdhur Mohapatter, a Hindu, subject to the Mitakshara law, adopted, first, Suddanund, the respondent in this appeal, and subsequently one Bonomalee. On the 5th of April 1849, Chuckurdhur registered a will, whereby, after making provision for his widow, the family worship, &e., he gave a nine annas share of his real estate to the respondent, and a seven annas share to Bonomalee, dividing his personal property equally between them. “Should either of the sons,” the will concluded, “bring any action in any Court in opposition hereto, then he shall forfeit his right of adoption, and his right and title to the share specified in the deed of division, as a disqualified son, and the other son shall be entitled to the entire sixteen annas.” The respondent, on the will being presented for registration, made various objections to its being registered in a petition presented to the Registrar of Deeds, in which he denied all knowledge of its terms and of the second adoption, and objected to any deprivation of his rights. On the 3rd February 1857 however, a petition was presented in the Collector's Court, purporting to be signed both by the respondent and Ronomalee and to be a full admission and consent by both of them, of and to their father's will. But later in the same year, violent disputes having arisen between Chuckurdhur and the respondent, Chuckurdhur filed petitions in the Collector's Court, stating in effect that he disowned the respondent as his son, and adopted and acted on the clause of disinherison in the will.

    On the 14th January 1859, the respondent instituted a suit against his father, Bonomalee, and certain persons who claimed portions of the property under deeds executed by the father for the purpose of setting aside those deeds, the will, and the adoption of Bonomalee, and for maintenance, and a declaration that his father's repudiation of him as a son was illegal. In his plaint he denied his father's right to alienate the property, alleging that no portion of it was self-acquired, but that the whole of the property was either inherited by Chuckurdhur from his father, or was purchased oat of the proceeds of such inherited property. Chuckurdhur, in his written statement, maintained that his repudiation of the respondent was rendered lawful by the latter's own disgraceful and hostile conduct; that the second adoption was legal; that he had the right to alienate the property; and that the respondent had assented to the will. He also denied that all the property purchased by him was purchased solely from the profits of ancestral estate. The respondent in his written statement joined issue on the last point.

    On the 6th March 1860, the Principal Sudder Ameen dismissed the respondent's suit, holding that the Hindu law allowed two adoptions, and that the adoption of Bonomalee, therefore, was valid; that the respondent's conduct justified Chuckurdhur in disowning him; and that he had assented to Chuckurdhur's will. Chuckurdhur died on the 17th August 1861.

    The respondent appealed to the High Court from the judgment of the Principal Sudder Ameen, on the ground, amongst others, that all the property was ancestral, and therefore inalienable by Chuckurdhur, except with the respondent's consent. The High Court (Campbell and Pundit, JJ.), on the 28th of February 1863, reversed the decision of the Principal Sudder Ameen so far as it declared the adoption of Bonomalee and the disinherison of the respondent valid; and they set aside the will so far as it professed to deprive him of his right to succeed to the ancestral immoveable property, but ruled that Chuckurdhur was entitled to do as he chose with all other property. As to what constituted ancestral property they said: “By the Mitakshara law applicable to the case, the son has a vested right of inheritance in the ancestral immoveable property; and as the question was raised before us, we must declare that the ancestral property is only that actually inherited from ancestors, and not that which has been acquired or recovered, even though it may have been acquired from the income of the ancestral property; for the income is the property of the tenant for life, to do as he likes with”(1).

    On the 23rd of November 1863, Chuckurdhur and Bonomalee being both dead, the respondent brought the present suit in the Court of the Principal Sudder Ameen against Soorjomonee Dayee, the widow of Bonomalee, and others, for possession of the whole of Chuckurdhur's estate, real and personal. He subsequently abandoned the claim as to personalty, but claimed the whole of the realty as ancestral property acquired by Chuckurdhur either by inheritance from his father or by purchase out of the proceeds of the inherited property. With respect to this Soorjomonee maintained that property purchased with the income of ancestral property was treated by the Mitakshara as self-acquired; and that the matter was a res judicata, having been decided against the respondent in the previous suit. And further, that a large portion of the property had been purchased from other sources than the income of ancestral property.

    On the 27th April 1864, the suit was dismissed as regarded the self-acquired realty, and all the personalty both self-acquired and ancestral, but decreed as respects the ancestral real estate.

    On appeal, a Division Bench of the High Court (Steer and E. Jackson, JJ.) differed in opinion, and the case was referred to Trevor, J., who, on the 26th September 1866, after the two former Judges had left India, held that the will was good for everything which the testator could will away; and, secondly, that everything purchased by the joint fund followed the character of the fund of which it was the representation. On review of this decision, a Division Bench of three Judges (Loch, Hobhouse, and E. Jackson, JJ.) upheld the ruling of Trevor, J,; but being of opinion that the defendant should have an opportunity of showing what (if any) of the real estate had been acquired otherwise than out of the accumulations of ancestral property, they directed the lower Court to receive evidence upon this point and forward the same to the High Court. Thereafter, on the 5th May 1869, the second Court (Loch and Hobhouse, JJ.), in conformity with their previously expressed opinion, awarded possession to the respondent of all the immoveable estates for which he had sued; which iucluded not merely the ancestral estates covered by the decree of 28th February 1863, but also the acquisitions made out of the income.

    From this decision Soorjomoney Dayee appealed to Her Majesty in Council.

    Mr. Leith, Q.C, and Mr. Cochrane, for the appellant, contended that the decree of 28th February 1863 was a valid and subsisting decree and finally settled the rights of the parties; that further evidence ought not to have been called for; and that the dispositions of property made by Chuckurdhur in his lifetime were authorized by Mitakshara law and valid. The interest of a son under Mitakshara law is inchoate, only perfected by the death of the ancestor, and carrying with it during the father's life a power of restraining waste. The profits are not an increment to the ancestral estate. [Sir L. Peel.— A joint family is an institution, and until separation is effected between its members, the property belonging to it is altogether subject to the claims of all joint members, the number of whom is constantly varying by births, deaths, and marriages.] The plaint of 14th January 1859 put in issue the validity and effect of the will and petitions, and sought relief on that footing, while Chuckerdhur set up a paramount title as absolute owner of all the property, ancestral and self-acquired, and thus the whole matter was rendered res judicata by the decree of the 28th February 1863 — Gregory v. Molesworth. [Sir B. Peacock.— All that is directed by the decree is res judicata, not what the Judge may say in giving his reasons. Sir M. Smith.— What he says is a negative declaration, the decree deals affirmatively with what was done in the way of relief. Sir J. Colvile.— We will have the point of res judicata argued first.]

    Mr. Doyne and Mr. Cutler for the respondent, argued that there was no binding adjudication against the respondent in the previous litigation as to any of the properties now in suit; Act VIII of 1859, s. 2. No issue was raised in the former suit with Bonomalee either in his present or previous character. He stands on the devise in his favor. [Sir M. Smith.— All the property in both the suits was the same. Mr. Leith. — The case of Mussamut Mitna v. Syad Fuzl Bub shows that an issue is unnecessary if the point decided is raised by the pleadings.] Not merely was no issue raised, but nothing was done under the judgment by interfering with the possession. [Sir B. Peacock.— You do not contend that the clause in the will for disinheriting in case of the will being disputed is invalid.] No, it is admitted, on the authority of Cooke v. Turner(2) that such a contention cannot be raised.

    Counsel for the appellant were not called upon to reply. Their Lordships' judgment was as follows:—

    This suit was brought by Suddanund Mohapatter, as adopted son and heir-at-law of Chuckurdhur, against Soorjomonee Dayee, the widow of Bonomalee, the devisee of Chuckurdhur, to obtain possession of all the estate, real and personal, of Chuckurdhur. Other defendants were joined, but inasmuch as Soorjomonee is the only appellant against the judgment, which was in favor of the plaintiff, the rights of the plaintiff as against Bonomalee have only to be considered. The claim to the personal property was abandoned by the plaintiff, nor did he dispute that Chuckurdhur had the right to dispose by will of all real property which had been self-acquired by him; but he asserted that there was no self-acquired real property; that all the real property of Chuckurdhur was either ancestral in the strict sense of the word (that is, acquired by inheritance from his father) or bought out of the income of ancestral property, whereupon it also became ancestral.

    The defendant did not maintain that Chuckurdhur could devise his ancestral property, properly so called, but maintained that what he had bought from the income of ancestral property was, according to the Mitakshara law (which is admittedly applicable to this case) self-acquired, and disposable by his will. She further maintained that this very question had been decided in favor of Bonomalee in a previous suit between the plaintiff and him. She also contended that, in fact, a large portion of the property had been bought by Chuckurdhur from other sources than the income of ancestral property.

    The High Court held that this question had not been so determined as to bind the plaintiff. After directing further evidence to be taken upon the point, they found as a fact that the real property bought by Chuckurdhur had been bought from the income of ancestral property: and, that being so, they ruled that according to the Mitakshara law, he had no power to dispose of it by will.

    The first question which arises in the cause is, whether or not it had been decided, in a manner binding upon the parties, that Chuckurdhur had the power to devise by will such real property as he had acquired out of the income of his ancestral property?

    The suit in which this question is alleged by the defendant to have been so decided, was brought by the plaintiff against Bonomalee and others in January 1859, and judgment was given in it in 1863. It is not now denied by the Counsel for the respondent that this question was in fact decided by that judgment, but it is argued that the question was not so raised as to give the Court jurisdiction to decide it, and that the judgment upon it was ultra vires.

    The facts necessary to make that suit intelligible are as follows:—

    Chuckurdhur had first adopted the plaintiff, and subsequently adopted Bonomalee. On the 5th April 1849 he made a will, giving a nine annas share of his real estate to the plaintiff, and a seven annas share to Bonomalee, dividing his personal estate equally between them. The will contained a clause to the effect that if either devisee disputed it, he should forfeit all benefit under it. Chuckurdhur shortly afterwards published this will by filing it in the Court of the Collector.

    Violent disputes having arisen between the plaintiff and his father, in the course of which the plaintiff disputed his father's competence to make a will, Chuckurdhur, in 1857, filed in the same Court two petitions, the purport of which was that he disowned the plaintiff as his son, and adopted, and acted upon, the clause of the will depriving either devisee who disputed it of any benefit under it.

    On the 14th January 1859 the plaintiff filed a plaint against his father, and against Bonomalee, and some other persons who had obtained property under deeds executed by his father, for cancellation of those deeds, for cancellation of the adoption of Bonomalee, for cancellation of the will, and for maintenance. He alleged the will to be inoperative and fraudulent, on the ground that his father had no testamentary power over his ancestral property, to which the plaintiff was jointly entitled with him during his life; he further alleged that his father had acquired such property as he had not inherited, from the proceeds of his ancestral property, and that such property was therefore ancestral; and in a schedule appended to his plaint, entitled “A schedule of the disputed property,” he distinguished ancestral zemindaris from zemindaris acquired from the profits of ancestral estate. The case of Kanth Narain Singh v. Prem Lall Paurey, decides that it was competent for the plaintiff to bring such suit in his father's lifetime.

    Chuckurdhur, in his answer, maintained his right of disposition by will in these terms: “The plaintiff writes that I had no authority to transfer ancestral estates by sale or gift, and prays for the reversal of the will and the deeds of gift executed by me. This is his mistake, because I am the owner of all the estates, ancestral and self-acquired, and have every power to alienate them by sale or gift in various ways.” He further denied the fact that his purchases of land were made solely from profits of the ancestral estate.

    In the replication the plaintiff reasserted his right of inheritance, and maintained that in that right he was entitled to require, among other things, the cancellation of the will. He reasserted that all the estates of his father were ancestral estates, and none self-acquired according to Hindu law, and that by that law they are not transferable by sale or gift or otherwise; and joined issue on the fact that the purchased estates were acquired otherwise than from the proceeds of ancestral estate.

    In their Lordships' opinion, the effect of the pleadings is that the plaintiff sought, inter alia, to set aside the will on the ground that the testator had not the power to make any of the devises of realty that it contained, inasmuch as he could not devise ancestral real property, and all his real property was in point of law ancestral, consisting of such as he had inherited from his father, and such as he had bought out of the income of it.

    It is true that this question is not raised as distinctly as it ought to have been in the issues, the only issue directly referring to the will being, whether or not it was assented to by the plaintiff, an issue clearly embracing but a portion of the controversy between the parties. That the question was, however, raised in the suit, appears not only by the pleadings which have been referred to, but by the grounds of appeal by the plaintiff from the decision of the Principal Sudder Ameen which was against him, wherein he insists (among other things) that the will is wholly irregular and illegal, and that the defendant had no power under the shastras to execute such a will or wills. He says:— “all the properties moveable and immoveable are ancestral, and not the self-acquired properties of my adopted father; therefore, according to the provisions of the Mitakshara shastra, gifts of even a portion without the consent of your petitioner are illegal and improper.” Chuckurdhur, in opposition to the grounds of appeal, insists that his will was valid and regular, and that he had the power to dispose by it of all property not ancestral in the proper sense.

    If both parties invoked the opinion of the Court upon this question, if it was raised by the pleadings and argued, their Lordships are unable to come to the conclusion that, merely because an issue was not framed which, strictly construed, embraced the whole of it, therefore the judgment upon it was ultra vires. To so hold would appear scarcely consistent with the case of Mussamut Mitna v. Syud Fuzl Rub, wherein it was held that in a case where there had been no issues at all, but where nevertheless it plainly appeared what the question was which was raised by the parties in their pleadings, and was actually submitted by them to the Court, the judgment upon it was valid.

    Their Lordships are of opinion that the plaintiff sought for the decision of the Court on this question, whether his father had or had not the power to dispose of all or part of his real property by will, he himself dividing that property under two heads, viz., ancestral property, and that derived from the income or profits of ancestral property; that this question was raised by the pleadings and treated by both parties as before the Court, and that the Court had jurisdiction, and indeed were called upon, to decide whether or not the will was operative as to all, or to any, or what portion of the property. The Principal Sudder Ameen decided in substance in favor of the plaintiff as far as the ancestral property was concerned, but dismissed his suit as far as it related to the property derived from the income of ancestral property.

    An appeal from this decision came before the High Court on the 28th February 1863, after the death of Chuckurdhur, and it now becomes necessary to refer to the judgment given on that appeal. After stating that “the present suit is brought by Suddanund for maintenance, to declare the adoption of Bonomalee invalid and unlawful, to declare that the father's repudiation of the plaintiff as a son is illegal and beyond the father's powers, to declare the will and petitions disinheriting him inofficious and inoperative, and to set aside certain deeds of sale and gift,” (with which we are not concerned at present,) the High Court proceed to say that the case involves several important questions of Hindu law, and they thus divide those questions:— First, “the status of Bonomalee, whom the plaintiff seeks to declare to be no lawful son of Chuckurdhur;” secondly, “the status of plaintiff who seeks to be declared a son, and whom the father sought to repudiate;” and thirdly, “the property.” After deciding in favor of the plaintiff on the question of adoption and status, they then proceed to deal with the question of property in these terms:— “With respect to the property, our decision must follow the decisions regarding personal status above laid down. By the Mitakshara law applicable to the case, the son has a vested right of inheritance in the ancestral immoveable property; and as the question was raised before us, we must declare that the ancestral property is only that actually inherited, and not that which has been acquired or recovered, even though it may have been acquired from the income of the ancestral property, for the income is the property of the tenant for life to do as he likes with it On the other hand, the father has it in his power to dispose as he likes of all acquired and all personal property. Such, then, being the status of the parties, and such the law, we declare that the will and the petitions sought to be set aside are inofficious and inoperative so far as they profess to deprive the plaintiff, the only son of Chuckurdhur, of his right to succeed to the whole ancestral immoveable property held by the said Chuckurdhur; but as regards all other property, seeing that Chuckurdhur was entitled to do as he chose, and chose to disinherit his son, me cannot interfere, and in so far dismiss the prayer of the plaintiff. There is not the least doubt that by the petitions presented by Chuckurdhur, he unmistakeably published his will and desire to deprive the plaintiff of all right to the property so far as he could deprive him, and give it to Bonomalee.” They then deal with the question of consent to the will, which they find in favor of the plaintiff; and then they proceed to say, “the father being dead, the appellants have waived a decision of the claim to maintenance: and with respect to the deeds of sale and gift sought to be set aside, as the appellants must again go into Court to recover possession of the ancestral property, they are satisfied with the simple declaration that such deeds cannot affect the ancestral property, and that they are at liberty in any fresh suit, to recover possession of all such ancestral property.” In their Lordships' opinion the Court had the power to substitute, with the consent of the parties, such a declaration for the relief specifically asked for, viz., the cancellation of the will.

    The 2nd clause of Act VIII of the Code of Procedure of 1859 is in these terms: “The Civil Courts shall not take cognizance of any suit brought on a cause of action which shall have been heard and determined by a Court of competent jurisdiction, in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they claim.” Their Lordships are of opinion that the term “cause of action” is to be construed with reference rather to the substance than to the form of action, and they are of opinion that in this case the cause of action was in substance to declare the will invalid, on the ground of the want of power of the testator to devise the property he dealt with. But even if this interpretation were not correct, their Lordships are of opinion that this clause in the Code of Procedure would by no means prevent the operation of the general law relating to res judicata, founded on the principle “nemo debet bis vexari pro eddem causd.” This law has been laid down by a series of cases in this country with which the profession is familiar. It has probably never been better laid down than in a case which was referred to — Gregory v. Molesworth — in which Lord Hardwicke held that where a question was necessarily decided, in effect though not in express terms, between parties to the suit, they could not raise the same question as between, themselves in any other suit in any other form and that decision has been followed by a long course of decisions, the greater part of which will be found noticed in the very able notes of Mr. Smith to the case of the Duchess of Kingston.

    Applying these principles of law to the present case, their Lordships are of opinion that there has been a binding decision between the plaintiff and the defendant — who, for this purpose, stands in the position of her late husband — that Chuckurdhur's will was operative to dispose of all such real property as he had acquired out of the income of ancestral property. Their Lordships agree with the High Court that Chuckurdhur did in fact devise the property over which he had the power of disposition to Bonomalee; and they regard the petitions of 1857 not as in the nature of new wills, bat as declarations of his intention to act upon the clause of forfeiture in his will, a clause which, according to the case of Cooke v. Turner, would be valid and operative.

    Having come to this conclusion, their Lordships forbear from intimating any opinion on the points of law which would have arisen had their decision on this been different, on one of the most important of which the judgment of the 28th of February 1863, and that which is now under appeal, are in conflict.

    Their Lordships will therefore humbly advise Her Majesty that the decree of the High Court be reversed, and the decree of the Principal Sudder Ameen affirmed.

    Considering that the complications which have arisen have been due in some measure to the manner in which Chuckurdhur himself dealt with his property, and that the Courts below, both that of the Principal Sudder Ameen and the High Court, thought this a case in which each party ought to bear his own costs, their Lordships are of opinion that each party should bear his own costs in this appeal, and before the High Court.

    Appeal allowed.
    Agent for the appellant: Mr. F. Graham.
    Agents for the respondent: Messrs. Barrow and Barton.

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    Soorjomonee Dayee v. Suddanund Mohapatter
    (Jul 8, 1873)