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  • art. 91 of the Limitation Act.
  • art. 129 of Act IX of 1871,
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  • art. 91 of the Limitation Act.
  • art. 129 of Act IX of 1871,

    Hasan Ali v. Nazo

    Straight, J.:— The following are the facts necessary to be stated in order to make the grounds upon which this second appeal will be disposed of intelligible.

    [457] There were two brothers from whom the parties to the present suit come, as the subjoined tree shows:—

    The plaintiff Sadruddin is a transferee from Hasan Ali under a deed of sale of the 29th September, 1885. On the 13th October, 1875, Sadullah made a gift of the property now in suit to his two daughters, the defendants, and on the 10th June, 1885, he died. The present suit was instituted on the 15th February, 1886, for a declaration of the plaintiff Hasan Ali's right by inheritance under the Muhammadan Law to one seham out of the three sehams into which the estate of Sadullah was divisible on his death, by declaring the deed of gift of the 13th October, 1875, ineffectual on the ground that it was obtained from Sadullah by the defendants “when he was very old and out of his senses.” The first Court dismissed the plaintiffs' suit, holding them to have failed to establish their case upon all points. The lower appellate Court, though apparently finding that the deed of gift was perfected by possession given and taken thereunder, has upheld that decision upon the ground that the suit, being one for the invalidation of the deed of gift, is barred by art. 91 of the Limitation Act. The decree of the learned Subordinate Judge is assailed in second appeal upon this contention, that the suit being really one for the recovery of possession of immoveable property by declaration of the right of inheritance thereto of the plaintiff Hasan Ali, is governed by the twelve years' rule. I have very fully and carefully considered the arguments addressed to us at the hearing of the appeal, and in the result the matter appears to me to present itself thus. It is not denied that the property now in suit belonged to Sadullah Khan, and that so long as he lived it was competent for him to dispose of it by way of gift; in other words, he was the full and absolute owner and, as such, entitled to deal with it in that way. It is equally [458] clear that had he been induced by fraud, misrepresentation, undue influence or coercion to execute a deed of gift, he could have come into Court to avoid it upon that ground. But he did not do so, and as far as I understand the Muhammadan Law, his gift of his property to his two daughters was as effectual and binding against him from the time it was made, as if he had sold the property covered by it to a stranger vendee for good consideration. Then the question arises, could the plaintiff, Hasan Ali, have come into Court in the lifetime of Sadullah, his uncle, and asked for a declaration that the deed of gift was invalid upon the ground now asserted by him? I am clearly of opinion that he could not, and I think such a suit would have been open to that objection in limine, that his expectant right as a possible heir of his uncle, should he survive him, was, to use the words of my brother Mahmood in a judgment of his as Judge of Rae Bareli, approved by the Lords of the Privy Council in Abdul Wahid Khan v. Nuran Bibee—“a mere possibility which, under the Muhammadan Law, is not regarded as a present or vested interest.” In other words, if I understand the Muhammadan Law aright, it does not recognise any reversionary inheritance or contingent interest expectant on the death of another, and till that death occurs which by force of that law gives birth to the right as heir in the person entitled to it according to the rule of succession, he possesses no right at all. Consequently until his uncle Sadullah died, Hasan Ali had no right present or expectant, which, had he predeceased Sadullah, would, supposing him (Hasan Ali), to have had a son, have passed to such son. It seems to my mind therefore to follow that Sadullah having full disposing power over his property to the date of his death, and such death being the crucial point, the right which then accrued to Hasan Ali came to him through Sadullah subject to and affected by any act done or disposition made by Sadullah in the exercise of his undoubted rights as proprietor. No doubt had a will been then put forward by the defendants to justify their possession of the whole estate by way of bequest from Sidullah, he could have withheld his consent to it with the results provided by the Muhammadan Law, because he had then [459] acquired his right as heir. But it is to be observed that the principle underlying this rule is that it is only on the death of the testator that the right of the heir to assent or refuse assent to the bequests of a will comes into existence, and no assent given in the lifetime of the testator has any force or binding effect. But in the present case we have not to deal with a will, but a deed of gift made by the proprietor of an estate nearly ten years before his death, and neither revoked nor sought to be set aside by him. If Sadullah were alive now, and had come into Court with a suit to set aside his deed of gift, it cannot be denied that lie would have been barred by the limitation of art. 91 of the Limitation Act. How then is the position of the plaintiff Hasan Ali better than that of the person through whom he claims? As I have before remarked, had Sadullah sold the property in suit to a purchaser for good consideration, such sale could not be impeached by Hasan Ali; for it; was fully within his uncle's powers, and the title the vendee acquired against Sadullah would hold as good against him. The deed of gift of October, 1875, in my opinion does not stand upon an inferior footing, and as it was binding on Sadullah, so is it binding on the plaintiff Hasan Ali. But it is said, this being a suit for the recovery of immoveable property by right of inheritance, the prayer for invalidation of the deed of gift is merely ancillary and incidental to the main purpose of the suit, and cannot: affect the substantive relief sought. And the same contention was raised in Jagadamba Chaodhrain v. Dakhina Mohun with regard to art. 129 of Act IX of 1871, which was a suit by reversionary heirs for possession of immoveable property in which the validity of the adoption of the defendants in possession came into question. Their Lordships held that in suits governed by that Limitation Act, where the plaintiff cannot succeed without displacing an apparent adoption under which defendants are in possession, must be brought within twelve years from the date of the adoption, or (at the option of the plaintiff) the date of the death of the adoptive father. In the present case it seems equally clear to me that the plaintiffs cannot dislodge the defendants [460] from the property, of which they are admittedly in possession without clearing out of their way the deed of gift of October, 1875, and that merely because they choose to call the suit one for possession of immoveable property, they cannot escape the obligation to do so. If then this be the true view of the matter, and the prayer to set aside the deed of gift is to be regarded as a substantial incident of their claim, what is the article of the limitation law applicable to such a suit? It is not denied that almost from the date of the deed of gift Hasan Ali was aware of its existence, and that had he possessed any right to maintain a suit for its cancelment, “the facts entitling him to have it cancelled or set aside” were known to him much more than three years before the present suit was instituted, and he is now barred. But as I have already ruled, he had no such right, and the grounds upon which he seeks relief from the deed are grounds which can only come to the plaintiff Hasan Ali through Sadullah. As time had run against Sadullah, so in my opinion it has run as against the plaintiffs, and the Subordinate Judge rightly held them barred by art. 91. The appeal is dismissed with costs.

    Brodhurst, J.:— I concur.

    Appeal dismissed.

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    Hasan Ali v. Nazo
    (Mar 21, 1889)