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  • s. 42 of the Specific Relief Act,
  • s. 113 of the Land Revenue Act.
  • s. 113 of Act XIX of 1873,
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  • s. 42 of the Specific Relief Act,
  • s. 113 of the Land Revenue Act.
  • s. 113 of Act XIX of 1873,
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Sir John Edge, C.J. and Knox, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant (plaintiff below) brought a suit for a declaration of his right to partition. His father had earlier obtained a decree for partition in 1860 against persons whose representatives are the defendants to the present suit. The plaint alleged that the 1860 decree was never carried into effect and that the defendants grouped as No. 2 conspired to prevent the plaintiff obtaining his full share, colluding to obtain an order for the partition of mauza Rekua contrary to the plaintiff's rights. The plaint further alleged that the defendants induced patwaris to record separate possession for villages that were joint.

Some defendants admitted the plaintiff's right to partition in their written statements; others disputed it. The defendants grouped as No. 2 pleaded that the claim was bad under s. 42 of the Specific Relief Act and barred by s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and alleged that the whole ilaka had been privately partitioned in 1841 and that their ancestor and they had proprietary and exclusive possession.

The Subordinate Judge dismissed the plaintiff's claim on two principal grounds: (1) that s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure applied, and (2) limitation. He also apparently held that a partition made by the Revenue Court could not be interfered with by a Civil Court. The appellate court considered these points and other matters; the Subordinate Judge's decree was ultimately set aside and the cause remanded for trial under s. 562 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a Civil Court can entertain a suit to declare a right to partition where a Revenue Officer (Collector) has made a partition decision without proceeding in the manner specified by s. 113 of the Land Revenue Act (Act XIX of 1873).
  2. Whether the decree for partition obtained in 1860 operates as res judicata so as to bar the present suit or any defence that could or should have been set up at that date.
  3. Whether s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure (bar to certain suits) applies to the plaintiff's claim.
  4. Whether the suit is barred by limitation in the light of the earlier proceedings and the 1860 decree.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Plaintiff's) Allegations and Contentions

  • The 1860 decree for partition was never carried into effect and no partition took place pursuant to that decree.
  • The defendants (grouped as No. 2) conspired and colluded to prevent the plaintiff obtaining his full share and obtained a partition order for mauza Rekua contrary to the plaintiff's rights.
  • The defendants caused patwaris to record separate possession in respect of villages that were joint, thereby prejudicing the plaintiff's rights.
  • The plaintiff sought a declaration of his right to partition when that right was being or had been challenged.

Respondents' (Defendants') Allegations and Contentions

  • The defendants grouped as No. 2 alleged that the plaintiff's claim was bad under s. 42 of the Specific Relief Act and barred by s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • They alleged that in 1841 the whole ilaka had been privately partitioned (an allegation that, if true, would have been a defence in 1860).
  • They further alleged proprietary and exclusive possession by their ancestor and themselves (i.e., adverse possession or exclusive possession).
  • Some defendants admitted the plaintiff's right to partition while others disputed it.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Muhammad Abdul Karim v. Muhammad Shadi Khan Consideration of the jurisdiction of the Collector in partition matters and the limits of his authority. The court cited it in support of the proposition that the Collector's decision, made without proceeding under s. 113, does not prevent the Civil Court from declaring the plaintiff's legal right; the Collector is not a court of competent jurisdiction on title unless he proceeds as provided in s. 113.
Kishan Singh v. Dabeer Singh Partition made by the Revenue Court could not be enforced on a decree which, by reason of lapse of time, had become inoperative. The court observed that this case decided only that a Revenue Court partition could not be enforced where a decree had become inoperative by lapse of time; it does not support broader reliance by the Subordinate Judge.
Doobee Singh v. Jowkee Ram Permitted a party with a prior decree for possession to maintain a suit for partition and separate possession where, since the first decree, they had been in possession of the undivided share. The court noted this decision to some extent supports the plaintiff's contention that a subsequent suit for partition may be maintainable in circumstances like the present.
Yaqoob Ali v. Khajeh Ubdoolrahman (Not explicitly stated by the Subordinate Judge as applicable in this matter.) The appellate court held that the Subordinate Judge had misunderstood this authority and that it had no application to the present case.
Sheikh Golam Hoosein v. Musumai Alia Rukhee Beebee (Not explicitly stated by the Subordinate Judge as applicable in this matter.) The court observed that this authority, like Yaqoob Ali, was misunderstood or not applicable to support the Subordinate Judge's view.
Jagat Singh v. Durjan Lal (General bearing on questions of partition and related jurisdictional/limitation issues.) The court stated that this case has some bearing on the questions dealt with by the Subordinate Judge, though the opinion does not elaborate the precise application.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded to analyse the principal questions raised by the Subordinate Judge's dismissal of the plaintiff's suit.

1. Jurisdiction of Revenue Officer (Collector) and the Civil Court's Competence:

  • The court explained that under s. 113 of Act XIX of 1873 (Land Revenue Act) a Revenue Officer (Collector/Assistant Collector) faced with a question of title in a partition proceeding had two courses: (a) refuse to proceed with partition until a competent court decided the question of title, or (b) inquire into the merits of the objection himself. If he chose the latter, he was bound to make the necessary inquiry, take evidence, and record proceedings declaring the interests, following the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure for trial of original suits; with the parties' consent he could refer questions to arbitration.
  • When the Collector proceeds in accordance with s. 113 and gives a decision, that decision is, under s. 114, a decision of a Court of Civil Jurisdiction and is open to appeal to the District Court or the High Court.
  • In the present matter the Collector adopted neither statutory course. Instead, he made some inquiry from the Settlement Department, concluded (whether on his own inquiry or not was unknown) that Ganeshpur was of imperfect pattidari tenure, and proceeded to partition on that basis. The court regarded this as a decision on a question of title made without following the s. 113 procedure.
  • Consequently, the Collector's action did not render the Civil Court incompetent to decide the plaintiff's legal right, because the Collector had not acted as a court of competent jurisdiction under the prescribed statutory procedure. The decision of the Collector, made outside s. 113 procedure, could not disentitle the plaintiff from seeking a Civil Court declaration. Moreover, because the plaintiff had no appeal available against the Collector's course, the plaintiff was entitled, under the circumstances, to maintain the Civil suit to have his legal right declared.

2. Res Judicata and the Effect of the 1860 Decree:

  • The court accepted that the 1860 decree operates as res judicata for any claim or defence that was set up or should have been set up at that date. For example, a defence asserting a private partition prior to 1860 (the allegation in paragraph 3 of the defendants' written statement regarding partition in 1248 Fasli) would have been open in the 1860 suit, and therefore is no longer available.
  • However, the court emphasised that the 1860 decree cannot operate as res judicata concerning rights acquired after 1860. Rights such as adverse possession acquired since 1860 or a subsequent partition where no question of title was raised could be shown by defendants in the present suit.
  • The court explained that where a decree declaring a right to partition has not been carried into effect, it is competent for interested parties to bring another suit for declaration of the right to partition if their right is challenged at a time when the prior decree cannot be put into effect (e.g., by reason of limitation or other disability). Thus, suits for declaration of right to partition differ from many other suits because the right to partition continues so long as the property remains jointly held.
  • Put plainly, if a person having a right to partition wishes to partition and that right is challenged, he can maintain a suit for declaration so long as the prior decree is not still enforceable.

3. Application of s. 13 Civil Procedure Code:

  • The court concluded that if the plaintiff had pleaded the 1860 decree and shown continuance of the state of things since 1860 and that the defendants resisted his right to partition, such a claim would not properly have been barred by s. 13 CPC. The present claim, though not in that exact form, was in effect such a claim.
  • Therefore the Subordinate Judge erred in applying s. 13 to dismiss the suit at an interlocutory stage without trying the substantive issues.

4. Limitation:

  • The Subordinate Judge held the suit barred by limitation on the basis that defendants in the 1860 suit had denied the plaintiff's right and set up adverse possession. The appellate court observed that those issues were decided by the decree in 1860 adversely to the defendants; on that basis the question of limitation did not arise in the manner suggested by the Subordinate Judge.
  • The court acknowledged that questions of limitation might arise from circumstances subsequent to 1860 and that such questions may have to be decided at trial, but the present record did not furnish the materials to express an opinion on those possible questions.

5. On the Subordinate Judge's Reliance on Authorities: The court reviewed the authorities relied upon by the Subordinate Judge and found that some were either inapposite or misapplied. It referred specifically to Kishan Singh v. Dabeer Singh, Doobee Singh v. Jowkee Ram, Yaqoob Ali v. Khajeh Ubdoolrahman, Sheikh Golam Hoosein v. Musumai Alia Rukhee Beebee, and Jagat Singh v. Durjan Lal and explained their limited or differing relevance.

Conclusion of Reasoning: Because the Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit on preliminary points (s. 13 and limitation) without trying the merits, and because the Collector's action did not preclude a Civil Court determination, the appellate court set aside the decree and remanded the case for trial on the merits and on the points of law that genuinely arise.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appellate court set aside the Subordinate Judge's decree and, under s. 562 of the Code of Civil Procedure, remanded the cause for trial on the merits and on such points of law as really arise. Cause remanded.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The plaintiff's suit is restored for a full trial; the Subordinate Judge's summary dismissal on the preliminary points of s. 13 CPC and limitation is reversed and the matter must be tried on merits and any bona fide limitation questions arising from post-1860 circumstances.
  • The court held that a Collector's partition decision made without following the procedure of s. 113 of the Land Revenue Act does not bar the Civil Court from determining title; where the Collector did not act as a court of competent jurisdiction under the statute, the Civil Court may declare legal rights.
  • Res judicata: The 1860 decree bars matters which were or should have been litigated in 1860, but it does not bar rights or matters acquired after 1860 (for example, adverse possession obtained since then), which may be raised in the present suit.
  • Costs: The costs of the appeal and of the proceedings hitherto will abide the result of the trial on remand.
Cause remanded.

Note: This summary is confined strictly to matters explicitly stated in the provided opinion. No information has been added beyond the text of the opinion.

    Nasrat-Ullah v. Mujib-Ullah

    [311] Sir John Edge, C.J and Knox, J.:— The appellant here was the plaintiff below. All the defendants below were respondents here. The group of the defendants below No. 2 are represented here by Mr. Banerji and Mr. Mehdi Hasan. The other defendants-respondents have not appeared here and have not been represented. The suit was brought to obtain a declaration of the plaintiff's right to partition. His father had, in 1860, obtained a decree for partition against the persons whose representatives the defendants to this suit are. According to the plaint, that decree for partition of 1860 was never carried into effect, and no partition took place. Whether that is true or not we need not now decide. The plaint further alleges that the defendants grouped as No. 2 conspired to prevent the plaintiff getting his full share, and, having colluded together, obtained an order for the partition of mauza Rekua in a manner contrary to his rights. The plaint also alleges, amongst other things, that the defendants caused the patwaris in the villages to record separate possession in respect of the joint villages. Some of the defendants admitted in their written statements the plaintiff's right to the partition, others disputed it. The defendants grouped as No. 2 alleged that the claim was bad under s. 42 of the Specific Relief Act, and was barred by s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure. They alleged that in 1841, that is, long prior to the decree of 1860, the whole ilaka was privately partitioned. They further alleged, in paragraph 4, that their ancestor in his lifetime and they were in proprietary and exclusive possession. There are other allegations which it is not necessary to allude to now. The Subordinate Judge tried this case. He dismissed the plaintiff's claim on two main grounds. The first main ground being that s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure applied, the other main ground being limitation. He also apparently held that a partition which was made by the Revenue Court could not be interfered with by a Civil Court. To deal with the last point first.—A question of title was raised by the plaintiff in a partition proceeding before a Revenue Officer. That Revenue Officer had two courses open to him. Under s. 113 of Act XIX of 1873, be could have refused to proceed with the partition until the question of title and proprietary right which was [312] in dispute between the parties had been decided by a competent Court, or he could have proceeded to enquire into the merits of the objection as to title. In the latter case he was bound himself to make the necessary inquiry, to take such evidence as might be produced, and to record a proceeding declaring the nature and extent of the interest of the parties applying for the partition and of any other party or parties that might he affected thereby. The procedure he was bound to follow in the latter case was the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure for the trial of original suits. He might, with the consent of the parties, refer any question arising in such a case to arbitration. If he had proceeded to inquire into the merits of the objection in accordance with s. 113, his decision, when given, would, under s. 114, have been a decision of a Court of Civil Jurisdiction and would be open to appeal to the District Court or the High Court, as the case might be. Now the Collector adopted neither of those courses. He made some inquiry from the Settlement Department, and on the result of that inquiry, whether conducted by him or not we do not know, he came to the conclusion that the village he was dealing with, namely, Ganeshpur, was one of imperfect pattidari tenure and he proceeded to partition the village on that basis. We need not inquire at present whether the village was in fact one of imperfect pattidari tenure or not. That is a question yet to be decided in this suit. The plaintiff alleged that the village was one of pure zamindari tenure. Coming to the conclusion at which he arrived, the Collector really was deciding a question of title. Mr. Banerji has contended that the Civil Court has no power to interfere in a case of a partition. The Civil Court is a Court of competent jurisdiction to decide questions of title. The Collector or Assistant Collector is not a Court of competent jurisdiction to decide questions of title unless he proceeds in the manner specified in s. 113 of the Land Revenue Act. In the case of Muhammad Abdul Karim v. Muhammad Shadi Khan(1) the question of the jurisdiction of the Collector in such matters was considered. The decision of the Collector under the [313] above circumstances cannot disentitle the plaintiff to have his legal right declared in the Civil Court. The course adopted by the Collector precluded the plaintiff from questioning his decision by appeal to the District Judge or to this Court. That remedy not having been open to the plaintiff, be is entitled, under the circumstances, to maintain this suit and have his legal right declared. The next question is as to whether s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies in this case. Undoubtedly the decree of 1860 operates as res judicata to any claim or defence that was set up, or should have been set up, at that date, as for instance the allegation in the third paragraph of the written statement of the group of defendants No. 2, namely. “In 1248 Fasli the whole of the ilaka was divided privately by the ancestors of the parties and from the date of the; partition each party has held proprietary possession of the entire divided villages Ganeshpur, Eekua and Aspur without the interference of any other.” That defence is not now open to the defendants. If that were a true statement of fact, it would, in the suit of 1860, have afforded grounds of defence. Whether it were then made or not is immaterial. To put it more plainly, the decree of 1860 settled the rights of the parties as they were at that date and cannot now be questioned. But that decree cannot operate as res judicata on any question arising as to rights of the parties acquired since that date. As for instance the defendants would be entitled to show that since that date they had obtained adverse possession, or that there was a partition in which no question of title was raised or other similar defences. It appears to us that when a decree declaring a right to partition has not been given effect to by the parties proceeding to partition in accordance with it is competent for the parties or any of them, if they still continue to be interested in the joint property, to bring another suit for a declaration of a right to a partition in case their right to partition is called in question at a time when, by reason of limitation or otherwise, they cannot put into effect the decree first obtained. In this respect suits for declaration of right to partition differ from most other suits. So long as the property is jointly held so long does a right to partition continue. When a person having a right [314] to partition and desiring to partition has his right challenged, it appears to us he can maintain a suit for a declaration, provided his prior decree is not still enforceable. In the partition suit questions have arisen which could not have been determined in the suit which ended in the decree of 1860. The Subordinate Judge relied on certain decisions to which he refers in his judgment. On the question of res judicata it appears to us those authorities either do not apply or do not support the view which he adopted. The first of those in order of date is Kishan Singh v. Dabeer Singh. All that case decided was that a partition in the Revenue Court could not be enforced on a decree which by reason of lapse of time had become inoperative. The next case is Doobee Singh v. Jowkee Ram(2).

    That case to some extent supports the contention of the plaintiff here. There the Court decided that, notwithstanding that the plaintiffs had obtained a prior decree for possession, they would be entitled to maintain a suit for partition and separate possession, if since the date of the first decree they had been in possession of the undivided half share by that decree decreed to them. The next case was Yaqoob Ali v. Khajeh Ubdoolrahman(3). That case the Subordinate Judge has misunderstood. It has no application. The same observation may be made as to the fourth case relied on by him, namely, the case of Sheikh Golam Hoosein v. Musumai Alia Rukhee Beebee(4). In the course of argument we have been referred to the case of Jagat Singh v. Durjan Lal(5) which has some bearing on the questions dealt with by the Subordinate Judge. We have no doubt that if the plaintiff had drawn his plaint alleging the decree of 1860, and showing how be and the defendants were bound by it, that is, that they were representatives of the parties to it, and alleging that the state of things of 1860 continued up to the present, and alleging that the defendants or some of them resisted his right of partition, and asked for a declaration of his right to partition, that would be a claim to which even this Subordinate Judge would not have applied s. 13 of the Code [315] of Civil Procedure. The present claim is in effect such a claim as I have referred to, although not so in form. The last point we need refer to is that of limitation. The Subordinate Judge held that this suit was barred by limitation, because the defendants in the suit of 1860 had denied the plaintiff's right of partition and set up an adverse possession. He overlooked the fact that those issues were decided by the decree in that suit adversely to the defendants there. The question of limitation does not arise on the point suggested by the Subordinate Judge. It may be that some question of limitation arises from circumstances subsequent to 1860 and may have to be decided in this suit. We have not got the materials before us to express any opinion as to whether a question of limitation does arise. The Subordinate Judge in truth did not try the rest of the case, but be disposed of it on those preliminary points to which we have referred. That being so, we set aside his decree, and, under s. 562 of the Code of Civil Procedure, remand the case for trial on the merits and on such points of law as really arise. The costs here and hitherto will abide the result.

    Cause remanded.

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    Nasrat-Ullah v. Mujib-Ullah
    (Feb 3, 1891)