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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • S. 11 and 12 of Act VIII of 1879 (amending the Revenue Act, 1873),
  • Act X of 1859 and Bengal Act VIII of 1869 the provisions
  • s. 6. Act X of 1859, and ss. 8 and of Act XVIII of 1873,
  • s. 58 of the Transfer of Property Act (I Vo of 1882).
  • Act X of 1859, the provisions of that Act
  • s. 9 of the Rent Act XVIII of 1873,
  • ss. 11 and 12 of Act VIII of 1879
  • s. 9 of Act XVIII of 1873,
  • TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • s. 141 of Act XIX of 1873,
  • Provinces, Act X of 1859
  • s. 9, Act XVIII, of 1873,
  • s. 93 of the Rent Act
  • s. 9 of the Rent Act,
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • S. 11 and 12 of Act VIII of 1879 (amending the Revenue Act, 1873),
  • Act X of 1859 and Bengal Act VIII of 1869 the provisions
  • s. 6. Act X of 1859, and ss. 8 and of Act XVIII of 1873,
  • s. 58 of the Transfer of Property Act (I Vo of 1882).
  • Act X of 1859, the provisions of that Act
  • s. 9 of the Rent Act XVIII of 1873,
  • ss. 11 and 12 of Act VIII of 1879
  • s. 9 of Act XVIII of 1873,
  • TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • s. 141 of Act XIX of 1873,
  • Provinces, Act X of 1859
  • s. 9, Act XVIII, of 1873,
  • s. 93 of the Rent Act
  • s. 9 of the Rent Act,
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns references to the Full Bench of the Court in two second appeals (No. 1152 of 1881 and No. 509 of 1881) regarding whether a simple mortgage or hypothecation by an occupancy-tenant constitutes a "transfer" within the meaning of section 9 of the Rent Act XVIII of 1873. The Court was called upon to determine if such a transaction is a transfer favored and legalized by that section.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a simple mortgage or hypothecation by an occupancy-tenant is a "transfer" within the meaning of section 9 of the Rent Act XVIII of 1873.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bhawani Gir v. Dalmandan Gir Whether the mortgagee of a co-sharer is himself a co-sharer within the meaning of section 93 of the Rent Act XVIII of 1873. The Court held that a mortgagee is not a co-sharer and does not have proprietary rights; this distinction informed the Court's view that a mortgage is not a complete transfer under section 9 of the Rent Act.
Narendra Narayan Roy Chowdhry v. Ishan Chandra Sen Whether the occupancy right is transferable and the nature of the occupancy right under Act X of 1859. Referenced to show the occupancy right was held not transferable under earlier law, supporting analysis of the nature of occupancy rights.
Ablakh Rai v. Udit Narain Rai Whether the right of an occupancy-tenant was transferable by sale in execution of decree but only among co-sharers by inheritance. Used to illustrate limits on transferability under section 9 but did not decide the exact question of hypothecation as transfer.
Umroo Begam v. The Land Mortgage Bank of India Whether section 9 of the Rent Act prevents sale in execution of a decree of an occupancy-right. Held that section 9 did not prevent such sale by a landholder of the occupancy-right of his judgment debtor.
Goki v. Kewal Ram Whether sub-letting by an occupancy-tenant amounts to transfer within section 9. Held that sub-letting was not a transfer prohibited by section 9.
Gholam Mohammed v. Tika Ram Whether usufructuary mortgage constitutes a prohibited transfer under section 9. A Board of Revenue held that a usufructuary mortgage constituted a temporary transfer not prohibited by section 9; this view was rejected by the dissenting opinion in the present case.
Barton v. Reevel Rule of statutory construction regarding technical language in legislation. The Court applied the principle that technical terms in statutes are to be given their technical meaning unless the statute indicates otherwise.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the nature of the occupancy right, statutory provisions, and the legal character of simple mortgages (hypothecation) under Indian law. Chief Justice Sturt and other majority judges held that a simple mortgage or hypothecation does not amount to a "transfer" within the meaning of section 9 of the Rent Act XVIII of 1873. They reasoned that a mortgage is a limited security interest that does not effect a complete conveyance or divestiture of ownership or proprietary rights. The mortgagee acquires no absolute ownership by the mortgage itself; transfer of ownership requires further steps such as foreclosure or sale by decree, which are distinct from the mortgage contract.

In contrast, Justice Mahmood dissented. He undertook a detailed examination of the occupancy right, comparing it to the Roman law concept of emphyteusis, concluding it is a substantive real right akin to land ownership, subject to statutory limitations. He emphasized that the term "transfer" in section 9 must be understood in its technical legal sense, encompassing all contracts that pass real rights, including hypothecation. Mahmood J. held that hypothecation creates a transfer of an estate in immovable property, albeit not absolute ownership, because it conveys the right of sale by the mortgagee. He further reasoned that the restrictions in section 9 prohibiting transfers to strangers must also apply to hypothecation and its enforcement, as allowing hypothecation would circumvent statutory protections. He found practical and procedural difficulties in enforcing hypothecation subject to the statutory restrictions on transfer, concluding that hypothecation is a transfer within the meaning of section 9.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Full Bench delivered a majority decision that a simple mortgage or hypothecation by an occupancy-tenant is not a transfer within the meaning of section 9 of the Rent Act XVIII of 1873. However, Justice Mahmood dissented, holding that it is a transfer within the meaning of the section.

Implications: The majority ruling means that hypothecation does not violate the statutory restrictions on transfer of occupancy rights, preserving the validity of such security interests by occupancy-tenants. The dissent highlights significant legal and procedural complexities regarding the enforcement of hypothecation under statutory transfer restrictions. The decision clarifies but does not fully settle the legal status of hypothecation under the Rent Act, reflecting divergent judicial interpretations rather than establishing a new binding precedent.

    Gopal Pandey v. Parsotam Das

    Sturt, C.J:— These are references to the Full Bench of the Court in two second appeals, No. 1152 of 1881, before Straight, J., and Oldfield, J., and No. 509 of 1881, before Brodhurst, J. and myself, and in both of which the question referred to the full Bench, and which we have now to consider, is the same, viz., whether a simple mortgage or an hypothecation by an occupancy-tenant is a transfer within the meaning of s. 9 of the Rent Act XVIII of 1873, that is, in other words, whether it is such a transfer as is favoured and legalised by that section?

    In my remarks proposing the reference in the latter of these two cases, I in licated an opinion that such a right or contract had not the effect of transferring the holding of the occupancy-tenant within the true intent and meaning of s. 9, and having since fully considered the question they raise, I remain of the same opinion.

    Besides the authorities mentioned in my referring order there is one case, also a reference to the Full Bench by Straight, J., and myself, in which although the question was not the same as that submitted by the present reference, I pointed out certain legal considerations to which I may be permitted to refer. That was the case of Bhawani Gir v. Dalmandan Gir in which the material question was whether the mortgagee of a co-sharer was himself a co-sharer within the meaning of s. 93 of the Rent Act XVIII, of 1873. And in the course of my answer to the reference. I ex-pressed the opinion that such a mortgagee was not in the position of a co-sharer, and for reason which appear to me to have a material hearing on the question now before us. I there said:—“I am clear that under the revenue law as applicable to this case, that is the revenue law in operation prior to the passing of the amending, Act VIII of 1879, a mortgage is not in the position of a co-sharer A co-sharer is a landowner, or landholder, or proprietor, whereas the interest of a mortgagee, even of a mortgagee in possession, is of a more limited nature. A mortgagee may, by for closure or other determinate procedure, as by decree, become possessed of the mortgaged property, but he can never by the direct and unaided effect of his mortgage right become absolute owner, and unquestionably he has no proprietary right to begin with S. 11 and 12 of Act VIII of 1879 (amending the Revenue Act, 1873), were referred to at the hearing is showing that the intention of the Legislature was that the terms ‘owner’ and ‘proprietor’ included a mortgagee. But if these words were intended to be applied is their full and complete sense, no argument could he deduced from luck a provision of the law in favour of the present appellant, for that Act is not retrospective, or simply declaratory in any Retrospective sense; and it would be much more reasonable to argue that ss. 11 and 12 of Act VIII of 1879 rather showed that, in the mind and intention of the Legislature, the revenue law previously enacted did not recognize any synonymous right in landlord or proprietor and mortgagee, but that to make these different rights mean the same thing, an express law had for that purpose to be passed. The sections in question, however, only provide that a mortgages; shall be deemed to be an owner or proprietor in a very partial sense. Thus s. 11 provides that a mortgagee shall only be deemed as owner as that term is used in s. 141 of Act XIX of 1873, that is as being ‘bound to maintain and keep in repair at their own cost the boundary marks lawfully erected in mahals, villages or fields; and under s. 12 a mortgagee in possession or a farmer is only to be understood as a proprietor within the meaning and application of s. 146 of Act XIX of 1873. In all other respects, as regards those two sections of Act VIII of 1879, a mortgagee remains such without any further rights.” Now these remarks (to which I may say I adhere very clearly) have a direct bearing on the question we have to consider in the present references, for they show that, while a co-sharer is himself a landowner or proprietor, the interest or right taken by the mortgagee of a co-sharer is of a different nature, inasmuch as no complete conveyance or transfer of the property mortgaged, or any rights, or interests therein, had by force of the mortgage contract itself been made. It will have been observed that I said “a mortgagee may by foreclosure become possessed of the mortgaged property,” by which I meant that the holder of a mortgage in terms which allowed of such a remedy may thereby ultimately become possessed of the mortgaged property; adding, however, “but he can never by the direct and unaided effect of his mortgage right become absolute owner, and unquestionably he has no proprietary right to begin with. It will be seen that, these remarks are strictly relevant to the question before us, showing, as they do, that a mortgage is not in itself a complete transfer in any sense, and therefore a fortiori not a transfer within the meaning of s. 9, Act XVIII of 1873. I may here observe that in these remarks I used the words “foreclosure” advisedly and not—withstanding some observations in the well-known work on Mortgages in India by Mr. A.G Macpherson, formerly a Judge of the High Court of Calcutta, and a lawyer of acknowledged ability and learning. On p. 162 of that work it is asserted that:—“It is only is mortgages by bye-bil-wafa, kut-kubale, or conditional sale, that foreclosure can occur”. But this is a statement of the law which, if taken literally, is calculated to mislead. In the Tagore Lectures for 185-6 on the Law of Mortgage in India it is pointed out that Mr. Justice Macpherson's view of the mortgage character of a conditional sale is taken from a Judgment of the old Calcutta Sadr Diwani Adalat, but which, if argued to support the dictum I have referred to, affords, in my opinion, no sound basis for such a view of the law. All such securities are conditional sales of the property hypothecated or charged, and in all cases foreclosure may take place if the terms of the contract admit of that remedy, and it matters not whether the security may have the name of a simple mortgage, or usufructuary mortgage, or a conditional sale. Nor does the right of foreclosure exclude any other remedy under the contract. In England a mortgagee can foreclose although a power of sale is given him in his mortgage deed; and in this country, notwithstanding foreclosure being available to the mortgagee, he may, if he so elect, sue on his contract for possession of the mortgaged property.

    It thus appears that whether the remedy to the mortgagee or conditional vendee be by foreclosure or suit, no complete transfer by force of the security itself has taken place but something outside the security-deed has yet to be done, whether by foreclosure or suit, in order to effectuate any transfer, much more a transfer under s. 9 of Act XVIII of 1873, A mortgage or conditional sale may be a limited alienation, but in no sense can such a contract be termed a transfer, and it is to my mind beyond all doubt that such an hypothecation as is stated in these references is not a transfer within the meaning of s. 9, Act XVIII of 1873. My answer then to both references is in the negative.

    Straight, J., Brodhurst, J., and Tyrrell, J., concerning:— In answer to this reference we would say that a simple mortgage by an occupancy-tenant of his occupancy-right is not a transfer within the meaning of s. 9, Act XVIII of 1873. Such a transaction does not involve an absolute conveyance of the tenant's interest but it merely amounts to a temporary charge on, or alienation of, the cultivatory area of the holding as a collateral security to the personal obligation of the borrower for the money advanced. What s. 9 aimed at was to prevent occupancy-tenants from wholly divesting themselves of their rights of occupancy by out-and-out transfer to strangers to the exclusion of co-sharers interested by inheritance in such right. It was argued for the zamindar that before determining whether a simple mortgage is a transfer, regard must be had to the consequences that may result from it, namely, judgment and decree for enforcement of hypothecation with subsequent sale. This does not in the least degree affect the case. If the mortgagee takes an inadequate or unenforcable security, that is his look-out. For neither the mortgage itself nor the decree involve any transfer, and such sale as follows can only fake place to one or more of those persons who are specially exempted from the restriction of s. 9, namely, “co-sharers by inheritance” in the right sold. For these reasons we would answer this and the kindred reference in S.A 509 of 1881, as indicated at the outset of these remarks.

    Mahmood, J.:— These two cases have been referred to the Full Bench for determination of the question:—“Is an hypothecation by an occupancy-tenant of his interest a transfer within the meaning of s. 9 of Act XVIII of 1873?”

    As I am in the unfortunate position of not being able to agree with my learned and hon'ble colleagues in the answer proposed, I feel it incumbent upon me to explain the reasons for my opinion more fully than I should otherwise have considered necessary.

    In order to deal with the question raised in this reference, it appears to me necessary first of all to consider the nature of the right possessed by an occupancy-tenant in these Provinces, and in the next place to consider the nature and incidents of the form off alienation known as hypothecation or simple mortgage in India.

    Whatever the rights of tenants may originally have been in these Provinces, Act X of 1859 was the first legislative enactment which recognized or conferred the right of occupancy upon cultivators who had occupied their holdings for twelve years and upwards. S. 6 of that Act virtually declared the right to be heritable, but left the question of transferability of the tenure unprovided for. Numerous rulings, more or less conflicting, are to be found in the reports. It was held, by a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court that the right was not transferable, that it was a right to be enjoyed by the person who held or cultivated and paid the rent, and had done so for a period of twelve years, that the right was only to be in the person who had occupied for twelve years, and was not intended to give any right of property which could be transferred—Narendra Narayan Roy Chowdhry v. Ishan Chandra Sen .

    The same view had been previously taken by Phear, J. in the case of Bibe Sohodwa . That learned Judge, in examining the nature of the right of occupancy, compared it to the relation which obtains between the right of ownership of land in England and the servitude or easement which is termed profit a prendre. He further observed that the ryot's was the dominant and the zamindar's the servient right; that whatever the ryot had, the zamindar had all the rest which was necessary to complete ownership of the land; that the latter must, therefore, have such a right as would enable him to keep the possession of the soil in those persons who are entitled to it, and to prevent it from being invaded by those who are not entitled to it.

    Whilst such was the nature of the right to which occupancy-tenants were held to be entitled merely by force of the statute, it had been held, both by this Court and by the High Court of Calcutta, that local custom would entitle the occupancy-tenant to transfer his holding; in other, the question of transferability was to be determined with reference to the original nature of the tenure, irrespective of the statutory provisions which were not understood to deprive tenants of such customary or other rights as they possessed before the passing of Act X of 1859. The status of occupancy-tenants was therefore variable and indefinite, and being thus involved in uncertainly was liable to create the mischief which arises from imposing upon the Courts, charged with deciding such suits, the duty of ascertaining local custom in every case in which the tenant chose to plead it—customs which in India are far from being fixed or easily ascertainable.

    Such was the state of things found by the Legislature in 1873 when the Rent Act of that year was passed. The preamble to that Act shows that its objects were of a wider scope that those with which Act X of 1859 was enacted. The object of the Act of 1873 was not only to consolidate, but to amend, the law relating to the recovery of rent in these Provinces. It is therefore with reference to the provisions of that Act, which are more specific and clear, that the nature of the right of occupancy should be determined, and it is to be observed that the question of transferability is no longer left unprovided for by the Legislature.

    The manner in which the right of occupancy comes, into existence is described in s. 8 of the Act. The right is acquired by the tenant merely in virtue of occupying or cultivating land continually for twelve years: in computing the period the occupation or cultivation by “the father or other person from whom the tenant inherits” is also taken into calculation; and the whole rule is subject to certain provisos, which need not be considered for the purposes of the present cases. The right which thus comes into existence confers definite benefits on the tenant. He ceases to be a tenant-at-will; the rent payable by him cannot be enhanced by the mere wish of the landlord (s. 12) without special grounds (s. 13); he can apply for abatement of rent on showing adequate grounds (s. 15); the entire question of the amount of rent no longer remains a matter of discretion with the landlord, but is regulated by definite rules (ss. 16 and 17), though the landlord and tenant can by mutual agreement fix such amount (s. 22) for such term as may be agreed upon. Further, the tenant can claim a lease from the landlord at the rates paid by him (s. 26); he Cannot be ejected expect on the ground of the non-payment of arrears of rent and other definite grounds specified in the Act. In short, while the landlord still continues to be the owner of the land, the tenant acquires a right to occupy and cultivate the soil wholly irrespective of the assent or permission of the landlord, so long as the provisions of the Act are conformed to.

    Now, these statutory provisions which, on the face of them, appear to relate only to the province of procedure or adjective law on the subject of recovery of rent have, in reality, the effect of creating a substantive right in favour of the tenant. It has been said that the nature of that right is only a personal one because, at is contended, it belongs to the tenant personally, and dies with him. This contention is no doubt in a measure supported by the view expressed by Couch, C.J, in the Full Bench ruling in the case of Narendra Narayan Roy Chowdhry . But that ruling was passed under Act X of 1859 and Bengal Act VIII of 1869 the provisions of which were vastly different to those of Act XVIII of 1873. I confess I can take no such view of the right of occupancy under the provisions of the last-mentioned Act. The idea of a personal right has been variously defined by jurists to whom it is known by the term jus in personam, but in all those definitions the essential principle is recognized that such right avails exclusively against persons specifically determinate. In the case of an occupancy-tenant the right created in his favour by the statute is not a right which binds the landlord alone; in other words, it is not a right which has for its correlative the obligation of only the landlord of the soil. On the contrary, it is a right in land, a right which avails against all persons universally. It is therefore not a jus in personam, audit is clear that it cannot be called a jus ad rem, for that class of right is only a species of personal right, and implies the right of compelling a determinate person or persons to do any specific act, the commission of which would confer a real right known in the language of jurisprudence as jus in rem or a permanent right in and over a thing which forms the subject of the right, in the cape of an occupancy tenant the right which the Legislature has conferred upon him under Act XVIII of 1873 is such as, subject to the limitations provided by the statute, prevails against all the word. The subject of the right is the land held by the tenant, and whatever changes the ownership of that land may undergo, the occupancy right subsists in and goes with the land. The right no doubt falls for short of absolute ownership or domihion defied by Austin to be a “right over a determinate thing indefinite in point of user, unrestricted in point of disposition, and unlimited in point of duration.” But “one or more of the subordinate elements of ownership, such as a right of possession or user, may be granted out while the residuary right of ownership—called by the Romans nuda preprietas—remains, unimpaired. The elements of the right which may thus be disposed of without interference with the right itself—mother words, which may be granted to one person over an object of which another continues to be the owner—are known as jura in re aliena.”—(Holland on Jur., p. 144.) Thus jura in re aliena are such of the rights in rem, availing against the word at large, as are acquired over and in the absolute ownership or dominion of another person in whom the ownership still continues. Am over such rights was a right known to Roman jurisprudence as emphyteusis, which has been defined to be “the right of a person who was not the owner of a piece of land, to use it as his own in perpetuity, subject to forfeiture on non-payment of a fixed rent, and on certain other contingencies.”

    It appears to me that the right of an occupancy-tenant in these Provinces resembles the emphyteusis of the Roman Law. It is a right carved out of the proprietary estate of the zamindar by the operation of the statute, as indeed it might have been by grants from the landlord himself. That such was the nature of the right of occupancy intend to be conferred by the Legislature upon tenants of twelve years' standing seems to me to be clearly shown, not only by the general provisions of the Rent Act, but by the express language of a clause in s. 9. That clause lays down that “when any person entitled to such last-mentioned right dies, the right shall devolve as if it were land.” Moreover, as shown by s. 8 the tenant acquires the right of occupancy not only by virtue of his own cultivation, but also by virtue of the continuous cultivation or occupation of the land by the person from whom he inherits. Under s. 9 the right is capable of devolution by inheritance and also of transfer by act of parties, but both these capabilities are subject to the limitations provided by that section. It provides that the right of occupancy shall not be transferable by grant, will, or otherwise, except as between persons who have become by inheritance co-shrers in such right.” These limitations, however, do not alter the nature of the right so as to take it from one class of rights recognized by jurisprudence into another class. Therefore, according to my view, the holding of an occupancy tenant must, for the purposes of the present question, be regarded as land or any other real and substantive interest in immoveable property. If any light can be thrown upon this question by the provisions of laws other than the Rent Act itself, I should say that the rules of procedure in regard to the territorial jurisdiction and limitation, applicable to a suit by an occupancy-tenant for recovery of possession of his holding from a trespasser, proceed upon the principle that the tenant's light is immoveable property and must be treated as such for purposes of procedure.

    The question then before us resolves itself into the simple question whether the word “transferable,” as used in s. 9 of the Rent Act, includes the alienation known in this country as hypothecation or simple mortgage. Under the view which I have taken of the nature of the occupancy-right, the answer to the question must, in ??? occupancy were a right of ownership of land qualified by the limitations which s. 9 of the Rent Act has imposed upon the occupancy right.

    It has been said that the interpretation of the word “transferable” is simply a matter of ascertaining the meaning of a word of the English language; that in its ordinary import it conveys the idea of only an absolute transfer amounting to a divestiture by the transferor of his rights out-and-out in favour of the transferee followed by possession of the latter as a necessary consequence; that hypothecation being a mere collateral security does not amount to such divestiture; that is merely a temporary alienation, and does not therefore fall under the prohibitions against transfer provided by s. 9 of the Rent Act. It is further argued that the object of the Rent Act was to batter the condition of the tenant and not to ruin his credit, and that to hold that he is prohibited from hypothecating his right would be to ruin his credit. To give force to this contention the learned pleader, who appeared to support this view, has cited the ruling of the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Ablakh Rai v. Udit Narain Rai if which it was held that the right of an occupancy-tenant was transferable by sale is execution of decree, but only as between persons who had become by inheritance co-sharers in such right. In the same case it was held by Stuart, C.J, that such right was transferable by sale in execution of decree without any restriction. Again, the case of Umroo Begam v. The Land Mortgage Bank of India has been cited, in which it was held by a Division Bench of this Court that s. 9, Act XVIII, of 1873, did not prevent a landholder from causing the sale in execution of his own decree of the occupancy-right of his own judgment-debtor in land belonging to himself. This ruling was subsequently upheld the majority of the Full Bench of this Court (3). The learned pleader has also cited more recent rulings of this. Court. In S.A No. 847 of 1880, decided on the 27th January, 1880 (4), it was held that s. 9, Act XVIII of 1873, did not bar a sub-letting of his occupancy by an occupancy-tenant, as by doing so he did not part with his occupancy-right within the meaning of that section. The same view was taken by the North-Western Provinces Sadr Board of Revenue in the case of Goki v. Kewal Ram . A stronger case than any of these is S.A No. 899 of 1881, decided on the 15th April 1882 , in which it has been held by a Division Bench of this Court that even a perpetual lease by an occupancy-tenant does not amount to a transfer such as is prohibited by s. 9 of the Rent Act. These rulings, however, do not deal with the exact question before us, and whatever effect they may have upon the interpretation of the section, they do not go to the extent of showing that hypothecation is not a transfer prohibited by s. 9 of the Rent Act. The exact question before us has, therefore, never been decided by this Court. The learned, pleader has however, cited the case of Gholam Mchammed v. Tika Ram which not only goes to the full extent of his contention, but indeed goes beyond it. For that was a case of usufructuary mortgage, and a Bench of the North-Western Provinces Sadr Board of Revenue, consisting of Messrs Carmichael and Plowden, held that “the middle paragraph in s. 9 simply refers to the absolute transfer of an occupancy-right, not to a conditional and temporary transfer, whatever shape such temporary transfer may take, i.e, whether it is made by a mortgage for a term of years, or by a sub-lease for a term of years; that an occupancy-tenant in no way infringes the law or endangers his occupancy-rights in a holding which he assigns over to a third person temporarily; and that the term for which such an assignment may run is concurrent with, and only limited by, the occupancy-tenant's life.”

    I confess I am unable to take any such view. It seems to me to be based upon what I cannot help feeling is a misconception of the nature of the occupancy-right. I have already endeavored to show, by introducing a comparison between the occupancy-right of an Indian cultivator and the emphyteusis of the Romans, that the right as now defined by the statute is—subject to its own limitations—as much a real and subsisting right as any other kind of estate carved out of the full ownership of land. The duration of the tenant's life plays no part in determining the right. Like any other estate it devolves upon heirs, and is also transferable by act of the parties, the devolution and the transfer being both subject to the limitations provided by s. 9. It cannot be taken to be in the nature of an estate for life; nor can the position of the tenant's heirs be compared to that of reversioner. That this is so appears to me to be clear from the fact that the right can be fully transferred by the tenant in favour of any one of the “persons who have become by inheritance co-sharers in such right,” even though such transfer may be against the will and to the prejudice of all other persons of the same class, or those on whom the right would otherwise devolve upon the death of the tenant. So far as the duration of the right is concerned, it lasts so long as not only the original tenant himself, but also as such persons as are described in s. 9 continue to live and occupy the land. Like emphyteusis, it is a right which falls short of ownership, for it has reversion expectant upon it, the reversion being not in favour of the tenant's heirs, but in favour of the zamindar to whom the right reverts on default of such persons as could succeed to it under the rules of s. 9.

    In considering the arguments addressed to us as to the policy of the Rent Act, I think we are bound, as much as Courts of Justice in England, to recognise the rule of construction which prohibits Judges from taking into consideration the history of an individual clause in an Act, or the policy of Government with reference to any particular legislation. Nor can we, interpreting the Act, seek any help from the statements of objects and reasons which accompanied the Bill, nor from the debates in the Legislative Council, or any other proceeding which preceded the passing of the Act. It is for the Legislature to consider and determine whether the words which they employ in framing the Acts will give effect to the object and policy which the State has in view. We are no doubt at liberty to consider the general state of the law which prevailed in pari materia prior to the enactment of any statute under consideration. In the present case all we can refer to for the purpose of comparison to ascertain the policy of the Legislature consists of the law which preceded Act X of 1859, the provisions of that Act itself, and, lastly, the various authoritative judgments passed under that Act, in regard to the right of occupancy. By the light of these rules of construction it seems to me that Act XVIII of 1873, going somewhat in advance of the Rent Act which preceded it, intended to confer settled and durable rights of occupancy on such ryots as had held the Soil for the prescriptive period of twelve years, and had by unremitting labour improved the land. The creation or Recognition of such a right by the express language of the statute is no doubt calculated to advance agriculture and promote peace in a country like this, the vast majority of whose population consists of agriculturists. The creation of the right was an act of grace on the part of the State, dictated by a sense of natural justice in favour of those who may be said by the length an continuity of that cultivator possession to have earned a right in the soil which had been the object of their care and affection. But the right was not intended to favour only the tenant in actual occupation at the time, but also those who, belonging to the same stock, had taken part in the cultivation, and thus helped him in earning the right. On the other hand, as seems to me to be clear from s. 6. Act X of 1859, and ss. 8 and of Act XVIII of 1873, the State did not disregard the rights of ownership which it had previously conferred upon the zamindar by express stipulations and legislative enactments. Whilst it seemed advisable to secure for those already in long standing occupation of cultivatory holdings some fixity of tenure and some guarantee of fair rents, it was equally necessary, both in the interests of the stock to which the tenant belonged, and of the zamindar who owned the land, to subject the right so created to such restrictions as Would prevent the constant change of tenants and the acquisition of the right by those who formerly had no connection with the soil. Hence the prohibitions against transfer which s. 9 provides. Those prohibitions must be so interpreted as to give effect to the policy of the law.

    The interpretation of the word “transferable” depends upon the meaning to be attached to the word “transfer”. Whatever the meaning of that word as used by the English people in ordinary parlance may be, I cannot hold that the question before us can be decided on any such ground. I fully admit that words used in statutes are, as a general rule, to receive their natural and ordinary signification, and the Courts in construing legislative enactments will adopt the popular meaning of words and phrases. But this rule of construction is qualified by a distinct limitation, explained by Parke, B, in Barton v. Reevel that “when the Legislature uses technical language in its statutes, it is supposed to attach to it its technical meaning, unless the contrary manifestly appears,” and the reason of the rule is that “such language is employed for the purpose of escaping the difficulties caused by the use of merely popular expressions in regard to matters precise and technical in their nature such as the title to land or the vesting of estates or other legal subjects.”—Wilberforce on Statute Law, p. 124.

    Now the word “transfer” has long been recognised to be a technical term of law in all countries where English is the language of the Legislature and of the Courts of Justice. It is often used as a convertible term with “alienation” “conveyance” and “assignment.” whether any distinction exists between the technical meaning of these expressions—and, if so, what that distinction is—it is not necessary exactly to determine. But it may be safely taken that the word “transfer” is used in law in the most generic signification, comprehending all the species of contract which pass real rights in property from one person to another.

    In considering the question immediately before us, it seems to me necessary to bear in mind that we are not at present concerned with transfers which take place by judicial process, but with such transfers only as take place between living parties by virtue of their own act. In this signification the term cannot be defined better than by saying that it means an act by which a living person conveys the whole or part of the right of ownership of property, in present or future, to one or more other living persons. This being my view, the next question to consider is the exact nature of Indian mortgages in general. Mortgage as understood in this country cannot be defined better than by the definition adopted by the Legislature in s. 58 of the Transfer of Property Act (I Vo of 1882). That definition has not in any way altered the law, but, on the contrary, has only formulated in clear language the notions of mortgage as understood by all the writers of text-books on Indian mortgages. Every word of the definition is borne out by the decisions of the Indian Courts of Justice as fully explained in Macpherson's celebrated work on Indian mortgages. I adopt that definition simply for the sake of convenience, and I must not be understood to rely upon it, as if I held that anything in Act IV of 1882 gave legislature authority to the interpretation of Act XVIII of 173. A mortgage, then, is the transfer of an interest in specific immoveable property for the purpose of securing the payment of money advanced or to be advanced by way of loan, an existing or future, debt, or the performance of an engagement which may give rise to a pecuniary liability. The transferor is called a mortgagor, the transferee a mortgagee. Now, hypothecation is only a species of mortgage. It has in India been used in the sense of a pledge, and the proper term for it is simple mortgage. What, then, is the nature of a simple mortgage? I again borrow the definition from the Transfer of Property Act solely for the sake of convenience, and wholly irrespective of its legislature authority. Where, without delivering possession of the mortgaged property, the mortgagor binds himself personal ??? to pay the mortgage-money, and agrees, expressly or impliedly, that in the event of his failing to pay according to his contract, the mortgagee shall have a right to cause the mortgaged property to be sold and the proceeds of sale to be applied, so for as may be necessary, in payment of the mortgage-money, the transaction is called a simple mortgage. Now, it is quite clear to my mind that the most essential of the elements which constitute the simple mortgage is the right to cause the property to be sold—a, right without which the transaction, whatever else it may be, certainly cannot be called hypothecation, pledge, or simple mortgage. This right does not come into existence when the actual sale takes place by virtue thereof, but it comes into existence as the time when the mortgage is made: it subsists in the property ever afterwards so long as the mortgage-money remains unpaid: it limits the interest of the mortgagor as they were at the time of the mortgage. Jurisprudence recognises it as one of the various species of jur in re aliena, or estates carved out of the full ownership of property. It may happen that the right, though not apparently, but in reality, is tantamount to absolute transfer in its virtual effect. For instance, when land of the value of Rs. 100 is pledged by hypothecation in lieu of a debt amounting to Rs. 101, the mortgagor is simply a nominal owner, and his nuda proprietas is worth less than zero. I am, therefore, of opinion that the rights created by hypothecation in this country amount to nothing more or less than a transfer of an estate amounting to a transfer of immoveable property, though of course not an absolute transfer. The feature which distinguishes hypothecation from other forms of mortgage consists in the fact that it does not entitle the mortgagee to enjoy the physical qualities of the subject of the mortgage. That this distinction does not alter the nature of the transaction so as to take it out of the category of transfer is clear to me from the man tier in which the right is treated by jurisprudence. The reason of the juristic view is well described by a modern writer on jurisprudence. “The right of sale is one of the component rights of ownership, and may be parted with separately, in order thus to add security to a personal obligation. When so parted with, it is a right of pledge, which may be defined as a right in rem realizable by sale, given to a creditor by way of accessory security to a right in personam. The objects aimed at by a pledge are, on the one hand, to give the creditor a security on the value of which he can rely, which he can readily turn into money, and which he can follow even in the hands of third parties; on the other hand, to leave the enjoyment of the thing in the meantime to its owner, and to give him every facility for disincumbering it when the debt for which, it is security shall have been paid.”

    Such being the very nature and essence of the rights created by hypothecation, it follows that if hypothecation is valid and legal, the incidents which flow from it must necessarily be held to be ‘valid and legal too—on the principle that when the law permits a, thing, it also permits that which is essential to its accomplishment. The most essential incident of hypothecation is the eventual sale by order of Court—a sale which in the ordinary course of law must be held by public auction, at which ex necessitale rei any person may bid, and which must be concluded in favour of the highest bidder. If hypothecation does not carry with it this right of sale at the instance of the mortgagee, and without any restrictions as to the class of bidders or purchasers, it cannot be called hypothecation at all. For if any such restrictions are attached to the right of sale, they are essentially repugnant to the very nature of the right conveyed, and must end in defeating the or the object of the pledge. Therefore, so long as I hold that under the terms of s. 9 the occupancy-tenant has no right of sale, I must as a logical consequence also hold that he cannot convey that right to another, on the maxim that no man can give to another what be himself does not possess,—non dat qui non habet.

    But has been said that the terms of s. 9 have not the effect of prohibiting hypothecation, but only go to reduce the value of the security. For it is contended that the occupancy may be lawfully sold in enforcement of hypothecation so long as the bidders in auction, belong to; the class of persons in whose favour transfer could have been legally made under that section. It seems to me to be clear that no dacree of Court could, in enforcing the lien created by the hypothecation bond, deal with the occupancy right more freely than the tenant himself could have done. And it follows that if the tenant could not transfer his rights to total strangers, the decree of Court could not do so either. If such were not the rule the prohibitions of law could be easily circumvented by the occupancy-tenant and the holder of the hypothecation bond. All that is now contended is, that a decree enforcing the hypothecation lien could be executed subject to the restriction that the sale in auction must be held in such a manner that the only persons allowed to bid for the property should be “person who have become by inheritance co-sharers” in the right of occupancy. I am not aware of any process recognised by the rules of procedure which can impose any such restriction on a public auction sale to be held in execution of decree. The sale, in fact, can no longer be called a public auction sale, and indeed cannot achieve the very objects for which auction-sales are provided by the law. Supposing a case in which the decree (passed on a hypothecation-bond executed by an occupancy-tenant) is put into execution and no “co-sharer” of the occupancy-tenant exists, or such co-sharers as do exist decline to bid in auction, the question arises, what happens to the decree which orders sale? It seems to me the decree must necessarily remain wholly in fructuous and entirely incapable of execution so far as it directs the gale of the occupancy right, Again, supposing the hypothecation-bond was executed by the occupancy-tenant jointly with all his co-sharers, the same difficulty arises in a more aggravated form. Ex hypothesi the property would be put up to auction-sale, and the only persons who could bid in the auction could be the judgment-debtors themselves—an anomaly which no system of procedure with which I am acquainted can permit, if I could hold that hypothecation of the occupancy-right is allowed by the law? that the lien created thereby can be enforced by decree of Court, I should be driven to the logical conclusion that a well-advised tenant, in borrowing money on the security of his tenure, could effectually defeat the very essence of the pledge by getting all his co-sharers to join in the bond. For, ex hypothesi, whilst a decree could enforce the lien, if the hypothecation-bond was executed by only one of the co-sharers in the occupancy-tenure, the lien would be entirely unenforceable when all the co-sharers had joined the bond. And we have to face the anomaly that only one co-sharer in an occupancy-right could confer by hypothecation of the tenure rights greater than all the co-sharers collectively could have conveyed. In other words, what all the owners of an occupancy-tenure could not do, only one of them can do.

    And it follows as a logical consequence that the larger the number of obligers, the smaller the value of the security obtained by the obligee; and if all the co-sharers are obligers, the value of the security is equal to zero. On the other hand, if, subsequent to the execution of the hypothecation-bond, the number of co-sharers in the occupancy-tenure increases, the number of possible bidders in auction also increases, thus enhancing the chances of an auction sale being held, and augmenting the value of the security. And again, on the other hand, if, subsequent to the bond, the number of the obligor's co-sharers diminishes by death or otherwise, the value of the security could diminish as each death among the co-sharers took place. The right of hypothecation, as I understand the term, can be subject to no such sliding scale of increasing and diminishing value. It is as conceive it, a right which, once validly created, subsists in the property, and depends for its value only on the value or the subject-matter or the hypothecated property. Nor can I hold that a valid hypothecation, which I have endeavoured to show means the transfer of the right of sale, can be subjected to the uncertainty of being enforceable or non-enforceable, according to the will or existence of persons wholly unconnected with the transaction. And if I am right in holding that there is no process of procedure known to our law by which a public auction-sale can be limited to a determinate class of intending purchasers, it must necessarily follow that no decree passed in enforcement of hypothecation of an occupancy-tenure can be executed. It also follows that if such a qualified public auction-sale could be ordered and held, its only effect would be to take from those interested in saving the tenure money which they need never hate paid to Secure the occupancy-right from sale. For it is not questioned that the refusal of the co-sharers to take part in the auction-sale would, have the effect of rendering the security ineffective and the decree passed thereon incapable of execution, so far as the right of occupancy is concerned. I am unable to hold, that the law contemplates any such anomalies and results And for these reasons I hold that hypothecation by an occupancy-tenant of his interest is a transfer, within the meaning of s. 9 of Act XVIII of 1873; and this my answer to the reference in these two cases.

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    Gopal Pandey v. Parsotam Das
    (Jun 13, 1882)