Straight, J.:— This is an application for revision of an order of the District Judge of Cawnpore, dated the 4th December, 1888, confirming an order of the Assistant Magistrate of the same place, dated the 21st November. Such last-mentioned order was passed under s. 2 of Act XIII of 1859, and by it the petitioner was ordered to return to his service under the pains and penalties mentioned in that section, and to complete his contract and to pay the complainant's costs. The facts found by the Magistrate were as follows:—On the [265] 22nd March, 1889, Indarjit, the petitioner, entered into a contract with the manager of the Elgin Mills Company, Cawnpore, to serve them as a carding mistri for a period of three years, and upon signing that contract an advance of Rs. 3 was paid to him. On the first November, 1888, he tendered twenty-four hours' notice of his intention to quit the service. Such notice was not accepted by his employers; and thereupon having applied for eight days' leave “to bathe in the Ganges,” which was refused him, though his application was promised to receive subsequent consideration, he threw down his keys and left his service and did not return. It is admitted by the managers of the Elgin Mills, who are complainants in this case, that at the date of his departure from service a sum of Rs. 19 odd was due to him. Upon these facts the prosecution was instituted, as I have already mentioned, under s. 2 of Act XIII of 1859. Upon a consideration of all these circumstances the Magistrate came to the conclusion that the requirements of the statute were satisfied, and that the petitioner had rendered himself liable to its provisions. That order of the Magistrate was upheld by the Judge, and I am invited by this application for revision to say that both orders are bad in law upon two grounds; first, that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to try this complaint by a summary trial; secondly, that even if he had jurisdiction, the facts found did not bring the case within the provisions of Act XIII of 1859. With regard to the first of these points, I have no doubt that the Magistrate had jurisdiction to try the case summarily, and that under the Criminal Procedure Code full power was given him to do so. The second point is not without difficulty. The argument that has been addressed to me in support of it by Mr. Dillon on behalf of the petitioner is to the following effect:—He says, looking to the preamble of Act XIII of 1859, an essential ingredient required to be proved in order to sustain a conviction under s. 2 of that Act is the ingredient of fraud, for in the preamble it is said that the mischief aimed at is fraudulent breach of contract “on the part of artificers, workmen, and labourers, and the object of the Act, the punishment of such “fraudulent breaches of contract.” In support of this view he has no doubt direct authority, in the case of Taradoss [266] Bhattacharjee v. Bhaloo Sheikh and if I could follow that judgment without hesitation, there need be no difficulty in disposing of this case. But with the greatest respect, for the learped Judges who decided that case, it seems to me that they have interpreted this Act mainly, if not entirely, with reference to the language of the preamble, and not in reference to the enacting clauses contained therein, which declare what shall be an offence and what shall be its punishment. There can be no doubt, whether it be the fault of insufficient or ineffective drafting, that the preambles to statutes do not always cover in the wide and general terms in which they are necessarily couched, all the specific offences which are to be found provided for within the enacting portions of the statute itself. I understand it to be an undoubted rule of construction that where the language of the enacting sections of a statute is clear, the terms of a preamble cannot be called in aid to restrict their operation, or to cut them down. The purpose for which a preamble is framed to a statute is to indicate what in general terms was the object of the Legislature in passing the Act, but it may well happen that these general terms will not indicate or cover all the mischief which in the enacting portions J of the Act itself are found to be provided for. For example, a striking illustration is referred to by Sir Peter Maxwell in his work on the Interpretation of Statutes, in which he refers to the statutes 4 and 5 Ph and M. c. 8 in which the preamble spoke only of the Act being directed to the abduction of heiresses and other girls with fortunes, yet the body of the Act was applicable to and made penal the abduction of all girls under sixteen years of age. Many other illustrations are given by Sir Peter Maxwell in his book at page 58 et seq., which go to support the principle I have stated. It is true that in this Act XIII of 1859 the preamble does speak of fraudulent breaches of contract and punishment therefor; but when I come to look into the section which invests a Magistrate with powers under the Act to deal with the persons brought before him, I find that the element he is to look for as going to constitute the offence under s. 2, is the wilful and [267] without lawful and reasonable excuse, neglecting or refusing to perform the contract entered into by the persons whom the Act concerns. There is no mention in that section of the word “fraudulent,” and in my opinion it is legislating and not interpreting an Act of the Legislature to read that word into the section. Consequently, I am of opinion that this conviction was a right one, because upon the facts found there was most undoubtedly a wilful, and without lawful and reasonable excuse, neglect and refusal to perform the contract of service which the petitioner had entered into. I need not point cut the importance of statutory provisions of this kind, and their being enforced in large commercial centres like Cawnpore where, by combined action on the part of persons employed in large commercial establishments there, the proprietors of those establishments might be placed not only at very grave and sudden inconvenience but very serious pecuniary loss. This application is refused.
Application rejected.