The facts of this case are as follows:— The Petitioner before us was the Plaintiff in a suit in which the complainant was the Defendant, and it has been found by the Courts below that, in the plaint, the complainant was described by a wantonly offensive and defamatory designation. The Petitioner has, on that account, been convicted under sec. 500, I.P.C, and has been sentenced to a fine out of which compensation has been awarded to the complainant.
The present rule was granted simply on one point of law, viz., whether the defamatory matter was privileged merely by reason of its finding place in a plaint. It has been held by the Bombay High Court in the case of Nathji Muleshvar v. Lalbhai Ravidat that no action for slander lies for any statement in the pleadings or during the conduct of a suit against a party or witness in it. That ruling has, however, been considered and expressly dissented from by this Court in the case of Angoda Ram Shaha v. Nemai Chand Shaha. We think that we must follow that ruling. It has been sought to impress upon us that it was erroneous on the ground that there is, in principle, no difference between the case of a witness giving evidence in a suit, who is admittedly privileged, and a party making a statement in the pleadings and it has been urged that the whole principle on which that case was decided was unsound. We are unable to take that view and, in particular, it seems to us that there is a very obvious distinction between the case of a witness who is bound by law to say all that he knows on a particular subject, even though the consequence may be that his evidence will include defamatory matter, and a party conveying a perfectly unwarrantable and irrelevant insult in his plaint against the opposite party, as in this case.
It has been stated by the learned pleader for the Petitioner as an argument in favour of the privilege of parties that, in this country, the pleadings in a civil suit habitually contain defamatory matter. All that we have to say on this point is that, if that is so, it is time that the practice was checked and we cannot regard it as affording a reason for declaring parties privileged to indulge in a practice as we are asked to do. The rule is discharged.
H.P.C
Rule discharged.