This case has been argued before us at considerable length, although the question which requires our determination seems simple enough.
The first question is whether the covenant, which the lower Appellate Court considered to be binding between the parties, and upon the basis of which the learned Judge in the Court below decreed the Plaintiffs' suit, was a personal one between the purchaser from whom the Defendants other than Defendant No. 1 inherited 1 And, secondly, whether if it was intended to bind his representatives and persons deriving their title under him, it would be binding in law?
The Munsif was of opinion that the covenant was void, upon the authority of the case of Tripura Sundari v. Juggur Nath Dutt(1). The Subordinate Judge, however, was of opinion that the decision cited by the Munsif was based on what seemed to him to be the English law on the subject, and he considered that the present case should be decided upon Indian laws, as contained in the Specific Relief Act and the Transfer of Property Act; and he thought there was nothing in those Acts to invalidate the contract.
The pleader for the Defendant, Appellant, has contended, in the first place, that the covenant was purely a personal covenant, and, therefore, could not bind the heirs of the person covenanting. He also urged that even assuming that it was intended to make it binding upon the heirs of the original convenantor, it would be void in law; and, in support of this contention, he relied chiefly upon the case of London and South Western Railway Co. v. Gomm(2) in which the Court of Appeal, proceeding upon the principle generally applicable to these cases, held, with reference to a contract to re purchase by the Plaintiff Company, that inasmuch as the covenant was not limited to any specific period, it was void for remoteness. The Master of the Rolls, in discussing the validity of the contract, pointed out that there was a restriction upon the alienation of the lands which were conveyed to the Defendant, and that although in equity covenants of a restricted character, which imposed any burden upon the purchaser, in regard to the mode of enjoyment of the land, was enforceable in law, a covenant which violated the rule against remoteness should not be enforced.
Lord Justice Lindley puts it still more clearly. He says, in answer to the question, upon what principle was it that a purchaser was bound in equity, “It is said that he is bound in equity because he bought the land knowing of the covenant into which his predecessor in title had entered. That proposition, stated generally, assumes that every purchaser of land, with notice of covenants into which his vendor has entered with reference to the land, is bound in equity by all those covenants:” and, when discussing the cases on which reliance was placed, he says that this covenant, which created an interest in favour of the Defendant, was void for remoteness. This case was decided in 1882. In 1875, however, Mr. Justice Markby, in the case of Tripura Sundari v. Jugger Nath Dutt held in, a case which was absolutely analogous to the present, that a covenant of this character was not binding upon the widow of the original covenantor, as she was not a party to the covenant, and he farther observed;—“if we hold that she was bound by it, we must then hold that every person to whom the land may pass by inheritance will also be bound by it. But that would be to create a perpetual covenant, as to the disposition of the land, for which we have not been shown any precedent.” He relied upon the case of Stocker v. Dean(3), which case also appears to us to be on all fours with the present.
In the case of Trevelyan v. Trevelyan(4), Vice-Chancellor Bruce, following the case of London and South Western Railway Co. v. Gomm, was of opinion that a covenant of this character, which bound the covenantor to convey the property to the vendor, without any definite limit as to the period of time, within which the covenant was to have effect, could not be enforced. In that case the covenant expressly went on to include the representatives and assigns of the covenantor; and yet the learned Judge held, upon the authority of Gomm's case, that it was invalid for remoteness.
On the other side it has been contended, upon the authority of various cases, first, that it was not a personal covenant; and, secondly, that it was a covenant running with the land and binding upon all persons succeeding to the property, either by inheritance or deriving title from him or from his heirs. With reference to the authorities upon which this contention is based, it is enough to say that most of the cases are between the lessor and lessee, imposing upon him restrictions either in the enjoyment of the property demised, or upon its assignor. The only case of an out and out sale was the case of Stocker, referred to in Gomm's case, which was explained by the learned Judges in the Court of Appeal. It appears that the principle of that case must be so restricted as to limit the enjoyment of the land assigned, but not to impose a limit upon the power of alienation which extends beyond any definite period, and which contravenes the doctrine of remoteness. It is not necessary to refer to the other cases cited before us, because they do not seem to have any bearing upon the facts of the present case.
It has been said that these principles of English law ought not to be applied to such cases in India; and the learned Judge in the Court below has further held that the principle which has been laid down by Mr. Justice Markby in the case referred to above was not applicable to India.
The principles embodied in the various Indian Statutes, save and except those of a special character, such as the Bengal Tenancy Act, have been founded upon the general principles of the English law; and when cases arise here involving such principles, it has always been the practice to refer, in deciding cases in this Court, to cases decided in the English Courts to discover how the law is construed there. Mr. Justice Markby's judgment was passed in 1875, long before Gomm's case, which was decided in 1882, and, therefore, Mr. Justice Markby could not possibly have referred to that case; or else that learned Judge would have been in a position more fully to explain the principles he laid down in the case before him.
It seems to us, therefore, that the view taken by the lower Court upon the questions that have been argued before us, namely, in the first place, that the contract was of a purely personal character, and, in the second place, that even if it was intended to bind his representatives, and persons deriving their title under him, it would not be binding in law was not correct.
We accordingly decree this appeal, set aside the decree of the lower Appellate Court, and dismiss the Plaintiffs' suit with costs in the Courts.
S.C.S
Appeal allowed.